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**IDEOLOGY OF REVOLUTION: A NORMATIVE STUDY OF THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION IN IRAN**

Howard University

PH.D. 1986

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**IDEOLOGY OF REVOLUTION:
A NORMATIVE STUDY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF**

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

AUGUST 1986

By

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In the Name of God The Beneficent, The Merciful

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ABSTRACT

The Islamic Revolution in Iran is one of the greatest world events in the second half of the twentieth century. The whole phenomenon of the Revolution and its implications are of great interest. One of the interesting and important aspects of the Revolution worth studying is its ideology. It is important not only for understanding the Revolution itself, but also for putting the developments in Iran after the Revolution in proper perspective. More important, however, is the potential role of Iran's revolutionary ideology in bringing about revolutionary changes in other "Third World" countries--especially in the Muslim ones.

In the literature on the Iranian Revolution, there is no systematic effort to analyze and understand the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Moreover, when the authors focus on religion as the ideology of revolution in Iran, they limit themselves to Shiism--as if the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran did not have much relevance to Islam and Muslims as a whole. The present study is an attempt to remove the above shortcomings in the literature. Thus, the main purpose of this dissertation is (1) to go to the basic sources of Islam to find out if they provide an ideology of revolution, and (2) to understand the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

To approach the phenomenon of revolution from the point of view of its ideology, a conceptual framework--a model--is needed. Thus,

the study constructs a model of revolutionary ideology which has nine components, that is, capacities which all revolutionary ideologies possess to varying degrees. They are: (1) introduction of political consciousness; (2) criticism and delegitimization of the existing social, political, and economic arrangements; (3) a new set of values; (4) an outline of the desired society; (5) a program of action for bringing about revolutionary changes; (6) a call for commitment to action and self-confidence; (7) a call for self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience; (8) simplification of the revolutionary message; and (9) claim to truth and rationality.

Chapter three of the dissertation studies the Holy Quran within the framework of the proposed model of revolutionary ideology. Chapters four to nine study some major work of six prominent Iranian revolutionary leaders within the framework of the model. The leaders are (1) Imam Khomeini, (2) Ayatullah Taleqani, (3) Ayatullah Muntaziri, (4) Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, (5) Dr. Ali Shariati, and (6) Abul-Hasan Bani-Sadr. Chapter ten presents a summary of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran as well as some comparison among the contributions of the revolutionary leaders. It also compares the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran to the ideology of revolution found in the Quran.

The dissertation also includes a review of literature on the Iranian Revolution, a brief historical review of different concepts of "ideology," and a survey of the major theories of revolution with a focus on their views on the role of ideology in revolution.

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PREFACE

Praise be to God Who created man in the "best of moulds" and appointed him His Khalifa (viceregent and representative) on earth. To achieve his high status, He entrusted man with freedom of choice. Out of His boundless Mercy, He sent Messengers to each nation to guide the people to the "Right Path." When man distorted His Message, He continued sending new Messengers until humanity reached the level of socio-historical evolution to preserve His Guidance in its original form.

Peace and blessings be on God's Messengers--including Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad--who brought about great revolutions in human history. They not only delivered God's Guidance to mankind, but also waged relentless struggles against oppression, exploitation, arrogance and corruption and for establishment of moral and just societies. And may God be pleased with His righteous servants who strive to move in the path of the Messengers and struggle for the cause of truth, justice and liberty.

Separation of religion from politics and "liberation" of science and knowledge from the influence of religion are considered two great achievements of modern times. Thus, for western scholarship it is surprising to mix religion with politics or let religious faith interfere with scientific inquiry. From an Islamic point of view, however, the dichotomies do not make sense. This is not the place to expound on the subject. A few words are in order, however, to put this study in proper perspective.

According to Islam, God appointed man His viceregent and representative on earth. This means that God endowed man with great potentialities and granted him the capability to actualize them. In order for man to develop those potentialities, he should live in the right environment--like a seed that must be placed in proper conditions to grow into a tree and bear fruit. The society where man would have the opportunity to become God's Khalifa is a moral and just society. Therefore, it is the duty of Muslims to strive for establishment and maintenance of such a society. Thus, in Islam politics lies at the heart of religion.

In regard to science, according to the Holy Quran, the whole universe including the heavenly bodies, nature, the natural phenomena, human societies, and human history are "Signs" of God. It is man's duty to observe them keenly, contemplate on his observations, and try to understand their nature and how they function. The Quran goes to the extent that it tells mankind, "Travel through the earth and see how God did originate creation" (29:20). Thus, Islam does not consider science as a rival to religion. God's Holy Book, the Quran, does not introduce itself as a book of science or history or prophecies. It introduces itself as a "Book of Guidance." This means that religion provides direction and commitment. Any endeavor which increases man's knowledge and understanding of God's creation and contributes to man's intellectual and physical development are sacred and acts of worship. Only when scientific discoveries lead to man's arrogance and transgression, are they considered evil by Islam.

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem. "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, You Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect and the admiration and love your people give to you."¹

This is what Carter had to say to the Shah of Iran on the Eve of 1978. A year later waves of revolution were raging all over Iran. Millions of those who used to give all "the respect and the admiration and love" to the Shah were shouting death to him and were toppling his statues. The Shah was planning to go into exile to save his life and the Carter administration was wholeheartedly supporting his decision. Two years later the revolutionary government was in full control in Iran; the Shah could not find a place to live in the whole world; and the Carter administration suffered the humiliation of its diplomats being taken hostage in Tehran and its not being able to do any thing about it.

The Iranian Revolution did not surprise only Carter. It took the whole world by surprise. When Carter was uttering those words, the Shah's regime seemed one of the most stable governments in the "Third World." Economically, Iran had one of the highest growth rates in the world. Enormous oil revenues financed not only the Shah's military procurements, but also his "development" programs. Moreover, billions of dollars of foreign investment were pouring

into the country. Politically, the Shah seemed to have curbed all opposition to his regime. His dreadful SAVAK, trained and equipped by the CIA, seemed to have penetrated all strata of the Iranian society and removed any kind of opposition to the regime by bribery, threat, and imprisonments. The Shah seemed so sure of himself that at the suggestion of the American government he started encouraging limited political freedom. Militarily, Iran had one of the largest and the best-equipped military forces in the "Third World." The loyalty of the military to the Shah was beyond any doubt.

In spite of all this, an incident that happened on January 8, 1978,² soon became a revolutionary avalanche which swept all over the country. "Never before in the history of Iran has there been a situation like [this]. Never before in the development of any popular and revolutionary movement has there been such a high percentage of the population actually involved in street demonstrations and uprising as [there were in the months of September and October 1978] in Iran. As many as 10 to 15 million people [were] in the streets against the Shah's regime."³

Iran's Revolution is not only important for the Iranian people--because of ending their exploitation and oppression--but it has a worldwide importance. Under the Shah's regime Iran was part of the capitalist imperialist system. While itself a periphery of the United States, Iran had become a "center" in the Middle East and South Asia. Iran was the "gendarme" of the Persian Gulf. Iran was part of the "free world" for transnational corporations. It provided highly generous tax exemptions and other incentives for foreign investors. The Iranian Revolution is the first successful attempt by

a major "Third World" country to break the dependency chain of the capitalist imperialist system while also avoiding becoming a victim of "social imperialism." What is more important is that Iran can become an example for other "Third World" countries, especially for the Muslim ones.

The whole phenomenon of the Revolution and its implications are of great interest. But obviously it is not possible to cover all aspects of the Revolution in a single study. One of the interesting and important aspects of the Revolution that is worth studying is its ideology. "Liberalism" was the ideology of the "American Revolution," the French Revolution, and many other revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries. "Socialism" was the ideology of the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution and several other revolutions in the 20th century. But neither was the ideology of the Iranian Revolution. What was, then, the ideology of the Iranian Revolution and how does it compare with liberalism and socialism?

The importance of the Iranian revolutionary ideology becomes more clear when we realize that the role it played in "making" the Revolution has made some scholars of revolution look at the role of ideology more seriously. For example, Theda Skocpol—who has made an indepth study of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions⁴--confesses that: "This remarkable revolution forces me to deepen my understanding of the possible role of idea systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action."⁵

Can Iran's revolutionary ideology play a similar role in other Muslim countries? This question becomes more interesting when we notice the panic that the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran

has created in the oppressive governments of the Muslim countries not only in the region but as far away as Indonesia and Tunisia. These governments are afraid of the "export of revolution" to their countries. To be sure, Iran's revolutionary leaders call their Revolution "the Revolution of the oppressed" and speak of the export of the Revolution. But they emphasize the point that they do not mean exporting it by force--and probably they do not have the means to do so either. What they mean is metaphorically expressed in the phrase: "like the breeze of the Spring dawn." "Spring" symbolizes the coming of a new era, and "dawn" means the passage of darkness and night. According to the phrase, the "breeze" of revolution will gently touch the bodies and souls of the sleepy masses and wake them up. What can this "breeze" be but the ideology of the Revolution?

The picture that the western mass media draw of the ideology of the Revolution and the contradicting levels of significance they attach to its role in bringing about revolutions in other countries make the study of the subject even more important. The media portray the ideology of the Islamic Revolution--what they call "Islamic fundamentalism"--as "Ayatollah-ism" (meaning dictatorship of the clergy); "turning back to the seventh century;" and "a revolt against modernity [and] doing away with such things as parliaments, courts, and liberated women."⁶ It should be noted that this picture was drawn before the developments in Iran which followed the success of the Revolution. The above quotations were written just after the fall of the Shah, some even before his departure from Iran. After the success of the Revolution, the same broad picture was painted; and the more the interests of the capitalist system

were damaged by the Revolution, the thicker got the lines and the deeper got the colors.

Regarding the role of the ideology of the Revolution in causing revolutions in other Muslim countries, two contradicting views have been expressed in the media. According to some commentators: "Virtually every conflict in the Muslim world for the last three years ... has had an ideological connection to Iran's revolution. This is a startling trend, so disturbing to Middle Eastern governments that few even discuss it openly for fear of accelerating it."⁷ And another expert considers "Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalism" as "one of the most important, and less comprehended, political epidemics of our time."⁸ According to some other "experts," however, "despite the current show of strength in Iran and other countries, it is wrong to think of Islam as an irresistible force. On the contrary, ... Islam is bound to playing an adversary role in national and international politics. It cannot lead regions or countries which, for all the pain involved, irreversibly embark on the road to development."⁹ And others believe that "Iran's Islamic revolution will not be exported ideologically."¹⁰ It seems that both of these views--as well as the picture drawn of the ideology of the Revolution--reflect the anxieties and uncertainties of the West vis a vis the Islamic Revolution. One view stems from the fears and worries that the Islamic Revolution might damage the interests of the capitalist system even more than what it has done so far; and the other view is a response to those fears and worries, trying to comfort them.

Is the ideology of the Islamic Revolution what the western mass media make us believe it is? And if it is not that, then what is it? Is it really the ideology of the "oppressed" as claimed by the Iranian leaders? What are its potentialities? What role can it play in liberating the "Third World" countries--especially the Muslim ones--from the claws of the western and eastern imperialists and their "bridgeheads"? What lessons can other oppressed people learn from the Iranian Revolution? In order to be able to answer these questions, we must try to understand the ideology of the Islamic Revolution. That is the aim of this study.

At the outset, however, it is important to review the literature on the Islamic Revolution in Iran to see what kind of question it deals with, and whether it covers the subject matter of this dissertation.

2. The Literature on the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The purpose of this review is not to present a critique of the books and article written about the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It is intended, rather, to survey the literature, to find out what kind of work has been done, and to determine how this study can contribute to the on going discussion on the subject.

Generally the works on the Iranian Revolution can be categorized into three groups: (1) works of a journalistic nature, mostly descriptive without much analysis and/or a central these, (2) works concerned with the socio-cultural (other than religion), economic and political conditions before the Revolution, and (3) works

concerned with the role of religion in the Iranian society and the Revolution.

a. Journalistic and descriptive works: With the sudden triumph of the revolutionary movement over the Shah's regime, the world was taken by surprise. There was a great need for some literature to make some sense of what had happened in Iran. To answer this need, a number of books and special issues of some journals were published in 1979-1980. Most of these works did not have enough time to do a thorough analysis of any aspect of the Revolution. Thus, they tended to be descriptive and journalistic. A number of other works which had been prepared earlier and were ready for publication at the time of the Revolution added one or two chapters and changed their titles so that they reflect the new developments. Thus, in spite of their titles, they have not much to say about the Revolution or the fall of the Shah.

Probably the first book about the Revolution that was published in English is Iran Erupts: Independence, News and Analysis of the Iranian National Movement. It was edited by Ali-Reza Nobari and published in 1978. It consists of "a selection of newspaper articles, reports, editorials, and interviews, especially those from Le Mond, which appeared in 1978."¹¹

Another early collection of essays and articles is the book Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution edited by David H. Albert.¹² The editor is sympathetic to the Revolution and the articles he has collected--most of which were already published in some journals and magazines--shed some light on the

history of Iran, its relations to the West, the social conditions under the Shah and immediately after the Revolution, and the events during the Revolution. None, however, presents a serious analysis of any aspect of the Revolution.

The books by Hoveyda, Zabih, Stemple, Carlson and Heikal are also mostly descriptive. In his book, The Fall of the Shah, Fereydoun Hoveyda--the brother of Iran's former Prime Minister--is chiefly concerned with the personality of the Shah and the change in his character in the last years of his reign. In the meantime he tries to acquit his brother from any wrong doing. Sepehr Zabih has written two books about the Revolution: Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretive Essay, and Iran Since the Revolution. More than half of the first book is about the events during the Revolution. Even when he tries to attribute "the revolution to the Shah's inability to allow genuine political participation ... his analysis throughout is even weaker than that of [Hoveyda]."¹³ The second book deals with the post revolutionary developments in Iran upto Spring 1982. John Stemple's book Inside the Iranian Revolution can be described as speculative-descriptive. He makes general statements about the causes of the Revolution (historical-cultural) without substantiating them, and he describes events without documentation. More than two-third of the book deals with the description of the 1978-79 events. Robin Carlsen describes his journey to Iran and his impression of the Revolution (mostly favorable) in his book The Imam and his Islamic Revolution: A Journey into Heaven and Hell. And finally Mohamed Heikal's book

Iran: The Untold Story "is full of insights and persuasive summary assessments about actors and events in recent Iranian politics."¹⁴ It does not provide any analysis, however.

Two books which have little to do with the Revolution in spite of their titles are: The Rise and Fall of the Shah by Amin Saikal, and Fall of the Peacock Throne: the Story of Iran by William Forbis. Saikal's study is mostly concerned with the regional and international policies of the Shah's regime. Domestic policies are discussed only in so far as they relate to foreign policy. This is why, as a reviewer observes, "The final chapter, which attempts to deal with the collapse of the Shah's visions and his flight from the country ... reads like an appended afterthought."¹⁵ William Forbis' book is a total disappointment. "This book has no central theme and with the exception of the title has nothing to do with the political problems which led to the collapse of the Shah's regime."¹⁶ Moreover, it contains stereotypic and offensive descriptions of the Iranian culture and its national character.

Although almost all of the books noted above discuss the US-Iranian relations during the Shah's regime to some extent, there are some books which focus on this subject. In Debacle: the American Failure in Iran by Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, the authors want to explain why the US policy failed in Iran. Thus, the US-Iranian relations and the process of the Revolution are approached from this point of view. What is presented, however, is a shallow analysis without much documentation.

In contrast to the above book, Barry Rubin's book Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran is well-researched and well documented. The author, however, "presents a story of shah's, presidents, generals and diplomats rather than that of the Iranian and American people."¹⁷ In one section of the book, the author tries to explain "the Iranian revolution and its outcomes ... as a combination of ... various factors."¹⁸ But because of his different focus, he fails to discuss any of the factors in detail. His treatment of "Khomeini's opposition ideology" is extremely superficial.

In his article, "Who lost America: the Case of Iran" and in his book The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence, R.K. Ramazani also focuses on US-Iranian relations. He discusses themes of domestic policies and tries to determine the achievements and failures of the US and Iran in those areas.

b. Socio-cultural, economic and political analyses: The pre-revolutionary Iranian society has been the subject of a number of excellent--and some not so excellent--studies. Some of the studies begin their analysis from the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, but the majority concentrate on the three decades before the Revolution. These works can be categorized into three groups: (1) those which were conducted before the Revolution but provide important insights into the conditions which led to the Revolution, (2) those which analyze and describe the conditions in Iran in general terms but with a view to their relations to the Revolution, and (3) those which set forth certain hypotheses about the

Revolution and then try to analyze the situation to substantiate their theses.

(1) The first edition of Fred Halliday's book Iran: Dictatorship and Development was published before the Shah's regime was overthrown. Although its analysis of "the opposition" is very shallow, the book does provide acute insight into the political and economic conditions under the Shah. Especially significant are the chapters on the historical background and general characteristics of the State (from a Marxist point of view) and the discussion of the armed forces and SAVAK. The "Afterword," added to the second edition, presents some theses about the Revolution, but they remain in an outline form.

Robert Graham's Iran: The Illusion of Power concentrates on the study of the Shah's regime between 1973-77. It is an interesting and rather indepth study of the politics of oil in Iran during that period. The last chapter, "Opposition and Revolution," however, is very brief and sketchy.

Two other books--although they focus on a narrow subject--also help us better understand the pre-revolutionary Iranian society. The researches for both books were mainly conducted before the Shah's downfall, but the books were published after the Revolution. They are: Land and Revolution in Iran: 1960-1980 by Eric Hooglund and Poverty and Revolution in Iran by Farhad Kazemi. In a way these two complement each other. Hooglund presents a clear discussion of the land reform programs and a thorough analysis of their effects on the rural society. His analysis raises at least three significant

questions about the Revolution: (1) what were the factors that caused the massive migrations of peasants to the cities which provided enormous manpower to the revolutionary demonstrations, (2) why did the Shah fail to muster rural support while his power was crumbling in the cities, and (3) what role did the the villagers play in the Revolution and how were they affected by it. Kazemi follows the rural migrants into the cities and describes their living conditions there and the process of their involvement in politics and the Revolution.

(2) Two very useful books which provide a general historical background to the Revolution are: Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran by Nikki R. Keddie and Iran between two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian. Both authors synthesize their extensive knowledge of Iran's recent history to provide a background for understanding the Islamic Revolution in Iran. To justify her general historical approach, Keddie argues,

Was this revolution religious, political, social, economic--or what? The only good answer seems to be that it was all of these; as will be discussed in this study, economic, social, and political discontents had developed over decades and coalesced in the past few years, while added to the central Islamic identity felt by the majority of the popular classes were new interpretations of religion that justified revolutionary ideas and became widespread in society.¹⁹

Thus, her historical survey focuses on the "economic, social and political discontents" and the sources of their development which are mostly foreign intervention, the negative impacts of relations with the West, and forced modernization. The book also contains a chapter on "Modern Iranian Political Thought" which will be discussed in the next section. The last chapter, which is on "The

Revolution," covers several broad topics and clearly cannot do justice to any of them.

Abrahamian's book is divided into three parts.

Part I provides a historical background to the understanding of modern Iran, surveying the nineteenth century, the Constitutional Revolution, and the reign of Reza Shah. Part II analyzes the social bases of politics in the period between the fall of Reza Shah's autocracy in August 1941 and the establishment of Muhammad Reza Shah's autocracy in August 1953. ... Finally, part III examines contemporary Iran, describing the socioeconomic programs carried out by Muhammad Reza Shah, the political tensions aggravated by these programs, and eventually the eruption of the recent Islamic Revolution.²⁰

It should be noted that the book puts undue emphasis on the period 1941 to 1953 and especially on the Tudeh Party during that period. As a critic notes, the book "might have been titled 'Political Parties and the Monarchy, 1941-1953.'"²¹ The chapters on "Contemporary Iran" are very brief but they provide some insight into the situation (especially interesting is the discussion on socio-economic classes). The author's thesis--which in a separate article he calls "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution"²²--is worth quoting:

The revolution came because the shah modernized on the socioeconomic level and thus expanded the ranks of the modern middle class and the industrial working class, but failed to modernize on another level--the political level; and that failure inevitably strained the links between the government and the social structure, blocked the channels of communication between the political system and the general population, widened the gap between the ruling circles and the new social forces, and, most serious of all, cut down the few bridges that had in the past connected the political establishment with the traditional social forces, especially with the bazaars and the religious authorities.²³

(3) A number of books and articles are based on specific theories about the phenomenon of revolution in Iran.

(a) Economic Theory: In his book Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution, Robert Loony argues that "the Shah's demise can be traced almost exclusively to a set of economically related factors."²⁴ In his study, he focuses on the goal and strategy of the Shah's development programs and discusses the subject in a highly technical manner within the framework of "conventional economic analysis." In the "Conclusion," he first tries to acquit the Shah and the development planner—including himself who was an "economic advisor" to the Shah's regime as well as to several other "Third World" governments--of any wrong doing and then provides a summary of his findings. Overall, Loony does not try to relate his analysis of Iran's economic situation to the Revolution and leaves it to the reader to find "possible connections between developments in the economy and the deterioration in popular support for the regime."²⁵

(b) The theory of unmet expectations: Another explanation of the Revolution is provided by Narriss Hetherington. In his article "Industrialization and Revolution in Iran: Forced Progress or unmet expectation?" Hetherington contends that

It was not because the Shah's government forced upon people more largesse than they were accustomed to that they rebelled. Rather it was a failure to meet rapidly rising expectations, rational or otherwise, a failure to deliver immediately in full measure or even in partial measure sufficient to encourage realistic hope of progress toward obtaining the material benefits of a modern industrial nation, that contributed to increasing dissatisfaction with the Shah's government and to a climate of a public opinion conducive to revolution.²⁶

To substantiate his contention, he presents some statistics about the level of standard of living in 1960s and 1970s and looks at

"bazaar merchants" and the "emerging professional middle class" and how they felt "cramped." He also provides examples of the incompetence of the Shah's government. Hetherington's discussions are brief but well-researched and well-documented.

(c) The Countermobilization Theory: In his article "Pseudoparticipation and Countermobilization: Roots of the Iranian Revolution" and in his book Revolution in Iran: the Politics of Countermobilization, Jerrold Green studies the Revolution in Iran within the framework of political development theories. Green summarizes his theory in the following words:

Processes of modernization implicitly politicize a population. The denial of political participation to such politicized sectors can lead to popular unrest. This, in its extreme form, may spell revolution and in rare instances countermobilization that is dependent on preexistent leadership, legitimacy, finance, and other infrastructural attributes. In Iran, only the national religious sector could claim these requisite attributes.²⁷

In spite of the important role that religion plays in the "countermobilization," Green does not bother to properly study the subject. He assigns less than four pages to the discussion of "Religion and the Iranian Revolution."²⁸

(d) "Organization theory": In his article "Leadership by distrust: the Shah's Modus operandi," Khosrow Fatemi contends that "it was the sudden disintegration of [the Shah's] system which provided the critical element that enabled the Iranian Revolution to succeed."²⁹ To explain "the sudden disintegration" of the system, he develops "an organizational framework" in which the Shah is located at the center of a highly "centralized and unintegrated system" of government. According to Fatemi, in such a system "any

changes of actors and/or roles assignments will create a disequilibrium and thus make the entire system dysfunctional." This is what happened, according to Fatemi, when the Shah appointed a new cabinet in August 1977:

(e)Communication dualism theory: Majid Tehranian has written a number of articles about the Iranian Revolution in all of which he emphasizes the role of communication dualism. A good representative of his work on the subject is his recent article entitled "Dependency and Communication Dualism in the Third World: With Special Reference to the Case of Iran." According to Tehranian, "In a profound sense, one could say that the upheaval in Iran represented a crisis of communication rooted in political, economic and cultural cleavage between the elite and the mass that had emerged over the last 170 years."³⁰ To substantiate his contention, Tehranian talks about "The cultural and Ideological Cleavage" in Iran, "the process of atomization, bureaucratization and homogenization" and their impact upon the Iranian society, "Dissonance and Dualism in Communication" between secularism and religion, "Themes of Political Communication," and "Competing Communication Systems" which included TV and radio for the secular elite and "small media" for the revolutionaries. The discussions on these topics are extremely brief. For example, "Themes of Political Communication" covers less than one page (the earlier works do not elaborate these subjects either).

c. Works on the role of religion and on religious thought: The role of religion and religious scholars in Iran had been the subject of several very good studies before the Revolution.³¹ After the Revolution, a number of books and articles focused their study on the important role of religion and on the religious thought in Iran. These works can be discussed under three categories: (a) the role of religion, religious scholars and religious institutions in the Revolution, (b) the evolution of the Shia political thought, and (c) the ideas of the leading revolutionary religious thinkers.

Before discussing each category, however, we shall review a book which touches upon several subjects and does not fall under any one of the categories mentioned. The book is The Roots of the Islamic Revolution by Hamid Algar. It contains the text of four lectures by Algar--and the subsequent question and answer discussions--at the Muslim Institute, London in Summer 1979.³² In the first lecture, the author first talks about what he considers as the two main themes of Shiism: "Imamat" (which implies "the rejection of de facto authority") and "martyrdom;" and then he discusses the establishment of Shiism as an official religion in Iran and presents a brief review of State-Shia ulama (scholars) relations from the beginning of the 16th century to the 1960s. The second lecture is on Imam Khomeini. It links the historical discussion of the first chapter to the life and thoughts of Imam Khomeini.³³ According to the author, "Far from being a radical break with the essential and profound developments of the Iranian nation, [the Islamic Revolution] is, on the contrary, a continuation and fruition of long years of

political, spiritual and intellectual development."³⁴ The third lecture is on "Islam as Ideology: the Thought of Ali Shariati." It presents a note on the predecessors of Shariati and a brief sketch of his biography followed by a summary-review of some of his works. The fourth lecture first describes the major events of the Revolution and then draws some conclusions about the nature of the Islamic Revolution and the lessons that other Islamic movements can learn from the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

(1) Role of religion in Iranian politics and Revolution: In her article "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," Theda Skocpol emphasizes the important role of religion in the Revolution in Iran. The article first characterizes the Shah's regime as "a rentier absolutist state" and briefly reviews its "vulnerabilities." Then it looks at "Urban Communities as the Basis for Political Resistance" and notes that "even though the Shah's Crash program did create widespread disruption and discontent, ... disruption and discontent alone do not give people the collective organizational capacities and the autonomous resources that they need to sustain resistance to political and economic powerholders. ... To deal with these issues, we must address the historical and changing place of Shi'a Islamic religious organization and belief in Iranian society and politics."³⁵ Afterwards it mentions "the founding myth of Shi's Islam" and reviews the role of religion and religious scholars during the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties--with especial emphasis on the 1960s and 1970s. The author concludes that "In sum, Shi'a Islam was both organizationally and culturally

crucial to the making of the Iranian Revolution against the Shah."³⁶ It should be noted that Skocpol's discussions are extremely brief and sketchy.

In his article, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran," James Bill also notes the important role of religion in the Iranian Revolution: "The central and pivotal role played by religious leaders and Islamic scholars (ulema) in the revolution cannot be overemphasized. ... While the ulema played a critical organizational role in the movement, Shi'a Islam became the overarching ideology of the revolution."³⁷ The article first takes a look at the historical importance of the "institution of Mujtahid" in Iran and notes that it "has been one of the most democratic and popularistic in the comparative history of religion."³⁸ Then it focuses its attention on the struggle between the Shah and the religious scholars ("Mujtahids") in the 1970s. According to the author, "it was not until the early 1970s that the old balance of tension [between the two forces] was torn."³⁹ The rest of Bill's article--which forms the greater part--deals with post-revolutionary developments, with regretful disregard of pre-revolutionary relevance (especially his discussion on "neo-Shi'ism").

Azar Tabari's article "The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics" tries to explain "the sustained political involvement of the clergy over the past century: its initial prominence, its subsequent ebb and marginalization, and its modern militant revival."⁴⁰ To do so, it first looks at the historical background of "Shi'ism in Iran." Then it talks about the Constitutional

movement and "Emergence of Historical Opposition to the Qajar," as well as "Shi'ite theory of Government and Constitutionalism." While discussing "Reza Shah's Reforms and the conflict with Clergy," the author talks in some details about the book Kashf al Asrar (The Discovery of Secrets) written by Imam Khomeini in 1944. Imam Khomeini's and other religious scholars' activities against the Shah are the subject of the last section of the article. Throughout the article, Tabari emphasizes the importance of socio-economic forces for the political activities of the ulama.

William Floor's article "The Revolutionary Character of the Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality?" focuses on the ulama's political activities in the early 1960s. Floor quotes Hamid Algar's assertion that "autocratic rule and violation of the constitution; the proposal to grant capitulatory rights to American advisors ... and relations with Israel" were the real targets of Imam Khomeini's criticism in 1963. Floor undertakes to "present an alternative explanation and note the conservative issues for which most of the ulama agitated."⁴¹ To do so, he first notes Ayatullah Burujardi's quietism in the 1950s and then his opposition to the Shah's land reform program in 1960 which "brought about the end of an effective dialogue between the regime and the clergy."⁴² The chain of events that followed Ayatullah Burujardi's letter of opposition to the land reform upto Imam Khomeini's exile in 1964 form the bulk of the article. In most part, Floor is successful in providing evidence to support his view about the conservative-reformist nature of the

demands by most of the ulama. He fails, however, to repudiate Algar's observation about Imam Khomeini.

In his article, "The Ideology and Praxis of Shi'ism in the Iranian Revolution," Shahrough Akhavi contends that the Shah's regime was overthrown because "In an area of the world where the religious basis of political legitimacy is of central importance, the Pahlavi state so excluded Shi'ism that it failed to gain religiously sanctioned moral acceptance. Nor did the regime come remotely close to meshing its corporate structure with the salvationist yearnings of Shi'its--especially the petit bourgeoisie and those at the bottom of the economic pyramid."⁴³ Central to Akhavi's argument is his characterization of the Shah's regime as "corporatism." Thus, the first part of the article focuses on the "Structure of Pahlavi Corporatism" and "The Shi'a Doctrine of Authority and the State." The rest of the article deals with post-revolutionary developments.

Akhavi has also written a book on Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period. It consists of seven chapters. The first three chapters discuss historical developments in Shia and Sunni political thought up to the early 20th century, "Clergy-State relations before 1941," and "Revival of ulama Influence and Clergy Alignment: 1941-1958." Chapter four is on "Ulama-State Confrontation and the defeat of the Clergy, 1959-1963." Unlike William Floor, Akhavi does not lump all the ulama together. Rather, according to him, "The pattern of ulama behavior at this time enables one to suggest the existence of a

number of factions in their midst."⁴⁴ He distinguishes "the 'radical' faction"--led by Imam Khomeini--from "social reformers," "the 'conservative' wing of ulama," and "the faction of ulama that was willing to cooperate with the Court." In chapter five, the views of a number of Iranian scholars--including Murtaza Mutahhari and Ali Shariati--on religious reform are discussed. It also talks about attempts by the Shah's regime in the early 1970s to extend its control over the religious affairs and "to destroy the influence of Ayatullah ... Khomeini."⁴⁵ The next chapter briefly surveys "The Clergy's Politics in the Mid-Sixties to late Seventies" and reviews Imam Khomeini's book The Islamic Government and a revolutionary manifesto. Chapter seven presents the "Conclusion."

Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution by Michael Fischer is another book on the role of religion in the Iranian society. Like Akhavi's book, the original research for the book "was conducted in Iran during 1975 as part of the Islam and social Change Project of the University of Chicago."⁴⁶ Thus, except for the last chapter, the book is not directly concerned with the Revolution. It consists of six chapters. The first chapter presents some observations on "Culture, History, and Politics." The three subsequent chapters focus on madrasa (traditional religious school) system in Iran. Chapter five is entitled "Discourse and Memes: Shi'ism in Everyday Life." It talks about "Sufism, self-Development, and the Upper-Class Idioms" and well as "Social Utopia and the Religion of the Ulama." In a section of the chapter, the discussion moves from a speech by Ayatullah Milani in 1975 to some ulama in the early twentieth

century, then to a mixture of Imam Khomeini's 1943 book and a rawda (preachment) by someone in 1975, then to Imam Khomeini's Islamic Government of 1971, and finally to Dr. Shariati's ideas. Clearly none receives a systematic analysis. In the last chapter, the author talks about "The Revolutionary Movement of 1977-1979." He views "[t]he crucial fourteen months of 1977-1979 ... as a social drama or a successful passion play" which witnesses a shift in paradigm. According to Fischer,

Two important ideological shifts occurred in the course of the revolution. First, it became practical to stress that the Karbala paradigm is not a passive weeping for Husayn but rather an active fighting for Husayn's ideals, and it is not merely a personal and individual commitment but a social one. Second, after the removal of the shah there was a shift from Husayn as a symbol of protest against tyranny to Ali as the symbol of constructive government and Muhammad as a symbol of universalism.⁴⁷

(2) Evolution of Shia political thought: Nikki Keddie's article "Religion, Society, and Revolution in Modern Iran" presents probably the best summary of the historical background of various developments that contributed to the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The main concern of the article, however, is "the evolution of Twelver [Shia] political doctrine." According to Keddie, "Sociopolitical factors alone cannot account for the ulama's political successes and influence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; without the prior development towards a doctrine that gave the ulama political and moral claims against the government, it is hard to imagine the string of political successes scored by the Iranian ulama."⁴⁸ Thus, she reviews the political doctrine of the Twelver branch of Shiism from the time of the Twelfth Imam's occultation to 1980. Her conclusion is stated as the following:

The earliest Shi'i politico-religious sects were predominantly messianic and totalistic--expecting their leader to establish the kingdom of God on earth. The Shi'i line that became the Twelvers became increasingly politically quiet and accepting the established rulers, a process forwarded by the development of a theory of occultation, which removed Imam from earthly activity. ... While acceptance of rulers remained the predominant trend through and beyond the Safavid dynasty, there also developed new claims that the mujtahids had a superior right to rule, although a king might be needed to act on their advice in many worldly and military matters. Such theories helped support the oppositional movements from 1891 to 1911, and again in 1924 and the 1950s. Only in the 1960s did a leading ayatullah put forth the idea that Islam was fundamentally opposed to monarchy, and that the ulama should rule directly.⁴⁹

Keddie discusses the evolution of the Shia political doctrine in her paper "Is Shi'ism Revolutionary?" as well. Most of the themes of this paper are covered in the above article. It presents, however, some new interesting points about early revolutionary Shia sects. The author notes, for example,

Both Qarmatian states [in Bahrain and Swad] aided the poor and avoided extreme of poverty and wealth. The Bahrain state intervened in the economy to encourage production and owned or controlled some key parts of the economy, while the Swad community for a time abolished private property and at all times was able to get popular support via donations to its treasury. ... Even when the will to be revolutionary and egalitarian continued beyond the initial revolt, socioeconomic circumstances were not ripe to uphold these small states against the major ones that surrounded them.⁵⁰

Her answer to the question posed by the title of her paper is: "Shi'ism, owing to its rebellious origins, provided special elements for revolutionary synthesis, but like many religions can as well be adopted to conservative causes."⁵¹

In her article "Tradition and Change in Iranian Socio-Religious Thought," Mangol Bayat-Philipp contends that by advancing revolutionary ideologies, Dr. Ali Shariati and other "lay ideologist ... are in fact upholding a centuries-long tradition of dissent in

Shi'i thought against the established orthodoxy."⁶² Thus, she first reviews "Dissent in Traditional Shi'i Thought" and then the nineteenth century "Religious Reforms" and "Secular Reforms." Under the section "Twentieth Century Political Activism" she talks about Kesravi (anti-Shia political writer of the 1920s and 1930s), Jalal Al-e Ahmad (prominent writer of the 1950s and 1960s) and Dr. Ali Shariati. From her study she concludes that,

Imami Shi'ism, which has dominated Iranian thought for so many centuries, has proved to be an important vehicle for intellectual continuity and change. In a remarkable fashion ... it has accommodated the 'stifling narrowmindedness' of the official religion. ... Dissent in Iranian intellectual history almost always expressed itself in terms and fashion relevant to the sociopolitical situation of the age. ... In the twentieth century, as the Pahlavi regime harshly and rapidly implemented modernizing and secularizing policies, opposition reverted to traditionalist, religious, Shi'i rhetoric. ... The Iranian intellectuals have been able to play a dominant role as effective opinion makers and ideologists, yet, in the absence of organized political parties, their political action could not succeed without the support of the organized ulama leadership.⁵³

As the above quotations shows, Bayat-Philipp demonstrates a complete lack of knowledge of Imam Khomeini's and other ulama's thoughts and actions in the above mentioned article. She considers "Khomeini as a symbolic figure of Shi'ism" and dismisses him by alleging that, "The intellectual leadership of the political and ideological battle against the regime is not provided by the ulama themselves, though Khomeini, Shariatmadari and their colleagues are giving the movement an essential religious legitimacy, but by lay ideologists of whom Ali Shariati (d. 1977) is the most influential."⁵⁴ In a later article, "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern," however, she tries to correct

the situation and asserts that, "The revolution, when it came in the late fall of 1978, was Khomeini's. But he did not make it single-handedly. He inherited and made use of the reformers' groundbreaking tools and ideas, which he supplemented with his won ideologized and politically assertive interpretation of Shi's doctrines and traditions."⁵⁵ The bulk of the second article is on "Khomeini's Revolutionary Theory of the 'Governance of the Jurist'." The author tries to compare Imam Khomeini's views to "the classical doctrine," and in many cases she finds "a radical departure from traditional shi'a views." In some cases she notes the similarity of Imam Khomeini's ideas to the Sunni views. And in some other cases she traces his ideas to "the Muslim philosophers and mystics." She concludes from her study that

Khomeini's 'Governance of the Jurist' threatens the very foundation of Twelver Shi'a Islam as expounded by the sixth Imam. ... To confer doctrinal legitimacy to Khomeini's theory of government necessitates a thorough reformulation of the doctrine of Imamatus agreed upon by all the principal leaders of Shi'a Islam, and an official definition of 'righteous' government in the absence of the Imam. ... Will Khomeini succeed where centuries long Shi'a juridical tradition has failed?⁵⁷

The historical background of Imam Khomeini's thought on "Governance of the Jurist" is also the subject of Norman Calder's article "Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khomeini and the Classical Tradition." According to Calder, although for Shi's ulama the actual government after the occultation of the last Imam was always de jure illegitimate, "[t]he most practically relevant areas of juristic speculation lay not in the presentation of an ideal government by the faqih [jurist] but in the various efforts at accommodation. ... The principle of de jure illegitimacy

did not prevent the emergence of a spectrum of de facto approaches to political power."⁵⁸ In his discussions of Imam Khomeini's "Governance of the Jurist," Calder tries to show that "The underlying appeal of the [arguments], notwithstanding [their] juristic or logical appearance ... is emotional and apocalyptic."⁵⁹ From his study the author concludes that:

Khumayni's success as a revolutionary leader was due largely to his ability to exploit the revolutionary implication of the Imami Shi'i juristic tradition in a manner not obviously inconsistent with earlier developments. ... The Imami juristic tradition had for centuries preserved and propagated an idea of legitimate authority as belonging ultimately to fuqaha. ... The revolutionary interpretation of the Imami tradition was based on the isolation of the notion of divine law and shar'i government from a self-established context of accommodation. Divine law, Islamic government and the clerical ruler became disembodied ideals functioning as apocalyptic symbols of a new just and well ordered system.⁶⁰

In her article "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," Mary Hegland approaches the change in Shiism from a socio-anthropological point of view (similar to that of Fischer). According to her, "The success of the revolution followed a transformation in the understanding of the central meaning of Shi'i Islam among the Iranian masses."⁶¹ She considers "the martyrdom of Imam Husain "as the central event or myth" of Shia Islam and calls the two "opposing ideologies" which are both based upon it as: "Imam Husain as Intercessor" and "Imam Husain as Example." The first ideology leads to "political accommodation" because in "this view of Islam, a main focus of the believer is concern for himself and his own interests and problems."⁶² The second ideology is "the ideology of self-reliance and resistance to unjust authority," which was, according to the

author, "popularized in large part by the teachings of Dr. Ali Shariati."⁶³ She does not study the teachings of Shariati, however. Rather, she studies the change of ideology at the village level and tries to link it to socioeconomic changes in the 1960s. The author sums up her conclusions as the following:

Rational reevaluation, embedded in ideology, of real political, economic, and social conditions, not an unreflective emotional attachment to traditional rituals, was instrumental in pulling a people together to revolt. For assessing the world and individual attitudes toward it, Shi'i thought provides two central possibilities. Both of them are closely related to Imam Husain's martyrdom. ... Overall social oppression as well as change of economic and social relations in the village itself have favored a weakening of the traditional Husain as Intercessor ideology. The revolutionary version of the concept of Husain transformed the Shi'i masses perception of their religion, and, for many caused a revival of their Islamic heritage and identity. ... ⁶⁴

Hamid Enayat's book Modern Ismaic Political Thought: The Response of the Shi'i and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century has a broader scope than the evolution of the Shia political thought, but it does cover that subject.

The book starts with an introduction outlining the way in which the traditional heritage has impinged on the development of modern thought. ... This is followed by a study of the political differences between the two main schools or sects in Islam--Shi'ism and Sunnism, and especially on the twofold process of conflict and concord between the two. The main intension is to show that the relationship between the two has been slowly changing in recent times, at least in the realm of political doctrines, from confrontation to cross-sectarian fertilization.⁶⁵

The last chapter of the book is on "Aspects of Shi'i Modernism." It discusses the evolution of Shia thought on three important subjects: "Constitutionalism," "Taqiyyah" (dissimulation or expedient concealment), and "Martyrdom." According to the author,

These do not represent three disjoined, random categories of thought. Chronologically, it was constitutionalism which brought the Shi'is, for the first time in their history, face to face with democratic demands of the modern world. ... A heightened political atmosphere in Iran since the end of the nineteenth century, combined with the pressure of having to answer Sunni criticism of Shi'ism ... as well as the rivalry of growing popular secular ideologies, both forced and helped a number of Shi'is to rethink the traditional attitude on the second and third themes. The outcome of this rethinking has undoubtedly changed some of the political features of Shi'ism ...--turning it from an elitist, esoteric and passive sect into a mass movement animated by democratic ideals, and contempt for innate privilege. It is a rethinking which has greatly diminished Shi'i differences with Sunnis.⁶⁶

(3) Ideas of the leading religious thinkers: The thoughts of Imam Khomeini and Dr. Shariati have been the subject of a number of studies. The works of Ayatullah Taleqani, Abul-Hasan Bani-Sadr, and some other writers have also received some attention in the literature. Most of the studies, however, present a review or criticism rather than a systematic analysis.

In his article on "Contemporary Shi'i Thought"--presented as a portion of a chapter in Keddie's Roots of Revolution--Yann Richard briefly reviews the lives and works of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Imam Khomeini, Ayatullah Shariatmadari, Ayatullah Taleqani, Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, Ali Shariati, and Abul-Hasan Bani-Sadr. Obviously it is not possible to review the lives and thoughts of so many prominent scholars and writers in any detail in a single article. Thus, both biographies and reviews of writings and speeches remain sketchy. For example, the review of Imam Khomeini's Islamic Government covers less than one page.

In contrast to the above article, the focus of Adele Ferdows' paper on "Shariati and Khomeini on Women" is narrow. The paper is

short, however, and does not provide a detailed analysis. Ferdows is critical of both Dr. Shariati and Imam Khomeini. According to her, "Shariati raises the issue of women's role but does not address it. Khomeini's position on women's rights is much clearer. He represents the conservative traditionalist school of Shi'i fiqh and hadith transmitted by clerics before him for centuries."⁶⁷

The article "Shi'ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies" by David Menashri is mainly a study of Ayatullah Shariatmadari's political views. The ideas of Imam Khomeini are discussed only when they are compared to those of Shariatmadari. The author talks about "ideological differences" between Ayatullah Shariatmadari and Imam Khomeini on the character of the Islamic government, involvement of ulama in politics, the fate of the monarchy, "approaches to democracy," and "Iranian Nationalism versus Pan-Islamism."

Amir Ferdows' article "Khomeini and Fadayan's Society and Politics" presents a comparison of the ideas of Imam Khomeini and those of Fadayan-e Islam--mid 20th century religio-political activists. The points of comparison are on the ideal "Islamic Society," "Politics," "Justice," "Economics," "Education and Modernization," and "Women." Ferdows finds minor differences but great similarities between the thoughts of Imam Khomeini and Fadayan on these points. His discussion of the subjects, however, is very brief. It is not certain whether Imam Khomeini and the Fadayan do not have much to say on those subjects or space limitations prevent the author from presenting a detailed discussion.

George Rose's article "Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini" focuses on two subjects. First, it presents a rather detailed "historical excursus" into the concept of "Governance of the Jurist" and make some observations on Imam Khomeini's view on the concept. Secondly, it discusses Imam Khomeini's thought on "The Recovery of Islamic Identity." In relations to the second point, the author emphasizes Imam Khomeini's condemnation of "Westoxication" and his call for implementation of Sharia (Divine Law) as well as his call for a return to faith which "for Khomeini entails revolutionary activity."⁶⁸

"Shariati's Social Thought" is supposed to be the subject of an article by Shahrough Akhavi. The article, however, focuses on Shariati's ideas on the "Nature of Reality," "Theory of Knowledge," and "Philosophy of History;" and only towards the end talks about Shariati's notion of "Political Community and Authority." Even the last section does not do justice to Shariati's social thought. Instead of providing an analysis of his ideas on the concepts of ummat (Islamic community) and Imamat (leadership), the author chooses to focus on what he considers Shariati's pro-"enlightened thinker" and anti-clergy position.

Mangol Bayat-Philipp's article "Shi'ism in Contemporary Iranian Politics: The Case of Ali Shariati" provides a better understanding of Dr. Shariati's social thought. Its focus, however, is different. According to the author, she is not concerned with "the value of [Shariati's] message, but rather [with] diagnosing a present

religio-political phenomenon of which he is so much a part."⁶⁹

That "religio-political phenomenon" is the fact that

The present religious revivalism among lay writers ... which expresses a profound disillusion and disenchantment with the West, is championed by men who have gone to Western-type, if not Western, schools. Their whole mental formation is consequently much more secularized than their predecessors. It is therefore inevitable that their understanding and interpretation of their native culture would bear the mark of the West.⁷⁰

Abdulaziz Sachedina's article "Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution" is another study of Shariati's thought. The article focuses on two topics: "Man and Society," and "Shariati and the Religious Leadership." Under the first topic Shariati's views on man's nature according to Islam, the concept of Tawhid (Oneness, Unity, Monotheism), the principle of ijtihad (independent reasoning on religious teachings) and its role in an Islamic society, and the notion of society according to Islam are discussed. Under the second topic, the author looks at the reaction of some religious scholars to Shariati's teachings and then discusses Shariati's criticism of the religious leadership of the time and his view on a truly Islamic scholar and his important role in bringing about changes in society.

The economic thoughts of Abul-Hasan Bani-Sadr and Sayyed Muhammad Baqr Sadr are the subject of the article "Shi'ism and Islamic Economics: Baqr Sadr and Bani Sadr" by Homa Katouzian. The article studies two major books by Sadr and Bani-Sadr in order to find their views on "Property and Property Ownership," "Production, Distribution, and Exchange," "Riba, Interest, and Money," and "The Islamic State." The author's approach, however, is more critical (and sometimes just for the sake of criticism without much

justification) than analytic (for the sake of a better understanding).

3. Outline of the Chapters. As the above survey of literature indicates, although many of the studies noted above provide acute insights into some aspects of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the work done so far is far from being comprehensive.⁷¹ In regard to the ideology of the Revolution at least two shortcomings can be noted:

(1) When the authors focus on religion as the ideology of revolution in Iran, they limit themselves to Shiism. Every one seems to agree with Skocpol's observation that, "As a religious world-view, Shi'a Islam arguably has especially salient symbolic resources to justify resistance against unjust authority, and to legitimate religious leaders as competitors to the state."⁷² If this is the case and the ideology of revolution is limited to Shia Islam, then the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its ideology would not have much relevance and significance to the overwhelming majority of Muslims in other parts of the world who are not Shias. To my knowledge, there is no attempt to study the original sources which form the basis of both Shia and Sunni branches of Islam to see if they could provide an ideology of revolution.

(2) In the literature reviewed above, there is no systematic effort to study the works of the leaders of the Revolution from the point of view of their contribution to the ideology of revolution. As David Albert notes, "[various] factors may explain misery,

oppression, and degradation, but they do not explain the creation of hope, faith, patience, or fortitude, the stuff of which revolutions are made."⁷³ These phenomena and the whole value system that comes along with the revolution are part of the ideology of revolution. Ideologies can be studied in at least two ways: 1) by survey research of the public opinion, and 2) by an analysis of the works of the leaders. To my knowledge, there has been no attempt to study the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran through either of these methods.

In this study I will try to remove these shortcomings at least to some extent. Thus, the main purpose of the dissertation will be to understand the ideology of the Islamic Revolution. To "understand" the ideology of the Revolution means finding out the ideas, values and beliefs that moved people to take action against the Shah and to work for establishment of an Islamic regime. To approach the phenomenon of the Revolution from this point of view, a conceptual framework--a model--is needed. Before constructing the model, however, we need to define ideology and revolution and note the important role of ideology in revolution by a review of the theories of revolution. These will be covered in the second chapter.

The third chapter of the dissertation will be on Islam and revolution. This will be an attempt to find out if the original sources of Islam--i.e., the Holy Quran and the tradition of the Prophet--can provide the basis for creating an ideology of revolution. Because of the reasons mentioned above, I will try to approach these sources particularly from a Sunni perspective. It

would also be desirable to discuss the conditions under which such an ideology could be popularized among the masses and could lead to revolution, but that would entail a comprehensive study of the history of Islam and Islamic revolutionary movements. Such a study, however, is far beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Chapters four to nine will be an attempt to understand the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran by an analysis of the writings, speeches, and messages of the Islamic revolutionary leaders within the proposed conceptual framework. In view of the lack of any systematic study of the ideology of the Revolution in Iran and the difficulty of conducting survey research of public opinion in the country, this seems the only viable method. I will divide the leadership into two groups: (1) the ulama (religious scholars) revolutionary leaders, and (2) the "intellectual" revolutionary leaders. I will select the three most prominent leaders in each group, and then select the three most important and influential works or speeches of each leader for the analysis.

Chapter ten will present a summary of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran as well as some comparison among the works of the Iranian revolutionary leaders.

It should be noted that the emphasis on the ideology of revolution in this study does not mean that ideology was the only factor that caused the Revolution in Iran and that the economic, political, and social factors were unimportant. Rather, I tend to agree with the view that the causes of social events are too numerous to be covered in a single study. Ideology seems to have

been a leading factor in the Revolution in Iran, but possibly other factors were equally important. The study of the special social, economic, and political conditions within which the revolutionary ideology operated can be the subject of another dissertation. Some of the works noted in the above review of literature, however, already provide important clues on these conditions. To keep the study manageable, I will not deal with this issue in this study.

Chapter II

IDEOLOGY, REVOLUTION, AND REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY

In this chapter I will first present a brief historical review of the uses of the term "ideology" in the literature and mention the definition I adopt in this study. Then I will present a survey of the theories of revolution and will discuss the role of ideology in revolution from the point of view of each theory. Afterwards I will describe what "model" is and will present a model of revolutionary ideology.

1. A Historical Review of the Uses of "Ideology". Ideology has many different meanings. Some of the dictionary definitions of the term are the following:

Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd edition, 1948) gives the following definition of ideology: "1. the science of ideas; 2. the integrated assertions, theories, and aims constituting a political social program, often with an implication of factitious propagandizing."

Webster's New World Dictionary (1971) presents the following definition: "1. the study of ideas, their nature and course; 2. thinking of an idealistic, abstract or impractical nature; 3. the doctrines, opinions, or way of thinking of an individual, class, etc."

Standard College Dictionary (1963) defines ideology as the following: "1. the ideas and manner of thinking characteristic of an

individual or group; especially, the ideas and objectives that influence a whole group or natural culture, shaping especially their political and social procedure. 2. The science that treats of the origin, evolution, and expression of human ideas. 3. Fanciful or visionary speculation."

Although these dictionary definitions are somewhat different from the scholarly definitions of the term ideology, they show the confusing state of affairs and the fact that the term has been used in many different ways. A comprehensive study of the concept is beyond the scope of this dissertation. A brief historical review of the uses of the term will somewhat clarify the confusing situation, however.

a. Ideology as science of ideas: There seems a general agreement that the term ideology was first used by a group of French intellectuals called "ideologues" in the late 18th century. Destutt De Tracy, a prominent member of the group, has been credited as coining the term. For De Tracy and other French ideologues ideology had a positive connotation and meant "the study of the origin of our ideas about the world in sense experience."¹ They contrasted this new science of ideas with old metaphysics and considered it as "the answer to the unscientific past. ... The new science of ideas was intended to be the bases of an entirely new society and economic order."² To achieve this aim, the ideologues "designed a program of popular education to underpin the progressive achievements of post-revolutionary government in the way that the teachings of Roman Catholic church had, in their view, underpinned the repressive

institutions of the ancien regime."³ At the beginning the ideologues were able to win the favor and support of Napoleon for their programs, and he became an honorary member of their National Institute. But later he decided to restore the influence of the Catholic Church. Therefore, he "dismissed the ideologues as annoying, tiresome theorists."⁴ In his attack on the ideologues, Napoleon gave a derogatory connotation to the term "ideology."

b. Ideology as false consciousness and apology: Although De Tracy coined the term ideology, it is due to Marx's use of the word that it found its way into scholarly discussions and popular usage. Most of the writers on the subject of ideology--Marxist and non Marxists--believe that for Marx ideology meant false or distorted consciousness. H.M. Ducker, however, distinguishes two different meanings in Marx's concept of ideology: "When Marx says of a theory that it is ideological, he is commenting on either (a) the 'false consciousness' which has led the author of the theory to speak in this mistaken way, or (b) the way the theory functions--or is supposed by its author to function--to serve the interests of the class."⁵ The bourgeois ideology, which stems from its material existence, becomes the dominant ideology of the society because the bourgeoisie controls the "means of mental production" as well as the means of material production.

It should be noted that from the reading of The German Ideology Marx seems to denote the whole superstructure of the society as ideological. This has led many scholars to conclude that: "What [Marx and Engels] ... call 'ideology' include not only the theory of

knowledge and politics, but also metaphysics, ethics, religion, and indeed any 'form of consciousness' which expresses the basic attitude or commitments of a social class."⁶ According to Jorge Larraín, however, since The German Ideology was written in a period when Marx was undergoing changes in his intellectual evolution, there are ambiguities in the book and it does not represent his scientific achievements. He holds the view that: "ideology for Marx, as a distorted consciousness, has a particular negative connotation whose two specific and connected features are, firstly, that it conceals social contradictions and, secondly, that it does it in the interest of the dominant class. Hence, ideology is a restricted kind of distortion. ... Non-ideological consciousness can still be erroneous for reasons other than the concealment of contradictions in the interest of the dominant class. ... These two meanings should not be confused."⁷

c. Ideology as class world view: According to H.M. Drucker there are two types of Marxists: (1) "Philosophical"--such as Marcuse, Shlomo Avineri, and George Linchtleim--and (2) "Political"--such as Deutcher and Lenin. For the first group ideology means false consciousness--as discussed above. "Political Marxists," however, "are inclined to emphasize the function of ideas, especially the enemy's ideas, in a class struggle."⁸ For them, therefore, ideology refers to the world view of a class. In this sense, they not only speak of "bourgeois ideology" but also of "proletarian ideology" or "socialist ideology;" because in their political struggle against the bourgeoisie, they criticize its ideology from the point of view

of the proletariat, and this critique itself is considered as ideological. Lenin, who is probably the first one to conceive ideology in this sense, states, for example: "Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working classes themselves, in the process of their movement, the only choice is--either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a "third" ideology, and moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms, there can never be a non-class or above class ideology). ..."⁹ Lukcas and Gramsci are other Marxists who adopt this concept of ideology in their writings. It should be noted that, "When ideology becomes weltanschauung, its validity tend to vary according to the imputation of a class background. ... The concept may now encompass distorted as much as true forms of consciousness and, therefore, does not by itself entail a negative meaning."¹⁰

d. Ideology and the sociology of knowledge: Karl Mannheim uses the concept of ideology in the context of the sociology of knowledge. He distinguishes between two different meanings of the term which he calls "particular" and "total." The particular concept of ideology resembles Napoleon's and Marx's use of the term as "distortion," which, according to Mannheim, ranges "from conscious lies to half conscious and unwitting disguise; from calculated attempts to dupe others to self-deception."¹¹ This is at the individual level when people are suspicious of the ideas of their opponents. The total conception of ideology, however, refers to "the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social groups,

e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and compositions of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group."¹² This resembles Lenin's concept of ideology as a class world view. In this sense, for Mannheim, ideology approaches the sociology of knowledge. "It points ... to a research interest which leads to the raising of the question when and where social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the former concretely determine the latter." But since Mannheim believes a "moral or denunciatory intent" has become part of the concept, he proposes to "as far as possible, avoid the use of the term 'ideology'."¹³

e. Ideology as action-oriented irrational idealization: The popular use of the word "ideology" is a recent phenomenon of a few decades. The first edition of the Encyclopedia of Social Science in 1937, for example, did not have any entry for the term "ideology" and did not even mention it in its index. Contrasted to this is the latest issue of the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1968) which devotes two articles and several pages to the term "ideology."

The popular use of the term seems to be due to the rise of "totalitarian ideologies" to power not only in Russia but, more importantly, in Germany and Italy. This provoked a debate on what had gone wrong in those countries, and how the western "democracies" could save themselves from such calamities. One of the immediate results of this focus on totalitarian ideologies was the imputation of a strong negative connotation to the term ideology. The reason

why the term was used for communism, fascism, and Nazism seems to be the use of the term by "political Marxists" for their own ideology--as well as for those of their enemies. But whereas for them ideology meant a class world view--as mentioned earlier--for the liberals and conservatives who wanted to attack totalitarianism ideology it came to mean action-oriented belief systems which were irrational. One member of this group defines ideology as "selected or distorted ideals about social systems or a class of social systems when these ideas purport to be factual, and also carry a more or less explicit evaluation of the 'facts.' ... Ideologies consist only of those parts of aspects of a system of social ideas which are distorted or unduly selective from a scientific point of view."¹⁴ Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Edwards Shils, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Lewis S. Feuer are among the proponents of this concept of ideology.

Most of the social scientists mentioned above advocated the notion of "the end of ideology" in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As Gould puts it, "The target has been the belief patterns which have supplied extremist and totalitarian movements. The aim has been to trace the decline of enthusiasm for such patterns among intellectuals against the background of economic growth and social change."¹⁵ But the rise of the new left and anti-establishment movements in the late 1960s put an end to the end of ideology notion.

f. Ideology as a system of ideas, beliefs, and values: The same factor--i.e., the rise of Nazism and fascism to power--that gave rise to the previous definition of ideology, in the meantime brought

forth a neutral meaning to the term similar to the "class world-view" but eliminating the notion of class from the definition. Richard Cox in his book Ideology, Politics and Political Theory provides a historical review of how the new meaning developed in Europe and American. Stated briefly,

The examination of liberal democracy's relationship to the totalitarian war of ideas became a problem during [the late 1930s]. Practically, how could liberal democracies best respond to attacks by the Communists and Fascists? Theoretically, were the principles of liberal democracy also an ideology and if so, how did it differ from totalitarian variety? Two positions became evident in response to these questions. The first position was that democracy was not an ideology and that its best means of defense was to remain steadfast in its dedication to its own intrinsic qualities. ... The second line of response still distinguished the principle of liberal democracy from an ideology but called for their reformation and aggressive application. ... As the decades wore on, ... there was a gradual shift in terminology: the principles of liberal democracy were more and more frequently referred to as ideology.¹⁶

Ideology in this neutral sense--i.e., without positive or negative connotations--has been defined differently. A restrictive historical conception of ideology defines it as "any general pattern of ideas which a) embodies an inclusive interpretation of human history, b) incorporates a highly articulated theory of the social order, c) inculcates these ideas by means of an educational system, d) possesses mass allegiance, and e) is identified with the policy and interests of a major power."¹⁷ On the other end of the spectrum, we have the broad definition of ideology as "an organization of opinions, attitudes and values--a way of thinking about man and society."¹⁸ A middle range definition with which most of those who use the concept in a neutral sense seem to agree is:

a system of political, economic and social values and ideas from which objectives are derived. These objectives form the nucleus of a political program. Political ideologies, although more or less elaborate, are more or less consistent as well. Some are only outlines. ... Others are thoroughly elaborated to the most subtle details. Often they form a complete, harmonious, and consistent system of explanation of the purpose of society and of surrounding social, economic, and political phenomena.¹⁹

A wide range of social scientists and philosophers--including some Marxists--adopt this concept of ideology. They include: Feliks Gross, Theodore Adorno, Richard Burks, Robert Lane, Joseph LaPolomabara, L.H. Garstin, John Plamentz, George Rude, H.M. Drucker, C.B. MacPherson, Karl Loewenstein, Willard Mullins, David W. Minar, Leon Dion, Samuel Barnes, Irving Kristol, Robert Haber, David Bouchier, William Bluhm, and many others.

g. Ideology as a system of meaning: Closely related to the above definition of ideology is the cultural conception of the term. According to Robert Wuthnow, "Culture may be defined as the entire array of symbols, including objects, acts, utterances, and events, with which reality is apprehended, giving meaning, internalized and communicated. Ideology may then be regarded as any subset of systematic constructions which, in fact, serves as a vehicle for the expression and transmission of collectively shared meanings."²⁰ In his celebrated article entitled "Ideology as a cultural system,"²¹ T. Geertz does not provide a definition of the term ideology, but he seems to be using the concept as defined by Wuthnow.

The above review of the uses of the term ideology is not comprehensive. For example, it does not cover the uses of ideology by structuralists and linguistic analysts. Nonetheless, it outlines

the major uses of the term and shows that we cannot talk of a (or the) concept of ideology but concepts of ideology. Which concept one uses depends upon the nature and interests of his study. In this work, I will use the term ideology as it is conceptualized by the scholars in group (f) above. In accordance with this conceptualization, I define ideology as a more or less consistent set of political, economic, and social values and beliefs which "can galvanize man into action--or inaction--and turn necessities, preferences, and ideas relating to social issues and social relations into levers of action--or modes of inaction--to change or maintain the status quo."²² Ideology as defined here has several elements: "1) a set of moral values, taken as absolute, 2) an outline of the 'good society' in which those values would be realized, 3) a [more or less] systematic criticism (or, in the case of status quo ideology, affirmation) of the present social arrangements and the analysis of their dynamics, 4) a strategic plan of getting from the present to the future (or, in the case of status quo ideology, how continued progress is built into the system."²³

2. Revolution: Definition and a Review of Theories. Definitions of the term "revolution" are as diverse as those of "ideology." More than 50 years ago Dale Yoder observed that: "The term 'revolution' is one of the most used and, one suspects, one of the most misused of words. Both within and without the literature of the social science it has acquired a variety of meanings which make it as adaptable to personal purposes as is the chameleon's skin."²⁴ The

work on revolution since then instead of clarifying the concept has made it more confusing. In this section, instead of a historical survey of the uses of the term, I will first provide a sample of the definitions of "revolution" as it is applied to political change in the state and specify the definition which I find more useful. Then I will survey the theories of revolution and discuss the role of ideology in revolution according to each of the theories.

a. Definition: Revolution has been defined as:

- "a forcible intervention, either to replace governments, or to change the process of government" (Peter Calvert).
- "a sudden and violent overthrow of an established political order" (Carl Friedrech).
- "a change whereby one system of legality is terminated and another originated" (L.P. Edwards).
- "the wide range of circumstances--from mere threats of force to major civil wars--in which illegitimate violence is employed within a country to effect political change" (Cyril Black).
- "a challenge to the existing political--and perhaps social, economic and cultural--systems with an aim at redirecting and restructuring [them]" (Robert Blackey and C. Paynton).
- "an acute, prolonged crisis in one or more of the traditional systems of stratification (class, status, power) of a political community, which involves a purposive, elite-directed attempt to abolish or to reconstruct one or more of said systems by means of an

intensification of political power and recourse to violence" (Mark Hagopein).

- "that kind of social change which occurs when the basic institutional values of social order are rejected and new values accepted" (Rex Hopper).
- "an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another" (Mao Zedong).
- "a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the dominant myth of social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuing of a development" (Sigmund Newman).
- "Only when [the] pathos of novelty is present and where novelty is connected with the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution" (Hanneh Arendt).
- "Social revolution is basic transformation of a society's state and class structures accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below" (Theda Skocpol).
- "Political revolution is the transformation of power [which] aims to change the style of politics based on the state's monopoly of armed violence. It aims at the dissolution of the state" (Krishan Kumar).

What is common in all the definitions is the idea of change. But what kind of change characterizes a revolution? I think Johan Galtung's definition provides the best answer: "A revolution is a fundamental change of social structure brought about in a short

period of time."²⁵ According to this definition if a turn-over or rotation in the leadership of a state--no matter how quickly it takes place--does not affect the social structure, it is not considered a revolution. Neither is any superficial change in the social structure; rather, it should be "fundamental." Moreover, the change should take place in a relatively short period of time; changes evolving over a long period are not considered revolutions.

It is important to note two points about the definition:

(1) The definition is "neutral." It attaches neither positive nor negative connotation to the concept of revolution. Whether someone views a particular revolution as "good" or "bad" depends upon his values and on the type of changes that the revolution brings about.

(2) Although for bringing about "a fundamental change of social structure in a short period of time" the chances of violence are very great, violence is not part of the definition of revolution. The definition leaves the door open for non-violent revolutions. Although the occurrence of such a revolution seems improbable, it is not impossible or inconceivable. For example, if Allende's regime had not been toppled because of the CIA's intervention, there was a possibility of Chile having a "peaceful" revolution--or perhaps the Chilean case supports the contention that it is not possible to have revolutions without violence!

b. Theories of revolution and the role of ideology: A comprehensive survey of the rich and enormous literature on revolution is an extremely difficult job--if not impossible--and

certainly beyond the scopes of this dissertation. It is not proper, however, to overlook the literature altogether in a study like this one. Therefore, with the risk of oversimplification, in this section I provide a cursory survey of the major theories of and approaches to revolution and briefly discuss how they view the role of ideology in revolution.

(1) The Marxist theory of revolution: For Marx revolution is a transition of a society from one historical epoch to the next one; or, in other words, the transformation of one social formation into another one. According to him, with changes in the forces of production the relation of production should change as well. This change in the mode of production "with consequent changes of all subordinate elements of the social complex" constitutes "a social revolution in the Marxist definition,"²⁶ and it is proposed to be the result of class struggle between the new emerging class and the old ruling class. "The source of revolutionary energy in a class is the frustration of man in his capacity of producer, his inability to develop new power of production to the full within the confines of an existing mode of production or social order."²⁷

Marx held the view that "no social order perishes before the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society."²⁸ Moreover, Marx considered the proletariat as the only class that would bring about the transformation of a society into socialism. According to this view, Russia of the 1910s seemed very

far from a socialist revolution. To make it more appropriate for the Russian society, Lenin had to expand (or revise?) Marx's theory.

Basically what Lenin said is that in the society in which capitalism is not fully developed, but in which there is a growing working class, a revolution led by the proletariat is possible provided several conditions are met. The proletariat must seek allies for revolution. ... [And] in order to coordinate the revolution, a vanguard party is needed to bring revolutionary consciousness to the potentially revolutionary mass and to coordinate the revolution even after the old regime is overthrown.²⁹

Thus, Lenin changed Marx's philosophical conception of revolution into a political conception and assigned the most important role in a revolution to the intelligentsia and its vanguard party.

Mao Zedong also made some contributions to the Marxist theory of revolution. According to A.S. Cohan, these contributions can be summarized as:

First, he expanded the class analysis to include in the revolution classes that may previously have been thought hostile to the revolutionary movement. Second, he developed ideas of strategy for China's revolutionary war and ways of developing strategy that would be applicable to other revolutionary situations. Third, he adopted a humanist attitude with regard to the masses by insisting that the ideas that fuelled the revolution must stem from the masses who were participating in the revolution.³⁰

The role of ideology: Marx's definition of ideology as false consciousness and his emphasis on the role of dialectic materialism in bringing about the revolutionary transformation does not allow much room for the role of ideology in his theory of revolution. Nonetheless, Marx considers proletarian class consciousness as an important element in its class struggle with the bourgeoisie which will lead to the socialist revolution. Based on the theory of dialectical materialism, Marx believes that in all its battles, the bourgeoisie sees itself forced to appeal to the proletariat and seek

its help. Thus, the bourgeoisie itself provides the proletariat with political education which will be used as a weapon against it. "Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, ... a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending the historical movement as a whole."³¹

Lenin takes the idea in the last sentence and assigns the most important role to the "revolutionary socialist intelligentsia" in the process of revolution. This is the group of bourgeois ideologists who have been converted to socialist ideology. Thus, ideology plays an important role in Lenin's theory of revolution. The task of the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia is to bring about class consciousness among the proletariat. Lenin does not believe that the proletariat can develop class consciousness by itself. What it can develop is "trade union consciousness." The "social-democratic consciousness" must come from outside by the intelligentsia based on socialist ideology.³² Moreover, it is on the basis of socialist ideology that the "vanguard party" would try to build a socialist society after seizing power in the name of proletariat. As quoted earlier, according to Lenin the working classes themselves cannot formulate an independent ideology; thus the socialist ideology is the only alternative to the bourgeois ideology.³³

(2) Natural history approaches to revolution: Among many others, three of the famous classic works on revolution--L.P. Edwards' Natural History of Revolution, Crane Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution, and George Pettee's The Process of Revolution--follow this approach. Although Edwards proposes causes of revolution--which are "the repression of one or more of [the four] elemental wishes"³⁴--and Pettee reviews the pre-revolutionary society--which is characterized by "institutional decay," "economic cramp," "ideological cramp," "decadence of the elite," and "political cramp"³⁵--the natural history approach studies the stages of revolution and the characteristics of these stages. Rex Hopper has presented a synthesis of the natural history theories of revolution in his article "The Revolutionary Process."³⁶ The four stages of revolution and their main characteristics are the following:

- A. The preliminary stage of mass (individual) excitement and unrest, which is characterized by:
 1. The spread of socialization of general restlessness,
 2. The development of class antagonism,
 3. Marked government inefficiency,
 4. Reform effort on the part of the government.
- B. The popular stage of crowd (collective) excitement and unrest, which is characterized by:
 1. The spread of discontent,
 2. The transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals,
 3. The fabrication of a social myth.

C. The formal stage of the formulation of issues and formation of policies, which is characterized by:

1.

The fixation of motives and the definite formulation of aims. This major characteristic is paralleled by these developments:

a. A struggle between the conservative, moderate, and radical factions of the revolutionary group,

b. The moderate faction gains control,

c. The development of a set of norms formally stated in dogma and formally expressed in ritual, together with a marked increase in the use of shibboleths,

d. The spread of patriotism and the social myth elevates the radicals to power.

2. The development of an organizational structure with

leaders, a program, doctrines, and traditions. This is accompanied by:

a. The development of a condition of dual sovereignty,

- b. The occurrence of an immediate precipitating factor and the seizure of power by the radicals,
 - c. The presence of conflict within the ranks of radicals,
 - d. The formation of a provisional government,
 - e. The use of a Reign of Terror as a control technique.
- D. The institutional stage of legalization and social organization, which is characterized by:
- 1. Causal characteristics:
 - a. Psychological exhaustion,
 - b. Moral let-down and return to old habits,
 - c. Great economic distress, amounting to almost chaos, demands a settling down.
 - 2. Resultant characteristics:
 - a. End of the Reign of Terror,
 - b. Increase in powers of central government, frequently resulting in dictatorship,
 - c. Social reconstruction along lines of the old social structure but with the new principles essentially intact,
 - d. The revolution becomes attitudinally established and develops a permanent organization that is acceptable to the current mores; that is, it is institutionalized.

The role of ideology: The natural history approach to revolution recognizes the important role of ideology in the process of revolution. What is meant by the concept of ideology in this study is termed "social myth" in the natural history literature. As an example of the views of these approaches on the role of ideology in

revolution we can present Pettee's observations on "ideological cramp" and "propagation of new ideas." Pettee argues that in an integrated society a widely accepted system of symbols govern wills of the people. The people who are frustrated by the material cramp in the society will question the symbols which lead them into frustration and will try to find or invent new symbols according to their capacity for participation. Once they find "a new view of destiny for themselves" they will try to share it with others. Thus, Pettee believes that new ideas about society originate from "maladjusted individual minds." After they undergo a long process of development, elucidation and propagation, they become "a full-grown myth"--or ideology--and play an important role in the process of revolution.³⁷ Pettee mentions some of the characteristics of a revolutionary ideology: "One of the most important features of a myth is the picture it draws of the position of the oppressed or cramped classes in society, as it exists and as it should exist. This is fundamental to the development of class consciousness and political solidarity. ... Symbols must be attractive as well as simple. ... A myth or symbol is always an intermediate answer to ultimate questions. ... An integrated part of the new myth is its criticism of the existing order. [And another integrated part is the] projected blueprint for the good society."³⁸

(3) Sociological theories of revolution: The "multiple dysfunction of the social system" and the "rank disequilibrium of the elite" are two of the more important sociological theories of revolution.

(a) The theory of multiple dysfunction of the social system has been advanced by Chalmers Johnson. Johnson develops his theory within the framework of structural functionalism. For him, "revolution is one form of social change in response to the presence of dysfunction in the social system. Revolution is the preferred method of change when (a) the level of dysfunctions exceeds the capacities of traditional or accepted methods of problem solving; and (b) the system's elite, in effect, opposes change. ... Revolution is the acceptance of violence in order to bring about change."³⁹ Johnson calls (a) "multiple dysfunction" and (b) "elite intransigence." Multiple dysfunction develops because of the pressure on the social system by "sources of change" which includes: "(1) exogenous value-changing sources; (2) endogenous value-changing sources; (3) exogenous environment-changing sources; and (4) endogenous environment-changing sources."⁴⁰ Elite intransigence includes (1) "power deflation" defines as increasing use of force, and (2) "loss of authority." But these two conditions by themselves are not sufficient to bring about revolution. "Multiple dysfunction plus elite intransigence plus X equals revolution."⁴¹ Johnson considers X as "accelerators of dysfunction" which include (1) "a break in the effectiveness of the armed forces," (2) "an ideological belief held by a protesting group that it can, for a variety of reasons, succeed in overcoming the elite's armed might," and (3) "special operations launched against an elite's armed forces by a group of conspirators who are pursuing a revolutionary strategy (e.g., guerrilla warfare)."⁴²

(b) The rank disequilibrium theory traces the origin of revolution to rank disequilibrated elites. Johan Galtung is one of the advocates of this theory. According to him,

"revolutions are structurally conditioned. There are structural forms leading to them, and when these forms are present, revolution will occur. ... True revolutions are directed against vertical interaction structures; they have their origin among the groups in society that are most badly frustrated by these structures--the rank disequilibrated groups and certain segments of the underdog groups; once these conditions are present, then some non-structural factors like ideology, charismatic leaders, frustrated expectations, a precipitating incident and new cooperation patterns will be among the final ingredients sparking off the revolution."⁴³

The rank disequilibrated elite group consists of those members of the society who according to some criteria of social stratification belong to one social class and according to some other criteria of social stratification belong to another social class; or in Galtung's terminology, they belong to both "topdog" and "underdog." This group is the origin and a necessary condition of revolution "because of its broad motivational base as well as its resources."⁴⁴

Since the social order that is created as a result of the revolutionary struggle has "a potential for new class formation and for refeudalization" as well as for creation of new rank disequilibrated elites, Galtung does not believe that "there is such a thing as the final revolution to end all revolutions."⁴⁵

The role of ideology: Ideology plays an important role in Chalmers Johnson's sociological theory of multiple dysfunction of the social system. According to Johnson, once disequilibrium is produced in a social system because of exogenous or endogenous value

and/or environment changes, it is ideology that sets the stage for revolution. "The dynamic element which overcomes the effects of multiple role playing and which leads to the development of lines of cleavage is ideology. Without ideology, deviant structural groups ... will not form alliances; and the tensions of the system, which led particular groups to form these associations, will be dissipated without directly influencing the social structure. Once persons whose latent interests have become manifest have an ideology, however, the society will tend to polarize into two groups: one group with an interest in maintaining the status quo and another with an interest in and ideology for altering the status quo."⁴⁶ Ideology can also play an important role as an "accelerator" of revolution. This is so when the protesting group holds "an ideological belief ... that it can, for a variety of reasons, succeed in overcoming the elite's armed might."⁴⁷ Johnson also mentions some of the characteristics of the revolutionary ideology: (1) "It will combine the idea of 'goal,' 'instrument,' and 'value.'" Thus, revolutionary ideologies provide "images of a new value environment symbiosis [i.e., 'goal culture']." (2) It is "exclusivist" towards the old value system and new competing ideologies. And (3) It is "imminentist": "An ideology does not envisage postponing its realization to a later time or a superterrestrial existence."⁴⁸

Galtung's sociological theory of rank disequilibrium also recognizes the important role that ideology plays in a revolution. According to Galtung, "change oriented ideology" is one of the ten

factors that "condition" revolutions. Galtung conceives ideology "as a body of thought essentially containing three elements: -values, leading to an image of the desired future; -ideas, leading to an image of the rejected present; -hypotheses, about how to proceed from the present to the future."⁴⁹ For a revolution to happen, it is necessary that the rank disequilibrated elite and the underdog are "ideologically united in a strong emphasis on rejection of the present, and the [disequilibrated elite] have crystallized the values into relatively concrete imagery of the future, which they try to disseminate to the [underdog] groups."⁵⁰ Galtung observes that revolutionary ideologies often emphasize only the second element of ideology, i.e., rejection of the present, they contain some image of the desired future but only 0-10 percent of "revolutionary directives, the moral approach as to how to overcome the present regime."⁵¹ Despite this shortcoming, as mentioned, ideology plays an important role in revolution because it serves as "a banner around which highly different members of the social order can gather. The ideology is a medium of communication; a language expressive enough to harbor the thought and sentiments of the [disequilibrated elite] group and the politically conscious members of the [underdog] group alike, so as to unite them."⁵²

(4) Psychological theories of revolution: The "rising expectation" and the "relative deprivation" are the two more important psychological theories of revolution.

(a) Advocates of the theory of rising expectation note that the "great revolutions" were not born at periods when people were at the

"ebb of their existence" or "in societies economically retrograde; on the contrary, they took place in societies economically progressive."⁵³ The reason for this is that "events that seem inevitable are patiently endured. They are endured in the extreme case because the physical and mental energies of people are totally employed in the process of merely staying alive."⁵⁴ It is only after economic progress starts that potentials for revolution develop. Crane Brinton considers "a feeling on the part of the chief enterprising groups that their opportunities for getting on in this world are unduly limited by political arrangements" as one of the preconditions of revolution.⁵⁵ James Davies, a recent proponent of the theory, provides a different hypothesis, however.

According to Davies, revolutions do not take place at the peak of economic progress but rather when a prolonged period of social and economic progress is followed by "a short period of sharp reversal." This is so because in the period of development of the society an expectation that the society can satisfy the needs of the population grows among the people. During the later period, however, a mental state of frustration and anxiety is produced "when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality." Therefore, according to Davies, "The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that the past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future."⁵⁶

(b) The theory of relative deprivation actually tries to explain the phenomenon of civil violence, but it has been widely regarded as a theory of revolution. This theory, like the theory of rising

expectations, is based on the assumption that "the frustration-aggression mechanism, however culturally modified, is the source of most men's disposition to illicit collective violence."⁵⁷

Ted Gurr, one of the proponents of the theory, presents the main thesis of the theory as follows:

The necessary conditions for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled. The referents of value capabilities are to be found largely in the social and physical environment: they are the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain.⁵⁸

This does not mean that there are no other factors involved in the outburst of civil violence. Gurr does identify "social control" and "social facilitator" variables that determine "the likelihood and magnitude of civil violence." But, as mentioned, relative deprivation is considered as the original cause and the most important factor.

The role of ideology: Even the psychological theories of revolution cannot disregard the relations between ideology and revolution. James Davies, however, recognizes the role of ideology in negative terms--i.e., in preventing the emergence of revolution. According to his theory he finds the American society in the early 1930s ready for revolution. But it did not materialize; "why?" Davies finds the answer in the American conservative ideology. "The great majority of the public shared a set of values which since 1776 had been official dogma--not the dissident program of an alienated

intelligentsia. ... Because of a conservatism in America stemming from strong and long attachment to a value system shared by all classes, an anticapitalist, leftist revolution in the 1930s is very difficult to imagine."⁵⁹

Ted Gurr's psychological theory of relative deprivation considers ideology as a "source of attitudinal support for violence." This means that: "The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary directly with the availability of common experience and beliefs that sanction violent response to anger."⁶⁰ Moreover, according to Gurr, "a new ideology ... can serve to define and explain the nature of the situation, to identify those responsible for it, and to specify appropriate sources of action."⁶¹

(5) The "political modernization" theory of revolution: Samuel Huntington considers revolution as "characteristic of modernization" and sees its origin and cause in the gap between "political modernization" and "political development." He defines political modernization as involving "the extension of political consciousness to new social groups and the mobilization of these groups into politics," and defines political development as involving "the creation of political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb and to order the society." Therefore, according to Huntington, "the political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing institutions to assimilate them.

Revolution is the extreme case of explosion of political participation." But this explosion, without which "there is no revolution," does not make the revolution complete and successful. "The measure of how successful a revolution is is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth."⁶²

As for the forces that can bring about the "explosion of political participation," Huntington argues that they can be only the combination of urban opposition with rural opposition. Among the urban groups, the industrial proletariat and lumpenproletariat may oppose the government, but they cannot make revolution. The middle class--and specially the intelligentsia in that class--is "the true revolutionary class" in modernizing societies. But even this class cannot make a revolution by itself--or in coalition with other urban groups. The active participation of rural groups is necessary. And the latter do not join the revolution unless they are affected by modernization--which has two important impacts on them: (1) worsening the conditions of their work and welfare, and (2) elevating their aspirations.⁶³

It should be noted that Huntington does not consider any violent overthrow of a government or a regime as revolution. Rather, he defines revolution as "a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activities and policies."⁶⁴

The role of ideology: In his theory, Samuel Huntington does not discuss the significance of ideology. Nonetheless, his definition of

revolution and his recognition of "the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics" as "the political essence of revolution" indicate that ideology plays some role in his theory. To Huntington, however, the role of ideology and all other factors is secondary compared to modernization. It is modernization that brings about "a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations. ... These changes typically require the broadening of loyalties and identification from concrete and immediate groups (such as the family, clan, and village) to larger and more impersonal groupings (such as class and nation)."⁶⁵ In this theory, an important function of ideology in revolution is bridging the gap between the revolutionary middle-class intelligentsia and the peasants. The differences in background, perspective and purposes create obstacles to the formation of the revolutionary alliance between the two groups. It is the task of the intellectuals to take the initiative. When the social and political conditions of the peasantry are suitable, "the common cause" upon which the intelligentsia can build the alliance is nationalism. Thus, according to Huntington, the ideology of "nationalism is the cement of the revolutionary alliance and the engine of the revolutionary movement."⁶⁶ Another important function of ideology in Huntington's theory is to provide community in a state in which the old social order has been destroyed because of revolution. In such a state there is a vacuum. "Society is no longer the basis of community. ... Political ideologies and political institutions become crucially important in providing

community not as a result of the growth of society but as a result of its destruction."⁶⁷

(6) Group conflict theory of revolution: The group-conflict theory of revolution--advanced by Charles Tilly, among others--is the outcome of opposition to psychological theories. As Skocpol puts it, "Political-conflict theories argue that no matter how discontented an aggregate of people may become, they cannot engage in political action (including violence) unless they are part of at least minimally organized group with access to some resources. Even then, government or competing groups may successfully repress the will to engage in collective action by making the cost too high to bear."⁶⁸

Tilly bases his theory of revolution on the concept of "collective action" which he defines as "people's acting together in pursuit of a common interest."⁶⁹ Under the normal situation, collective action leads to "politics as usual." When a "revolutionary situation" appears, however, the collective action might lead into a "revolutionary outcome." A revolutionary situation has been defines as a condition of "multiple sovereignty ... [that is] the presence of more than one bloc effectively exercising control over a significant part of state apparatus." And revolutionary outcome has been defines as "the displacement of one set of power holders by another." According to Tilly, the concepts will do a better job if they are taken as continua. Thus, both situation and outcome can be more or less revolutionary. "Great revolutions" occur when both the revolutionary situation--i.e.,

multiple sovereignty--and revolutionary outcome--i.e., elite displacement--are high.⁷⁰

Tilly also describes the factors that cause revolutionary situations and outcomes. In a nutshell, "Proximate causes of revolutionary situations [are] (1) the appearance of contenders making exclusive alternative claims; (2) significant commitments [by the population] to those claims; and (3) repressive incapacity of the government. ... Proximate causes of revolutionary outcomes [are]: (1) the presence of a revolutionary situation: multiple sovereignty; (2) revolutionary coalition between challengers and members of the polity; [and] (3) control of substantial force by the revolutionary coalition."⁷¹

The role of ideology: Tilly does not talk about the role of ideology in revolution according to his theory. I believe this is more an oversight than insignificance of ideology in his theory. For example, the contending groups "making exclusive alternative claims" will certainly base their claims on certain values and beliefs--i.e., ideology. Thus, ideology plays an important role in bringing about a revolutionary situation. It might also play an important role in revolutionary outcome by creating a "revolutionary coalition between challengers and members of the polity."

(7) "Value-oriented" theory of revolution: As A.S. Cohan observes, "Most theorists would consider the alternation of values to be a critical and perhaps most important features of a revolution."⁷² Few of the theorists, however, focus their analysis on values. One of the few is Neil Smelser. To be sure, Smelser does

not develop a theory of revolution as such; rather, he is concerned with "collective behavior" in general. Moreover, he adopts Edwards' definition of revolution as "a change ... whereby one system of legality is terminated and another originated," and thus considers "palace revolution" and coup d'etate as forms of revolution.⁷³ Nonetheless, it is possible to derive a theory of revolution--as defined in this work--from his general theory. This is why he is generally considered as a theorist of revolution.⁷⁴

Smelser's definition of "collective behavior" as "mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action"⁷⁵ puts "generalized belief" at the core of his theory. Based on the definition of "social action" he develops a typology of collective behavior which includes: 1) panic, 2) craze, 3) hostile outburst, 4) norm-oriented movement, and 5) value-oriented movement. "Religious revolution" and "political revolution" are two particular forms of value-oriented movements "in which [religious or secular value-oriented beliefs are] the basis for challenging the legitimacy of established political authority."⁷⁶ "A value-oriented belief envisions a modification of those conceptions concerning 'nature, man's place in it, man's relation to man, and the desirable and non-desirable as they may relate to man-environment and interhuman relations.'"⁷⁷ Whether a value oriented movement arises or not, and if it does, whether it takes the form of a religious revolution, a political revolution, a religious cult or sect, a political party, or it just disappears depends upon "determinants" which affect all types of collective behavior. They are: (1) structural

conduciveness, (2) structural strain, (3) growth and spread of the generalized belief, (4) precipitating factors, (5) mobilization of participants for action, and (6) the operation of social control. An oversimplified summary of Smelser's theory of revolution appears in a passage towards the end of his book:

In ideal typical sequence, the value-oriented revolutionary movement unfolds in the following way: the society experiences a period of strain and dissatisfaction which is met by a posture of effectiveness, inflexibility, and unresponsiveness on the part of agencies of social control. Thus, [value-oriented beliefs begin to crystalize but remain passive because of effective repression]. After a period, however, when a value-oriented belief has developed, the agencies of social control change their posture; they begin to display inconsistency, vacillation or weakness. At this time the movement begins to evolve toward a value-oriented revolutionary movement.⁷⁸

The role of ideology: Ideology plays a central role in Smelser's "value-oriented" theory of revolution. Smelser uses the term "ideology" sometimes. More often, however, he refers to the concept as "value-oriented generalized beliefs." According to him, the main function of the value-oriented belief--like all generalized beliefs--is to define the situation. "Before collective action can be taken to reconstitute the situation brought on by structural strain, this situation must be made meaningful to the potential actors. This meaning is supplied in a generalized belief, which identifies the sources of strain, attributes certain characteristics to the source, and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate."⁷⁹ Sometimes, however, the value-oriented generalized beliefs themselves can become a source of strain. This so when "they are a conscious attempt to modify existing traditional values."⁸⁰ Smelser describes the main features of ideology in

terms of the "components of action"--which are: facilities, mobilization, norms, and values. In a "value-added" scheme, he distinguishes nine stages (or levels) of value-oriented beliefs. Five of the stages are negative and four are positive: Stage 1 "involves a condition of ambiguity rising from conditions of strain;" Stage 2 (-facilities): involve anxiety; Stage 3 (-mobilization): involves the generalized belief that specific agents of evil are responsible for sources of anxiety; Stage 4 (-norms): is the generalized belief that society is in a state of chaos, instability, disharmony, or conflict; Stage 5 (-values): is the generalized belief that there is "a threat to the values of the civilization as a whole;" Stage 6 (+values): is the generalized belief in regeneration of values, "adherents see a new world, not merely an improvement of individuals or a reform of institutions;" Stage 7 (+norms): involves beliefs in future harmony and stability; Stage 8 (+mobilization): is the "belief that value change will destroy, remove, damage, or restrict the responsible agents;" and Stage 9 (+facilities): involve "belief in omnipotence of regeneration" and "that a condition of human happiness will be ushered in forthwith."⁸¹

(8) Social-structural theory of revolution: The social-structural theory of revolution has been advanced by Theda Skocpol in her comparative study of French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. Skocpol bases her theory on "the Marxist conception of class relation" and on "the political conflict argument that collective action is based upon organization and access to

resources, often including coercive resources."⁸² This gives her "a nonvoluntaristic, structural perspective" on the causes and process of revolution. Unlike Marxism, Skocpol considers state as autonomous from the dominant class and defines it as "a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well-coordinated by, an executive authority."⁸³ Thus, the state of the state plays an important role in her theory of revolution. Moreover, she assigns an important role to "international socioeconomic dynamics" in her theory.

By her "comparative historical" study of old regimes and revolutions in France, Russia, and China Skocpol reaches the conclusion that

Before social revolutions could occur, the administrative and military power of these states had to break down. ... Revolutionary political crisis, culminating in administrative and military breakdowns, emerged because the imperial state became caught in cross-pressures between intensified military competition or intrusions from abroad and constraints imposed on monarchical responses by the existing agrarian class structures and political institutions. The old-regime states were prone to such revolutionary crisis because their existing structures made it impossible for them to meet the particular international military exigencies that each had to face in the modern era.⁸⁴

It should be noted that Skocpol is aware of the limitations of her theory and gives an "unequivocally 'no'" answer to the question whether her arguments can be applied to cases other than France, Russia, and China. Nonetheless, she maintains that "a focus on the nexes of state/state, state/economy, and state/class relationships remain useful for deciphering the logic of social-revolutionary causes and outcomes."⁸⁵

The role of ideology: As noted, Skocpol's theory focuses on "non-voluntaristic, structural" factors. Nonetheless, she concedes that ideology plays some role in revolution. From her study of France, Russia, and China she concludes that: "Revolutionary ideologies such as Jacobinism and Marxism-Leninism could help political elites committed to them to struggle for, build, and hold state power within a social-revolutionary situation for several reasons."⁸⁶ The reasons--which can be considered as the functions of the revolutionary ideology--were: (1) Being "universalistic creeds," they attracted people with different backgrounds and united them as comrades. (2) They enjoined the revolutionary elite to mobilize the masses for political struggles and revolutionary activities. (3) They provided justification for employing different means for reaching the desired goals. Skocpol emphasizes, however, that the role of ideology was limited to these functions. "It cannot be argued in addition that the cognitive content of the ideologies in any sense provides a predictive key to either the outcomes of the Revolutions or the activities of the revolutionaries who built the state organizations that consolidated the Revolutions."⁸⁷

In a recent article about the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Skocpol concedes more role to ideology than she did in her book. "Indeed, if ever there has been a revolution deliberately 'made' by a mass-based social movement aiming to overthrow the older order, the Iranian revolution is it. ... Shi'a Islam was both organizationally and culturally crucial to the making of the Revolution."⁸⁸ And, as was quoted earlier, she confesses that

"this remarkable revolution forces me to deepen my understanding of the possible role of idea systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action."⁸⁹

To end this section, I would like to present some quotations from other studies (not covered above) which underscore the significant role of ideology in revolutions:

Some interpreters have blamed (sic) the outbreak of the French Revolution on intellectual causes, that is to say, on the ideas, techniques, and great public influence of the philosophes (who were indeed very influential). This is the standard theory of post-revolutionary conservative theorists, from Chateaubriand to Taine, men who felt, in essence, that in pre-revolutionary France a sound society was corrupted by seductive and corrosive philosophy. (Harry Eckstein)⁹⁰

Hitherto, all religions have tended to subdue the passions: this creed [i.e., the revolutionary ideology of the time] excites them all, and sets them free from restraint. In the north and south alike, in every region, rank, and country, it enlists the unsuccessfully ambitious men ruined or discredited, men of letters. ... It develops and propagates itself like Islamism, by arms, and opinion; in one hand holds the sabre, in the other the rights of men. (Mallet du Pan writing in 1794-5)⁹¹

... I am told that, because there is no visible disorder on the surface of society, there is no revolution at hand. ... Gentlemen, permit me to say that you are mistaken. True, there is no actual disorder; but it has entered deeply into men's minds. ... Do you not see that they are gradually forming opinions and ideas which are destined not only to upset this or that law, ministry, or even form of government, but society itself? ... And do you not realize that when such opinions take root, when they spread in an almost universal manner, when they sink deeply into the masses, they are bound to bring with them sooner or later, I know not when or how, a most formidable revolution? (Alexis de Tocqueville in a speech at the eve of 1848 French Revolution)⁹²

As long as there are no myths accepted by the masses, one may go on talking of revolt indefinitely, without even provoking any revolutionary movement. (George Sorel)⁹³

Generally, those revolutions which are successful in overthrowing a regime and creating the more permanent changes in the structure of a society are those which have been guided by a clear, forceful and systematic ideology. (Robert Blackey and Clifford Paynton)⁹⁴

Every revolution has an ideology. ... [A] revolutionary ideology is based upon a thoroughgoing critique of the existing order as inhuman and immoral. ... [It] articulates an alternative vision of society embodying a superior order. ... [And it] embodies a statement of plans and programs intended to realize the alternative order. (Mostafa Rejai)⁹⁵

3. Conceptual Framework: A Model of Revolutionary Ideology.

Before constructing a model of revolutionary ideology I will briefly describe what a model is.

a. Model and its functions: A more detailed description of model construction and its functions appear as Appendix A at the the end of this dissertation. The description here will be very brief.

Wright Mills define a model as "a more or less systematic inventory of the elements to which we must pay attention if we are to understand something. It is not true or false; it is useful and adequate to varying degrees."⁹⁶ It is important to note that a model--as defined here--is not a hypothesis. Neither is it a description of reality or an average type. Rather, it is a heuristic device, a constructed picture of an "objectively possible" world that provides certain constellations of elements which are only approximations of the empirical reality.

A model is formed "by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual

phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sided emphasized view points into a unified analytical construct."⁹⁷ Both inductive and deductive methods are used in the construction of a model. A model is not an end in itself; rather it is a means for ordering and understanding empirical reality. Therefore, it must be inductively abstracted from reality. On the other hand, as mentioned, a model is not a description of the real world; it is an "utopia." In its construction we approach the empirical phenomenon from a particular point of view and build our model by logical reasoning.

The definition mentioned above considers "understanding something" as the purpose and function of model construction. Understanding something means to make clearly explicit the unique individual character of a social phenomenon and to find out the motives of the individual actors who brought it about. But understanding is not the only function of a model. According to Weber, the model "offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses."⁹⁸ Thus, generation of hypotheses can be another function of a model. And a third major use of model is in comparative studies. According to John McKinney, "A scientific function of the [model] is to order the concrete data so that they be described in terms that make them comparable, so that the experience had in one case, despite its uniqueness, may be made to reveal with some degree of probability what may be expected in others."⁹⁹

b. A model of revolutionary ideology: In spite of the emphasis on the important role of ideology in the literature on revolution, there is almost no work which focuses on the study and analysis of the revolutionary ideology. Two of the exceptions are George Rude's Ideology and Popular Protest and David Bouchier's Idealism and Revolution. Rude concentrates on the sources of ideology and studies the popular ideologies of the 17th, 18th, and 19th century European revolutionary movements. Bouchier's work, which is of more relevance to this study, develops a model of revolutionary ideology and studies "new ideologies of liberation in Britain and the U.S." in the framework of his model. The model, which includes "three capacities which all radical ideologies in social movement possess to varying degree," has been summarized as the following:

1 The radical ideology must identify areas of deprivation or strain and present an attack on the legitimating mechanisms which are associated with them. This attack will embody alternative values, relevant experience, empirical knowledge and theory; and this whole process ... will be labelled de-legitimation.

2 Closely related to de-legitimation must be an interpretation of the world which provides an alternative blueprint, a new cognitive universe and an explanation of how the group can act to produce the desired changes. This process ... will be called dis-alienation.

3. Finally, the radical ideology, must ... 'find an audience'--it must be communicable as a realistic alternative interpretation. But, more than this, it must be at least minimally flexible, and able to deal with responses, new ideas and new situations, in order to maintain credibility with its audience. To the process I have attached a new name, commutation.¹⁰⁰

There are at least two problems with this model. First, Bouchier claims that Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and recent theories based on phenomenology have contributed to the formation of his model. Although he provides a brief review of those theories, their

relation to the model is not clear--except to some extent to the first point of the model. Second, as can be seen from the quotation and the subsequent description of the model by Bouchier, he amalgamates several different components and features of radical ideologies in one group. That obscures the importance of those features and produces confusion.

I believe a better model of revolutionary ideology can be formulated on the basis of the definition of the concept while having in mind the elements of ideology.

Earlier, ideology was defined as "a more or less consistent set of political, economic, and social values and beliefs which 'can galvanize man into action--or inaction--and turn necessities, preferences, and ideas relating to social issues and social relations into levers of action--or modes of inaction--to change or maintain the status quo.'" ¹⁰¹ And revolution was defined as "a fundamental change of social structure brought about in a short period of time." ¹⁰² Therefore, a revolutionary ideology is: A more or less consistent set of political, economic, and social values and beliefs which galvanize men into action and turn necessities, preferences, and ideas relating to social issues and social relations into levers of action in order to bring about a fundamental change of social structure in a short period of time.

As for elements of ideology, they were earlier mentioned as: (1) a set of moral values, taken as absolute, (2) an outline of the "good society" in which those values would be realized, (3) a systematic criticism or affirmation of the present social

arrangements and an analysis of their dynamics, (4) a strategic plan for getting from the present to the future or for continuing progress under the existing system. In addition to these, Robert Haber argues, an ideology must have some other characteristics in order to be linked to a political movement--which is a must for a revolutionary ideology--and for the movement to develop a mass following. Those characteristics are: "(1) the ideology must be easily communicated, which usually involves their simplification and sloganization, (2) they must establish a claim to truth [i.e., 'a basis of authority--divine, institutional, charismatic'], and (3) they must demand commitment to action."¹⁰³

We can formulate the following model--ideal type--of revolutionary ideology based on the above definition of the concept and description of the elements of ideology:

(1) The first task of a revolutionary ideology is to bring about political consciousness to the society. Political consciousness is a prerequisite to "a systematic criticism of the present social arrangements." "The politically conscious individual" has been defined by Johan Galtung as "the person who questions the ability of the social structure to satisfy his own needs and those of the larger group with which he identifies, and wants changes of structure. Personal satisfaction, 'success,' is not enough."¹⁰⁴ Unless a significant number of people in the society develop the capacity to question the existing order and to look beyond their self-interest to the interest of the community as a whole, no revolutionary movement can start off. The importance of "class

consciousness" in Marxist theory of revolution was earlier mentioned. Bouchier also emphasizes the importance of consciousness: "If we look at radical movements from the inside, that is from the viewpoint of committed activists, we can see that the problem facing those who wish to change the social order ... is that they must change people's consciousness."¹⁰⁵ Certainly praxis plays an important role in bringing about political consciousness, but political education is also important. Therefore, a revolutionary ideology contains some elements of political education to bring about political consciousness.

(2) According to Galtung, the "systematic criticism of the present social arrangements"--which he calls "data, leading to an image of the rejected present"--composes 20 to 90 percent of "a typical revolutionary ideology."¹⁰⁶ To criticize the present conditions means to identify "areas of deprivation or stress, and to present an attack on the legitimating mechanisms which are associated with them."¹⁰⁷ Legitimacy denotes "a condition of positive valuation, validity and acceptance enjoyed by individual rulers, political institutions and movements, and by systems of authority by the reason of [their] accordance ... with some law, principles, or source of authorization."¹⁰⁸ A revolutionary ideology would first specify the areas of deprivation and strain and then seek to remove the conditions of positive valuation and validity of the rulers and institutions responsible for them.

(3) As Hagopain and many other theorists of revolution maintain: revolutions "are not just against something, but they are for

establishing something radically new."¹⁰⁹ The criticism of the present social arrangements will introduce some new values, but the revolutionary ideology will not limit itself to this. It will introduce new sets of values which will form the basis of the whole revolutionary struggle and the ideal future society. "Value" is used here as defined by Milton Rokeach: "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence."¹¹⁰

(4) In addition to the new set of values, the revolutionary ideology presents "an outline of the 'good society' in which values can be realized." This means an outline of the political, economic and social system of the desired society. The presentation of the outline of the future society is necessary in order to encourage the people to work for changing the existing system. The outline, however, need not be detailed and fixed. As Mostafa Rejai argues, "there is a necessary ambiguity in revolutionary ideology, which is inherent in the nature of the phenomenon itself--if only due to its comprehensiveness." He further maintains that "ambiguity must be deliberately cultivated ... [and] the ideology must be diluted" in order to be able to capture wide popular appeal.¹¹¹ In other words, not only is it impossible for revolutionary ideology to get rid of ambiguity, but it needs to leave the door open for flexibility.

(5) "A strategic plan for getting from the present to the future" involves two stages: (a) destruction of the present system,

and (b) building the new society. The detailed plan for the second stage can be postponed until the revolutionary movement reaches power. A program of action for the first stage, however, will be included in the revolutionary ideology. The program of action will specify the forms of action necessary, the key targets of change that the struggle should focus on, and the key agents that bring about the change.

(6) The revolutionary struggle cannot get started and the program of action cannot be undertaken unless the people are confident of themselves and sure of their victory. According to Robert Michels, "the classes representing a past economic order continue to maintain their social predominance only because the classes representing the present or future economy have as yet failed to become aware of the strength, of their political and economic importance, and of the wrongs which they suffer at the hands of society." The point is that, "a sense of fatalism and a sad conviction of impotence exercise a paralyzing influence in social life."¹¹² Therefore, revolutionary ideology calls for commitment to action and eliminates the condition which Bouchier calls "alienation--a sense of powerlessness/meaninglessness, a subjective feeling of helplessness in the face of an all-pervasive social control."¹¹³ The revolutionary ideology provides a sense of mission and self-confidence to the group of revolutionaries--which can include the whole population.

(7) Although violence is not part of the definition of revolution, in most revolutionary struggles violence will be

unavoidable, because those in power will not give up easily and will use violence at least as a last resort. Since the government holds the means of destruction--i.e., the armed forces--the revolutionaries will certainly suffer heavy losses. Even if there is no violence, revolutionary struggle--such as strikes and civil disobedience--will call for economic and other types of sacrifice on the part of revolutionaries. This point is emphasized by Lenin as well: "For revolution it is essential ... that a majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class-conscious, thinking, politically active workers) should fully understand that revolution is necessary and be ready to sacrifice their lives for it."¹¹⁴ Therefore, revolutionary ideology asks for sacrifice either by painting such a picture of the future society that makes the sacrifice worth it or by appealing to higher values. Moreover, it calls for revolutionary patience and forbearance in the face of prolonged sufferings and sacrifices.

(8) A revolutionary ideology should be at a sufficient level of complexity and logical coherence to appeal to the intellectuals and the educated strata. In the meantime, it should be simple enough to appeal to the masses who have been prevented from proper education and from developing their understanding. One of the ways to simplify the revolutionary ideology is to sloganize its main values or those values which attract the masses--e.g., "liberty, equality, and fraternity;" or "peace, land, and bread." The other means of simplification is the use of allegories, myths, and symbols.

(9) And last, but not least, a revolutionary ideology--like any other ideology--must establish "its claim to truth." It is needless to say that no one will accept the criticism of a revolutionary ideology of present conditions, its values and outline of ideal society, and its call for action and sacrifice unless he believes them to be true and justified. To be accepted as true and justified, the revolutionary ideology should allege coming from a source which people believe in--"God," "science," "philosophy," "tradition," or a "charismatic leader." Moreover, it should not contradict people's life experience, rather, be confirmed by it. It should also seem "rational." A revolutionary ideology will be more successful in establishing its claim to truth if it can show examples of the embodiment of its values and ideals either in societies or in individuals.

This concludes the discussion on the model of revolutionary ideology. Certainly it is an incomplete model. It does not include discussion on the sources of ideology, nor about how it is propagated. But I believe it is adequate for the purpose of this study, i.e., analyzing and understanding the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It can also serve as a basis for comparative study of revolutionary ideologies as well as for generating hypotheses about factors that cause successful revolutions.

Chapter III

IDEOLOGY OF REVOLUTION IN THE HOLY QURAN

Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, a renown Muslim scholar, suggests that

If one desires to know the Quranic solution of a certain human problem, he should first make a study of the relevant literature, both ancient and modern, and mark down the basic issues. He should also make use of the research so far done into the problem and note down the issues at point. Then he should study the Quran with a view to finding out the answers to those issues. I can say from my personal experience that when one studies the Quran with a view to making research into any problem, one will find an answer to it even in those verses which one had skipped over without even imagining that it was there.¹

In the last chapter I reviewed the literature on ideology and revolution and presented a model of revolutionary ideology. Although the model is "neutral" in the sense that it can be used for studying both "liberating" revolutionary ideologies and "dominating" revolutionary ideologies--such as fascism--my main concern was, and is, the kind of revolutionary ideology that liberates man from domination of man. In this chapter, I would like to seek answers from the Quran to the questions: How can the oppressed masses--especially in the "Third World" Muslim countries--get rid of domination and exploitation and become the masters of their own destiny? Does the Quran suggest any ideology for bringing about revolutionary changes? What kind of revolutionary ideology is it? How does it try to bring about political consciousness? Does it delegitimize the oppressive conditions? What are its high values? What kind of a social, economic and political system does it suggest? Does it suggest a program of action for revolutionary

change? What is it? How does it call for a commitment to action and try to eliminate the condition of powerlessness and meaninglessness? Does it provide a sense of mission and confidence? How does it encourage its adherers to self sacrifice and revolutionary patience and forbearance? Is it possible to simplify its revolutionary ideology by sloganization and use of allegories and symbols? How does it establish its claim to truth? Is it rational?

These are the issues that I want to find answers for in the Quran, which is the basic source of the religion of Islam and "does provide a firm basis of undoubted authenticity."² Occasionally I will use Hadith--the Sayings of Prophet Muhammad--to clarify or explain some points. Although some orientalists doubt the authenticity of Hadith, the absolute majority of Muslims consider it as the second source of Islam.

In this chapter I will not present a new interpretation of the Holy Quran, because I will not be concerned with its "meaning," rather, with its "significance." The distinction between "meaning" and "significance" has been developed and emphasized by E.D. Hirsch Jr., who is an eminent theorist of hermeneutics. He does not claim originality for this distinction; rather, he bases it on the work of other theorists of hermeneutics such as August Boeckh and Gottlob Frege.³ According to Hirsch, "The term 'meaning' refers to the whole verbal meaning of a text, and 'significance' to textual meaning in relation to a larger context, i.e. another mind, another era, a wider subject matter, or an alien system of values, and so on."⁴ "Interpretation" is an explanation of author's verbal

meaning as understood by the commentator. What concerns itself with "significance" is called "criticism" which "is not identical with significance, but rather refers to it, talks about it, describes it." Hirsch is in favor of "critical freedom"--following no specific rules and regulations for the criticism. But he emphasizes the importance of "valid interpretation," because "from the stand point of knowledge, valid criticism is dependable on valid interpretation."⁶ Hirsch further notes,

Usually we cannot even understand a text without perceiving [some relationships between a verbal meaning and something else] because we cannot artificially isolate the act of construing verbal meaning from all those acts, perceptions, associations, and judgments which accompany that act and which are instrumental in leading us to perform it. Nevertheless, we certainly can isolate or at least emphasize a particular goal for our activity. We can decide at a given moment that we are mainly interested in constructing what the author meant rather than in relating that meaning to something else, we can devote our attention to that meaning and use all our related knowledge entirely in the service of that goal. On the other hand, we could assure that we have already rightly understood what the author meant and could devote our attention entirely to placing that meaning in some context or relationship.⁷

Although I do not believe the meaning of the Holy Quran has ever been completely understood by any of its commentators, I neither have the capability nor the opportunity to present a new interpretation of the Quran. Thus, for the purpose of this study I assume that "we have already rightly understood" the meaning of the Quran and devote my attention entirely to placing that meaning in relationship to the issues I raised above. In this study I will use the translations and interpretations of the Quran by Abdullah Yusuf Ali⁸ and Marmaduke Pickthall.⁹ The reason for using two translations instead of one is that Arabic words are usually broader

in meaning than English words, and different translators emphasize different shades of the meaning. The reason for selecting these two translations of the Quran is that: (1) they are done by Muslims and in this study I am concerned with the significance of the Quran to the revolutionary ideology for Muslims, and (2) the fact that both works have undergone numerous reprints in different countries since their original publication in the 1930s is evidence of the fact that Muslims widely consider them as valid interpretations.

The rest of this chapter presents a study of the Holy Quran in relation to each component of revolutionary ideology. As noted earlier, reference to the Sayings of the Prophet will be minimal.

1. Political Consciousness. Earlier "the politically conscious individual" was defined as "the person who questions the ability of the social structure to satisfy his own needs and those of the larger group with which he identifies, and want changes of structure. Personal satisfaction, 'success,' is not enough."¹⁰ Thus, to bring about political consciousness, a revolutionary ideology needs to (a) "create" new needs among the people; it should not only turn people's attention to their unfulfilled basic needs, but also to higher needs and values; (b) bring about a sense of community among the people so that they identify with a larger group and strive for their common ideals; and (c) provide a framework for popularization of the higher needs and values and for creation of a sense of community.

A study of the Holy Quran shows that it provides for all the elements mentioned above:

(a) The basic concept in Islam is Tawhid which literally means unity and oneness, and in its religious sense it refers to oneness of God and unity of mankind. Oneness of God has been emphasized throughout the Quran,¹¹ and it has been put in the form of the maxim that "There is no god (entity worthy of worship) but God (the Supreme and Perfect Being)." This maxim together with the proclamation that "Muhammad is God's Messenger" form the "first pillar" of Islam. Thus belief in God is the highest value in Islam and serves as the basis of all Islamic teachings--including its political teachings.

A cursory look at the Quran shows that the concept it mentions most often is God--either in the form of His proper name as "Allah" or in the form of one of His attributes. Every Quranic passage turns man's attention towards God in one way or another. Moreover, according to the Quran, man's purpose of creation is to serve God (51:56). This shows that from the Quranic point of view "serving God" is the supreme goal towards which man should strive. Yusuf Ali sums up Muslims' understanding of the meaning of "serving God" as the following: "Creation is not for idle sport or play [the Quran, 21:16]. God has a serious plan behind it, which in our imperfect state, we can only express by saying that each creature is given the chance of development and progress towards the Goal, which is God. God is the source and the center of all power and all goodness, and our progress depends upon our putting ourselves into accord with His Will. This is His service."¹²

"Serving God" certainly has political implications. "God's Will" as revealed in the Quran is not only concerned with man's moral and spiritual well-being and development, but it also gives clear socio-political directives. We can mention only some examples here:

(1) God created mankind "from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made [them] into nations and tribes, that [they] may know each other (not that [they] may despise each other)" (49:130). Thus, all human beings are equal and there should be no discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, tribe, etc.

(2) Balance and justice is a law of creation on the basis of which the whole universe functions. Therefore, man must learn that law and apply it in his society (55:7-9). Moreover, God sent His "apostles with Clear Signs and sent with them the Book and the Balance (of Right and Wrong), that men may stand forth in justice" (57:25). Thus, justice should prevail in human society.

(3) "Verily the most honoured of you in the Sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you" (49:13). Thus, social status based on wealth, power, family lineage, etc. has no value and should be eliminated.

(4) "To God belongeth all that is in the heavens and on earth" (2:284 and many other verses). Thus, there is not absolute individual ownership and "ultimately all property belongs to the Community."¹³

(5) The believers should fight "in the cause of God and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)" (4:75). Thus, it is a duty of true Muslims to work for liberation of the weak from oppression.

(6) The Islamic Umma (brotherly community) is "the best of people evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God" (3:110). Thus, it is a duty of the believers to be concerned with--and actively involved in--the affairs of their society as well as those of mankind in general.

(7) "Let there be no compulsion in religion" (2:256). Thus, no one can force his views and ideas on others.

(8) Muslims are supposed to obey even the Prophet only in "just matters" (60:12). Thus, disobedience to unjust orders--no matter from what authority--is a duty of a Muslim.

(9) "Verily never will God change the condition of a people until they change it themselves (with their own souls)" (13:11).

Moreover, according to the Quran, the apostles that were sent by God to different people not only preached monotheism but also asked the people to rise up against exploitation, corruption and oppression and led them in their struggles. For example, Shuaib rose up against exploitation and warned the exploiters, "Give just measure, and cause no loss (to others by fraud). And weigh with scales true and upright. And withdraw not things justly due to men, nor do evil in the land, working mischief" (26:181-83). Prophet Salih asked the people to rise up against corruption and told them, "And follow not the bidding of those who are extravagant--who make mischief in the land, and ment not (their ways)" (26: 151-52). And Moses' mission was to liberate the "Children of Israel" from the domination of Pharaoh who had elevated himself to absolute power, had promoted discrimination and division among the people, and had

oppressed the Israelites to the extreme (2:49, 28:4). The Quran also tells the believers that the purpose of relating those stories is that they reflect upon them (7:176). Such a reflection would certainly lead to development of political consciousness.

(b) The Quran also tries to develop a sense of community among Muslims. First of all, it stresses the unity of mankind. According to the Quran, the creation and resurrection of humanity "is in no wise but as an individual soul" (31:28). Mankind also lived as "one single nation" at the beginning but they differed later, and one of the reasons why God sent Messengers was to settle the differences among them (2:213, 10:19). When people believe that their origin and destiny are the same and that they are supposed to live as a single nation, they should tend to develop a sense of community. They should care more about each other and work for their common good rather than for their self-interest.

Although ideally all mankind should live as a brotherly community, obviously the practice is far from this. According to the Quran, the only way mankind can reach that ideal is by adherence to God's revelation: "And hold fast, all together, by the Rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember God's favour on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren" (3:103). Therefore, the Quran puts more emphasis on the community and brotherhood of those who adhere to its teachings and ideology: "The Believers are but a single brotherhood" (49:9). "The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin what is

just, and forbid what is evil ..." (9:71). And the Prophet has said, "The believers are like one body. If its eye complains, the whole (body) complains; and if its head complains, the whole (body) complains."¹⁴

(c) Islam recognizes the importance of organization and enjoins upon Muslims to strive in an organized manner (the Quran: 61:4).¹⁵ Moreover, it establishes some institutions which--in addition to their other functions--serve to develop a sense of community among the Muslims and to popularize its political teachings.

Congregation prayer is one such institution. Praying five times a day is a religious duty on all Muslims--with some specific exemptions. They can perform the prayer individually, but they have been encouraged by the Quran and the Prophet to perform it in congregation.¹⁶ At least one prayer in a week--Friday noon-time--must be in congregation (the Quran, 62:9). Thus, not only the Muslims of a community see each other often and develop a sense of community, but the place where the regular congregation prayer is held--i.e., the mosque--becomes a center for community affairs. Moreover, in prayer a Muslim reads verses from the Quran which reminds him of his social and political obligations. Furthermore, the Khutba (speech or sermon) which is an integral part of Friday Prayer and Eid Prayer (larger gatherings twice a year) provide the religious leaders a great opportunity for political education of the masses and developing their political consciousness.

Hajj (pilgrimage to Makka) is congregation on a grand scale. In recent years over two million Muslims from different corners of the

globe get together in Makka to perform Hajj. The Quran states the purpose of Hajj in general terms: "That they [i.e., the pilgrims] may witness the benefits (provided) for them" (22:28). Commenting on this verse, Yusuf Ali writes, "There are benefits both for this our material life and for our spiritual life. Of the former kind are those associated with social intercourse which furthers trade and increases knowledge. ... Of both kinds may be considered the opportunity which the Pilgrimage provides for strengthening our international Brotherhood."¹⁷ Thus, Hajj intensifies Muslims' sense of community and increases their knowledge of and concern with their common good.

2. Criticism of Social Arrangement. In general, the Quran distinguishes between two types of social systems. One is the "evil" social system which is characterized by: (1) arrogance, (2) oppression and tyranny, (3) discrimination and division into classes, (4) luxury and waste, (5) corruption and indecency, (6) traditionalism and conservatism, (7) exploitation. The Holy Quran describes these characteristics of the evil social system by narrating the stories of the apostles who rose up against the prevailing social arrangement of their societies, tried to abolish them, and tried to establish a moral and just social system--which is the second type of social system distinguished from the "evil" one.

The prime example of the evil social system is the Egyptian society under the Pharaoh where Moses rose up to liberate "the Children of Israel" from the oppressive conditions they lived in:

(1) Arrogance: "Pharaoh and his chiefs ... behaved insolently: they were an arrogant people" (the Quran, 23:46).

(2) Oppression and tyranny: "The people of Pharaoh" set the Israelites "hard tasks and punishments, slaughtered [their] sons and let [their] women-folk live" (2:49).

(3) Discrimination and division into classes: "Pharaoh exalted himself in the earth and made its people castes. A tribe among them he oppressed, killing their sons and sparing their women"* (28:4).

(4) Luxury and waste: "Pharaoh was verily a tyrant in the land, and lo! he verily was of the wanton"* (10:83).

(5) Corruption and indecency: Pharaoh "transgressed beyond bounds in the lands and heaped therein mischief (on mischief)" (89:10-12).

(6) Traditionalism and conservatism: Pharaoh and his chiefs rejected Moses' invitation to change the social system because they did not want to break off their traditional way of life. They told Moses: "Hast thou come to us to turn us away from the ways we found our fathers following" (10:78)?

(7) Exploitation: Pharaoh-together with his chiefs--had exploited those who lived in Egypt to the extent that he claimed the ownership of Egypt: "And Pharaoh proclaimed among his people, saying: 'O my people! Does not the dominion of Egypt belong to me, (witness) these streams flowing underneath my (palace)'" (43:51)? Pharaoh and his chiefs had also enslaved the Israelite. In response to Pharaoh's mentioning his "favours" to him, Moses replied, "And

this is the favour with which thou dost reproach me,--that thou hast enslaved the children of Israel" (26:22)?

According to the Quran, these characteristics were not limited to Pharaoh's Egypt. They are found--more or less--in every society that is not based on moral and just principles. Other examples of evil social systems are those of Noah's people; and the tribes of Ad, Thamud, and Madian. they were characterized with one or more of the above characteristics. Their stories are told in different parts of the Quran.¹⁸ Examples of moral and just social systems are those societies established by prophets--including the kingdoms of David and Solomon--and some other just rulers--for instance Zul-Qarnain who captured large territories, tried to eliminate wrong doing and oppression, encouraged righteousness, and protected the weak against the mischievous people (the Quran, 18:83-98).¹⁹

The above characteristics of "evil" systems can apply to the existing conditions of a society where a revolutionary movement is active. To delegitimize the government and other institutions based on an "evil" social system, Islam enjoins that: (1) Nothing is worthy of worship but God, and (2) all the authority belongs to God. These points are discussed briefly:

(1) As mentioned in the last section, the "first pillar" of Islam is the maxim that "There is no god (entity worthy of worship) but God (the Supreme and Absolute), and Muhammad is God's Messenger." This seems a superb formula for attacking the legitimacy of evil social systems. When a person sincerely believes that no man or man-made object or institution is worthy of worship,

he will rebel against all power and authority that try to subjugate him. According to the Quran, associating partners to God not only means to worship idols but also to follow someone in defiance to God's orders (9:31) or to love someone as much as--or more than--God (2:165). Thus, a believer will rebel against oppression and arrogance which are the common features of all evil social arrangements. He will not attribute any positive valuation and validity to the individual rulers and the social, economic, and political institutions responsible for areas of deprivation. There is a possibility, however, that such rulers and institutions try to base their legitimacy on religion and commit their actions in the name of God. The second part of the above maxim challenges the authenticity of such a claim. The Message that Muhammad brought is not only itself against the mentioned areas of deprivation, but considers all the genuine religions as opposed to them.

(2) Closely related to the above means of delegitimization is the principle that all authority belongs to God. As the Quran states, "The Command rests with none but God" (6:57). Those in power are obliged to rule according to God's teachings; and if they do otherwise, they will be "unbelievers," "wrong-doers," and "rebellious" (the Quran, 5:47-50). Obviously such rulers cannot enjoy any legitimacy; and if they remain in power, it can be only through the use of force or by keeping the people ignorant about God's commands.²⁰

3. New Set of Values. A comprehensive study of values in the Quran needs a separate treatment. To get a preliminary picture, however, I used the very limited and incomplete index at the end of Yusuf Ali's translation and commentary of the Holy Quran in the following way:

- (1) I prepared a list of the entries which explicitly suggested a value.
- (2) I checked the entries under "Believers," "Nonbelievers," and "Righteousness" to see what values the Quran approved and/or tried to inculcate.
- (3) After preparing a list of values, I checked all the entries again and noted the ones that indirectly suggested one of the values in the list.
- (4) I counted the number of instances that each value had been mentioned in the Quran according to its entry in the index.

A total of 38 values with 624 instances of their occurrence in the Quran were noted. It should be emphasized that this study is in no way comprehensive or conclusive. There are certainly other values in the Quran which are not included in the list. There are numerous other instances that many of the values in the list have been mentioned in the Quran but not included in the index. The frequency of occurrence of each value only suggests its relative importance from the Quranic point of view. Whether it is really the case or not needs further research. The values that were noted are the following. They are listed according to their frequency of occurrence:

(1) Belief in God and God-consciousness: These values seem the most important values from the Quranic point of view. Their frequency of occurrence in the prepared list of values is 88.²¹ The number does not include every instance that the word "God" has been mentioned in the index. Neither does it include when God's attributes or favors are mentioned. The entries that are included are only those which enjoin upon the believers to fear God, to remember God, to worship God, and to pray--all of which imply belief in God and God-consciousness. The verses which refer to these values include the following: "O ye who believe! Observe your duty to Allah with right observance, and die not save as those who have surrendered (unto Him)"* (3:102). "When My servants ask thee concerning Me, I am indeed close to them: I listen to the prayer of every suppliant when he calleth on Me: let them also, with a will, listen to My Call, and believe in Me: that they may walk in the right way" (2:186). "But keep in remembrance the Name of thy Lord and devote thyself to Him whole-heartedly" (73:8).

(2) Success and salvation: With its frequency of 69,²² this is the second most important value from the Quran's point of view. Some of the entries include the word Aflah which, according to Yusuf Ali, means "win through, prosper, succeed, achieve their aims or obtain salvation from sorrow and all evil."²³ Thus, it not only refers to salvation in the Hereafter but also to success in this world. Other entries include God's promise for forgiveness and reward and His promise for "Gardens of Bliss." Some verses which refer to this value are the following: "The Believers must (eventually) win

through" (23:1). "God hath promised to Believers, men and women, Gardens under which rivers flow, to dwell therein, and beautiful mansions in Gardens of everlasting bliss. But the greater bliss is the Good Pleasure of God: that is the supreme felicity" (9:72). "Whoever works righteousness, men and women, and has Faith, verily, to him will We give a new life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on such their reward according to the best of their actions" (16:97).

(3) Sharing, charity, generosity: Sharing and charity seem to be the most important social values in the Quran--and they also imply generosity at the personal level. Their frequency of occurrence is 50 in the list.²⁴ Many of the entries enjoin upon Muslims to spend freely the bounties that God has given them. Many other entries consider spending and Zakat (which means purity and growth and has been translated as "regular charity" by Yusuf Ali) as a characteristic of a believer. And some of the entries condemn covetousness. The verses which refer to these values include the following: "By no meand shall ye attain righteousness unless ye give (freely) of that which ye love; and whatever ye give, of a truth God knoweth it well" (3:92). "Believers are those ... who establish regular prayer and spend (freely) out of the gifts We have given them for sustenance" (8:2-3). "They ask thee how much they are to spend; say 'What is beyond your needs'" (2:219)

(4) Activeness (in doing good): According to the Quran belief by itself is not good enough, and it must lead into good deeds in order to be counted. This is why in many places in the Quran belief in God

has been coupled with doing good deeds. Most of the entries refer to the reward that awaits those who are active in doing good and righteous actions. Some other entries enjoin upon the believers to "hasten" in doing good work. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 28 in the list.²⁵ But if we add entries which refer to "militancy," "exertiveness," and "social responsibility"--all of which imply "activeness"--the frequency will be much higher, i.e., 68. Some verses which refer to this value are the following: "If any do deeds of righteousness--be they male or female--and have faith, they will enter Heaven, not the least injustice will be done to them" (4:124). "Verily those who live in awe for fear of their Lord ... it is these who hasten in every good work, and these who are foremost in them" (23:57-61). "... Such will be the Gardens of which ye are made heirs for your (good) deeds (in life)" (43:72).

(5) Patience and perseverance: The Quran considers patience and perseverance an act of righteousness and as a characteristic of a believer. It refers to this value mostly in the context of Jihad and struggle in the way of God. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 27 in the list.²⁶ The verses which refer to it include the following: "It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces towards East or West [for prayer]; but it is righteousness to believe in God ... and to be firm and patient, in pain (or suffering) and adversity, and throughout all the periods of panic" (2:177). "God is with those who patiently persevere" (2:153). "Ye shall certainly be tried and tested in your possessions and in your personal selves; ... but if ye persevere patiently, and guard

against evil,--then that will be a determining factor in all affairs" (3:186).

(6) Truthfulness and sincerity: Islam--like all other religions--enjoins honesty and sincerity and condemns lying and hypocrisy. In general, the Quran takes the honesty of the believers for granted and only in a few places emphasize the importance of truthfulness and sincerity. Most of the entries in the list refer to condemnation of hypocrisy and hypocrites. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 26.²⁷ The verses which refer to it include the following: "God will say [on the Day of Judgment]: 'This is a day on which the truthful will profit from their truth: theirs are Gardens, with rivers flowing beneath' ..." (5:122). "The hypocrites will be in the lowest depths of the Fire: no helpers wilt thou find for them" (4:145).

(7) Piety and self-restraint: The Arabic word for piety is Taqwa which signifies, according to Yusuf Ali, "(1) the fear of God; ... (2) restraint or guarding one's tongue, hand and heart from evil; (3) hence righteousness, piety, good conduct."²⁸ Although in the Arabic text all the ideas are implied; Yusuf Ali indicates only one shade of the meaning in his translation according to the context. The instances which he translates Taqwa as "fear of God" have been included under "God-consciousness." Most of the entries included here are the instances that Taqwa has been translated as righteousness or piety. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 23 in the list.²⁹ The verses which refer to the value include the following: "Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is

(he who is) the most righteous of you" (49:13). "Set thy face towards Religion with true piety, and never in any wise be of the Unbelievers" (10:105). "And for such as had entertained the fear of standing before their Lord's (tribunal) and had restrained (their) souls for lower Desires, their abode will be the Garden" (79:40-41).

(8) Equality and brotherhood, unity, companionship: According to the Quran, the origin of all mankind is the same. Thus they are equal to each other regardless of their race, tongue, color, worldly possessions, family background, etc. Moreover, all those who adhere to Islam are considered as a single brotherhood. They have been described as friends and protectors of each other and have been commanded to remain united. The values of equality, unity, and companionship are inculcated by and manifested in the Islamic congregation prayer and Hajj. Their frequency of occurrence is 22 in the list.³⁰ Some verse which refer to these values are the following: "O Mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you" (49:13). "And obey God and His Apostle; and fall into no dispute, lest ye lose heart and your power depart; and be patient and persevering for God is with those who patiently persevere" (8:46). "The Believers are but a single Brotherhood" (49:10).

(9) Militancy (in the cause of God and the oppressed): Unlike most other religions, Islam stimulates its followers to pick up arms

and fight for their own defense, the defense of their religion, and the defense of the oppressed people. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 20 in the list.³¹ Only the entries directly referring to fighting are included here. The entries which refer to Jihad, which also implies fighting, are classified as "exertiveness" because of its wider meaning. If the entries under "exertiveness," "self-sacrifice," and "self-defense"--all of which imply militancy--are added, the frequency would be more than 50. The verses which refer to this value include the following: "Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress the limits; for God loveth not transgressors" (2:190). "And why should ye not fight in the cause of God and those who, being weak, are illtreated (and oppressed)" (4:75)? "Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But God knoweth, and ye know not" (2:216).

(10) Devotion and self-sacrifice: Struggle in the cause of God and the oppressed requires devotion and self-sacrifice. These values have also been emphasized in the Holy Quran. The frequency of occurrence of these values is 20 in the list.³² The verses which refer to them include: "Say: if it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your mates, or your kindred; the wealth that ye have gained; the commerce in which ye fear a decline; or the dwellings in which ye delight--are dearer to you than God, or His Apostle, or striving in His cause;--then wait until God brings about His decision: and God guides not the rebellious" (9:24). "Think not of

those who are slain in God's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the Presence of their Lord" (3:169). "Those who believe, and suffer exile and strive with might and main, in God's cause, with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of God: they are the people who will achieve (salvation)" (9:20).

(11) Justice and equity: The Holy Quran emphasizes justice and equity. It considers justice and balance as a universal law of creation. At the social level, it considers the establishment of a just society as a main part of prophets' mission. And at the personal level, it asks the believers to judge with justice even if it proves harmful to themselves and/or to those close to them. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 19 in the list.³³ The verses which refer to it include the following: "And the Firmament has He [God] raised high, and He has set up the Balance (of Justice), in order that ye may not transgress (due) balance." (55:7-8). "We sent aforetime our apostles with Clear Signs and sent down with them the Book and the Balance (of Right and Wrong), that men may stand forth in justice" (57:25). "O ye who believe! Stand out for justice, as witnesses to God, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for God can best protect both ..." (4:135).

(12) Courage and self-confidence: Courage and self-confidence are also required in the struggle in the cause of God and the oppressed. The Quran tries to inculcate these values in the believers. The frequency of such instances is 18 in the list.³⁴

The verses which refer to these values include the following: "So lose not heart, nor fall into despair: for ye must gain mastery if ye are true in Faith" (3:139). "God will certainly aid those who aid His (cause);--for verily God is Full of Strength, Exalted in Might, (Able to enforce His Will)" (22:40). "O Apostle! Sufficient unto thee is God,--(unto thee) and unto those who follow thee among the Believers" (8:64).

(13) Liberty: As noted earlier, the Holy Quran mentions the cause of God together with the cause of those who are oppressed (the Quran, 4:75). In more than 30 instances it commands the believers to strive and fight in the cause of God--which also implies against oppression. Moreover, large sections of the Quran are devoted to the story of Moses whose mission was to liberate the Israelites from Egyptian domination and guide them to the right path. The entries included here, however, are only those which explicitly condemn oppression and/or talk about liberation. The frequency of its occurrence is 18 in the list.³⁵ Some verses which refer to this value are the following: "And slay them wherever you catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter" (2:191). "So go ye both [Moses and his brother Aaron] to him [Pharaoh], and say, 'verily we are apostles sent by thy Lord: send forth, therefore, the Children of Israel with us, and afflict them not ...'" (20:47). "And We [God] wished to be Gracious to those who were being depressed in the land, to make them leaders (in faith) and make them heirs" (28:5).

(14) Kindness: Like other religions, Islam enjoins kindness to parents, relatives, neighbors, and those in need. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 16 in the list.³⁶ The verses which refer to it include: "We have enjoined on man kindness to parents ..." (29:8). "God commands justice, the doing of good, and liberty to kith and kin, and he forbids all shameful deeds and injustice and rebellion" (16:90).

(15) Obedience (to Divine authority and righteous leader): Obedience is considered as a value by the Quran only when it is to the Divine authority and the leaders who follow God's commands. A Muslim should not obey orders which are against his religious beliefs even if it comes from his parents.³⁷ The frequency of occurrence of this value is 15 in the list.³⁸ All the entries enjoin obedience to God and/or His Apostle. Only one entry commands obedience to "those charged with authority among you" (4:59), but this obedience is also conditioned to the obedience to God and the Apostle. Another verse which refers to this value is: "The answer of the Believers when summoned to God and His Apostle, in order that he may judge them, is no other than this: They say, 'We hear and we obey': it is such as these that will attain felicity" (24:51).

(16) Keen observation, reasoning, reflection: The Holy Quran tries to inculcate the values of keen observation, rational reasoning and reflection in its reader. In over 75 instances in the Quran, natural phenomena have been referred to as "Signs of God." Moreover, according to another count, "repeated about fifty times in the Koran is the verb aqala which means 'connect ideas together,

reason, understand and intellectual argument.' Thirteen times we come upon the refrain, after a piece of reasoning: a fa-la taqilun, 'have ye then no sense?'"³⁹ All these references imply the importance of reasoning and rationality and man's keen observation of and reflection upon natural phenomena. The entries counted here, however, are only those instances which are noted in the index and explicitly refer to natural phenomena as God's signs and mention words related to reasoning and reflection. The frequency of occurrence of such instances is 15 in the list.⁴⁰ The verses which refer to these values include: "Behold! In the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the alternation of Night and Day,--there are indeed Signs for men of understanding,--men who celebrate the praise of God, standing, sitting, and lying down on their sides, and contemplate the (wonders of) creation in heavens and the earth" (3:190-91). "And among His Signs is this, that He created for you mates from among yourselves, that ye may dwell in tranquility with them, and He has put love and mercy between your (hearts): verily in that are Signs for those who reflect" (30:21).

(17) Dependability: The Quran asks the believers to be dependable and trustworthy. It enjoins upon them to fulfill their contracts and obligations, to return faithfully orphans' property which has been entrusted to them, not to betray their trust, and to stand firm in their testimonies. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 15 in the list.⁴¹ The verses which refer to it include the following: "O ye who believe! fulfill all obligations" (5:1). "O

ye that believe! Betray not the trust of God and the Apostle, nor misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you" (8:27).

(18) Exertiveness: The Quran invites the believers to Jihad over and over. Yusuf Ali translates Jihad as "strive," and in its explanation he notes:

It may require fighting in God's cause, as a form of self-sacrifice. But its essence consists in (1) a true and sincere Faith, which so fixes its gaze on God that all selfish or worldly motives seems paltry and fade away, and (2) an earnest, and ceaseless activity, involving the sacrifice (if need be) of life, person, or property, in the service of God. Mere brutish fighting is opposed to the whole spirit of Jihad, while the sincere scholar's pen or preacher's voice or wealthy man's contribution may be the most valuable forms of Jihad.⁴²

Because of this wider meaning, I have classified the instances referring to Jihad as "exertiveness" rather than "militancy." Its frequency of occurrence is 14 in the list.⁴³ The verses which refer to it include: "God hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home)" (4:95). "And strive in His cause as ye ought to strive, (with sincerity and under discipline)" (22:78). "... Therefore listen not to the Unbelievers, but strive against them with the utmost strenuousness, with the (Quran)" (25:52).

(19) Chastity: Chastity is a value according to the Quran, and the believers--men and women--should avoid indecency and shameful deeds. Its frequency of occurrence is 13 in the list.⁴⁴ The verses which refer to it include the following: "Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty. ... And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty ..." (24:30-31). "... Nor come nigh to adultery:

for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil, opening the road (to other evils)" (17:32).

(20) Humility: The Quran condemns arrogance and admires humbleness. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 11 in the list.⁴⁵ Some verse which refer to it are: "And swell not thy cheek (for pride) at men, nor walk in insolence though the earth, for God loveth not any arrogant boaster" (31:18). "For Muslim men and women, ... for men and women who humble themselves, ... for them has God prepared forgiveness and great reward" (33:35).

(21) Mobility/search for knowledge: The Holy Quran instructs its readers to travel around the world in order to study the past civilizations and to study how the creation originated. The frequency of occurrence of this value is 10 in the list.⁴⁶ The verse which refer to this value include: "Do they not travel through the earth, and see what was the End of those before them? They were superior to them in strength ..." (30:9). "Say: 'Travel through the earth and see how God did originate creation; so will God produce a later creation: for God has power over all things'" (29:20). "Do they not travel through the land, so that their hearts (and minds) may thus learn wisdom and their ears may thus learn to hear" (22:46)?

(22) Forgiveness: The Quran allows retribution but commends forgiveness. It also enjoins upon the believers to turn off evil with good. The frequency of occurrence of this value is nine in the list.⁴⁷ The verses which refer to it include the following: "The recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is due

from God: for God loveth not those who do wrong" (42:40). "Hold to forgiveness, command what is right; but turn away from ignorance" (7:199). "Those who patiently persevere, ... and turn off Evil with good: for such there is the final attainment of the (Eternal) Home" (13:22).

(23) Firmness and steadfastness: The value of "perseverance," which was mentioned earlier, implies steadfastness as well. But there are several instances that the Quran explicitly mentions firmness and steadfastness as a value. The frequency of occurrence of such instances is nine in the list.⁴⁸ Some verses which refer to this value are the following: "When they [the believers] advanced to meet Goliath and his forces they prayed: 'Our Lord! Pour out constancy on us and make our steps firm: help us against those that reject faith" (2:250). "O ye who believe! When ye meet a force, be firm, and call God in remembrance much (and often) that ye may prosper" (8:45). "O ye who believe! Fight the Unbelievers who gird you about, and let them find firmness in you: and know that God is with those who fear Him" (9:123).

(24) Moderation: The Quran enjoins moderation not only in consumption of food and drink, in spending wealth, and in pace and voice, but even in religion. The frequency of occurrence of this value is eight in the list.⁴⁹ The verses which mention this value include: "O ye who believe! Make not unlawful the good things which God hath made lawful for you, but commit no excess: for God loveth not those given to excess" (5:90). "Verily spendthrifts are brothers of the Evil Ones" (17:27). "O People of the Book! Commit no excess

in your religion: nor say of God aught but the truth" (4:171).

(25) Frugality: The Quran condemns wastefulness and commends wise management of economic resources. The frequency of occurrence of this value is seven in the list.⁵⁰ Some verses which refer to this value are: "O Children of Adam! Wear your beautiful apparel at every time and place of prayer: eat and drink: but waste not by excess, for God loveth not the wasters" (7:31). "O ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities: but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good-will" (4:29). "To those weak of understanding make not over your property, which God hath made a means of support for you, but feed and cloth them therewith, and speak to them of kindness and justice" (4:5).

(26) Self-defence: The Quran enjoin upon Muslims to defend themselves when they are attacked by an enemy. The frequency of occurrence of this value is seven in the list.⁵¹ The verses which refer to this value include the following: "Will ye not fight people who violated their oaths, plotted to expel the Apostle, and took the aggressive by being first (to assault) you? Do ye fear them? Nay, it is God whom ye should more justly fear, if ye believe" (9:13): "To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged;--and verily, God is Most Powerful for their aid" (22:39). "[Believer are] those who, when an oppressive wrong is inflicted on them, (are not cowed but) help and defend themselves" (42:39).

(27) Courtesy: The Quran enjoins the believers to be courteous to each other and to avoid mockery, n an oppressive wrong is

inflected on them, (are not cowed but) help and defend themselves" (42:39).

backbiting, defaming, and slandering. The frequency of occurrence of this value is seven in the list.⁵² The verses which refer to this value include the following: "When a (courteous) greeting is offered you, meet it with a greeting still more courteous, or (at least) of equal courtesy. God takes careful account of all things" (4:86). "Woe to every (kind of) scandal-monger and back-biter" (104:1). "O ye who believe! Let not some men among you laugh at others, ... nor defame nor be sarcastic to each other, nor call each other by (offensive) nicknames ..." (49:11).

(28) Peace: In spite of its emphasis on militancy, Islam considers peace a high value. First of all, the word "Islam" itself implies peace--as well as having other shades of meaning.⁵³ Secondly, Muslims' salutation of Salamun Alaikum means "Peace on you;" and, according to the Quran, it will be the greeting of the Righteous in the Hereafter (7: 46, and several other places). And thirdly, the Quran promises those who believe and do righteous deeds that God will "grant them in the land, inheritance (of power) ... and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace" (24:55). The frequency of occurrence of this value is seven in the list.⁵⁴

(29) Social responsibility: The values of sharing, activeness, militancy, liberty, justice, and exertiveness all imply social responsibility. But there are some instances in which the Quran directly commands the believers to take upon themselves social

responsibility by enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. The total frequency of instances referring to social responsibility exceeds 150. The frequency of occurrence of entries directly commanding social responsibility is six in the list.⁵⁵ The verse which refers to this value includes: "The Believers, men and women, are protectors, one of another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil. ... On them will God pour His Mercy: for God is Exalted in power, Wise" (9:71). "... Then will he be of those who believe, and enjoin patience, (constancy and self-restraint), and enjoin deeds of kindness and compassion. Such are the companions of the Right Hand [who achieve salvation]" (90:17-18).

(30) Tranquility: The Quran considers tranquility and peace of mind as a value and as a gift from God. Its frequency of occurrence is six in the list.⁵⁶ The verses which refer to this value include: "It is He [God] Who sent down tranquility into the hearts of the Believers, that they may add Faith to their Faith ..." (48:4). "Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of God: for without doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction" (13:28).

(31) Independence: In several instances the Quran warns the believers against seeking protection, intimacy and friendship from those outside their ranks. These verses could be understood to refer either to independence or to exclusiveness. Other verses of the Quran, however, indicate that the latter cannot be the case. For example, the Quran recognizes the Divine origin of other religions and states that, "Those who believe (in the Quran), and those who

follow the Jewish (scripture), and the Christians and the Sabians,--any who believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord: on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (2:62). It also allows Muslims to interact with the "People of the Book" (5:6) and commands them to deal "kindly and justly" with those who "fight [them] not for [their] Faith" (60:8). Thus, the instances noted above would refer only to independence. The frequency of occurrence of such instances is five in the list.⁵⁷ Some of those instances are the following: "O ye who believe! Take not for friends and protectors those who take your religion for mocking or sport ..." (5:60): "... Or think ye that ye shall be abandoned, as though God did not know those among you who strive with might and main, and take none for friends and protectors except God, His Apostle, and the (community of) Believers? But God is well-acquainted with (all) that ye do" (9:16).

(32) Cooperation: Many of the values mentioned above--such as sharing, unity and brotherhood, social responsibility--imply the value of cooperation as well. Direct references to this value are few, however. The frequency of its occurrence is five in the list.⁵⁸ Some of the verses which refer to this value are: "... But if they [i.e., the believers who have not migrated] seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to help them, except against a people with whom ye have a treaty of mutual alliance. And (remember) God seeth all that ye do" (8:72). "Help ye one another in righteousness and

piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour: fear God: for God is strict in punishment" (5:3).

(33) Seriousness: The Quran commands the Muslims to avoid vain talk and action and to say only "those things that are best" (17:53). Seen in the light of the values mentioned above, this means that Muslims should engage only in serious matters. The frequency of occurrence of this value is four in the list.⁵⁹ Another example of the verses which refer to this value is the following: "And when they [i.e., the Muslims] hear vain talks, they turn away therefrom and say: 'To us our deeds, and to you yours, peace be to you: we seek not the ignorant'" (28:55).

(34) Excellence: The Quran wants the Muslims to be the best because of their faith and action, and to gain mastery. Thus it inculcates the value of excellence. The frequency of occurrence of this value is three in the list. The verses which refer to it are the following: "Ye are the best of People, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God" (3:110). "So lose not heart, nor fall into despair: for ye must gain mastery if ye are true in Faith" (3:139). "Be not weary and faint-hearted, crying for peace, when ye should be uppermost: for God is with you, and will never put you in loss for your (good) deeds" (47:35).

(35) Discipline: Islam teaches the value of discipline by its obligatory prayers, fasting and Hajj. In the Quran, there are few direct references to this value, however. In one instance it blames Muslims' defeat in one of their early encounters with the pagans of

Makka--in which they were first successful--on their lack of discipline: "God did indeed fulfill His promise to you when ye with His permission were about to annihilate your enemy,--until ye flinched and fell to disputing about the order, and disobeyed it after He brought you in sight (of the Booty) which ye covet ..." (3:152). And as Yusuf Ali notes, "The order was: not to run after booty, but strictly to maintain discipline."⁶⁰ Another verse which refers to discipline as a value is: "Truly God loveth those who fight in His cause in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented structure" (61:4).

(36) Cleanliness: Islam also teaches the value of cleanliness by making it an integral part of the five daily obligatory prayers. In the Quran, there are several references to this value: "O ye who believe! Approach not prayer with a mind beflogged, until ye can understand all that ye say,--nor in a state of ceremonial impurity (except when travelling on the road), until after washing your whole body ..." (4:43). "O ye who believe! When ye prepare for prayer, wash your faces and your hands (and arms) to the elbows; rub your head (with water); and (wash) your feet to ankles. If ye are in a state of ceremonial impurity, bathe your whole body ..." (5:7).

(37) Taking precautions: According to the Quran, courage and fearlessness is a value, but the necessary precautions should be taken: "O ye who believe! take your precautions, and either go forth in parties or go forth all together" (4:71). Even when saying the obligatory prayer in the fighting front, the Muslims should be cautious: "When thou (O Apostle) art with them, and standest to lead

them in prayer, let one party of them stand up (in prayer) with thee, taking their arms with them: when they finish their prostration, let them take their positions in the rear, and let the other party come up which hath not yet prayed--and let them pray with thee taking all precautions, and bearing arms: the unbelievers wish if ye were negligent of your arms and your baggages to assault you in a single rush ..." (4:102).

(38) Consultation: The Holy Quran considers consultation of such importance that it even instructs the Prophet to consult the believers in the affairs of the Muslim society: "And consult them in affairs (of moment). Then when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in God ..." (3:159). It also considers mutual consultation as a characteristic of the believers (42:38).

4. Outline of the Good Society. Numerous books and articles have been written on the social, political and economic teaching of Islam and their implementation in the desired Islamic society. We do not need a detailed treatment of the subject here, however. As far as the ideology of revolution in the Quran is concerned, an outline of the desired good society would suffice. It was noted earlier that, "There is a necessary ambiguity in revolutionary ideology, which is inherent in the nature of the phenomenon itself--if only due to its comprehensiveness."⁶¹ Whether we consider it due to "ambiguity" or because of adherence to the principle of "permanence and change,"⁶² the Quran certainly does not provide a blueprint of the desired society. What it does provide are: (1) the main

values--listed in section 3 above-- which should not only be cherished by individual Muslims but must also prevail in the Islamic society; and (2) basic general principles upon which the social, political and economic systems of the desired Islamic society should be built. Muslims have the prerogative and responsibility to draw up the details of their social, political and economic systems on the basis of those general principles in such a way that the Islamic values prevail in the society. Thus, there can be more than one Islamic social, political and economic systems; but the values they adhere to and their basic principles would be the same. Some of the general principles which can be considered as an outline of the desired Islamic society are briefly discussed below. The list and the discussions are not intended to be comprehensive; they are, rather, only suggestive.

(1) Islamic law as the law of the land: A very important principle--on which there seems to be a general agreement among the Muslims--is that Sharia or Islamic law should be the law of the Islamic society. According to the Quran, God prescribed a law to the followers of each of the prophets: "... To each among you have We prescribed a law and an Open Way ..." (5:51). Each prophet and his followers were commanded to rule and judge according to the Divine Law: "... If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what God hath revealed, they are (no better than) Unbelievers; ... they are (no better than) wrong doers; ... they are (no better than) those who rebel" (5:47-50). As Muhammad Asad--an eminent Muslim scholar--points out, "Because it is restricted to commands and

prohibitions expressed in self-evident terms in Quran and Sunnah [i.e., the tradition of the Prophet], the real Shariah is extremely concise, and therefore, easily understandable; and because it is so small in volume, it cannot--nor ... was it ever intended to--provide detailed legislation for every contingency of life. Consequently, the Law-Giver meant us Muslims to provide for the necessary, accitional legislation through the exercise of our Ijtihad (independent reasoning) in consonance with the spirit of Islam."⁶³

The view that "independent reasoning" should be used to legislate on the basis of the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah in the areas where no clear rule can be found in these sources is based on the following Saying of the Prophet--among many of his Sayings:

When [Muadh ibn Jabal] was being sent [as a governor] to the Yemen, the Prophet asked him: 'How will you decide the cases that will be brought before you?' Muadh replied: 'I shall decide them according to the Book of God.' --'And if you find nothing concerning [a particular matter] in the Book of God?' --'Then I shall decide it according to the Sunnah of God's Apostle.' --'And if you find nothing about it in the Sunnah of God's Apostle?' --'Then,' replied Muadh, 'I shall exercise my own judgment [ejtahidu bi-rayi] without the least hesitation.' Thereupon the Prophet slapped him upon the chest and said: 'Praised be God, who has caused the messenger of God's Messenger to please the latter.'⁶⁴

(2) Sovereignty belongs to God: According to the Quran, "The Command rests with none but God" (6:57, 12:40). Thus, the ultimate authority belongs to God. This means that Muslim rulers and/or the Muslim population in general cannot make any laws and rules which run counter to the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet. This has been made clear in another verse as well: "It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by God and

His Apostle, to have any option about their decision: if any one disobeys God and His Apostle, he is indeed in clearly wrong Path" (33:36).

(3) The basis of legitimacy: An Islamic government can claim the loyalty and allegiance of the members of the society on the basis of the following verse of the Quran: "O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His Apostle, if ye do believe in God and the Last Day: that is best, and most suitable for final determination" (4:59). But as it is clear for this verse and what was mentioned earlier, the legitimacy is conditioned on government's obedience to the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet.

(4) Functions of the government: Since the Divine Law should be the law of the land, the main function of the Islamic government will be to implement that law in the society. The other main function of the Islamic government will be to provide the conditions so that the Islamic values prevail in the society--especially justice and equity.

(5) Consultation as the principle for decision making: According to the Quran, one of the characteristics of Muslims is that they carry out their affairs on the basis of mutual consultation and counselling: "[Believer are those] who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation" (42:38). As Muhammad Asad notes, "This nass [definite ordinance] injunction must be regarded as the fundamental, operative clause of all Islamic thought relating to statecraft. It

is so comprehensive that it reaches out into almost every department of political life, and it is so self-expressive and unequivocal that no attempt at arbitrary interpretation can change its purport."⁶⁵ But how the consultation should be carried out has not been determined.

(6) Criteria for appointment of the leadership: Since the implementation of Islamic law is one of the main functions of an Islamic government, it is the general consensus of the Muslim scholars that the head of an Islamic government should be a Muslim. This is one of the important criteria for the appointment of the leadership. The other important criteria is piety and righteousness. This is based on the verse of the Quran that, "Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you" (49:13). Two other criteria have been mentioned in the case of Talut (Saul) being appointed as the leader of the Israelites: "Their Prophet said to them: 'God hath appointed Talut as king over you.' They said: 'How can he exercise authority over us when we are better fitted than he to exercise authority, and he is not even gifted with wealth in abundance?' He said: 'God had chosen him above you, and hath gifted him abundantly with knowledge and bodily prowess'" (2:247). Thus knowledge and physical health and strength are other criteria that should be considered in the appointment of the leader. The above verse clearly rejects financial status as a criterion.

Now the question is: how can the leader be appointed? The Quran is not clear on this point. The principle of consultation mentioned

above suggests that all the members of the society should have a say in it. Moreover, some Muslim scholars translate the phrase Uolel amri minkum in verse 59, chapter four of the Quran (quoted under item (3) of this section) as "those in authority from among you" and interpret it as meaning that the leader should be elected from among the Muslim population.⁶⁶ Furthermore, some Muslim scholars look at the mode of appointment of the "Righteous Caliphs"--i.e., the heads of the Islamic State who followed Prophet Muhammad--and conclude that,

(1) In an Islamic State, the election of its Head depends entirely on the will of the general public and nobody has the right to impose himself forcibly as their Amir [leader].

(2) No clan or class has a monopoly of this office.

(3) The election should take place with the free-will of the Muslim masses and without any coercion or force.⁶⁷

But still the question remains: how should he be elected and for how long? There is no answer to this question in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet. Thus, Muslims can decide about these matters according to the conditions of their time and society.

(7) Rights and responsibilities of the citizens: It is a prerogative of the Muslims to live in a society where the government provides the conditions for fulfillment of Islamic values. Moreover, it is a right and a responsibility of Muslims to be concerned with the affairs of their government and to set forth constructive criticism. This principle is based on the verse of the Quran that, "You are the best of the Peoples evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God" (3:110). And also the Prophet has said, "Nay, by God, you must enjoin right and forbid wrong, and you must stay the hand of the wrong doer, bend

him to conformity with justice (al-haqq) and force him to do justice--or else God will set the hearts of you all against one another."⁶⁸

It is the duty of citizens to obey the orders of the government. This is based on the verse mentioned under item (3) above. This obedience is not unconditional, however. The above verse itself sets the limits to obedience as well. According to another verse--which refers to women's political rights--even obedience to the Prophet is limited to just orders (60:12). Moreover, the Prophet has said, "No obedience is due in sinful matters: behold, obedience is due only in the way of righteousness (fil-marul)."⁶⁹ "No obedience is due to him who rebels against God."⁷⁰

(8) Adherence to ideology as the basis of social solidarity: The Islamic society is an ideological society. In such a society the basis of social solidarity is the common belief and ideology rather than common blood or race or tongue or territory. The Holy Quran states, "O ye who believe! Fear God as He should be feared, and die not except in state of Islam [i.e., submission to God]. And behold fast, all together, by the Rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude God's favor on you; for you were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace ye became brethern" (3:103). In such a society there is a harmony of interest among all the members of the society because all work for the same goal, that is, to serve God.⁷¹ In such a society each member loves for the other members what he loves for himself. The Prophet has said, "No one has real

faith unless he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself."⁷² In such a society there is mutual cooperation among the members of the society at all levels--rather than continuous contention among different interest groups. Again Prophet Muhammad is reported as saying, "The Faithful are to one another like [parts of] a building--each part strengthening the others."⁷³ And the Quran commands, "O ye who believe! Fulfill (all) obligations. ... Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour" (5:1, 3).

(9) Family as an important social institution: Islam puts great emphasis on family as a basic social institution. The Quran orders the Muslims: "Marry those among you who are single, or the virtuous ones among your slaves, male or female: if they are in poverty, God will give them means of His grace: for God encompasseth all, and He knoweth all things" (24:32). Numerous passages are also devoted in the Quran to the discussion of norms and rules of marriage, relations between husband and wife, relations between children and parents, and laws of inheritance. From this detailed treatment of the subject by the Quran--and also emphasis on it in the tradition of the Prophet--it seems that Islam considers the formation of family as a religious duty.

(10) Mosque as another important social institution: Mosques play a very important role in the life of Muslims. Each neighborhood has its own mosque which serves not only as a place of worship but also as a community center. Then several neighborhoods have a larger mosque as their meeting ground which brings them together at least

once a week on Fridays. Each city has gotten one or a few mosques where all the people of the city meet at least twice a year on Eid occasions. And then there is the Grand Mosque in Makka which brings together millions of Muslims from different corners of the globe at least once a year during Hajj. The importance of the mosque in the life of the believers has been stated in the Quran: "The mosque of God shall be visited and maintained by such as believe in God and the Last Day, establish regular prayer, and practice regular charity, and fear none (at all) except God. It is they who are expected to be on true guidance" (9:18).

(11) Zakat as an important financial institution: The Quran commands Muslims to pay Zakat (regular charity) and makes it clear that it is in addition to what they spend for charity irregularly (2:177). It also includes "those employed to administer the (funds)" among the recipients of Zakat (9:60). This shows clearly that Zakat should be collected and distributed in an organized form. In the early Islamic society it was the government that supervised the collection and distribution of Zakat.⁷⁴ As noted, the Quran specifies the areas of expenditure for the fund: "Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer the (funds); for those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to Truth); for those in bondage and debt; in the cause of God; and for the wayfarer: (thus is it) ordained by God, and God is full of knowledge and wisdom" (9:60). But the Quran does not specify the rate of Zakat nor the financial limits over which it should be paid. Generally the limits and rates set by the Prophet have been taken as applicable for all times.⁷⁵

(12) God's trusteeship] as the basis of ownership: According to the Quran, "To God belongeth all that is in the heaven and on earth" (2:284, 4:126). "And what cause have ye why ye should not spend in the cause of God? For to God belongs the heritage of the heavens and the earth" (57:10). Thus, the absolute ownership of a property does not belong to an individual or to a group; it belongs to God--and therefore to the community. Commenting on the verse that "To those weak of understanding make not over your property, which God hath made a means of support for you ..." (4:5), Yusuf Ali writes: "This applies to orphans, but the wording is perfectly general. ... Your property: Ultimately all property belongs to the Community, and is intended for the support of you, i.e., the community. It is held in trust by a particular individual."⁷⁶ The individual cannot misuse the trust or spend it in vanity, as stated in the verse quoted above and also in the following verse: "And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities, nor use it as bait for the judges, with intent that ye may eat up wrongfully and knowingly a little of (other) people's property" (2:188). This verse--among several other verses and many Sayings of the Prophet--also shows that property cannot be acquired by unlawful means. The community, who is the grantor of the trust, can put additional limitations on the property if they are deemed necessary for its support and prosperity. But once the individual operates the trust within the set limitations, his possessions are inviolable. The Prophet has said, "The blood, property and honor of a Muslim must be sacred (haram) to every (other) Muslim."⁷⁷

(13) Equitable distribution of wealth: The Islamic government should manage the national resources in such a way that brings about equitable distribution of wealth in the society. This principle is based on the following verse of the Quran: "What God has bestowed on His Apostle (and taken away) from the people of township belongs to God, to His Apostle [that is, the Islamic state] and to kindred and orphans, the needy and wayfarer, in order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you. So take what the Apostle assigns to you, and deny yourselves that which he withholds from you. And fear God; for God is strict in punishment" (59:7).⁷⁸ The Quran also condemns hoarding of wealth: "And there are those who bury gold and silver and spend it not in the Way of God: announce unto them a most grievous penalty" (9:34). The interpretation of this verse, however, has been a subject of controversy from the early days of Islam. One writer puts the controversy in a nutshell: "Ibn Omar [one of the companions of the Prophet] said, 'All wealth whose Zakat dues have been paid cannot be described as hidden treasures, even if it is buried in the ground.' Abu Zar [another companion of the Prophet] said: 'All wealth which is in excess of the needs of its owners is the cursed wealth deemed hidden treasure.'⁷⁹ Although the first view has prevailed among Muslims for centuries, the second view seems more plausible in the light of the following verse of the Quran: "They ask thee how much they are to spend; say: 'What is beyond your needs'" (2:219).

It should be noted that equitable distribution of wealth does not mean complete equality in this regard. The Holy Quran recognizes

natural differences among the people, but it enjoins those who are better gifted to do more good: "It is He [God] who hath made you (His) agents, inheritors of the earth: He hath raised you in ranks, some above others: that He may try you in the gifts He hath given you: for thy Lord is quick in punishment: yet He is indeed Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful" (4:165).

(14) Ban on usury and fraud: As a means for the elimination of exploitation in the society, Islam bans usury and fraud. The Quran strongly condemns fraud: "Woe to those that deal in fraud,--those who, when they have received by measure from men, exact full measure, but when they have to give by measure or weight to men, give less than due ..." (83:1-3). Its condemnation of usury is even stronger: "Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the Evil One by his touch hath driven to madness. That is because they say: 'Trade is like usury,' but God hath permitted trade and forbidden usury" (2:275). It goes to the extent that it declares war against usurers and the usurious system: "If ye [do not give up usury], take notice of war from God and His Apostle ..." (2:279). There is a difference of opinion on the definition of usury, however. Many Muslim scholars consider usury to include the interest paid by a bank. Some others--including Yusuf Ali--hold the view that it excludes interest.⁸⁰

(15) Seeking knowledge as a duty: As noted earlier, the Quran puts great emphasis on the study of natural phenomena and history.⁸¹ The Quran also emphasizes man's mastery over the forces of nature. It states, for example, "... It is He [God] Who hath made

the ships subject to you, that they may sail through the sea by His Command; and the rivers (also) hath He made subject to you. And He had made subject to you the sun and the moon, both diligently pursuing their courses; and the Night and the Day hath He (also) made subject to you" (14:32-33). Commenting on these verses Yusuf Ali writes,

Man can understand and control the forces of nature so as to bring them to his own service. ... He has been made [God's] Vicegerent on earth (ii. 30): God commanded the highest creatures to bow down to Adam (ii. 34). Man, by God's command, can use rain to produce food for himself, make ships to sail the seas; use rivers as highways, and cut canals for traffic and irrigation. Not only this, but even the heavenly bodies can (by God's command) contribute to his needs. ... Because there are laws here, which man can understand and calculate, he can use such things for his own service, and in that sense the heavenly bodies are themselves made subject to him by God's command.⁸²

It is also interesting to note that the first verses of the Quran that were revealed talked about reading, teaching and the pen: "Read: In the name of thy Lord who createth, createth man from a clot. Read: And thy Lord is the Most Bounteous, who teacheth by the pen, teacheth man that which he knew not. Nay, but verily man is rebellious; that he thinketh himself independent"* (96:1-7). We can appreciate the significance of these verses more when we remember that Prophet Muhammad himself was illiterate and lived in a society where only a handful persons could read and write.

All this demonstrates the importance of knowledge and science from the Quranic point of view. It seems that the Quran considers it a duty of the Muslims--individually and collectively--to search for knowledge and to work for gaining mastery over the forces of nature. Some of the Saying of the Prophet express this duty explicitly. For

example, "Search for knowledge is a sacred duty [faridah] imposed on every Muslim man and woman;"⁸³ "Search knowledge though it be in China."⁸⁴

5. Program of Action. It was noted earlier that, "The program of action will specify the forms of action necessary, the key targets of change that the struggle should focus on, and the key agents that bring about the change."⁸⁵ Each element of the program of action will be studied from the Quranic point of view:

a. Forms of action: According to the Quran, those who want to bring about revolutionary changes in the society must start with themselves. They must first change their values and the attitudes and behaviors based upon those values. In the words of the Quran, "Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts"* (13:11).⁸⁶ The reason for this position is that for the Quran, "Whatever misfortune happens to you, is because of the things your hands have wrought" (42:30). Commenting on this verse, Yusuf Ali writes, "All evil, all sorrow, all pain and affliction, are things not normal, things twisted from the pure and holy nature as created by God's hands. As far as man is concerned, his misfortunes are but the consequences of the things he has done. He must bear personal responsibility for them and not throw the blame on others."⁸⁷ So if there is oppression in a society, it is because there are people who oppress and people who accept oppression. Except for extreme cases, weakness does not justify inaction of the oppressed from the Quranic point of view

(4:97-98). The Quran describes revolutionary believers as those "who when an oppressive wrong is inflicted on them, (are not cowed but) help and defend themselves" (42:39). In the meantime, the Quran realizes that defending against an oppression might lead to oppression itself. Thus, it warns that, "The recompense for and injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from God: for God loveth not who do wrong" (42:40).

After a person or a group of people change themselves in such a way that they would neither accept oppression nor oppress others, the second stage is invitation and propagation. When Moses received enlightenment and found the courage to stand up against the Pharaoh and his chiefs, his first action was to convince them to liberate the Israelites, and in the meantime to invite the Egyptians and his own people to accept his liberation ideology and religion (the Quran, 20:42-67, 26:10-69). Other prophets whose stories have been told by the Quran also used invitation and propagation as a technique. Prophet Muhammad--and thus Muslims in general--has been instructed by the Quran: "Invite (all) to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue them in ways that are best and most gracious" (16:125). This verse provides a general guideline on the basis of which specific policies and procedures should be designed. Inviting "with wisdom" means that the socio-political situation of the society should be carefully studied, "meeting people on their own ground and convincing them with illustrations from their own knowledge and experience, which may be very marrow,

or very wide. Our [invitation] must be not dogmatic, not self regarding, not offensive, but gentle, considerate, and such as would attract their attention. Our manner and arguments should not be acrimonious, but modelled on the most courteous and the most gracious example"⁸⁸

When the invitation and propagation process goes on, the oppressive regime will certainly resort to persecution of the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries can--and should--do two things: (1) patiently persevere and continue their peaceful resistance against the regime, and (2) develop secret ways of organization and resistance. The Quran mentions both actions in the case of the liberation struggle by Moses and his people: "Said the chiefs of Pharaoh's people: 'Will thou leave Moses and his people, to spread mischief in the land, and to abandon thee and thy gods?' He [Pharaoh] said: 'Their male children will we slay; only their females will we save alive; and we have over them (power) irresistible.' Said Moses to his people: 'Pray for help from God, and (wait) in patience and constancy: for the earth is God's, to give as a heritage to such of His servants as He pleaseth; and the end is (best) for the righteous'" (7:127-28). "We [God] inspired Moses and his brother, (saying): 'Appoint houses for your people in Egypt and make your houses oratories, and establish worship. And give good news to the believers'"* (10:87-88).

Sooner or later, the oppressive regime would threaten the very existence of the revolutionary movement. If the movement is not ready for direct confrontation, the Quran advises migration: "O My

[God's] servants who believe! Truly, spacious is My Earth: therefore serve ye Me--(and Me alone)" (29:56). "To those who leave their homes in the cause of God, after suffering oppression,--We will assuredly give a goodly home in this world; but truly the reward of the Hereafter will be greater. If they only realize (this)" (16:41)! In some cases the purpose of migration is to get away from the oppression all together--as in the case of the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt. In other cases the purpose is to find a place of refuge in order to launch a revolutionary struggle against the oppressive regime. The Quran is clear on this point: "Those who believed, and adopted exile, and fought for the faith, ... as well as those who gave (them) asylum and aid,--these are (all) friends and protectors one of another" (8:72).⁸⁹

As it is clear from the last verse quoted above, the Quran allows armed struggle as a form of revolutionary action. The importance of militancy from the Quranic point of view was noted in section (3) of this chapter. There are many verse, however, which warn against excesses by the revolutionaries: "Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God loveth not transgressors" (2:190). According to the Quran, the reason why it allows armed struggle is that structural violence is worse than direct violence: "And slay them [the enemies] wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter" (2:191).

Does Islam allow guerrilla warfare and/or terrorism as forms of revolutionary action? Guerrilla warfare is different from terrorism.

In the former, a revolutionary movement engages in fighting against those who are responsible for the areas of deprivation and tries to damage their interests and crush their power. Terrorism, on the other hand, is sporadic, indiscriminate use of violence--which endangers the life of innocent people--in order to achieve some political and/or economic goals. A revolutionary movement may resort to terrorism in order to create terror in the general population and in the ruling group, and thus undermine the latter's legitimacy. It seems that when the Quran asks the believers to leave the place where they live under oppression and then launch a struggle against the oppressive regime, it advocates guerrilla warfare. The Quran does not specify where such believers should go. They can go to another city--as in the case of migration of Prophet Muhammad and his companions from Makka to Madina. Or they could establish hideouts in the mountains, forests, or desert--as in the case of a group of Muslim youth who left Makka but were not admitted in Madina (because of the existence of a treaty between Muslims and the Makkans to that effect); thus, they established a base in the desert and engaged in guerrilla attacks against Makkan trade caravans.⁹⁰

Regarding terrorism, there is no clear provision in the Quran. But the fact that the Quran puts great emphasis on the value of human life shows that if terrorism involves innocent people, it is condemned. According to the Quran, "whosoever killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one,

it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind"* (5:32).⁹¹
 As noted earlier, the Quran also commands "dealing kindly and justly" with those who are not engaged in the fighting (60:8).

b. Targets of change: The targets of change are clearly the areas of deprivation which were discussed earlier. The revolutionary struggle will be focussed against those who are responsible for the areas of deprivation. In general, the Quran identifies two responsible groups:

(1) The power elite: According to the Quran, whenever Messengers went to a people to preach monotheism, to eliminate oppression, and to establish justice, it was the "leaders" and "chiefs" who opposed them and stood up against them (7:60,66,75,88,109; 23:24,33,46). This shows that "the chiefs"--or the power elite--are responsible for the areas of deprivation and should be the target of revolutionary struggle. It should be noted that according to the Quran, the power elite unknowingly plants the seed of its own destruction by its oppressive measures: "... Thus have We placed leaders in every town, its wicked men, to plot (and burrow) therein: but they plot only against their own souls, and they perceive it not" (6:123).

(2) The economic elite: The other group considered as responsible for the areas of deprivation--and thus as targets of revolutionary struggle--is the "wealthy ones"--or the economic elite (34:34). This is the conservative group which opposes any kind of change lest it damage its privileged position: "... Just in the same way, whenever We [God] sent a Warner before thee [Muhammad] to any

people, the wealthy ones among them said: 'We found our fathers following a certain religion, and we will certainly follow in their footsteps' (the Quran, 43:23). The Quran also considers the economic elite and its transgressions responsible for destruction of societies and civilizations (11:116; 17:16).

c. Agents of change: The agents of change consist of the revolutionary leadership and the people who join them.

(1) The leadership: According to the Holy Quran, in the past it was the Apostles and Messengers appointed by God who provided leadership for the religio-ideological movements to eliminate corruption and oppression and to establish monotheism and justice. In their absence, it is the duty of those who believe in the Message of those Messengers--and specifically those who believe in the Message revealed to Muhammad--to undertake the task: "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: they are the ones to attain felicity" (3:104). The criteria of what is good and right and what is wrong have been set forth in the Quran. As noted earlier, oppression, tyranny, corruption, and exploitation are considered wrong and evil by the Quran. Thus, it is the duty of Muslims to struggle against them. The Prophet has said, "If any of you sees something evil, he should set it right by his hand; if he is unable to do so, then by his tongue; and if he is unable to do even that, then within his heart--but this is the weakest form of faith."⁹² This shows that it is the duty of all the Muslims to struggle against the evils mentioned above according to their

capabilities and the conditions that they live in. Those who have a better opportunity to undertake this duty should start off the revolutionary struggle and provide leadership for it.

(2) The followers: The Quran addresses its Message to an-Nas--"the people".⁹³ This shows that for the Quran people as a whole--regardless of social strata, economic class, race, nationality, blood and tribal affiliation, and sex--have the potentiality of accepting its ideology. It also shows that the struggle against the evils of oppression and corruption is not restricted to any particular nation or class. A close study of the stories of the past prophets, however, indicates that most of those who joined their revolutionary movements were from among the weak and the oppressed. For example, "the chiefs of the Unbelievers among [Noah's] people said: 'We see (in thee [O Noah] nothing but a man like ourselves: nor do we see that any follow thee but the meanest among us, in judgement immature ...' (11:37). "The leaders of the arrogant party among [Salih's] people said to those who were reckoned powerless--those among them who believed: 'know ye indeed that Salih is an apostle from his Lord?' They said: 'We do believe in the revelation which hath been sent through him'" (7:75).⁹⁴

6. Commitment to Action and Self-confidence. The Holy Quran seems to put great emphasis on removing from believers the attitude of fatalism, apathy, and powerlessness. It tries to bring about a commitment to action and to eliminate "alienation" at least in the following ways:

a. The Quran tries to inculcate the values of activeness, militancy, exertiveness, and self-defense in the believers. These values and examples of the verses which refer to them were noted in section (3) of this chapter.

b. The Quran tells the believers that those who do not have faith have low morale and will retreat if they are resisted and fought back: "They will do you no harm, barring a trifling annoyance: if they come out to fight you, they will show you their backs, and no help shall they get" (3:111). It introduces this as a sociological law: "And if those who disbelieve join battle with you they will take to flight, and afterwards they will find no protecting friend nor helper. It is the law of Allah which hath taken course aforetime. Thou wilt not find for the law of Allah aught of power to change"* (48:22-23).

The Quran also considers the efforts and plots of those who do not have faith as futile and say they would work against themselves: "The parable of those who take protectors other than God is that of the Spider, who builds (to itself) a house; but truly the flimsiest of houses is the Spider's house;--if they but knew" (29:41). "Do then those who devise evil (plots) feel secure that God will not cause the earth to swallow them up, or that the Wrath will not seize them from directions they little perceive" (16:45)?

c. According to the Quran, those who commit corruption, oppression, injustice and exploitation are doomed to destruction. Over and over, it tells the story of the people who committed these evils in the past, how they rejected coming to the "right path," how

they were destroyed, and how those who rose up against them were saved.⁹⁵ It also tells the people that if they travel around the world and study past civilizations, they will find the evidence for this fact themselves.⁹⁶ If this is the case, then no matter how strong the forces of evil, the believers should not despair nor lose hope.

d. According to Islam, "God is the Greatest." He is far above any thing or anyone that man knows or can imagine. He is Almighty, Most Powerful, Irresistible. He is "Lord of the Throne of Glory, Doer (without let) of all that He intends" (the Quran, 85:15-16). "To God belong the forces of the heavens and the earth, and God is Exalted in Power, Full of Wisdom" (48:7). Therefore, according to the Quran, "on God let the Believers put their trust" (64:13); "and put thy trust in God, and enough is God as a Disposer of affairs" (33:3). "If God helps you, none can overcome you: if He forsakes you, who is there, after that, that can help you? In God, then, let Believers put their trust" (3:160). This putting trust in God does not mean inaction, however. The Quran mentions at least three conditions for God's help to come:

- (1) True and strong faith: "So lose not heart, nor fall into despair: for ye must gain mastery if ye are true in Faith" (3:139).
- (2) Taking action: "God will certainly aid those who aid His (cause)" (22:40; 47:7). "Be not weary and faint-hearted, crying for Peace, when ye should be uppermost: for God is with you, and will never put you in loss for your (good) deeds" (47:35).
- (3) Remaining firm and steadfast: "Verily those who say 'Our Lord is

God,' and remain firm (on the path),--on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (46:13, 41:30). "O Apostle! rouse the Believers to the fight. If there are twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two hundred ..." (8:65). "How many a little company hath overcome a mighty host by Allah's leave! Allah is with the steadfast"* (2:249).

e. The Quran reminds the Muslims of the early days of Islam--the time when the believers were a small and weak group but they could overcome the seemingly mighty enemies: "Call to mind when ye were a small (band), despised through the land, and afraid that men might despoil and kidnap you; but He [God] provided a safe asylum for you, strengthened you with His aid, and gave you good things for sustenance: that ye might be grateful" (8:26). "God's Good Pleasure was on the Believers when they swore Fealty to thee [Muhammad] under the tree. ... God has promised you many gains that ye shall acquire, and He has given you these beforehand; and He has restrained the hands of men from you; that it may be a Sign for the Believers, and that He may guide you to a Straight Path" (48:18-20).

f. The Quran provides the believers with a sense of mission. It can be recapitulated as the following: Man is God's viceregent on earth (2:30), and he bears the "Trust" of responsibility and limited free will (33:72). At the beginning "mankind was one single nation, and God sent Messengers with glad tidings and warnings, and with them He sent the Book in truth to judge between people in matters wherein they differed" (2:213). The other reason why God sent "Messengers," the "Book," and the "Balance" was "that men may stand

forth in justice" (57:25). Muhammad was "the seal of the Prophets" and no Messenger will come after him (33:40). In the absence of Prophets, it is the duty of believers to undertake their mission: "Ye are the best of People evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God" (3:110). In the process of their struggle, the believers will suffer adversities. But they should remember that God has "created Death and Life, that He may try which of you is best in deeds" (67:2). They should also remember that all those who undertook the task before them underwent similar experiences (2:214). Because of their patience and perseverance, God made the Children of Israel, "a people considered weak (and of no account), inheritors of lands in both East and West,--lands whereon [God] sent down [His] blessings" (7:137). And God promises the same to all those who faithfully struggle: "God has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in land, inheritance (of power), as He granted it to those before them; that He will establish in authority their religion--the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace" (24:55). This is because God "wished to be Gracious to those who were depressed in the land, to make them leaders (in faith) and make them heirs" (28:5).⁹⁷

7. Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience. The significance of self-sacrifice, perseverance, firmness and steadfastness as values in the Quran was noted in section (3) of this chapter. It is important to remember that those values are mostly mentioned in the context of Jihad and fighting in the way of God. In this section, some methods by which the Quran tries to bring about a commitment to those values will be discussed briefly:

a. As noted earlier, the Quran considers this life as a test for man to prove that he is worthy of God's trust. As part of the test, believing men and women should show readiness to sacrifice their lives and their belongings in the way of God and to persevere in hardship and adversity: "Be sure We [God] shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods or lives or the fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere,--who say, when afflicted with calamity: 'To God we belong, and to Him is our return.' ..." (2:155-57). "Do men think that they will be left alone on saying, 'We believe,' and that they will not be tested? We did test those before them, and God will certainly know those who are true from those who are false" (29:1-2). "And We shall try you until We test those among you who strive their utmost and persevere in patience" (47:31).

Thus, according to the Quran, sacrifice and perseverance are duties of the believers to which they have been ordered by God: "Say: 'Truly, my prayer and my service of sacrifice, my life and my death, are (all) for God, the Cherisher of the Worlds: no partner hath He: this am I commanded, and I am the first of those to bow to

His Will'" (6:162-63). "Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with your goods and persons, in the Cause of God. That is best for you, if ye (but) knew" (9:41).

b. The stories of the prophets and those who followed their teachings contain great lessons in sacrifice and perseverance. Such stories are found all over the Quran in numerous places.⁹⁸ The following passage presents their lessons in sacrifice and perseverance in a nutshell:

How many of the Prophets fought (in God's way), and with them (fought) large bands of godly men? But they never lost heart if they met with disaster in God's way, nor did they weaken (in will) nor give in. And God loves those who are firm and steadfast. All that they said was: 'Our Lord! Forgive us our sins and anything we may have done that transgressed our duty: establish our feet firmly, and help us against those that resist Faith.' And God gave them a reward in this world, and excellent reward of the Hereafter. For God loveth those who do good (3:146-48).

c. The Quran considers sacrifice, steadfastness, and perseverance as preconditions for victory: "O ye who believe! When ye meet an army, hold firm and think of Allah much, that ye may be successful"* (8:45). "If there are twenty among you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two hundred" (8:64). "Lo! With hardship goeth ease" (94:6).

d. According to the Quran, those who sacrifice their lives and belongings in the way of God and show steadfastness will get the highest reward from God: "To him who fighteth in the cause of God,--whether he is slain or gets victory--soon shall We give him a reward of great value" (4:74). "Say: 'Can you expect for us (any fate) other than one of two glorious things--(Martyrdom or victory)'" (9:52)? "Think not of those who are slain in God's way as

dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the Presence of their Lord; they rejoice in the Bounty provided by God" (3:169-70).

The Quran considers the sacrifice of life and belongings not as an irrational action but as a great bargain with God: "O ye who believe! Shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous penalty?--That ye believe in God and His Apostle, and that ye strive (your utmost) in the Cause of God, with your property and your persons: that will be best for you, if ye but knew! He will forgive you your sins, and admit you to Gardens beneath which rivers flow, and to beautiful mansions in Garden of Eternity: that is indeed the supreme achievement. And another (favor will He bestow), which ye do love,--help from God and a speedy victory. So give the Glad Tidings to the Believers" (61:10-13).⁹⁹

e. In the same way that self sacrifice and perseverance lead to victory and great reward, refusing these will lead to severe punishment in this world and in the Hereafter. According to the Quran, the reason why the Israelites had to wander in the wilderness for 40 years was that they lacked the courage to face the enemy and accept suffering and sacrifice (5:22-29). The Quran also warns the believers that, "O ye who believe! What is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the Cause of God, ye cling heavily to the earth? ... Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For God hath power over all things" (9:38-39). "[Those who hated to strive and fight] said, 'Go not forth in the heat.' Say, 'The fire of Hell is fiercer in heat! If only they could understand" (9:81).

f. Comparing the life in this world to salvation in the Hereafter, the Quran attaches greater importance and higher value to the latter. Thus, it makes it easier for the believers to forsake the life in this world and the worldly belongings for the higher values: "What is the life of this world but play and amusement? But best is the Home in the Hereafter, for those who are righteous. Will ye not then understand" (6:32)? "Those who desire the life of the Present and its glitter,--to them We shall pay (the price of) their deeds therein,--without diminution. They are those for whom there is nothing in the Hereafter but the Fire: vain are the designs they frame therein, and of no effect are the deeds that they do" (9:15-16).

According to the Quran, love of material things is part of human nature, but man should know that there are higher values that he should strive for: "Fair in the eyes of men is the love of things they covet: women and sons, heaped up hoards of gold and silver; horses branded (for blood and excellence); and (wealth of) cattle and well-tilled land. Such are possessions of this world's life; but in nearness to God is the best of the goals (to return to)" (3:14). "And were it not that (all) men might become of one (evil) way of life, We would provide, for everyone that blasphemes against (God) Most Gracious, silver roofs for their houses, and (silver) stair-ways on which to go up, ... and also adornments of gold. But all this were nothing but conveniences of the present life: the Hereafter, in the sight of thy Lord, is for the righteous" (43:33-35).

It should be noted that the Quranic emphasis on the Hereafter does not mean that a believer should withdraw from the life of this world and reject all material things. The Quran is clear on this point: "But seek, with the (wealth) which God has bestowed on thee, the Home of the Hereafter, nor forget thy portion in this world" (28:77). "And there are men who say: 'Our Lord! Give us good in the world and good in the Hereafter, and defend us from the torment of the Fire!' To those will be allotted what they have earned; and God is quick in account" (2:201-202). "O Children of Adam! Wear you beautiful apparel at every time and place of prayer: eat and drink: but waste not by excess. ... Say: Who hath forbidden the beautiful (gifts) of God, which He hath produced for His servants, and the things, clean and pure, (which He hath provided) for sustenance? Say: They are, in the life of this world, for those who believe, (and) purely for them on the Day of Judgement" (7:31-32). The Holy Quran also considers monasticism not part of Jesus' original teachings, but a later innovation (57:27).

8. Simplification. An ideology can be presented in a simplified manner by the use of slogans, stories, and symbols.

a. Slogans: As noted earlier, the "first pillar" of Islam is belief in and utterance of the maxim that: "There is no god (entity worthy of worship) but God, and Muhammad is God's Messenger." This can be seen as a slogan which presents the main values and some themes of the Islamic ideology:

(1) Belief in God and His worship are the supreme values.¹⁰⁰

- (2) Adoration and allegiance are due only to God.
- (3) All false gods--be it idols made of wood or stone or authorities demanding and/or receiving adoration and allegiance--should be rejected.
- (4) Muhammad has brought God's Message to mankind.
- (5) It is by following that Message that man can really liberate himself from the forces of evil, can worship God, and can reach success and salvation.

Another "slogan" that is emphasized in Islam is the phrase that "God is the Greatest." A Muslim repeats this phrase at least 94 times every day during his daily prayers. In addition to its significance to some points mentioned above, this slogan gives great courage to a believer. No matter how great the odds against him, a believer should not have any fear because God is with him and "God is the Greatest."

Another "slogan" is the phrase used for greeting by Muslims: "Peace be with you." This slogan emphasizes the value of peace and elimination of the factors that agitate the mind and bring about direct and structural violence.

Many phrases from the Quran can also be--and have already been--used as slogans. For example: "And hold fast, all together, by the Rope which God (stretcheth out for you), and be not divided among yourselves" (2:103). "The Believers are but a single Brotherhood" (49:10). "Help from God and a speedy victory" (61:13): "Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter" (2:191). "Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you" (49:13).

b. Stories: It is clear from the above discussions that the Quran makes extensive use of stories to elaborate its ideology. There are 14 major stories to each of which the Quran devotes more than 10 verses. The most detailed story is that of Moses, his struggle against the Pharaoh, and his relations to his people. His story covers more than 350 verses. The story of Moses is in most part the story of struggle for liberation of the weak and oppressed. This is another indicator of the significance that the Quran attaches to this subject. The story of Abraham with 127 verses comes next. His story is the story of devotion, rising up against falsehood, readiness to offer sacrifices, and perseverance in hardship. Joseph is a model of piety and self-restraint as well as wisdom and perseverance. His story--which also pertains the importance of economic planning--covers 98 verses. The stories of Noah, Salih, and Hud are all stories of struggle against arrogant political and economic elites who rejected God's guidance and wanted to continue their repressive rules by sticking to the tradition. Their stories cover respectively 84, 69, and 61 verses. Lut devoted himself to struggle against corruption and indecency. His story covers 59 verses. Solomon established a moral and just order and worked for spreading God's Message. His story covers 48 verses. Jesus was appointed to correct the distortions and excesses introduced by Jews in the Message revealed to Moses and the prophets after him. His story covers 45 verses. "The Companions of the Cave" were some youth who refused to serve a tyrant king. Their story covers 16 verses. David was an apostle and a king who ruled with

justice. His story covers 15 verses. "Zul-Qarnain" was a righteous ruler who travelled over large territories and worked for elimination of oppression and mischief and protection of the weak. His story also covers 15 verses. Jonah suffered adversities because of the mistake he had made; but after he repented, he was sent on a mission "to a hundred thousand (men) or more" who believed in him and were rewarded. His story covers 13 verses. And Shuaib was a prophet who rose up against exploitation and corruption. His story covers 11 verses.

c. Symbols: According to the Quran, it uses both: (1) a language which contains a clear meaning, and (2) a symbolic language (3:7). Here we are not concerned with the Quranic symbolism in general, however. What we are concerned with is whether the Quran provides symbols which can convey its ideological teachings. It seems that the stories used in the Quran can provide such symbols. In a few cases the Quran itself refers to some historical figures as examples and models. Pharaoh is one such figure (79:25). He symbolizes arrogance, tyranny, oppression and injustice as well as the end that awaits such behavior. Pharaoh's wife and Mary--Jesus' mother--have been mentioned as examples of believing and righteous women (66:11-12). The wife of Noah and the wife of Lut, both of whom were associated with righteous leaders but chose evil, have been mentioned as examples of unbelief and wickedness (66:10). Abraham has been noted as a model to be followed (16:120). He symbolizes devotion and sincerity, courage and integrity, sacrifice and perseverance. And Prophet Muhammad has been considered as having "a

beautiful pattern of conduct" (33:21). He was not only the Messenger of God, but also an ideological and moral teacher, a political leader, a military commander, a family man, and a friend and companions to the Muslims. As we know, the traditions of Muhammad were recorded by the early Muslims, and Muslims in general are supposed to follow him as a model in different aspects of their lives.

Not only historical figures have been mentioned as symbols in the Quran, but also specific places or rites. For example, the Kaabah--towards which Muslims face during prayer--is a symbol of the common goal of all Muslims as well as of their unity (2:148). Sacrificing animals during Hajj and on Eid day is a symbol of dedication, piety, and self-sacrifice (22:33). Safa and Marwa--two hills near the Kaabah between which the pilgrims run seven times in commemoration of Abraham's wife's search for water--are symbols of endurance and perseverance (2:158). And Hajj is a symbol--and manifestation--of equality of mankind (2:198-99).¹⁰¹

9. Claim to Truth and Rationality. The ideology of revolution--as expounded above--is part of the Quran's general world view and religious teaching. As such, it claims being the revelation from God. This is not the place to discuss the philosophical questions of what is truth, what is God, does God really exist, why people believe in God, etc. The fact that about a billion people adhere to Islam--and all Muslims believes in the Quran as Divine Revelation--is evidence of the fact that the Quran has been able to

establish its claim to truth--at least for those who adhere to Islam. It would be appropriate, however, to briefly discuss how the Quran proposes to establish its claim to truth and whether its ideology is rational.

a. Claim to truth: The Holy Quran proposes at least five types of arguments in support of its claim to truth:

(1) The guidance: The Quran considers its teachings as a guide for those who believe and do righteous deeds (2:2, 41:44). It is a guide that befits man's nature (30:30) and leads to his success and prosperity (2:5). Anyone who uses his God-given faculties and earnestly seeks to understand the Quran will see where it leads to and will believe in it (47:24, 34:6). Only those who "have hearts wherewith they understand not, eyes wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they hear not" (7:179, 43:40), and those who follow their vain desires and take them as their god (30:29, 25:43), and those who are arrogant (7:146, 16:22) would be unable to see its truth or would reject it despite seeing it.

(2) Quran's confirmation of the previous revelations: The Quran does not claim to be the first revelation from God. Rather, according to the Quran, God has sent Messengers to each nation (10:47, 13:38, 16:36). Muhammad's predecessors such as Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus brought basically the same Message. The previous scriptures, however, were corrupted by their followers (2:79, 5:15-20). Nonetheless, the Quran confirms their original teachings (5:51, 2:41). Thus, the Quran states, "They know full well, to whom We have given the Book, that it hath been sent down

from thy Lord in truth" (6:114). If they reject it, it is again only because of selfish desires (2:120) and because of envy and arrogance (2:87).

(3) Internal consistency of the Quran: According to the Quran, it is a Book "consistent with itself, (yet) repeating (its teachings in various aspects)" (39:23); and there is no crookedness in it (18:1). thus, it challenges those who disbelieve in it: "Do they not consider the Quran (with care)? Had it been from other than God, they would surely have found therein much discrepancy" (4:82).

(4) The form and the content of the Quran: The Quran also challenges its reader over and over to produce anything like it: "And if ye are in doubt as to what We [God] have revealed from time to time to our servant [Muhammad], then produce a Sura [i.e., chapter] like thereunto; and call your witnesses and helpers (if there are any) besides God, if your (doubts) are true" (2:23; also 10:38, 11:13, 17:88). Commenting on this verse, Yusuf Ali writes,

How do we know that there is revelation, and that it is from God? Here is a concrete test. The Teacher of God's Truth has placed before you many suras. Can you produce one like it? If there is any one besides God, who can inspire spiritual truth in such noble language, produce your evidence. Or is it that your doubts are merely argumentative, refractory, against your own inner light or conscience? All true revelation is itself a miracle, and stands on its own merits.¹⁰²

Some other verses in the Quran indicate that the challenge refers both to the Quran's form (52:34) and its content (28:49).

(5) The Prophet: The Quran also refers to Prophet Muhammad as an evidence of its truth. For one thing, Muhammad was illiterate, how could he produce the Quran: "And thou wast not (able) to recite a Book before this (Book came), nor art thou (able) to transcribe it

with thy right hand: in that case, indeed, would the talkers of vanities have doubted" (29:48). Commenting on this verse, Yusuf Ali writes,

The holy Prophet was not a learned man. Before the Quran was revealed to him, he never claimed to proclaim a Message from God. He was not in the habit of preaching eloquent truths as from a Book, before he received his Revelation, nor was he able to write or transcribe with his own hands. If he had those worldly gifts, then would have been some plausibility in the charge of the talkers of vanities that he spoke not from inspiration but from other people's books, or that he composed the beautiful verse of the Quran himself.¹⁰³

Moreover, according to the Quran, Muhammad possessed "an exalted standard of character" (68:4). He dealt gently with the believers--not being severe and harsh--(3:159), was "ardently anxious" over them and most kind and merciful to them (9:128), and did not ask for any rewards (25:57, 34:47). All these bear witness to his sincerity.

b. Rationality: The importance of reasoning and rationality from the Quranic point of view was noted in section (3) of this chapter. The discussions in other sections also demonstrate the rational approach of the Quran. The basic premise of the Quran is "belief in the Unseen" (2:3). But even for this premise the Quran does not ask blind faith. As noted earlier, all the natural phenomena are considered as signs of God which refer to the existence of a Power beyond man's sense perception. The Quran also tells its reader, "No want of proportion wilt thou see in the Creation of (God) Most Gracious. So turn thy vision again: seest thou any flaw? Again turn thy vision a second time: (thy) vision will come back to thee dull and discomfited, in a state worn out" (67:3-4). Moreover, man can

find the signs of God within himself (51:21) and in God's revelation (2:219, 29:49).

Once a person believes in the Unseen, according to the Quran, he should know that there cannot be more than one God, "else would each God have assuredly championed that which he created, and some of them would assuredly had overcome others"* (23:91); and the result would have been chaos and disorder (21:22). Nor can God have sons and daughters: "How can He have a son when He hath no consort" (6:101)? Thus, the Quran instructs the believers, "Say: He is God the One and Only; God, the Eternal, Absolute; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; and there is none like unto Him" (112:1-4).

According to the Quran, man's purpose of life is to serve God (51:56), to become His viceregent on earth (2:29), and to prove by his deeds that he is worthy of God's trust of responsibility and free will (67:2, 33:72). It also holds the view that in order to warn man and to guide him to the right path, God sent Messengers from time to time (6:46, 89-90)--including Muhammad who was "the seal of the Prophets" (33:40). What is considered as "the Islamic ideology of revolution" in this study is part of the general "guidance" expounded by Muhammad. It seems that a person who believes in God will find nothing irrational in it.

Chapter IV

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF IMAM KHOMEINI

Introduction. The Holy Quran states, "Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts" (13:11). Thus, it views change in people's ideas and values as a precondition for social change.¹ This seems to be true in the case of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. That is, major changes in people's ideas and values preceded and went along with the revolutionary process.

Considering the fact that the overwhelming majority of Iranians are Muslims and the the Revolution also had an Islamic character, the above statement might seem paradoxical. To understand the situation better, we should remember that in Iran, like other parts of the Muslim world, the teachings of Islam had degenerated over several centuries. Internal and external factors had made the Iranian people hold views and cherish values that were completely different from those taught by the original and genuine sources of Islam--that is, the Holy Quran and the tradition of the Prophet. In the two decades preceding the Islamic Revolution, however, there were major changes in people's ideas, values and outlooks about Islam introduced by the ulama (religious scholars) and the intellectuals who had western education but were also well-versed in Islamic studies.

What did the revolutionary leaders say and what kind of ideology did they introduce? How did they try to bring about political consciousness? What aspects of the oppressive conditions did they emphasize? What were the high values for them? Did they present any picture of the ideal society? What was their program of action for revolutionary change? How could they develop a commitment to action and a sense of self-confidence in people and eliminate the conditions of powerlessness and fear? How could they encourage the people to break down one of the strongest armies by offering sacrifices and showing revolutionary forbearance and steadfastness? Did they simplify their ideology in any way for the masses? How could they establish their claim to truth?

In this and the following five chapters I want to seek answers to these questions by analyzing works of six prominent revolutionary leaders, namely, Imam Khomeini, Ayatullah Taleqani, Ayatullah Mutahhari, Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Ali Shariati, and Abul Hasan Bani Sadr. There will be little disagreement on the prominence of these leaders. Imam Khomeini is the undisputed leader of the Revolution. Ayatullah Taleqani and Engineer Bazargan are the cofounders of the Liberation Movement of Iran, spent many years in the Shah's prisons, and were members of the Revolutionary Council. Ayatullah Taleqani became the first Imam Jumaa (Friday Prayer leader) of Tehran, and Bazargan was appointed the first (interim) Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ayatullah Mutahhari was also a leading member of the Revolutionary Council and a founding member of the Combatant Ulama of Tehran. Dr. Ali Shariati

is widely considered as the Teacher of the Revolution and its Ideologue. He passed away (believed to have been martyred by SAVAK) before the revolutionary fervor started, but there is no doubt about the significant role of his lectures and writings in stirring up that fervor. And finally Bani Sadr was well-known among the Iranian student organizations abroad before the Revolution. He served as ministers of Economics and Foreign Affairs in the interim governments and became Iran's first elected President.

Three of the revolutionary leaders mentioned above (Khomeini, Taleqani, and Mutahhari) are from the group of ulama, and the other three (Bazargan, Shariati, and Bani Sadr) are non-ulama intellectuals. Since biographical sketches of these leaders are already available in English,² and since presenting detailed biographies is beyond the scope of this work, I will not describe their biographies here.

In the case of each leader, three to five works were selected for analysis.³ When a specific work was the best-known work of a leader (for example, Imam Khomeini's Islamic Government, Ayatullah Taleqani's Islam and Ownership, and Bani Sadr's Personality Cult) there was no problem; the best-known work was included in the study. In other cases, however, selection of the works was based on personal judgment. I read all the works of the leaders available to me and selected for analysis the ones that seemed more relevant to the subject matter of this study--that is, the ideology of revolution. If several works seemed equally significant, I selected the ones which related to different aspects of the ideology of

revolution. If two works were relatively lengthy, I selected a shorter work as the third one--because of time and space limitations. And if two or more works were relatively short, I included additional works to provide a better coverage.

Discussing the ideology of revolution as it emerges from the works of each of the leaders will enable us to evaluate their points of agreement, points of difference, and their emphasis on different components of ideology. Thus, after discussing the ideology of revolution in the works of all the leaders, I will present an overview and a comparison.

For each leader, I will first briefly describe the kind of work he has done and mention the works selected for this study. Then I will present his ideas, beliefs, and values as they relate to each component of the ideology of revolution discussed in Chapter II.

Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Imam Khomeini

Imam Khomeini is a prolific writer and lecturer. The author of the book Nahzati Imam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini's Movement) lists 25 books written by him or prepared from his lectures.⁴ Most of his works, however, deal with Fiqha (Islamic jurisprudence), Akhlaq (Ethics), and Irfan (Gnosis). "Imam Khomeini's first public statement of a political nature came in a book published in 1941, Kashf al-Asrar [Secrets Exposed]. The book is essentially [a] detailed, systematic critique of an anti-religious tract, but it also contains numerous passages that are overtly political and critical of the Pahlavi rule."⁵ Most of Imam Khomeini's political

works, however, are in the form of speeches and declarations delivered and issued since 1962--when he launched his movement against the Shah's regime. His best known work, The Islamic Government (also known as The Guardianship of the Jurist), consists of a series of lectures delivered in Najaf (Iraq) in the early 1970s. Hamid Algar has translated and annotated the latter as well as a selection of his speeches and declarations into English under the title Islam and Revolution.⁶

The works selected for analysis in this study are:

- (1) Lectures on the Islamic Government;
- (2) Speech on "The Granting of Capitulatory Rights to the US" (October 7, 1964) which led to Imam Khomeini's imprisonment and exile;
- (3) Speech "In Commemoration of the First Martyrs of the Revolution" (February 19, 1978);
- (4) "Declaration on the Occasion of 'Id-i Fitr" (September 6, 1979),
- (5) "Address at Bihisht-i Zahra" (February 1, 1979) upon his return to Iran from exile.

1. Political Consciousness. Imam Khomeini's lectures on The Islamic Government are a systematic effort to develop the political consciousness of the group to which they were addressed--that is, the ulama. It was noted earlier that "to bring about political consciousness, a revolutionary ideology needs to (a) 'create' new needs among the people; it should not only turn people's attention to their unfulfilled basic needs, but also to higher needs and

values, (b) bring about a sense of community among the people so that they identify with a larger group and strive for their common ideals, and (c) provide a framework for popularization of the higher needs and values and for the creation of a sense of community."⁷

Imam Khomeini does not concern himself much with the third point probably because there was no need for providing a framework for popularization. It already existed there: the mosques, madrasas (religious schools), Husaynias (religious lecture halls), Hajj, and other Islamic institutions. He emphasizes, however, the political use of the religious gatherings and institutions. He notes, for example,

The forms of worship practiced in Islam are usually linked to politics and gestation of society. For example, congregational prayer, the gatherings on the occasion of Hajj, and Friday prayer, for all their spirituality, exert a political as well as moral and doctrinal influence. Islam has provided for such gatherings so that religious use might be made of them; so that feelings of brotherhood and cooperation may be strengthened, intellectual maturity fostered, solutions found for political and social problems, with Jihad and collective efforts as the natural outcome.⁸

He also argues against the separation of religion and politics and the religious leaders staying aloof from political activities.

This slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. Were religion and politics separate at the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him)? Did there exist, on one side, a group of clerics, and opposite it, a group of politicians and leaders? Were religion and politics separate at the time of the caliphs--even if they were not legitimate--or in the time of the Commander of the Faithful [Ali]? Did two separate authorities exist? These slogans and claims have been advanced by imperialists and their political agents in order to prevent religion from ordering the affairs of this world and shaping Muslim society, and at the same time to create a rift between the scholars of Islam, on the one hand, and the masses and those

struggling for freedom and independence, on the other. They have been able to gain dominance over our people and plunder our resources, for such has always been their ultimate goal.⁹

He presents a similar argument much later in his speech in commemoration of the first martyrs of the Revolution.¹⁰

Imam Khomeini tries to bring about a sense of community among the ulama by noting the importance of unity and collective action and by emphasizing the point that they face the same challenges and have the same duties. He also argues that "The fugaha [jurists] are the trustees of the prophets;" and it is their right and duty to be the rulers.¹¹

In the lectures on The Islamic Government, Imam Khomeini exerts enormous effort to make the ulama realize the challenges they face and the duties they have--which is, in effect, creating "needs" and developing political consciousness. He emphasizes the following needs and duties:

a. The need and duty to introduce the genuine teachings of Islam and to expose the enemies' plots: Imam Khomeini believes that Zionists, imperialists and their agents have plotted to destroy Islam.¹² Thus, he considers the duty to preserve Islam and introduce its genuine teachings as the most important obligation incumbent upon Muslims in general and scholars in particular. He goes to the extent of arguing that "it is more necessary even than prayer and fasting."¹³ He also condemns taqiya (dissimulation or expedient concealment of one's views), which is considered valid by Shiites and had become an excuse for inaction, and contends that it "relates to the branches (furu') of religion. ...But when chief

principles of Islam and its welfare are endangered, there can be no question of silence or taqiya."¹⁴

Moreover, he quotes a tradition stating that "believers who are fuqaha are the fortresses of Islam," and argues that

If a faqih sits in the corner of his dwelling and does not intervene in any of the affairs of society, neither preserving the laws of Islam and disseminating its ordinances, nor in any way participating in the affairs of the Muslims or having any care for them, can he be called "the fortress of Islam" or the protector of Islam? ...

We have abandoned almost all aspects of our duty, restricting ourselves to passing on, from one generation to the next, certain parts of Islamic law and discussing them among ourselves. Many of the ordinances of Islam have virtually become part of occult sciences, and Islam itself has become a stranger, only its name has survived.¹⁵

Thus he exhorts his audience:

You who represent the younger generation ... must strive diligently all your lives to pursue the aims I will now set forth. ...In whatever way you deem most beneficial, in writing or in speech, instruct people about the problems Islam has had to contend with since its inception and about the enemies and afflictions that now threaten it. Do not allow the true nature of Islam to remain hidden, or people will imagine that Islam is like Christianity (nominal, not true Christianity), a collection of injunctions pertaining to man's relations to God, and mosque will be equated with the church.¹⁶

b. The need and duty to struggle against oppression, exploitation, and injustice: This need and duty has been emphasized much more by Imam Khomeini than the need and duty just mentioned.¹⁷ Two quotations will suffice to illustrate his views on this point.

The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle against all attempts by oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while plundering oppressors usurp the sources of wealth and live in opulence. [Imam Ali] says: "I have accepted the task of government because God, Exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of the

gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other.

If the duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil [commanded by the Quran] is properly performed, all other duties automatically fall into place. If the good is enjoined and the evil is forbidden, the oppressors and their agents will be unable to usurp the people's property and dispose of it according to their own whims; they will be unable to squander the taxes taken from the people. For he who enjoins the good and forbids the evil actively calls man to Islam by remedying injustice and opposing the oppressor.¹⁸

c. The need and duty to establish an Islamic Government ruled by Fuqaha (jurists): Probably few--or no--religious scholars would have disagreed with Imam Khomeini on the duty to preserve Islam and to oppose oppression and injustice. His view to establish an Islamic government headed by religious scholars, however, went totally against the conventional wisdom held by the Shiite ulama.¹⁹ Because of this, Imam Khomeini had to devote one complete lecture on "The Necessity of Islamic Government" and to refer to the subject in numerous other passages.²⁰ The method he uses to establish his "claim to truth" will be discussed later. Here I will present some themes of his arguments.

First Imam Khomeini argues for the need of a righteous government:

If the ordinances of Islam are to remain in effect, then, if encroachment by oppressive ruling classes on the rights of the weak is to be prevented, ... if the Islamic order is to be preserved and all individuals are to pursue the just path of Islam without any deviation, ... if the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic land is to be destroyed--government is necessary. None of these aims can be achieved without governments and organs of the state. It is a righteous government, of course, that is needed, one presided over by a ruler who will be a trustworthy and righteous trustee.²¹

He pursues the theme noted at the end of the above quotation further and tries to establish that,

The sole matters relevant to rule, those that were mentioned and discussed in the time of the Most Noble Messenger (upon whom be peace) and our Imams (upon whom be peace) and were, in addition, unanimously accepted by Muslims, are: (1) the knowledgeability of the ruler or caliph, i.e., his knowledge of the provisions and ordinances of Islam; and (2) his justice, i.e., his excellence in belief and morals.²²

Certainly the Prophet and the Imams had these qualities and this is why the government belonged to them. But what about after the occultation of the last Imam? Imam Khomeini challenges the view of the majority of the Shiite ulama who believed that any government during this period is illegitimate. Rhetorically he asks: "Now that no particular individual has been appointed by God, Exalted and Almighty, to assume the function of government in the time of Occultation, what must be done? Are we to abandon Islam? Do we no longer need it? Was Islam valid for only two hundred years? Or is it that Islam has clarified our duties in other respects but not with respect to government?"²³ The implication is clear: we still need a government ruled by knowledgeable and just personalities. "The two qualities of knowledge of the law and justice are present in countless fugaha of the present age. If they would come together, they could establish a government of universal justice in the world."²⁴

Thus, according to Imam Khomeini, "Reason, the laws of Islam, the practice of the Prophet (upon whom be peace and blessings) and that of [Imam Ali], the purport of various Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions--all indicate the necessity of forming [an Islamic] government."²⁵

d. The need for the army to join the people: Whereas the lectures on the Islamic Government are addressed to the ulama and try to bring about political consciousness among them, Imam Khomeini's declarations and speeches are addressed to the people in general and sometimes to some specific groups.²⁶ One of the groups that receives special attention during the process of the revolutionary upheaval is the army.

As early as 1964 Imam Khomeini argues that American influence and the capitulatory rights granted to it destroy the dignity of the army. In his words, "What self-respect will remain for the army when an American errand boy or a cook has priority over one of our generals? If I were in the army, I would resign. . . . I would not agree to be disgraced."²⁷ He follows the same theme in his speeches and declarations in 1978-79:

Proud soldiers who are ready to sacrifice yourself for your country and homeland, arise! Suffer slavery and humiliation no longer! Renew your bonds with your beloved people and refuse to go on slaughtering your children and brothers for the sake of the whims of this family of bandits!

We want you in the army to be independent. We have toiled and suffered bloodshed, our young people have been killed, our honor has been besmirched, our religious scholars have been imprisoned and tortured. Part of our aim has been to make the army independent.

Army commanders, do you not want to be independent? Do you want to be the servant of others? My advice to you is to enter the ranks of the people and to add your voice to their demand for independence. ...

Members of the armed forces, Islam is better for you than unbelief, and your own nation is better for you than the foreigners. ...²⁸

2. Criticism of Social Arrangement. Imam Khomeini focuses his criticism of the social arrangement on the domination of imperialism and its attempts to extirpate Islam. The list of the socio-politico-economic conditions that come under his criticism, however, is a long one.

a. Domination of imperialism: Foreign domination over Iran is one of the main targets of Imam Khomeini's criticism of Iran's existing conditions in his lectures on the Islamic Government. The criticism was voiced, however, in a more dramatic way much earlier in his speech against granting capitulation rights to the U.S.:

I cannot express the sorrow I feel in my heart. My heart is constricted. ... Iran no longer has any festival to celebrate; they have turned our festival into mourning. ... They have sold us, they have sold our independence. ... They have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog. ... Even if the Shah himself were to run over a dog belonging to an American, he would be prosecuted. But if an American cook runs over the Shah, the head of State, no one will have [the] right to interfere with him. ...

Are we to be trampled underfoot by the boots of America simply because we are a weak nation and have no dollars? America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. They are all worse and [more] unclean than each other! But today it is America that we are concerned with. ...²⁹

Imam Khomeini believes that the Shah had "transformed Iran into an official colony of the U.S.," and had established friendly relations with the enemies of Islam:

So extensive is the influence of Israel in our country--Israel, which is in a state of war with the Muslims, so that those who support it are also in a state of war with the Muslims--and so great is the support the regime gives it, that Israeli soldiers come to our country for training! Our country has become a base for them! The markets of our country are also in their hands. ...³⁰

Foreign domination over Iran, manifested by the American and Israeli activities there, is not a recent phenomenon, according to Imam Khomeini. It is, rather, the fruition of centuries-old plots by imperialists and Zionists. The aim of the plots is not merely religious or ideological, but first and foremost, economic.

Their plot is to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our land, and our human resources. ...

If you [the ulama] pay no attention to the policies of the imperialists, and consider Islam to be simply a few topics you are always studying and never go beyond them, then the imperialists will leave you alone. Pray as much as you like: it is your oil they are after--why should they worry about your prayer? They are after our minerals and want to turn our country into a market for their goods. That is the reason the puppet governments they have installed prevent us from industrialization, and instead establish only assembly plants and industry that are dependent on [the] outside world.³¹

It should be noted that Imam Khomeini is not concerned with foreign domination only over Iran, but over the Muslim world as a whole. He considers the division of "the Islamic homeland" into numerous nation-states as a result of plots by the imperialists and talks about "the unity of the Islamic umma [brotherly community]." He also argues that the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran is imperative "in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments."³²

b. Unjust economic order, exploitation, and plundering of resources: Closely related to Imam Khomeini's criticism of foreign domination over the Muslim world is his criticism of the existing economic order. He argues:

Through the political agents they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have also imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed. Hundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all form of health care and education, while minorities comprised of the wealthy and powerful live a life of indulgence, licentiousness and corruption. ...

How can we stay silent and idle today when we see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the agents of foreign powers, have appropriated the wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of millions of Muslims ... granting the Muslims not the least right to prosperity?³³

He repeats the same theme over and over in different contexts.

The following quotation indicates the depth of his understanding of Iran's economic conditions under the Shah's regime. It is stated in relation to the verse of the Quran which condemns the religious scholars who do not forbid "the consumption of what is forbidden."

Since the range of thought of some people is confined to the mosque we are now sitting in and is incapable of extending any further, when they hear the expression "consumption of what is forbidden," they can only think of some corner grocer who is (God forbid) selling his consumers short. They never think of the whole range of more important forms of "consuming what is forbidden," of plunder. Huge amounts of capital are being swallowed up; our public funds are being embezzled; our oil is being plundered; and our country is being turned into a market for expensive, unnecessary goods by the representatives of foreign companies, which makes it possible for foreign capitalists and their local agents to pocket people's money. A number of foreign states carry off our oil after drawing it out of the ground, and the negligible sum they pay to the regime they have installed returns to their pockets by other routes. As for the small amount that goes into the treasury, God only knows what it is spent on. All of this is a form of "consumption of what is forbidden" that takes place on an enormous scale, in fact on an international scale. It is not merely an evil, but a hideous and most dangerous evil.³⁴

c. Misery, hunger, deprivation: Unjust economic order and exploitation certainly results in misery and deprivation for the majority of the people. This point is also highlighted and criticized by Imam Khomeini:

[G]o take a look at the south of the city--go look at those pits, those holes in the ground where people live, dwellings you reach by going down about a hundred steps into the ground; homes people have built out of rush matting or clay so their poor children can have somewhere to live. I am talking about Tehran, not some distant village or town. ... They don't have drinking water. ... Picture some poor woman in the middle of the biting winter climbing up and down those [hundreds of] steps to fetch water for her children.³⁵

He believes "the injunctions of Islam ... provide a solution for the problem of poverty." The imperialists and their agents who "want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our people to be trapped in their misery," however, prevent the implementation of the Islamic teachings.³⁶

d. Oppression and tyranny: Unjust economic order and exploitation cannot be maintained without oppression and tyranny. Imam Khomeini criticizes the oppressive condition together with the unjust economic order and exploitation in his lectures on the Islamic Government.³⁷ He emphasizes it more, however, in his speeches and declarations during the revolutionary upheaval. He states, for example,

In order to deceive the people, they mount empty speeches about freedom at a time when their jails still overflow with religious leaders and university students, with merchants and politicians, with workers and peasants. Religious and political leaders have been banished to remote parts of the country for the crime of speaking the truth and demanding freedom. ... Four hundred people were burned to death [in a cinema in Abadan] in order to fulfill the promise of a "great terror" that was a theme in his [the Shah's] propaganda against our sacred movement. ...

The Shah and his government are in a state of armed rebellion against the justice-seeking people of Iran, against the constitution, and against the liberating decrees of Islam. They are therefore traitors, and to obey them is to obey taghut.³⁸

e. Luxury and waste, incompetence, over-bureaucrization: Imam Khomeini strongly criticizes luxurious way of life of the Shah and the upper class; the "profligate royal ceremonies" and "reckless spending;" the government's incompetence which had destroyed the country's economy, agriculture, education, and human resources; and "superfluous bureaucracies and the system of file-keeping and paper-shuffling that is enforced in them." He considers all of these "totally alien to Islam."³⁹

f. Corruption, immorality, materialism: Imam Khomeini argues that "Islam has laid down no laws for the practice of usury, for banking on the basis of usury, for the consumption of alcohol, or for the cultivation of sexual vice, having radically prohibited all these. The ruling cliques, therefore, which are the puppets of imperialists and wish to promote these vices in the Islamic world, will naturally regard Islam as defective."⁴⁰

He also criticizes the Shah's regime for promoting "corruption on earth," "girls and boys wrestling together," "people's innocent daughters under young men at school," and "scandalous uncovering of women."⁴¹

g. Un-Islamic and anti-Islamic laws and policies: Imam Khomeini considers the 1907 Constitution of Iran void and null because it was drafted by agents of Britain under the instruction of their masters and was based on Belgian, French, and British legal code. "True, they added some of the ordinances of Islam in order to deceive the people, but the basis of the laws that were now thrust upon the people was alien and borrowed."⁴² He holds similar views on

judicial laws and criticizes the judicial system as being time-consuming, having wrong procedures which promote corruption, being inconsistent, and being illogical.⁴³

He also attacks the Shah's anti-Islamic policies and measures. According to him, "the people see that His Majesty is against whatever they attach value to. He is against the Islamic calendar. To be against the Islamic calendar is to be against Islam itself. ... Fayzia Madrasa [religious school in Qum] has been closed for several years now. They plundered the Madrasa and robbed its students; they burned the turbans of the tulab [students of religion] and even burned their books! They insulted the Quran itself!"⁴⁴

h. Monarchy and illegitimate Government and Parliament: Although all the criticisms mentioned above are attempts to delegitimize the Shah's regime, there are some passages in Imam Khomeini's lectures, speeches, and declarations that directly deal with the issue of legitimacy.

In his speech against the granting of capitulatory rights to the U.S., Imam Khomeini tries to prove the illegitimacy of the Parliament which approved that measure. He argues, for example, "The Iranian people did not elect these deputies. Many of the high-ranking ulama and maraji ordered a boycott of the elections, and the people obeyed them and did not vote. But then came the power of the bayonet, and these deputies were seated in the Majlis [Parliament]."⁴⁵ He further argues that even if the people had elected the deputies, they would forfeit their posts because of

their act of treachery in granting the capitulatory rights. "This is high treason. ... All the members of both houses who gave their agreement to this affair are traitors." Furthermore, he argues, "according to Article 2 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law, no law is valid unless the mujtahids [authoritative religious scholars] exercise a supervisory role in the Majlis."⁴⁶

In his speeches in 1964, Imam Khomeini does not attack the legitimacy of monarchy as such. In the lectures on "the Islamic Government," however, he categorically states that "Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid."⁴⁷

He launches his strongest attack against monarchy in a speech in 1979. The speech was delivered upon his return to Iran from exile--the time when the Shah had left the country and had appointed Bakhtiar as Prime Minister. Imam Khomeini wants to establish the illegitimacy of the Shah's regime first and then that of Bakhtiar's government. He argues that "A monarchical regime is . . . contrary to all rational laws and precepts as well as human rights." Furthermore, "the Pahlavi monarchy was illegal . . . from the time of its very formation . . . [because] the Constituent Assembly [which voted for it] was convened at bayonet-point, without the least participation in its affairs by the people." He goes on to argue that even if "the Constituent Assembly [had] reflected the wishes of the people, and that the invalid, false institution of monarchy were correct and acceptable, [a]ll this would mean is that Riza Khan would be the ruler for the lifetime of those who voted him into power. But did anyone fifty years ago have any right to impose

Muhammad Riza on us, in our time, as our ruler, though not many of us here were alive at the time of the decision?"⁴⁸ He also takes the people's massive demonstrations as a vote "against Muhammad Riza and the monarchical form of government, which is their right. The institution is therefore invalid."⁴⁹

After the monarchy, he attacks the legitimacy of Bakhtiar's government:

Can someone who has been appointed by an illegal Shah and illegal Majlis be in any way legitimate? We tell him, "You are illegal and must go." We declare to everyone that not even he regards his own government as legal, because a few years ago, when he had not yet been appointed Prime Minister, he used to denounce the existing government as illegal. What has changed in the meantime to make him regard his own government as legal?⁵⁰

3. New Set of Values. The values noted by Imam Khomeini in his speeches and writings--as well as by other Iranian revolutionary leaders in their works--can be categorized into three groups: (1) spiritual values, (2) social values, and (3) personal values. In the works covered in this study, Imam Khomeini seems to emphasize social values more than other types. The list, however, is not claimed to be comprehensive, nor are the frequencies of occurrence claimed to be exact. It is only a preliminary study to provide a general picture.

a. Social values: Imam Khomeini emphasizes justice and equity more than any other value (noted at least 21 times in the list of his values). It is followed by liberation and freedom (14 times) and struggle and Jihad (11 times). Other social values in the list of Imam Khomeini's values are independence, unity and brotherhood,

security, and social responsibility (each noted four to seven times). He also mentions cooperation, love and mutual affection, self reliance, public welfare, consultation, peace, and self determination.⁵¹

b. Personal values: Imam Khomeini notes more personal values than other types of values. Courage and fearlessness and true happiness and tranquility are on top of the list (eight times each). They are closely followed by fortitude and steadfastness, activeness, self-confidence, militancy and moral virtue (four to seven times each). Imam Khomeini mentions diligence, dignity, piety, trustworthiness, self-defence, and hope more than twice each. He also notes commitment to truth, self-reliance, perfection, strength and preparedness, decisiveness, honesty, intelligence, determination, resourcefulness, and seriousness.⁵²

c. Spiritual values: The works covered in this study is not a representative of all Imam Khomeini's works. Thus, there is less emphasis on spiritual values in these works. The only spiritual value in the list noted more than 10 times is dedication and self-sacrifice--which certainly has social significance as well. Other spiritual values in the list are belief in God, success and salvation, and asceticism.⁵³

4. Outline of the Good Society. According to Imam Khomeini an Islamic government is a constitutional government in which sovereignty and legislative power belong exclusively to God. Thus, "The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all

individuals and the Islamic government. . . . In Islam, then, government has the sense of adherence to law; it is law alone that rules over society. Even the limited powers given to the Most Noble Messenger (upon whom be peace) and those exercising rule after him have been conferred upon them by God."⁵⁴ Imam Khomeini believes such a government is the best and most popular form of government, because, "[t]he body of Islamic laws that exist in the Quran and the Sunna [tradition of the Prophet] has been accepted by the Muslims and recognized by them as worthy of obedience. This consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes it truly belong to the people."⁵⁵

As noted earlier, Imam Khomeini argues that during the occultation of the last Imam, the leadership of the Islamic government belongs to the fuqaha (Islamic jurists). Once a faqih is able to establish an Islamic government, it is the duty of the people and other fuqaha to obey him. Such a faqih will have the same governmental authority and power as Prophet Muhammad and other early Islamic leaders had.⁵⁶

Not every "faqih" is qualified as a leader, however. According to the traditions and arguments that Imam Khomeini presents, a faqih must possess the following qualifications in order to be eligible for leadership:⁵⁷

- (1) be knowledgeable of the Islamic laws;
- (2) be just, which means to have excellence in morals and beliefs, be untainted by major sin, abstain from illicit desires and wealth of this world, and be kind in general and harsh when needed;

- (3) be trustworthy and righteous;
- (4) be intelligent;
- (5) have administrative abilities;
- (6) "refuse to submit to others or fall under the influence of foreigners;"
- (7) "defend the rights of the nation and freedom, independence, and territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland, even at the cost of his life;" and
- (8) live a simple life.

For Imam Khomeini, rule and command are not a merit or status but a means and duty. He also notes that the head of the Islamic state and other officials should have a share in the public income equal to the ordinary citizens.⁵⁸

Imam Khomeini recognizes three branches of the government similar to the "forms of government that have emerged in recent centuries."⁵⁹ But for him, a "planning body takes the place of the legislative assembly. ... This body draws up programs for the different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam and thereby determines how public services are to be provided across the country."⁶⁰ He calls his "planning body" a "consultative assembly" as well and proposes that it will be composed of "consultants and advisors who are experts in different fields."⁶¹ Beyond this, we cannot find any elaboration of the "consultative assembly" in the lectures and speeches of Imam Khomeini.

Imam Khomeini does not elaborate much on the judiciary either. He just notes that "[t]he position of judge ... is reserved for

those who possess three qualifications--being a leader, and being knowledgeable and just." Since only a faqih can be knowledgeable of the Islamic law, "the function of judge belongs exclusively to the just faqih."⁶² In contrast to the existing judicial laws--which he claims "have brought our people nothing but trouble, causing them to neglect their daily tasks and providing the occasion for all kinds of misuse"--Imam Khomeini proposes that "the method established by Islam for enforcing people's rights, adjudicating disputes, and executing judgment is at once simple, practical, and swift."⁶³ He also strongly supports the Islamic penal code and attacks those who criticize it as being too harsh.⁶⁴

In regard to the executive branch, Imam Khomeini argues that "it is not necessary for all officials, provincial governors, and administrators to know all the laws of Islam and be fugaha; it is enough that they know laws pertaining to their functions and duties."⁶⁵

The functions and duties of the government receive more attention in the lectures of Imam Khomeini. For him the aim of the Islamic government and implementation of the Islamic law is to create "conditions conducive to the production of morally upright and virtuous human beings" and to establish "justice in the society, a means for man's intellectual and moral reform and his purification, . . . a just society that will morally and spiritually nourish refined human beings."⁶⁶ For this aim, the Islamic government has the following functions and duties:⁶⁷

(1) to act as a trustee to maintain institutions and laws of Islam;

(2) to execute Islamic laws and the Islamic penal code;

(3) to establish justice and order, and to prevent cruelty, oppression and violation of the rights of others;

(4) to collect Islamic taxes the purpose of which is to provide "for the needs of the people [and] for public services relating to health, education, defence, and economic development;"

(5) to ward off aggression and to be constantly ready to defend freedom and territorial integrity of the land of Islam, and the honor of the Muslims;

(6) to create favorable conditions for education;

(7) to root out groups that are a source of corruption and harm to human society;

(8) to treat all equally without any discrimination;

(9) to solve the problem of poverty; and

(10) to serve mankind in general.

According to Imam Khomeini, since in an Islamic society "law is actually the ruler; the security of all is guaranteed, and law is their refuge. Muslims and the people in general are free within the limits laid down by the law."⁶⁸ He also notes Islam's "radical prohibition" of "the practice of usury," "banking on the bases of usury," "the consumption of alcohol," and "the cultivation of sexual vice."⁶⁹ In regard to the rumors that Islam is also against cinema and television, he notes,

We are not opposed to the cinema, to radio, or to television; what we are opposed to is vice and the use of media to keep our young people in a state of backwardness and dissipate their energies. We have never opposed these features of modernity in themselves.⁷⁰

In general, Imam Khomeini believes, "The Muslims will be able to live in security and tranquility and preserve their faith and morals only when they enjoy the protection of a government based on justice and law, a government whose form, administrative system, and laws have been laid down by Islam."⁷¹ He promises to establish "a Constituent Assembly based on the votes of the people," and to "announce our fundamental program, which will be inspired by the progressive ideas of Islam" after the complete eradication of the Shah's regime.⁷²

5. Program of Action. It was noted earlier that a program of action specifies the targets of change that the struggle should focus upon, the agents who bring about the change, and the forms of action that are necessary.⁷³

a. Targets of change: As was mentioned above, Imam Khomeini focuses his attack on imperialism. He especially attacks imperialists' hypocrisy and secret plots. He notes, for example, "We have suffered, and continue to suffer, all these misfortunes at the hands of governments who have signed the Declaration of Human Rights and who loudly proclaim man's right to freedom. ... The Declaration of Human Rights exists only to deceive the nations; it is the opium of the masses. ... Before it was British who brought us misfortune; now it is the Soviets on the one hand, and Americans on the other.

All our miseries are caused by those imperialists."⁷⁴ Because of the United States' active role in the recent history of Iran, Imam Khomeini singles it out as the greatest enemy:

Let the American President know that in the eyes of the Iranian people, he is the most repulsive member of the human race today because of the injustice he has imposed on our Muslim nation. Today the Quran has become his enemy, the Iranian nation has become his enemy. Let the American government know that its name has been ruined and disgraced in Iran.⁷⁵

Imam Khomeini believes the real goal of the imperialist is economic and political--not ideological or religious--"for the imperialists really have no religious belief."⁷⁶ He argues, however, that they have been able to establish their economic, political, and military domination through cultural domination. "They felt that the major obstacle in the path of their materialistic ambitions and the chief threat to their political power was nothing but Islam and its ordinances, and the belief of the people in Islam. They therefore plotted and campaigned against Islam by various means."⁷⁷ Thus, foreign domination in general and its anti-Islamic plots and campaigns in particular are the first targets on which the struggle should focus.

The next target on which the struggle should focus is the monarchy system in general, and the ruling cliques, the government, the parliament, and the Shah--all of whom are agents of imperialism according to Imam Khomeini. Monarchy is wrong and invalid according to Islam, rational thinking and human rights. The ruling class is responsible for corruption and domination of the country by the foreigners. The government and the parliament do not represent the people and their decisions serve the interests of the imperialists.

And finally the Shah is directly responsible--among other things--for repression and killing of innocent people.⁷⁸ Therefore, he proclaims, "it is our duty to continue this movement until all elements of the Shah's regime have been eliminated and we have established a Constituent Assembly based on the votes of the people and the first permanent government of the Islamic Republic."⁷⁹

Certain elements of the Shia religious establishment in Iran and Iraq also come under Imam Khomeini's severe attack. He mentions the propaganda by "foreign agents ... that Islam has nothing to offer, that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition, and that this is the proper field of study for the akhunds [religious scholars]." He argues,

There is something of truth here, for it is fitting that those akhunds who have no intention of expounding the theories, injunctions, and world-view of Islam and who spend most of their time on precisely such matters, forgetting all the other topics of Islamic law, be accused and attacked in this manner. They too are at fault; foreigners are not the only ones to be blamed. For several years, as might be expected, the foreigners laid certain plans to realize their political and economic ambitions, and the neglect that has overtaken the religious teaching institution has made it possible for them to succeed.⁸⁰

Thus, he proposes, "the religious teaching institutions must be reformed. The syllabus and methods of propagation and instruction must be improved; apathy, laziness, despair, and lack of self-confidence must be replaced by diligence, endeavor, hope, and self-confidence. . . ."⁸¹ He calls those religious scholars who oppose reform, who oppose getting involved in politics, and who cooperate with the Shah's regime as "pseudo-saints." He tells his audience, "[f]irst, we must advise these pseudo-saints and try to

awaken them." If they do not wake up and do not assume their responsibilities, "it will be obvious that the cause of their failure is not ignorance, but something else." In that case, "[t]hey must be exposed and disgraced so that they may come to lose whatever standing they enjoy among the people."⁸²

b. Agents of change: For Imam Khomeini the ulama must play the leading role in bringing about an Islamic revolution. The success of the revolution, however, will depend on the participation of the people in general. He notes, for example, "We must end all this plundering and usurpation of wealth. The people as a whole have a responsibility in this respect, but the responsibility of the religious scholars is graver and more critical. We [ulama] must take lead over other Muslims in embarking on this sacred jihad, this heavy undertaking; because of our rank and position, we must be in the forefront." He further argues that, "the expression of opposition and the expounding of God's teachings and ordinances that stand in contradiction to innovation, oppression, and sin . . . make the masses aware of the corruption of society and the wrong-doings of the treacherous, sinful, and irreligious rulers. The people will then rise up in revolt and refuse to collaborate any longer with the tyrants or to obey corrupt and treacherous ruling powers."⁸³

In his lectures on the Islamic Government, Imam Khomeini emphasizes the important role of the "younger generation" of religious scholars in bringing about revolutionary changes.⁸⁴ In his speeches and declarations during the revolutionary upheaval, in

addition to the religious scholars, he calls upon the "Iranian army," "Iranian politicians," "Iranian merchants," "scholars" and "students" to undertake revolutionary actions.⁸⁵ He also tells the ulama: "You must address yourselves to the university people in particular, the educated class."⁸⁶ It seems that he assigns a greater role to these groups as agents of revolutionary change.

c. Forms of action: The forms of revolutionary action recommended by Imam Khomeini range from passive protest to active armed struggle. A long list of such actions can be prepared from his lectures and speeches. They can be categorized into the following groups:

(1) Self-development: Imam Khomeini focuses on self-development in a separate lecture which is not included in this study.⁸⁷ He notes, however, the significance of self-development as a precondition of revolutionary activity in his lectures on the Islamic Government as well. He tells his audience, for example, "apathy, laziness, despair, and lack of self-confidence must be replaced by diligence, endeavor, hope and self-confidence. ... Rid yourselves of your depression and apathy ... and resolve to establish an Islamic government."⁸⁸ In the meantime, he quotes a tradition which states--among other things--that the struggler should not be "prompted by rivalry for political power, nor by a search for wealth and abundance."⁸⁹ He emphasizes the point elsewhere: "We must improve ourselves spiritually and improve our way of life. We must become more ascetic than before and completely shun the goals of this world. All of you must equip yourselves to

protect the divine trust that has been vested in you. Become worthy trustees, and hold the world in less esteem."⁹⁰

(2) Passive protest: Imam Khomeini calls those religious scholars "who join the state apparatus of the oppressors" evil ulama," and advises that the least people could do is not to support the regime.⁹¹ He also says, "Let us overthrow tyrannical governments by: (1) severing all relations with governmental institutions; (2) refusing to cooperate with them; (3) refraining from any action that might be construed as aiding them; and (4) creating new judicial, financial, economic, cultural, and political institutions."⁹² As we see, three of his recommended measures are different forms of passive protest.

(3) Propaganda and instruction: Imam Khomeini puts great emphasis on the role of propaganda and instruction in preparing the grounds for bringing about revolutionary changes. He starts his lecture on "Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government" with the statement that, "It is our duty to work toward the establishment of an Islamic government. The first activity we must undertake in this respect is the propagation of our cause; that is how we must begin." He also notes that, "Propagation and instruction ... are our two fundamental and most important activities."⁹³ As a means of teaching and propagation he notes writing different materials, speeches, religious talks and sermons, publishing books, raising the voice of protest, demonstrations, and strikes.⁹⁴ He also recommends, "[i]n order to counteract [the oppressors'] press and propaganda apparatus, we must create our own apparatus."⁹⁵

As for the content of the teachings and propaganda, Imam Khomeini emphasizes dispelling "the doubts about Islam that have been created" and acquainting "the people with the world-view, social institutions, and the form of government proposed by Islam." He hope that "by presenting the system of government and political and social principles of Islam to broad segments of humanity, we will create a strong new current of thought and a powerful popular movement that will result in the establishment of an Islamic government."⁹⁶ He believes that people are all "dissatisfied and unhappy with the state of affairs. They are living now in the shadow of the bayonet, and repression will let them say nothing. They want someone to stand up and speak out." And he enjoins: "So, courageous sons of Islam, stand up! Address the people bravely; tell the truth about our situation to the masses in simple language; arouse them to enthusiastic activity, and turn the people in the streets and bazaar, our simple-hearted workers and peasants, and our alert students into dedicated mujahids [holy war fighters]. The entire population will become mujahids."⁹⁷

Imam Khomeini is also well-aware of the importance of world public opinion. Therefore, he instructs,

Our struggling brothers should establish as much contact as possible with foreign newsmen and make them understand that it is the Shah himself and his government that are responsible for the continuing repression and violation of the Constitution. ... Furthermore, they should expose the false propaganda directed against our Islamic movement from abroad.⁹⁸

He also emphasizes the importance of propaganda aimed at the army.⁹⁹

(4) Collective protest: According to Imam Khomeini demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of collective protest would not only have a propaganda value but would also influence the actions of the oppressors.. "If a collective protest were made against the oppressors who commit an improper act or crime, if several thousand telegrams were sent to them from all the Islamic countries telling them to desist, to relinquish their errors, they certainly would desist. ..."¹⁰⁰

In addition to sending telegrams, other types of collective protest that Imam Khomeini notes are general strikes, demonstrations, organizing meetings in the mosques and other public places, and "uttering thundering cries of protest" after congregation prayers.¹⁰¹ He emphasizes the unity of action in such protests and warns that "[a]ny divisionary voice that is raised, by no matter whom, is satanic; it benefits the oppressive rulers and harms Islam and the nation."¹⁰²

(5) Organization and creating new institutions: As noted earlier, one of the means by which Imam Khomeini proposes to "overthrow tyrannical governments" is "creating new judicial, financial, economic, cultural, and political institutions."¹⁰³ He also recommends taking advantage of the assemblies and gatherings that form part of Islamic worship in order to "propagate and teach religion and to develop the ideological and political movement of Islam." In this connection he notes: "In non-Islamic countries, or Islamic countries ruled by non-Islamic governments, whenever they want the people to assemble like this; millions must be spent out of

the national treasury or budget, and even then the result is unsatisfactory." While in Islam "people go eagerly to take part in congregation prayer" or to perform Hajj.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, he emphasizes organizing more such gatherings and meetings "[a]t every available opportunity and on every occasion ... on an even wider scale than before."¹⁰⁵

6. Long term planning: Imam Khomeini warns the Muslim revolutionaries against impatience and expecting to see the fruits of their endeavors right away. He tells them, "No reasonable person expects our activities of propagation and instruction to lead quickly to the formation of an Islamic government. ... Ours is a goal that will take time to achieve." Thus, revolutionary activities need well-thought, long term planning. "Great men, with broad horizons of thought ... continue making plans for the advancement of their cause. Either they will carry out their plans themselves, or if they are not granted opportunity, others will follow their plans, even if it is two or three hundred years later. The foundation of many great movements in history were laid this way."¹⁰⁶

(7) Armed struggle and jihad: Imam Khomeini sees armed struggle against the oppressors as a last resort but a natural outcome of revolutionary activities. He argues that when the people "rise up in revolt and refuse to collaborate any longer with the tyrants or to obey corrupt and treacherous powers," those powers have two alternatives: to bow to the wishes of the people and correct themselves, or to oppose the oppositional movement. If they choose the second option and "attempt to silence [the oppositional

movement] by force of arms, they will, in effect, have engaged in armed aggression against the Muslims and acquired the status of a rebellious group (fi'a baghiya). It will then be the duty of the Muslims to engage in an armed jihad against that ruling group."¹⁰⁷ This is why he believes that the ulama need to acquire "armed power."¹⁰⁸

6. Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence. Imam Khomeini uses different types of arguments in order to inculcate in his audience a sense of commitment to action and self-confidence. According to him, apathy of the ulama in the past is mainly responsible for the weakness of Islam in the society and for the rule of corruption and agents of imperialism. He tells his audience that just praying is not sufficient to counter the plots of the imperialists. He contends the propaganda that "[p]olitics is all dirt, lying, and viciousness" so the ulama should stay away from it "is undertaken by the political agents of imperialism only to make you shun politics, to prevent you from intervening in the affairs of society and struggling against treacherous governments and their anti-national and anti-Islamic policies."¹⁰⁹ He believes that to struggle against a "regime of oppression and exploitation" and for the establishment of "a government of divine justice . . . is one of the greatest forms of worship."¹¹⁰

Imam Khomeini exhorts the ulama to have confidence in themselves and to eschew "all forms of apathy, weakness and despair."

Rid yourselves of your depression and apathy. . . . An Islamic government will definitely be established; have confidence in yourselves. You have the power, the courage, and the sense of strategy it takes to struggle for national liberty and independence, you who succeeded in waking the people and inspiring them to struggle, causing imperialism and tyranny to tremble. Day by day, you are accumulating more experience and your ability to deal with the affairs of society is increasing. Once you have succeeded in overthrowing the tyrannical regime, you will certainly be capable of administering the state and guiding the masses.¹¹¹

To impress more upon the ulama that they are "capable of administering the state," he asks them: "What are the qualifications of those who now rule the Muslim countries? What gives them the ability to rule that we allegedly lack? Who among them has any more ability than the average man?"¹¹² Actually, he argues, ulama are more qualified than anyone else "for the supervision and supreme administration of the country, the dispensing of justice, and the establishment of equitable relations among the people [because] these are precisely the subjects that the faqih has studied."¹¹³

Another argument by which Imam Khomeini tries to encourage commitment to action is reminding the ulama of their Islamic duties to oppose and destroy oppressive, exploitative, and corrupt systems; to teach and guard Islam; and to establish an Islamic government.¹¹⁴ He also reminds them that God is with those who strive to fulfill their duties. But if the religious scholars do not undertake their responsibilities and are silent "in the face of the policies of the oppressors, they ... are reproached and condemned by God." And the same is true for all Muslims in general.¹¹⁵

Imam Khomeini also uses historical arguments in order to remove from his audience the feelings of apathy and powerlessness. He tells

them to "[l]ook at the history of the prophets" and mentions the successful struggles waged by Abraham, Moses and Muhammad (peace be upon them).¹¹⁶ He also gives the example of Sayyid Hasan Mudarris from recent Iranian history. In the early 20th century, when he was a deputy in the Iranian Parliament, he spoke against an ultimatum by Russia to the effect that unless its demands were met, it would occupy Iran. "The Majlis [Parliament] took courage from his act of opposition, rejected the ultimatum, and Russia was unable to do anything! That is the conduct of a true religious leader; a thin, emaciated man, a mere heap of bones, rejecting the ultimatum and demand of a powerful state like Russia."¹¹⁷

7. Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience. As we can see in section (3) above, the values of self-sacrifice and fortitude rank high on the list of values prepared from Imam Khomeini's works. He tries to inculcate these values in his followers in the following ways:

a. Examples of the prophets and Imams: According to Imam Khomeini, to make sacrifices for the sake of one's goal "is in conformity with the customs of the prophets."¹¹⁸ He mentions the examples of Abraham, Moses, and especially Muhammad as models of self-sacrifice and forbearance. He also mentions the examples of Imam Ali, Imam Husayn, Imam Musa ibn Jafar, and Imam Riza. He notes, for example, "[t]here is no blood more precious than that of Imam Husayn, yet it was shed for the sake of Islam, because of the precious nature of Islam. We must understand this matter well and convey it to others."¹¹⁹

b. Characteristics of true Islam and genuine scholars: As noted earlier, Imam Khomeini considers as a true faqih (Islamic jurist) the scholar who "refuses to submit to others or fall under the influence of foreigners . . . even at the cost of his life." He also notes that historically, "[n]ot only our fugaha opposed the rulers, they also suffered imprisonment and torture on account of their disobedience."¹²⁰

Imam Khomeini sees participation in protests, resisting repression, showing courage and yielding martyrs as signs of vitality and the people "proving how alive they are." He calls such people "the true sons of Islam." He also notes that the "courageous youths" return to their struggle over and over after being imprisoned and banished because "it is Islam that has trained them."¹²¹

c. Sacrifice for the sake of God: Imam Khomeini states that the sacrifices which are made for the sake of God will be rewarded by Him. He notes this, however, only in passing.¹²²

d. Success depends on steadfastness: Imam Khomeini emphasizes the significance of fortitude and steadfastness as determining factors to achieve victory. He argues that "all religions and schools of thought have advanced and progressed in this fashion: they started with nothing but a plan, which came to fruition later because of the fortitude and dedication of the respective leaders and prophets."¹²³ During the revolutionary upheaval of 1978-79, he encourages people to be more active by reminding them: "We have suffered, suffered greatly, during this recent period, but we have also gained certain victories that are, of course, great."¹²⁴

8. Simplification. Imam Khomeini frequently refers to the stories of the prophets and Imams. It is clear that he mentions them and their opponents as models and symbols. He makes it more explicit when he notes that, "[w]e constantly read in the Quran that the Pharaoh acted in a certain way and Moses in another way, but we don't think about why the Qur'an tells us all this. It tells us this so that we may act like Moses toward the Pharaohs of our age; let us pick up our staffs and oppose this vile Shah."¹²⁵

Not surprisingly, Imam Khomeini refers most often to the story of Moses and Pharaoh. For him, Moses is a symbol and a model of rising up and rebellion against oppression, as well as a symbol and a model of determination, resourcefulness, and seriousness. On the contrary, Pharaoh is a symbol of tyranny, oppression, and corruption.¹²⁶

As noted earlier, Imam Khomeini refers to some prophets and Imams as symbols of commitment to action, self-sacrifice, and steadfastness.¹²⁷ Prophet Muhammad has also been noted as a symbol and model of Islamic justice and Islamic leadership. Reference to Imam Ali in this regard, however, is more frequent. Imam Ali and some other Imams are also mentioned as symbols of militancy.¹²⁸

The Quranic term "taghut", which means "one who surpasses all bounds in his despotism and tyranny and claims the prerogative of divinity for himself, whether explicitly or implicitly,"¹²⁹ is frequently used by Imam Khomeini to refer to the Shah and other tyrant rulers of the Muslim countries.¹³⁰ The term became a popular expression during the revolutionary upheaval of 1978-79 and afterwards.

9. Claim to Truth and Rationality. Imam Khomeini bases his claim to truth on the Holy Quran, the tradition of Prophet Muhammad, the traditions of Shiite Imams, the practice of earlier prophets, the practice of early Muslims, and the work of previous scholars.¹³¹ It is logical reasoning, however, that plays the most important role in his attempt to establish his claim to truth. He frequently poses questions which challenge the stand of those scholars who have different views than his. In regard to the necessity for an Islamic government, for example, he asks those who believe there can be no legitimate government during the absence of Imams:

From the time of the Lesser Occultation down to the present, is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? Did God limit the validity of His laws to two hundred years? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation?¹³²

Another interesting example of his logical reasoning to repudiate the views of his opponents is his argument against those who misused a tradition and consider the Shah as "the shadow of God." In this regard he says,

Yes, the Islamic ruler is the shadow of God, but what is meant by shadow is something that has no motion of itself. Your shadow does not move by itself; it moves only when you move. Islam recognizes a person as the "shadow of God" who abandons all individual volition in the sense that he acts only in accordance with the ordinances of Islam, so that his motion is dependent, not independent. The Messenger of God (peace and blessings be upon him) was indeed a true shadow of God; but is this vile Shah a shadow of God?¹³³

The above example also indicates the manner in which Imam Khomeini uses logical reasoning to expound the traditions of the

Prophet and the Imams. Among the "sources of truth" mentioned above, traditions of the Prophet and the Imams are the most frequently quoted sources. A major portion of the lectures on the Islamic Government are in fact on expounding some specific traditions. Some traditions that he quotes run several pages and numerous other pages are devoted to expounding them.¹³⁴

In regard to the Holy Quran, Imam Khomeini quotes it less than the traditions of the Prophet or those of the Imams but makes it clear that it commands a greater authority. He rejects, for example, the position of those ulama who tried to find some traditions to support their view that they should wait for the Occulted Imam to "come himself to remedy our affairs" by arguing that "such traditions are contrary to the Quran. They have not read the Quran. Even if they can find a hundred such traditions, they will still be beating their heads against the wall, because such traditions are contrary to the custom of the prophets [mentioned in the Quran]."¹³⁵

Reference to other "sources of truth"--that is, the practice of earlier prophets, the practice of early Muslims, and the works of previous scholars--is minimal. Their significance is also secondary to that of the Quran and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad and the Imams. They are used only as a supplement to the primary sources.¹³⁶

Chapter V

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF AYATULLAH TALEQANI

Ayatullah Taleqani started his educational/political activities by "conducting clandestine sessions for the teaching of the Qur'an" in the early 1940s.¹ This concern with presenting the genuine teachings of Islam and the Quran to the Iranian society remained his main preoccupation throughout his life. In one of his writings he observed, "Neither the world that is totally absorbed in science and invention nor the bankrupt world of the Muslims imagines that the Qur'an has any place in our lives."² Thus, he saw as his duty to return the Quran from "antiquity" and the "graveyard" back to the heart of the social, political, and economic life of the society. It is natural, therefore, that most of his speeches, articles, and books are on exposition and interpretation of the verses of the Holy Quran. He has delivered countless speeches, sermons and statements and has written numerous articles. A portion of them has been collected in the form of books. Some have appeared in some periodicals or as parts of other books. His earliest well-known book is Islam wa Malikiyat (Islam and Ownership) which was first published in the early 1950s and was revised and completed in the early 1960s while he was in prison. It has been reprinted numerous times. His other major writing is a commentary on the Holy Quran entitled Partavi az Quran (A Ray from the Quran) which was also written while he was a political prisoner from 1963 to 1967. It has been published

in six volumes. He has also translated some books from Arabic and has edited a book on the Islamic form of government by Ayatullah Nayeri--an early 20th century Iranian religious scholar.

In this study the following works of Ayatullah Taleqani have been included for analysis:

(1) Five chapters of the book Islam wa Malikiyat ("Islam and Ownership"). The book has seven chapters. The first two chapters, which are historical accounts of the evolution of ownership and the emergence of labor power, have been excluded.³

(2) "Jihad and Martyrdom," a sermon delivered at the Hidayat Mosque, Tehran, in 1963.⁴

(3) Tabayun-e Resalat bara-e Qiyam ba Qist ("Clarifying [the meaning of] Mission to Rise up for Equity") a collection of six lectures delivered at Hidayat Mosque, Tehran, during 1979 Revolution.⁵

1. Political Consciousness. Ayatullah Taleqani believes that the root of man's socio-political domination lies in his mental and psychological servitude. He argues that man^{*} has instincts and impulses which bring about selfishness and make him seek pleasure and material gains. The oppressive authorities try to use this natural tendency and make man a slave to his selfishness and lust in order to "ride him like an animal." They do not have to try hard to stimulate the instincts and impulses because they are stimulated and strengthened by human senses and his basic needs. Man needs these instincts for his survival. They are not, however, the only force working in him. He is also endowed with great and unlimited

potentialities and infinite capacity to actualize them. To work for the actualization of these potentialities means continuous movement towards Absolute Perfection, that is, God. To accomplish this, man must establish a balance between his instincts and impulses (which are the source of his selfishness) on the one hand, and high human principles (which are the source of self-sacrifice) on the other. This means that he must always check his instincts and impulses which are easily provoked, and must prevent their total domination. For this purpose man needs faith which turns his attention towards--and attaches him to--the Absolute Truth, Strength, Life, and Perfection.⁶

There is no other way for freedom from such a domination and for continuation of evolution except by faith in--that is, attachment to--Infinite and Absolute Perfection and Power. The first principle of Islamic belief and the real meaning of calling to Tawhid [Unity, monotheism] is exactly this faith in Absolute Power and Perfection. Only such a belief can be the source of [a person's] transformation from being self-seeking to being perfection-seeking. ... [In the meantime,] attachment to the Source of Goodness and Mercy can elevate a person and broaden his perspective to such an extent that he looks at all the people [humanity as a whole] with one and the same view. Retaining such a view over a period of time would make the person a source of mercy and goodness which would gush from his heart and flow from his deeds.⁷

In addition to its moral and spiritual significance, the above argument certainly has a political significance. This is one way that Ayatullah Taleqani tries to turn the attention of his readers and audience to higher needs and values and thus bring about political consciousness.

Ayatullah Taleqani also believes that the Islamic acts of worship influence man's relations with his fellow human beings. He argues that these acts "consciously strengthen, develop and fix

human interests in such a way that the fulfillment of responsibility to fellow human beings and to the society becomes more significant than the personal gain or loss. It is then that man enters the stage of higher human consciousness. In this stage good is done for the sake of goodness; services are performed for the sake of serving; wealth is spent in the way of human perfection; and everything is done for the sake of God and His Eternal and Wise Will."⁸

Man's being God's Khalifa (viceregent and representative), which is noted in the Quran (2:30), also places great responsibility upon him.

The outlook of tauhid renders the "viceregent" responsible for bringing the task of viceregency to fruition in such a way that he may neither overstep the bounds of this role nor fall short of fulfilling his crucial responsibilities; although in his thought and behavior he is free and independent, and has discretionary powers, in accordance with the title of viceregent he is restricted to carrying out the will and attaining the object of the One possessing Command and owning creation. ...⁹

Ayatullah Taleqani emphasizes more the following three Islamic responsibilities and duties: (1) to struggle in the Way of God and against taghut (illegitimate authorities), (2) to rise up for establishing qist (equity), and (3) to enjoin right and forbid wrong. Each will be discussed briefly.

(1) Duty to struggle in the Way of God and against taghut: Ayatullah Taleqani considers jihad (struggle) in the Way of God and against illegitimate and tyrant regimes as an important Islamic duty. It is so important, he notes, that in Islamic jurisprudence jihad is discussed under the topic of "Acts of Worship." In regard to the meaning of jihad in "the Way of God," he notes that,

God's way is that way which leads to the well-being of human society as a whole, the way of justice, the way of truth, the way of human freedom, so a few, a certain class, cannot gain dominance over the powers and capacities of men in such a way as to block the intellectual movement of human society and keep men from appropriating for themselves the natural resources the God of the universe has places at the disposal of all. ... [I]t is "God's way" that all people should enjoy all their inner capacities and all of nature's potentials alike.¹⁰

This is the positive aspect of jihad "in the way of God." The negative aspect is to fight against taghut.

So the negative aspect is that you must take away the things that obstruct people's lives; you must sweep aside the powers, the classes that stand against the rights of the people and stifle free thought. ... Those centralized powers that deceive a weakened people, that set them at each other's throats, that lead them away from the Creator toward the created ...--these disruptive forces must be swept away from the path of human evolution.¹¹

(2) Duty to rise up for establishing equity: Based on a verse of the Holy Quran, Ayatullah Taleqani argues that the purpose of the prophets' mission was to make people stand up for qist, that is, to make them rise up to establish equity. According to Taleqani qist means that, "each person with his peculiar capabilities and talents occupies the appropriate position that he deserves. He obtains the rights and fulfill the duties which have been recognized for each human being on this planet of earth [with all its resources]."¹²

Ayatullah Taleqani makes it clear that qist not only means economic justice but also implies the idea of freedom. He severely criticizes those who consider man an "economic animal" having only material needs. He sees liberty and equity as the aim of all revolutions, an aim for which not only the Iranian people but mankind in general aspire.¹³

(3) Duty to enjoin right and forbid wrong: Again based on a verse of the Holy Quran, Ayatullah Taleqani considers enjoining right and good and forbidding wrong and evil as one of the most important duties of a Muslim. Because of this duty, every Muslim is responsible for the actions of the other members of the society. Therefore, he should first know what is right and wrong, good and evil, obligatory and prohibited. Then he has both the right and duty to get involved in public affairs, to express what he sees as good and fitting, to vote, and to prevent deviations and wrong-doing even if committed by a caliph or a ruler. This general responsibility, Taleqani believes, "is the secret of the superiority of the Islamic society and the brotherly community of Islam [over other societies]."¹⁴

What was discussed above is Ayatullah Taleqani's effort to bring about political consciousness among the Muslim people of Iran in general by turning their attention to higher aims and values. He also directs his efforts towards some groups who had political consciousness, but whose aims and values were different from those of Islam--namely, the leftist groups with Marxist tendencies. He tells the members of such groups that they commit "idolatry" by worshiping their particular schools of thought and refusing to look at anything beyond them. He asks them to open their eyes and to see that the people do not agree with their points of view. The people want freedom; and "in fact, even the real thought, conscience and incentive of the leftist youth are the demand for freedom. It is because of some secondary factors, however, that they have tended

towards the left [Marxism]." He reminds them of the negative experience of "communism" in the Muslim world in general and in Iran in particular, especially the Tudeh Party's role in the Oil Nationalization Movement of the early 1950s. He also warns them about the criticalness of the situation and the regime's attempts to utilize people's anti-atheist sentiments in order to create dissension.¹⁵ These arguments, together with his criticism of Marxism--which will be discussed later--seem to have aimed at extending "Islamic political consciousness" to the Marxist groups.

As for a framework for popularization of the higher values and needs, which is also considered as part of a revolutionary ideology in this study, it does not seem to concern Ayatullah Taleqani--not at least in the works covered in this study. The reason for this omission might be the fact that Ayatullah Taleqani himself used an institution provided by Islam--that is, the mosque--for that purpose. Thus, he did not see any need for creating a new framework.

As for bringing about a sense of community--another component of "political consciousness"--again Ayatullah Taleqani does not pay much attention to it, probably because he feels a sense of community already exists among the Muslims as a whole and especially among the Shiites in Iran.¹⁶ Nonetheless, occasionally he talks about the significance of community. In his lectures on qist in 1979, he argues that when people stand up for qist (equity), they should do so all as one body.

Actually the human body is a representation of qist because each cell has occupied a certain position and receives its proper share of food, etc. When there is a disturbance at the share of one cell, it will affect the whole body. The same is true about

the body of a human society whose members are like its parts. When one part hurts, other parts cannot remain unaffected. Although the geographical location does not make any difference [and all mankind should be as one body], the primary members of such a society would be those who have a common goal and a common texture; that is, "the community of faith."¹⁷

2. Criticism of Social Arrangement. Ayatullah Taleqani does not focus his attention on any particular aspect of the social arrangement. It is directed, rather, to the following socio-politico-economic conditions:

a. Imperialism and foreign domination, Zionism, and the influence of non-Muslim groups: Ayatullah Taleqani observes that imperialism has plotted for centuries "to suppress the light of faith in the hearts and consciences of the believers and to put it off for ever, because that was the only way it could reach its goals for the exploitation of the material and non-material resources of the Middle East and the Muslim countries."¹⁸ Nonetheless, unlike Imam Khomeini, he does not focus his attention on this phenomenon. He seldom talks about foreign influence; and when he does so, he often names specific countries--understandably almost always the United States and Israel.

Taleqani believes Iran's relations with the United States is a relationship of domination and servitude. "The U.S. thinks of the Iranian people as a lamb of which it can cut a piece of fat any time it wants." He considers all foreign investments as plundering and argues that the foreigners wish to have the Iranian people fight each other so that they could continue their exploitation. He also notes the army's domination by the C.I.A. and Israel.¹⁹ He also

criticizes the U.S. for following--in a worse manner--the same path which the European countries took after abolishment of slavery in their own countries, that is, moving into enslavement of foreign countries.²⁰

In a speech in 1963, Ayatullah Taleqani severely criticizes the Shah's regime for establishing relations with Israel. According to him, "Today Zionism is second kin of colonialism; colonialism was defeated in its initial form, and then it re-emerged in the form of Zionism. Zionism came forth in the shape of Israel." He believes, "Israeli agents . . . have flung to the wind the moral of this country, the virtue of this country, the economy of this country, the spiritual being of this country, the very life of this country." And he considers them "the greatest menace we face."²¹

Ayatullah Taleqani relates the influence of Zionism to that of Bahais and believes that "Israel has assumed another form in our country: Baha'ism. The Baha'is have influence with all the ministers and all the pillars of this Shi'i Islamic state. ..." He considers Bahais as dhimis (non-Muslims living in an Islamic country) and argues that according to Islamic jurisprudence when dhimis "overstep the bound of their dhimi status, they become belligerents."²²

b. The ruling clique: Ayatullah Taleqani considers the Iranian society during the Shah's rule as "upside down," because the most corrupt, the most shameless, and the most stupid people are positioned at the top. He characterizes the Shah's regime as "corrupt, corrupting, imposed (from outside), dictatorial, exploiter and plunderer--each of which would suffice to affect the legitimacy

of a regime." He accuses the Shah of lying when he claimed he would act according to the constitution. He also accuses him of attempting to create dissension and disunity among the people--a goal opposite to that of the prophets.²³

Taleqani also criticizes the repression practiced by the Shah's regime and notes that the ulama do not have the right to speak, and that the educated youths are being murdered.²⁴

Moreover, he criticizes the unjust economic relations and observes that the Iranian society has been divided into two groups. One group works and the other parasite group not only consumes the fruits of its labor but also saves it in the banks and sends it abroad. Thus, he believes, "the wealth, belongings, life and talent of the Iranian nation have been plundered."²⁴ Interpreting a verse of the Quran, he argues that this exploitation has been made possible by the cooperation of the exploiters and the ruling group:

Since unlawful consumption of the wealth which actually belongs to all the people is unjust and unnatural and can take place only with repression of the weak and deprived classes, the exploiters share their booty with the greedy ruling class and win its support. It is after this solidarity of the exploitative capitalists with the ruling class that a single class is formed against the people. ... Thus, the government which had emerged for administration, supervision, and settlement of differences becomes a tyrant and oppressive power tied to the exploiters.²⁶

c. Feudalism: Ayatullah Taleqani wrote the book Islam and Ownership in the early 1950s, almost a decade before the Shah's land reform programs were designed and implemented. Therefore, he criticizes the existing feudal--or semi-feudal--system of land ownership in Iran. He believes Islam to be anti-feudalism and argues that although some Muslim rulers and their agents had tried in the

past to allocate large chunks of land to themselves, their action did not lead to feudal system because their property would break into smaller pieces either during their life time or soon after their death.

If feudalism has lasted for a long while in the history of Islam, it is only in the recent centuries. This corresponds exactly to the time when imperialism extended its roots in Muslim countries. The Muslims became Westernized. The principles of belief and the Islamic ordinances were loosened or neglected all together. The rulers of the Muslim countries found centers of support outside their borders. Thus, they attacked all the rights of the Muslims and crumbled their independence, their character, and their economy.²⁷

d. Materialism, immorality and confusion: According to Ayatullah Taleqani the fact that wealth and profit-seeking have become goals in themselves--rather than being means for welfare and evolution of humanity towards perfection--lies at the root of all the economic problems not only in Iran but in the world as a whole. He argues that while the rulers themselves are dominated by the love of wealth and other desires related to it, they will not be able to solve the real problem of production and distribution, which is "idolatry of wealth and production."²⁸ He also notes the negative impact of materialism on personal well-being:

Now why are we glum-looking? It is because we have no aim. Since we have no [higher] aims, we imagine it is all a matter of achieving wealth and power, by any means possible. When we do not achieve them, we grow bitter, our faces grow gloomy. . . . The economic situation is bad. Everyone is despondent; everyone is tired; everyone is sad. This is because we are dominated by the world [materialism].²⁹

On the social level also materialism results in "aimlessness, confusion, frustration, instability, disorder, violence, and war--to all of which the planet earth and its inhabitants are subjected today."³⁰

Related to materialism is immorality which is encouraged by the oppressive regime. "This stimulation of lust, these movie theaters, these nightclubs, these casinos, these so-called 'art festivals'--these are all for degrading men and women. These are all [set up] to trap them in slavery: to make them slaves to their desires first; and once they became animal-like, then to ride them."³¹

e. Islam misunderstood and neglected: Ayatullah Taleqani finds Islam as a misunderstood religion in Iran. "Even now [in 1979] Islam is located amidst superstitions, imaginaries, distortions, and false interpretations caused by the influence of philosophical thoughts and the customs of different nations. Still it has not been clarified to most of the Muslims as it should be--especially to our youth. ..."³² Moreover, in his book Islam and Ownership, he complains over and over that the genuine teachings of Islam are not implemented in the society. "If they were," he believes, "all our problems would have been solved."³³

3. New Set of Values. Almost all values emphasized by Ayatullah Taleqani are social. He emphasizes few spiritual values and notes several personal ones.

a. Social values: Equity and justice is on top of Ayatullah Taleqani's list of values (noted 32 times). He seems, however, to consider freedom and liberty more significant (mentioned 22 times in the list). More than once he notes, "for mankind nothing is more desirable than freedom."³⁴ He also emphasizes Jihad (struggle) and

unity and brotherhood (mentioned 20 and 17 times respectively). Equality is next in the list followed by cooperation and charity (three to five times each). Other social values noted by Taleqani are good deeds, peace, independence, self-reliance, education, respect, sharing, and harmony.³⁵

b. Personal values: Truth and truthfulness and thoughtfulness and pondering are on top of Ayatullah Taleqani's list of personal values (each noted seven times). They are closely followed by piety, responsibility, self-defence, consciousness, foresight, and wisdom (each noted six to three times). Other personal values in the list include strength, perfection, kindness, self-control, fortitude, well being and happiness, action, dignity and honor (each noted at least twice); friendship, victory, willpower, alertness, and knowledge (each mentioned at least once).³⁶

c. Spiritual values: Fiath, self-sacrifice (each mentioned nine times) and evolution (towards perfection) (noted seven times) are the only spiritual values in the list of Ayatullah Taleqani's values.³⁷

4. Outline of the Good Society: Ayatullah Taleqani focuses his description of the good society on its economic aspects. Since in Islam economy cannot be separated from other aspects of life, however, he talks about the Islamic society and government as well.

(1) Islamic Law: According to Ayatullah Taleqani "Government belongs to God. The Prophet, the Imam, and, after them, the mujtahid [Islamic scholar] and the body of Muslims are the executors of the

divine laws."³⁸ In regard to the superiority of Divine law over man-made laws he argues,

Society is composed of individuals who willingly accept social laws and contracts and mutually bind themselves to respect and guarantee them. The deeper the root of belief in responsibility to the laws, the stronger will be the pillars of the society. Since society is a dynamic and evolutionary entity, the direction in which it should move must be made clear. Otherwise, a society without an aim and dynamism cannot survive. It is on this basis that a society is established; its goal, limitations, and rights are distinguished; and laws are made according to those rights. The strength of the laws and their power of execution depend upon the belief in the goal and on moral and conscientious responsibility of the individuals who make up the society. Therefore, the law-giver must:

First-be knowledgeable about the ultimate goal of life for the individuals and the society so that there is no stagnation at any stages of movement and evolution; and, accordingly, the laws can provide fulfillment to all the needs; ...

Second-have total knowledge of the human psychology, his desires and his values so that the laws could be comprehensive; ...

Third-be free from the effects of the social environment, class relations, and selfish desires so that the laws are legislated for the well-being of all the members of the society.

Fourth-The members of the society must have faith in the laws and in the status of the legislator so that the principles of the law have the power of execution by themselves, and that most of the people feel themselves responsible for its implementation.³⁹

Taleqani criticizes man-made laws as not fulfilling any of the above mentioned conditions and concludes that it is only the Divine laws revealed through God's Messengers that fit these criteria. The Islamic law, which is the last Divine revelation, "provides the principles and ordinances on each topic [of legislation] in an absolute and abstract form (except for a few cases such as ordinances pertaining to inheritance). These principles and ordinances together with genuine tradition [of the Prophet] and principles derived from it have left the way for ijtehad [independent reasoning] open to the rightly-guided intellect.

Moreover, according to the Islamic jurisprudence, masaleh mursala [public interest], good customs, and social traditions which are not against the principles and explicit ordinances [of the Quran] are hujat [binding]. . . .By connecting the active intellect with Divine and other sources of law and dynamic ijtihad, Islamic jurisprudence is--and should be--always in development and evolution."⁴⁰

(2) Qualifications of the leader: Unlike Imam Khomeini who emphasizes the knowledge of the law as one of the most important qualifications of the leader of the Islamic government, Ayatullah Taleqani refers to this qualification only indirectly. He quotes a tradition of Imam Husain about the qualifications of a leader. The first qualification is Al-hakim bil-Kitab (ruling by the Book). Ayatullah Taleqani notes one implication of this; that is, the leader himself is subject to the laws of the Book, and he cannot be above or beyond it. The other implication, though not made explicit by Taleqani, is of course that he must be knowledgeable of the laws of the Book--otherwise how could he rule by them. The qualification which Taleqani emphasizes the most is Al-qaeim bil-qist (standing in equity). According to him this means that the leader establishes justice and is watchful so that each individual receives his due rights, there is no discrimination, and everyone in the society occupies the position he deserves. The third qualification of a leader is that he is not under any kind of obligation to anyone. The fourth qualification is that "he curbs himself in the Will of God," which means that he is in such a moral and spiritual level of excellence that he can guard himself against his selfish desires,

and that his thoughts, words, actions and moves are all in the direction of ascension towards God.⁴¹

(3) Duties and authorities of the Government: According to Ayatullah Taleqani, the Islamic ruler has two basic duties: (1) to carry out the explicit principles and ordinances of the Islamic law, and (2) to derive and deduce the secondary ordinances and to relate them to the cases at hand. Moreover, he has the authority to freely dispose of public resources, to exercise complete supervision over production and distribution, and to take charge of public and government revenues. He is also responsible to provide for the sustenance of individual members of the society. Because of these duties, authorities, and responsibilities, the right of the government takes precedence over the rights of individuals.⁴² Ayatullah Taleqani is quick to note, however, that the ruler can act only within the law--not on the basis of his own whims. Actually, according to him, from the Islamic point of view the government and its officials are people's trustees and treasurers, not the owner and disposer of their lives and properties.⁴³ He also notes that an Islamic government is not a government of the Akhunds (religious scholars). First of all, the religious scholars do not constitute any particular class; and secondly, even if they were a class, in an Islamic state no class or strata have the right to dominate the government and deprive others.⁴⁴

(4) Social relations: Ayatullah Taleqani emphasizes that the Islamic society is a society of qist (equity). What this means is that in such a society everyone has the opportunity to train and

develop the talents and potentialities that he has, and that everyone occupies the social position that he deserves. In other words, "in such a society every individual is like a seed which requires proper conditions for development and actualization of his potentials. Such conditions must be provided [by the government]. Moreover, the arena of proper and useful action should be open to each individual, and the outcome of his mental and physical activities should return to him. That is, the individual owns his labor--no exploitation, no colonisation, no alienation. Each and all are human beings."⁴⁵ It is in such a society that "cooperation and assistance for survival--which is man's ideal--replaces struggle for survival--which is a remnant of his animal background and his life in the wilderness."⁴⁶ According to Taleqani, the realization of such a community and society is not a dream and utopia. "Islamic assemblies such as congregation prayer, Friday prayer, and Hajj all demonstrate the superiority of taqwa [piety and God-consciousness]; the sovereignty of God and His laws; equality of all human beings; and abolishment of all kinds of discriminations, class dominations, and their mental and psychological effects."⁴⁷ Moreover, the early Islamic society established by the Prophet is an embodiment of the ideal society. Taleqani devotes many pages to describing the society of the Prophet and notes that although it did not last very long after his demise, the struggle for its re-establishment was first championed by Ali and then continued by others. Furthermore, "if we look at the Muslim public in general [throughout the Islamic history] and compare them to other societies, we see that there was

much less oppression and violation of rights among the Muslims. In the long centuries from the beginning of Islam to the emergence of imperialism, neither the land owners of the Islamic territories were like feudal lords of other countries nor their businessmen like the capitalists of other nations. ..."⁴⁸

(5) Islamic Economy: As noted earlier, the focus of Ayatullah Taleqani's book Islam wa Malikyat (Islam and Ownership) is on Islamic economy. Detailed discussion of his views on the subject is beyond the scope of this dissertation. To get a picture of the economic relations in his ideal society, however, I will present a summary of Ayatullah Taleqani's views on ownership, production, distribution, consumption, and the role of government and public finance.

a. Ownership: Absolute ownership belongs to God, and the right of utilization of God's property belongs to all the people. Thus, in an Islamic society private ownership is "limited, restricted, temporary, and custodial." Some ordinances that can be derived from this general principle are:

1- Land and natural resources do not belong to anyone (neither individuals nor the society). The Islamic leader has the right of supervision over them in order to see them managed according to the public interest.

2- Within the limits of useful utilization and fruitful work, individuals have a special and limited right to utilize the land and natural resources. Within the same limits, they also have ownership rights to the fruits of their labor and to their products.

3- No individual or class has exclusive rights over natural resources, nor can anyone stop others from utilizing them.

4- No one is entitled to the ownership of profits and properties gained from illegal transactions (usury, gambling, lottery) and from production and sale of harmful or useless commodities.

5- Mentally retarded and immature persons do not have the right of disposition over their properties.⁴⁹

b. Production: According to the Islamic principles and ordinances individuals are free and independent, and the government does not have the right to restrict their freedom. They are free and enjoy freedom of choice to put to work their talents and their physical and mental capabilities in order to fulfill their material needs. Once the individuals act to seek wealth and to utilize it, however, their actions are limited within certain ordinances and within the limits of public interest. This is a distinguishing feature of the Islamic economy which prevents exploitation and concentration of wealth on the one hand, and nurtures individual personality within the society on the other.⁵⁰

The rights and ordinances of Islam provide for free workers and wage-earners, with all options open to them. Under fair and equitable provisions, they may work for wages or share in the profits or the principal. It is not for the employer alone to decide the amount of work they are to perform, or whether they will have a share in the profit or accept a wage, whether that employer is a private owner or the state. The ordinances regulating mudaraba, muzara'a, musaqat, ja'ala, and ijara [different types of contracts] in Islamic jurisprudence are based upon this freedom of choice and equality of rights.

In the view of Islamic jurisprudence, all financial contracts and resulting profits and benefits have been based on the principle of work. Capital is the product of the original work that has been applied to products of nature; profits result from joining of additional instances of labor to the original instance. Since there is a difference in capacity that results in a difference in the value of labor, and since the original

source of value--and consequently, of ownership--appears in the first instance of labor, subsequent instances and the form of the product resulting from them are super-added to the first instance so that the workers in these later stages are automatically disqualified from being absolute owners; the suppliers of means and tools likewise have no share in the profit [they are entitled only to the labor they put into the product and to the amount of depreciation of the means of production].⁵¹

c. Distribution: Distribution, like production, is the natural and innate right of the person whose labor is involved. Neither a capitalist class nor the state can have monopoly over production and distribution. The limits and legal restraints on the right of utilization and ownership secure the regulation and delimitation of distribution and prevent unlimited profits. Islam recognizes commerce and trade as a useful and legal occupation. However, "Islamic ordinances . . . have prohibited exchanges in which no useful act is performed. . . . In addition to forbidding usurious and quasi-usurious transactions, the specific provisions of Islamic jurisprudence have ruled out those instances in which profiting on nullity without useful work may creep in."⁵²

Given [the] kind of limited freedom of exchange [that Islam prescribes], and the government inspection of goods, the principle of supply and demand--in the capitalist sense--cannot govern exchanges. ... According to Islamic jurisprudence ... demand arises from need. Accordingly, goods are offered and made available to the extent required to satisfy the necessities of life. The market is not to become the plaything of greed, as it is under capitalism, where the way is open to pseudo-needs and oppressive profiteering ("squandering on nullity").⁵³

d. Consumption: In the same way that Islam has prohibited usury, which is profit without work and results in the concentration of wealth, it has unequivocally prohibited collection and accumulation of gold and silver. It has also warned against the accumulation of wealth in general.⁵⁴ On the other hand,

Islam has prohibited every sort of consumption not serving to further public life or to advance the cause of faith, thought, and science. Some instances of useless or harmful consumption are explicitly legislated against; examples are drinking alcohol, gambling, procuring the means of frivolous amusement, laying up gold or silver vessels, partaking of base and illicit pleasures and lusts, and supporting corrupting art forms. Some fall under more general ordinances, to the effect that the procurement, importation, buying and selling of whatever is determined to be useless and harmful, and a dissipation, must be prevented. From another stand point, no religion has so encouraged and urged the expenditure of wealth for the sake of public life, charitable works, and uplifting thought and morals as has Islam.⁵⁵

e. Government supervision and public finance: As noted earlier, although the people are free to engage in economic activities within the limits of the law, the government has the authority and the responsibility to provide general supervision. One of the principles on the basis of which the government can interfere in individuals' economic activities is the principle of la dharara wa la dharaara fi-l Islam ("there is no harming of others in Islam"), that is, no one can engage in an activity which proves harmful to other individuals or to the society. Moreover, the Islamic ruler has the right to supervise natural resources and to dispose of private property on the basis of the public interest. Nonetheless, he cannot exceed the limits set by the law.⁵⁶

Islam provides for a number of religious taxes. Some of them, like zakat and khums, are fixed; and some others, like kharaj, jazyā and kafara, are variable. The Islamic government collects and spends these funds for the benefit of the tax payers and for the public welfare. If there is a need, the Islamic ruler can lay additional taxes.⁵⁷

5. Program of Action. Ayatullah Taleqani does not concern himself much with providing a program of action. Nonetheless, the following targets of change, agents of change, and forms of action can be identified in his writings and lectures.

a. Targets of change: The only target of change that is well defined is the Shah and the corrupt and oppressive ruling clique. He attacks the Shah explicitly in his 1979 lectures, but refers to him as "taghut" (illegitimate and oppressive authority) in his earlier lectures and writings. He also attacks foreign domination over Iran and names the United States and Israel as the two countries responsible for the Shah's oppressive rule and for exploitation of the Iranian people. Moreover, he identifies Bahais as a target of attack because they have overstepped the bounds of their dhimi status.⁵⁸

b. Agents of change: Ayatullah Taleqani puts a lot of emphasis on the role of the people in bringing about revolutionary changes. He argues,

The Quran [referring to the establishment of equity] says: li yaquman-nas "people stand up themselves." ... It says "nas", that is, the people who have attained consciousness; not a particular strata, not a particular class, not a particular group; but the people, the masses of the people; not even a particular party. In countries where a party makes a revolution against oppression, tyranny, discrimination, class domination (or whatever you call it); when it comes to power, the dictatorship of the oppressive regime is replaced by the party dictatorship. Again new problems [arise]! ... But the Quran says all the people--each and every individual of you--are responsible.⁵⁹

He notes, however, that there is a need for leadership to organize and direct the people. His description of the qualifications of Imam (leader) indicates that the leadership should

come from among the ulama. He abstains, however, from explicitly saying that the leadership belongs to ulama. He advises his audience to follow the person whom they think has the qualifications set by Islam. But he adds, "the most important point is that you get together and move yourselves forward. Do not accept anything blindly from me or from anyone else. Rather, recognize your way by using the criteria and measures that the Quran has set up."⁶⁰

c. Forms of action: As noted earlier, Ayatullah Taleqani considers man's internal psychological servitude as the source of his external servitude. He introduces the prophets, who brought great revolutionary changes in their societies, as personalities who were freed from psychological and instinctual shackles and limitations, which are the heritage of man's animal background, as well as from domination of traditions, social environment, and imitation.⁶¹ What this means is that since the prophets are models for the believers, those Muslims who want to bring about revolutionary changes in their societies should follow their example.

The second step, after the revolutionaries' socio-psychological freedom, is to bring about consciousness to the society. In interpreting a verse of the Holy Quran, Ayatullah Taleqani argues that prophets' first task was "to illuminate the people; to deliver man from confusion and doubt about truth and falsehood and about himself; to deliver him from alienation; to enlighten him about his direction, his relations with his Creator, his relations with the creation, and his responsibilities in life." To inculcate this idea in his audience, he repeats it over and over in different words. He

also warns his audience that "socio-political campaigns, demonstrations and slogans are important; but they should not make our youths neglect ideas, reflection, mental development, strengthening faith and belief, and understanding their goals and ideologies."⁶²

After the people are enlightened, they will rise up themselves. They should not, however, engage in armed struggle right away. "It is the duty of every Muslim to give guidance to the tyrant, to speak to him charitably, to say 'Tyranny is not in your best interest; it is not in the best interest of the country or society. No bandit and tyrant has ever come to a good end.' He must be counselled. If he does not accept the counsel, then the ranks must be closed and a force to oppose him must be created."⁶³

The last sentence in the quote refers to organization and armed struggle. Ayatullah Taleqani notes two further conditions for waging armed struggle (Jihad): (1) it should be waged along side a just Imam, and (2) it should be purely "in God's way." In regard to the second condition he argues,

When the nature of God's way and the nature of the adversary become clear, and the ultimate outcome comes into view so that the people's intentions are purified, then jihad becomes truly "in God's way." At that time, the people must rise up in jihad. Otherwise, however much importance Islam gives to jihad and warfare, it places an even greater value on human lives. One must not be led to one's death by feelings. One must not be incited. Jihad has been instituted for the sake of our belief.⁶⁴

Another form of revolutionary action that Ayatullah Taleqani emphasizes is mazlumat (being innocently victimized by brutal force). In his lectures in 1979, he considers mazlumat as the

sharpest and most effective weapon that the revolutionaries have. He urges the revolutionaries to rely upon mazlummyat and not to fight back the army.

Most of the army are Muslims. Most of them are Iranians. They are your brothers and your sons. ... Enemy's last resort is to use the army against us. ... What should we do? We should see how and when our movement picked up momentum. ... [We should realize that] faith in addition to mazlummyat turns into a force and becomes the most effective weapon in the world. ... The victories we have had so far are all the result of mazlummyat. He [the Shah's soldier] would shoot and we would say "Allahu Akbar" (God is the Greatest). ... It was these cries that shook up the human conscience of those who had become no more than the wolves of imperialism.⁶⁵

Ayatullah Taleqani also emphasizes the importance of unity during the process of the revolution. He asks the revolutionaries to avoid any action that would bring about division. He also asks them to nullify the Shah's plots and propaganda to create fear and disunity by more cooperation. He tells them , "we are all one Iranian family. If there is not enough food, we will eat just once a day. If I have food but my neighbor does not, I will sacrifice and share mine with him. No one tells the parents that they should eat less when the children are hungry; it is natural to do so. This is the way Islam wants [all the believers to act towards each other]. When you attain such a quality, know that you can solve most of the problems."⁶⁶

6. Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence. For Ayatullah Taleqani man is located at the center of all the changes that happen in a society. "The form of a society and the movement of history originate with man."⁶⁷ As noted earlier, he argues that man has great potentialities and is duty-bound to work for their actualization. He has also the duty to struggle in the way of God, which is the way of the people, to oppose illegitimate authorities, to establish equity, and to enjoin good and forbid wrong.⁶⁸ When a person believes in all these, certainly he cannot remain apathetic and inactive.

Moreover, Ayatullah Taleqani argues that the struggle to fulfill one's duties should not be confined to following a leader.

One of the misfortunes of the underdeveloped nations is that the people always expect their leaders ... to move first; then they would follow them blindly. The Quran teaches against such a position. [According to the Quran,] each human being should move himself; he should rely upon himself; so that if the leader is lost, the people would be able to continue their way. . . . If you are not organized into a group, rise up two by two; and if you cannot even do that, then rise up one by one. It is after the rising up that the thought and ideas will be activated."⁶⁹

He also tells his audience that the power of God and Truth support those who rise up to establish equity.⁷⁰

Another method by which Ayatullah Taleqani tries to bring about commitment to action is by reminding the revolutionaries of the significance of their action. He tells them, "this [Revolution] is not the issue of one nation, confined within certain borders. It is an issue that will change the destiny of the Middle East and the whole world. With the commitment of our nation and vigilance of each and every man and woman, young and old, this movement will move

forward. Hopefully it will open up a new logic and a new school of thought for a world which is frustrated by all other systems and schools of thought."⁷¹

7. Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience. Ayatullah Taleqani believes "sacrifice" and "resistance" to be the message of the revolutionary movement in 1979. He declares:

Brothers and sisters! Take this message of ours to everyone. We are engaged in a severe and critical struggle. [The enemy] creates terror and artificial shortages. It wants to scare us of cold weather and [lack of] gasoline and food so that it could crush us. But it will not be able to scare us. You have become conscious and vigilant. . . . The same youth who had sunk into corruption yesterday is standing against imperialism and domestic tyranny and despotism--with all its artillery and tanks--today. . . . We should be ready and willing to devote whatever wealth we have to this cause. . . . This [Revolution] is a matter of historical importance and the destiny of our generation. . . . We should not behave in such a manner that would make the future generations curse us."⁷²

Ayatullah Taleqani also encourages self-sacrifice by arguing that martyrdom is to witness the Truth. "If someone becomes effaced in the Truth, forgets himself in the way of the Truth or for the sake of the Truth, and gives himself over to be killed in witness of the Truth or to uphold the Truth, he is called a martyr." He tells his audience that "God values the blood which has been shed in His way, not even a drop would be wasted;" and that "sacrifice serves evolution."⁷³ He frequently reminds them of the early martyrs of Islam--especially those who were martyred with Imam Husain in Karbala--and invites them: "Come, let us become martyrs; let us dominate the world [of materialism]; let us rise above the world! This is what is meant to be a believer."⁷⁴

8. Simplification. Since Ayatullah Taleqani is more concerned with the ideal Islamic society--especially in his book on Islam and Ownership--he frequently refers to the early history of Islam which was the embodiment of the ideal society. The Islamic state established by the Prophet in Madina is the prime example. He also gives examples of the caliphs Omar and Ali.⁷⁵ In regard to martyrdom and sacrifice, he emphasizes the story of Imam Husain and his companions who were martyred by the army of Yazid in the Karbala desert in the year 62 A.H.(682 A.D.).⁷⁶ In order to nullify the Shah's propaganda as well as to emphasize the illegitimacy of his regime, he compares his propaganda against the religious scholars to Yazid's propaganda against Imam Husain.⁷⁷

Ayatullah Taleqani mentions the phrases "Allahu Akbar" (God is the Greatest) and "La ilaha illallah" (there is no entity worthy of worship but God) as "the most frequently repeated mottoes" of the revolutionaries. He also quotes some verses from the Quran as mottoes for brotherhood, cooperation, charity, and jihad.⁷⁸

9. Claim to Truth and Rationality. Ayatullah Taleqani is first and foremost a commentator on the Quran. Thus, the Holy Quran constitutes the basic source of truth for him. He also frequently refers to the traditions of Prophet Muhammad and some Imams. History in general and the Islamic history in particular is another source upon which he relies heavily to support his views. Occasionally he also refers to the works of non-Muslim scholars and philosophers such as Jean Jaques Rousseau, George Jurdac.⁷⁹

Rationality and logical reasoning play an important role in Ayatullah Taleqani's writings and lectures. His argument regarding the superiority of the Divine law has already been noted in section (4) above. But what was presented there was only a summary. He devotes numerous pages to arguing about the shortcomings of man-made laws as well as about how Islam deals with the roots of human problems before legislating laws and how its laws work effectively.⁸⁰

Ayatullah Taleqani uses logical reasoning in his interpretation of the verses of the Quran as well. His interpretations are usually much more comprehensive and go much deeper into the meaning of each word and the relations of the words of a verse to each other than the works of most other commentators. The following example demonstrates this point.

Verse 29 of the fourth chapter of the Holy Quran says, "O ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanity and falsehood, except for trade and commerce by mutual good will; and kill not yourselves. Verily God has been to you Most Merciful." Traditionally this verse has been understood as a prohibition of waste and violence and an encouragement of trade and traffic.⁸¹ Ayatullah Taleqani, however, finds much more meaning in it:

This verse, by its reference to the original and primary condition of property, has forbidden any kind of disposition and ownership in vanity and falsehood, and has made "trade by mutual consent and good will" an exception. Conjunction of property to all the addressees--that is, "your property"--and the expression of "among yourselves" turn the attention to the original and natural state of property--be it natural resources or social products--which belongs to all [mankind] and should be "among" all and available to all. Personal disposition and individual

ownership is not permitted when it is based on vanity and falsehood, without any rights. The right [of disposition and ownership] is granted to individuals only when they perform useful manual or mental work on the property at disposal. This means that the "contractual" right of disposition and ownership is limited to the proportion of useful work put into a property.

Then the verse makes trade by mutual consent an exception to this rule. The reason is that although commerce does not have a direct and fixed effect on giving value to goods or making them useful--because what the merchant does is to make useful and valuable goods available to a consumer and profit by it--in general it does play a useful and necessary role in economic circulation, providing for people's necessities of life and [promoting] division of labor.

..."Trade by mutual consent and good will" means that both sides of a transaction are completely aware of all the conditions of the transaction and willingly consent to them. Although usually trade involves mutual consent, the qualification of "mutual good will and consent" must be for the reason of its comprehensiveness and generality; that is, there should not be any kind of pressure nor any direct or indirect domination. With reference to "your property" and "among yourselves," the phrase ["mutual consent"] also intends the public consent and the consent of the society. Any transaction and trade which is harmful to the society, causes public dissatisfaction, or takes place under pressure of the rich is illegitimate. ...

The phrase "kill not yourselves" seems to refer to the end result of eating, disposition and ownership in vanity and falsehood; because deprivation, class conflict, violence, and fighting that occur in the heart of a society are the clear results of "eating in vanity" and harmful and unsatisfactory trade.⁸²

Criticism of rival ideologies: Capitalism and communism both come under Ayatullah Taleqani's frequent attacks. This can also be considered an effort to establish his claim to truth. The reason for criticizing capitalism is clear: the Shah's economic policies were based on a capitalist model. The reason for criticizing communism seems to be that the Iranian youths were susceptible to its influence. Ayatullah Taleqani considers both capitalist and communist regimes as the outcome of Western countries economic and industrial fluctuations in recent centuries and believes they do not

take into consideration the realities of human life. He argues that because of their origin in the industrial revolution, the economists of both schools focus their attention on solving the problems of industry and industrial products. "They do not provide any clear, decisive, and equitable solution to the questions revolving disposition and distribution of natural resources, a solution which could be acceptable and satisfactory to the original and real owners of these resources [that is, the people as a whole] and safeguard their rights, and in the meantime expand, develop, and increase the production of those resources. Moreover, in both capitalism and communism wealth and its growth have been idolized. They are unrealistic because they "limit man's creation [human nature] to his need for food, shelter and production. [They] look at man only as a tool for production, distribution."⁸³

In regard to ownership rights, Ayatullah Taleqani argues that the freedom of absolute ownership of private property in capitalism results in exploitation, oppression, accumulation of wealth, emergence of the capitalist class, and deprivation of the workers. The total abolition of private property in communism, on the other hand, leads to limitation of human freedom and individual liberties and to the establishment of dictatorship of a particular class.⁸⁴ He also presents a detailed critique of Western countries' and communist states' failure to abolish different types of discriminations in spite of their loud cries to the contrary.⁸⁵

Chapter VI

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF AYATULLAH MUTAHHARI

Ayatullah Muttahhari is a very prolific writer and lecturer. The book Yadnama-e Ustad-e Shahid Murtaza Muttahhari (In Commemoration of the Martyred Teacher Murtaza Muttahhari) lists 50 books written by him or prepared from the collection of his articles and lectures (33 had already been published and the other 17 were ready for publication when the list was prepared). It also lists 27 articles which were published in periodicals but not in any of his books, and it notes several hundred cassettes of his lectures.¹ Most of Muttahhari's works deal with Islamic philosophy and theology. Some of the works are concerned with Islamic history, gnosis, and jurisprudence. He also has a book on Islamic economics. None of the writings and lectures, however, can be considered "political" as such. Nonetheless, many of them do contain political thoughts in one way or another.

Ayatullah Muttahhari's following works were included for analysis in this study:

- (1) "The Martyr," an article written in the mid-1970s,²
- (2) Insan dar Quran (Man in the Quran), a book most probably written in 1977-78, and
- (3) Jame'a wa Tarikh (Society and History), also most probably written in 1977-78.³

1. Political Consciousness. In most of his writings and lectures, Ayatullah Mutahhari's major aim seems to be to turn man's attention from his immediate selfish concerns to higher ideals and noble goals. Although he presents his discussions in a religio-philosophical language, in addition to bringing about philosophical and religious awareness he is also bringing about political consciousness. The higher ideals and noble goals he assigns to man are not individualistic and cannot be achieved by an individual alone. Rather, they concern humanity as a whole and their implementation in the society certainly would lead to political action.

Ayatullah Mutahhari's ideals and goals for man are based on his view of innate human nature. He argues that, "in the process of the general and substantive movement of the universe, man emerges with additional dimensions [than those of animals]. ... The basis and pillar of man's personality and character which is the sources of his thought and higher ideals is laid down by the hand of the factors of creation within his nature."⁴ Unlike animals, however, man is not born with a fixed personality. Rather, "man is born a potential creature who moves according to his faculties towards a special set of needs and tendencies under the guide of innate forces and in the light of external phenomena. He would receive the actuality he deserves--namely, humanity--should he develop his potentials. On the contrary, he would turn out a 'metamorphosed' [alienated] creature, if he accepts the existence imposed on him by external forces."⁵ In addition to the moral and spiritual

tendencies and attractions which "enable man to extend his sphere of activities beyond the limits of the material world into the sublime moral and spiritual horizons," man is equipped with the power of intellect and will. Thus, "he is able to resist his selfish desires, liberate himself from their domination, and 'rule' over them. Man can put all his desires under the direction of his intellect, allocate certain ranges of fulfillment to each, and thus achieve 'moral/spiritual' freedom which is the most valuable type of freedom. This great capability which is a characteristic of man--and does not exist in animals--qualifies man for [undertaking] 'responsibility'. It grants to man the right to 'choose', and makes him genuinely a 'free' being enjoying 'freedom of choice'."⁶

Ayatullah Mutahhari's philosophical thought is not independent from his religious thought. He believes that Islam pays special attention to make man discover and know his "self"--not his physical properties, but his real self as created by God with all its potentialities.

It is the "self" which is called the "spirit of God". By knowing that "self" man will feel dignity, honor, and sublimity. He will consider himself too noble to submit to humiliations and debasement. He will discover his sanctity and will also find meaning and value in the moral and social sanctities.

The Quran talks about man's [being] "the choicest". Why? [Because] it wants to say you are not an "accidental" creation which has come into existence by blind forces. ... You are the chosen and choicest creature. For this reason you have a mission and responsibility. Without doubt man is the strongest and the most powerful creature on the planet earth. ...[But] he should realize his real position in the universe. He should know that he is not solely earth-bound; rather, there is a ray of Divine Spirit in him. He should know that he can take precedence over the angels in knowledge and gnosis. He should know that he is free, with freedom of choice, responsible for himself, responsible for other individuals, and responsible for the construction and development of the world.

[The Holy Quran says,] "It was He [God] who created you from the earth and asked you its development" (8:61).

Man should know that he is the trustee of God. He should know he has not found superiority by chance or in order to practice tyranny and despotism grabbing everything for himself and disregarding any duty and responsibility.⁷

Ayatullah Mutahhari notes that the Holy Quran not only praises man as God's trustee and Khalifa (viceregent and representative), considering him higher than the angels. It also condemns man as "lower than the low." This is not a contradiction. Neither does it only mean that man is a double-nature creature half of which is praiseworthy and the other half blameworthy. It means, rather, that

According to the Quran man has all the perfections in him as a potentiality which he must actualize. It is man himself who is his constructor and architect. The primary condition for man's achievement of his potential perfections is "faith". Faith leads to tagwa (piety, God-consciousness), good deeds, and struggle in the way of God. It is faith which transforms science and knowledge from being an evil tool in the hands of man's passions and selfish desires into a useful tool [for his movement towards perfection].

Therefore, the true man who is God's khalifa, to whom the angels prostrate, to whom everything [on earth] belongs. and who possesses all human perfections is man with faith--not without it.

Man minus faith is a degraded and imperfect being. He is greedy, murderous, avaricious, and meager. He is denier [of the Truth] and lower than the beast.⁸

Faith brings responsibility and action along with it. Ayatullah Mutahhari argues that "the teachings of the Quran are all based on responsibility both on individual and social levels. The order to enjoin right and forbid wrong is an instruction to the individual to rebel against the corruption and tyranny of the society." He also notes that "Islam considers struggle against tyranny and oppression a sacred responsibility and permits jihad, which is the same as armed struggle, under certain conditions." One such condition that

he notes is when a person or a group of people are deprived of their rights and when "weak and helpless people are trapped in the claws of oppressors." He also argues that Islam, which is "a culture, a school of thought, and an ideology with divine origin and addressed to man and human nature, has a comprehensive message the orientation of which is towards justice, equity, purity, morality and spirituality, love, goodness, and struggle against oppression." He believes the message of Islam is capable of creating a great movement and a deep-rooted revolution: "a divine and human revolution in which the divine zeal, spiritual happiness, divine attraction, and human values shine and glow--a revolution the examples of which we have repeatedly witnessed throughout the human history with the Islamic revolution [of Prophet Muhammad] being the most glorious one."⁹

Ayatullah Mutaahhari emphasizes man's awareness of self and the world. "Man is both self-conscious and world-conscious, and he loves to increase his awareness of both. In fact, man's evolution, development, and prosperity depend upon his consciousness of his self and the world."¹⁰ He distinguishes eight types of consciousness for man: (1) primordial natural consciousness, (2) philosophical consciousness, (3) world consciousness, (4) class consciousness, (5) national consciousness, (6) human consciousness, (7) gnostic consciousness, and (8) prophetic consciousness. Of prime interest here is his discussion of human consciousness because it deals with "a sense of community among the people so that they identify with a larger group and strive for

their common ideals."¹¹ As for other types of consciousness, primordial consciousness is intrinsic and concerns only one's self. Prophetic consciousness is limited to a small number of individuals. Philosophical consciousness, world consciousness, and gnostic consciousness are mostly individualistic and do not lead to social commitment. Class consciousness and national consciousness do bring about social commitment and a sense of community, but Ayatullah Mutahhari criticizes them because: (1) they are concerned with particular groups and not with humanity as such, and (2) they lack moral aspects.¹²

Human consciousness is self-consciousness in relations to all human beings.

Human-consciousness is based on the principle that all mankind form one real unit and enjoy one 'collective human conscience.' Humanitarianism and humanism exist in all members of humankind. ... If a person attains such a consciousness, his agony will only be the agony of mankind; his hopes and aspirations will reflect only those of mankind; all his efforts will be directed towards [serving] mankind, and all his friendships and animosities will be for the sake of mankind. He will be a friend of man's friends, that is, science and knowledge, culture, health, welfare, liberty, justice, and love. He will be hostile to man's enemies, that is, ignorance, poverty, oppression, disease, repression, and discrimination.¹³

Mutahhari relates this type of consciousness to his notion of innate human nature--discussed earlier--and concludes that for man to attain human consciousness and become part of a unified body, first he must have developed his true human nature and potentials.

How can the wild and primitive man, who has remained at the stage of infancy and whose human nature is still dormant, feel the agony of others? How can he be subject of 'collective spirit'? The case of alienated man is also quite clear. So it is only the human beings who have reached the level of humanity, those who have attained their true human nature, and those who have become fruitful [to others] that are truly parts of one

body on whom a 'collective spirit' rules. ... Thus, what can really make all mankind one unified 'we' and breathes a collective spirit into them ... is only 'commonness of faith'--not commonness of physical composition or that of the roots."¹⁴

Ayatullah Mutahhari also holds that man is a social creature by his nature. "In order to attain the perfection for which he has the potential, mankind has a social tendency. This tendency prepares the ground for a collective spirit which serves as a means for taking man to his ultimate perfection. Nonetheless, it is man's nature that determines the direction of the collective spirit. In other words, the collective spirit is also at the service of human nature." This collective spirit, which is "a combination of spirits, ideas, feelings and emotions, desires and aspirations, and will and volitions," makes society "a real compound of the type of natural compounds."¹⁵

According to Mutahhari man's social life is natural--not contractual or an imposition--not only because man is social by nature, but also because God has created mankind with different physical, spiritual, intellectual, and emotional talents and capabilities. Some have excellence in some regards and others in some other regards. Thus, naturally all the people need each other and tend to join each other. "The common social needs and the peculiar human relations bring the people together and unify their lives in such a way that it make individuals in a society [comparable to] the passengers in an airplane or a ship travelling together towards the same destination. Either they will all reach the destination together or all will stop short. They face the perils together and find a unified destiny."¹⁶

Martyrdom and political consciousness: In the article on "The Martyr," Ayatullah Mutahhari tries to bring about political consciousness by turning people's attention to the value of martyrdom and self sacrifice. He considers martyrdom the highest position "a man can aspire for" and has that "[o]nly he, who is killed in an effort to achieve the highest Islamic objectives and is really motivated by a desire of safeguarding true human values, attain this position." He argues, "at no time is a martyr's blood wasted. It does not flow on the ground. Every drop of it is turned into hundreds and thousands of drops, nay into tons of blood, and is transfused into the body of his society. ... [The martyr] revives the spirit of valour and fortitude, courage and zeal, especially divine zeal, among the people who have lost it. This is why Islam is always in need of martyrs. The revival of courage and zeal is essential for the revival of a nation."¹⁷

2. Criticism of Social Arrangement. In Ayatullah Mutahhari's works covered in this study there is no criticism of the existing social arrangement in Iran. These works may not be atypical. None of his works with which I am familiar present any criticism of the Shah's regime or the prevailing social, political, and economic conditions. Moreover, some critics have charged that "Mutahhari dealt conservatively with the political issues and the nation's struggle during the trying conditions [of the Shah's oppressive rule]."¹⁸

As to why Ayatullah Mutahhari did not speak against the Shah and his oppressive and exploitative regime, I believe it would be unfair to think it was due to indifference or fear. As the testimonies of his close friends--personalities like Ayatullah Muntazeri, Ayatullah Dr. Behishti, and Hashemi Rafsanjani--show, he was politically active at least as early as the early 1960s.¹⁹ The reason for his abstention from criticism can probably be deduced from the following remarks by one of his colleagues: "After Imam Khomeini was exiled to Turkey in late 1343 [1964], Hai'at-e Mo'talefa [an Islamic-oriented political party] considered transforming its activities from educational and ideological to political and military. ... [But Mutahhari, who was a leading member, was against this view.] He was one of those who argued, 'we still have not presented a genuine and systematic ideology. We have not provided our youth with education, clarifying different concepts to them. The youth is moving on the basis of emotions, and its knowledge of Islam is meager and insignificant. ...'"²⁰ Thus, Mutahhari seems to have believed that he could better fulfill his duties by presenting the genuine teachings of Islam to the Iranian society, especially to the youth, than by criticizing the regime and risking the opportunity to speak.

The following passage in one of Mutahhari's books is also relevant to the question and sheds some light on the reasons for his lack of criticism:

In some cases supporting the [existing] power is forbidden and acquiring power is a duty. Suppose we face a violent and strong enemy who wants to attack our rights or to attack Islam. If we do not have the power to confront it at the present, and if confrontation leads to losing our resources without any [positive] results at the present or in the future, obviously we

are not obligated to confrontation and prevention [of tyranny]. But we have always been--and we are--obligated to work for acquiring strength and power, so that under such a condition we do not remain inactive.²¹

3. New Set of Values. In general, Ayatullah Mutahhari refers to values less often than other Iranian revolutionary leaders. Moreover, unlike others, he mostly emphasizes spiritual and personal values--though he underscores some social values as well.

a. Spiritual values: Faith is on top of the list of Ayatullah Mutahhari's values (mentioned 12 times). He also emphasizes self-sacrifice, evolution (towards perfection), and devotion and worship (each noted seven to nine times). Love, God-consciousness, (God's) trusteeship, purity (of soul), and beauty are other spiritual values in Mutahhari's list of values.²²

b. Personal values: Knowledge and responsibility are important personal values for Ayatullah Mutahhari (noted at least nine times each). He also emphasizes awareness and consciousness, reflection and intellect, freedom of choice and willpower, strength, honor and dignity, and truth (four to six times each). He mentions moral virtue, piety, courage, and welfare and prosperity at least twice each and health, sincerity, fortitude, and zeal at least once each.²³

c. Social values: Among social values, Ayatullah Mutahhari emphasizes good deeds, freedom, justice, and Jihad (struggle) (each noted at least seven times). He also mentions independence, culture, charity, equality, and Hijra (migration).²⁴

4. Outline of the Good Society. In the works covered in this study, Ayatullah Mutahhari does not provide an outline of the ideal society. This does not mean, however, that he ignores this important component of the ideology of revolution. He has written a book on Islamic economics and has delivered numerous lectures not only on Islamic economics but also on the principle of consultation in Islam, Islamic education, women's rights in Islam, international relations in Islam, and leadership in Islam. Those books and lectures will certainly indicate elements of the good society. Analysis of all those works, however, is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, in order to get an idea of how he envisioned the ideal Islamic society, I will briefly present some points Ayatullah Mutahhari made on the subject in his lectures on "the Islamic Revolution" in the months following the victory of the revolutionary movement in Iran.²⁵

a. The form of Islamic government: Ayatullah Mutahhari proposes that an Islamic government will be an "Islamic Republic." The word "republic" means that the people--regardless of sex, color, and creed--will elect the government. The only criterion will be maturity and mental competence. Moreover, it means that the government will be elected for a certain term at the end of which the people will either re-elect the same government or will replace it with a better one. The word "Islamic" means that the government will rule according to Islamic laws and principles.

b. Islamic law: Based on his notion of human nature, Ayatullah Mutahhari argues that although man's species does not change, he

does not remain static either. Rather, he moves in a process of social evolution. Because of this, man needs some permanent and fixed principles which demarcate his evolutionary path, and he needs some changing rules which will govern his behavior in different stages that he moves through. Islamic laws are not legislated for stages, rather, for the evolutionary process. Nonetheless, they also provide necessary guidelines for the stages. Islam provides fixed laws for man's constant needs and changing rules for his changing needs.

c. The role of the Faqih (top Jurist, the leader): According to Ayatullah Mutahhari, in an Islamic state, that is, a state where the majority of the people have accepted Islam as an ideology and have committed themselves to follow it, the faqih will play the role of an ideologue--not that of a ruler. The duty of an ideologue is to supervise the correct and proper implementation of the ideology. He supervises and reviews not only the eligibility of the Executive and the person who becomes the President, but also makes sure that they carry on their duties within the framework of Islamic ideology. Faqih will also be elected by the people.

d. Justice: Ayatullah Mutahhari emphasizes the role of justice in an Islamic society and argues that the success and continuation of the revolution will depend upon the government's pursuit of the path of justice. Justice means elimination of class differences, bridging the economic gap, abolition of all kinds of discrimination, and prevention of maltreatment to anyone--even the criminal who is sentenced to death.

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e. Islamic brotherhood: According to Mutahhari, an Islamic society will be organized on the basis of love and Islamic brotherhood. This means that the people will be ready to sacrifice their own comfort and interest for the sake of others. The early Islamic society provides the best model for this type of relationship.

f. Freedom: Ayatullah Mutahhari believes there will be genuine freedom of thought and expression in an Islamic society. Again on the basis of his notion of innate human nature, he argues that genuine freedom means to confine man's animal-side and selfish desire and to liberate his "humanity"--that is, the potentialities and tendencies that differentiate man from animals. The latter include man's logical thinking and higher tendencies such as the tendency to search for the truth, the tendency to moral virtues, the tendency to beauty and aesthetics, and the tendency to cherish and worship the Truth.

g. Independence: Mutahhari notes that an Islamic government will be completely independent: politically, economically, culturally, and ideologically.

5. Program of Action. Since Ayatullah Mutahhari does not present a criticism of the existing conditions of the society, he does not specify the targets of change on which the struggle should focus. He discusses in detail, however, the agents who would bring about the changes and the forms of action that are necessary.

a. Agents of action: Mutahhari notes that the message of the Quran, which contains revolutionary teachings, is addressed to an-nas, that is, "the people" as a whole. He criticizes those scholars and activists who translate an-nas as "the masses" and argue that Islam is the ideology of the oppressed. Ayatullah Mutahhari grants that most of the followers of the prophets were from the mustadhaf (weak and oppressed) group. He also grants that Islam is oriented towards the interest of the mustadhafeen (those who are weak and oppressed). He rejects, however, the view that Islam divides the society into two groups of mustadhaf and mustakbar (arrogant) and considers belonging to each class as the sole criterion for engaging in revolutionary or anti-revolutionary activities. Presenting evidence from the Quran, he argues that: (1) there have been revolutionary believers who have come from the mustakbar class, and (2) not always all of the mustadhaf class has been included in the "revolutionaries of Tawhid (monotheism, unity)." According to Mutahhari, what brings about commitment and responsibility is attachment to God and to human conscience--not belonging to a deprived group. To be receptive to the revolutionary message of the Quran, a person should be pure, untainted, and alive to his true nature; he should also feel anxiety and responsibility towards creation. The reason why the majority of prophets' followers were from the oppressed and deprived group is that wealth and a luxurious way of life taint the true human nature and bring about commitment to the status quo. By the same token, the youth, whose nature is still pure, is more receptive to the revolutionary teachings of Islam than the older generation.²⁶

b. Forms of action: On the basis of the verse of the Quran that "Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a people until they (first) change that which is in their hearts" (8:11), Ayatullah Mutahhari argues that Islam gives "priority" to the moral foundation of a society over its material foundation. It does not mean, however, that it overlooks the latter. According to him, the first type of consciousness that Islam wants to bring about is man's remembrance of his origin and his destiny.

Where did you come from? Where are you? Where are you going? Where did the world come from? Which stages has it passed through? Which direction is it going? The first anxiety of responsibility that the Messengers brought about was the anxiety of responsibility towards the totality of Creation and Being. Anxiety of social responsibility is part of that anxiety. ... This deep-rooted consciousness which extends to the depths of human nature creates in man such an enthusiasm for the defence and expansion of his beliefs that he is ready to sacrifice himself, his wealth, his position, and his children for its sake. Thus, the Messengers used to start from what is called as "superstructure" in our age and moved to "infrastructure." ... Any religious movement today should use a similar method.²⁷

The second type of consciousness that Islam wants to bring about is human consciousness, that is, turning man's attention to the nobility and dignity of his essence. "In this school [Islam] ... man is a ray of the Divine spirit. The angels have prostrated to him and call upon him from the heights of Empyrean. In spite of his animal tendencies to lust, evil, and corruption; in this creation [man] there is a pure essence which, by its nature, is incompatible with evil, bloodshed, lying, corruption, meanness, humility, and bearing with oppression and injustice."²⁸

At the third level, Islam wants to bring about consciousness of social rights and responsibilities. Mutahhari quotes verses from the

Holy Quran regarding the duty to fight for freedom of the oppressed, the right and duty to fight for self-defence, and the duty to repel injustice. He emphasizes that Islam considers these rights and duties as human values to strive for. "The Quran never relies upon [utilizing] psychological complex; nor does it incite envies, lusts, and selfish motives. ..."²⁹

As for the methods to bring about different types of consciousness and to fulfill responsibilities, Ayatullah Mutahhari does not talk in detail. He just notes that at the first stage guidance, reminder, encouragement, and logical reasoning should be used. "From the point of view of the Quran, these methods can completely change a person and the direction of his life. They can change his character and bring about a moral and spiritual revolution in him." He believes that Islam finds a pure innate humanity even inside a most cruel and tyrannical ruler, such as the Pharaoh of Egypt at the time of Moses. Thus, a tyrannical ruler should be given advice first, before other actions are taken against him.³⁰

If the use of the above methods does not lead to desirable results, then, according to Ayatullah Mutahhari, Islam considers "struggle, jihad, and the use of force moral and ethical."³¹ He argues that weakness cannot be an excuse for inaction. "In the same way that an ignorant individual or society who has failed to work for acquiring awareness is responsible to God, ... a weak individual or society which fails to acquire power and strength is held responsible by God." If the enemy is too strong and direct

confrontation impossible, the revolutionaries are not responsible to fight back. They are responsible, however, to strive for acquiring strength and force.³²

6. Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence. Based on his notion of innate human nature, Ayatullah Mutahhari presents a philosophy of history in which man plays the central role. His philosophy of history encourages commitment to action and self-confidence at least in two ways: (1) it considers man as the maker of his own destiny, and (2) it holds the view that the ultimate victory belongs to those who fight in the path of the Truth. The following is an attempt to derive his philosophy of history from the works covered in this study.

First of all, as noted earlier, Mutahhari argues that, "in order to attain the perfection for which he has the potentials, mankind has a social tendency. This tendency prepares the ground for a collective spirit which serves as a means for taking man to his ultimate perfection." When this is the case, then both individual and society are fundamental. "Society is a real compound of the type of natural compounds. It is, however, a combination of spirits, ideas, feelings and emotions, desires and aspirations, and wills and volitions--not that of bodies and limbs. ... Individual human beings, each of whom enters social life with his innate resources as well as the resources which he acquires from nature, merge together in their spirits and ideas and find a new spiritual identity which can be called a 'collective spirit.' ... But since the component

parts of the compound of society--that is, the individuals--do not dissolve into the new compound, ... the individual is also fundamental."³³

Ayatullah Mutahhari further argues that if society is fundamental, then it has its own character and life, and there are certain laws which govern it. He quotes from the Holy Quran to show that this is in fact the view of Islam. "The Noble Quran makes it clear that communities and societies--because of being not just collections of individuals but communities and societies--have certain laws, and rise or fall on the basis of those laws."³⁴ From his study of the Quran, he derives four main factors which contribute to the rise or fall of civilization: (1) justice or injustice, (2) unity or disunity, (3) implementation or neglect of the social duty to enjoin right and forbid wrong, and (4) moral uprightness or wrong doing and moral corruption.³⁵

Civilizations rise and fall. In this process, according to the Holy Quran, "The scum is cast away, but that which is of use to man remains on earth" (13:17). Thus, human society moves ahead and evolves. According to Mutahhari, the motor of history is again the potentialities latent in human nature.

Man has some characteristics on the basis of which his social life evolves. One of those characteristics and potentialities is to gather and record experiences and experiments that will form the bases of future experiments.

Another potentiality is to learn through speech and pen. . . [Thus] the experiences and experiments of one generation are transferred by oral communication and by writing to the future generations. . . .

The third characteristic is that man is equipped with the power of intellect and invention. . . . His fourth characteristic is his innate desire to, and natural interest in, novelty. That is, man does not only have the potential to invent

and create whenever he needs to, but by his nature he desires innovation, invention, and creativity.³⁶

What is the direction and the path of history's evolution? Ayatullah Mutahhari believes that all "societies, civilizations, and cultures progress towards unity and uniformity and finally will merge into each other. The future of human societies is a single universal society in which all possible human values actualize; and in which man attains his real perfection, his actual prosperity, and finally his genuine humanity." For Mutahhari this means "the victory of faith over faithlessness, victory of piety and God-consciousness over looseness, victory of righteousness over corruption, victory of good deeds over evil deeds, ... and the ultimate victory of the fighters of the path of the Truth."³⁷

Ayatullah Mutahhari argues that from the Islamic point of view, the causality of history and the laws of society do not mean historical and social determinism. "Although the society has a power which is stronger than the individuals, it does not mean that individuals have no choice in their human and social affairs. Durkheimian determinism results from the fact that it ignores the fundamentality of innate human nature which has emerged from the evolution in substance of humankind at the heart of nature. This innate nature provides man with such a possibility and freedom that enables him to rebel against social impositions." In addition to the social environment and the time factor and history, Mutahhari considers heredity and geographical and natural environment as factors that limit man's arena of freedom. Man cannot sever his relations to these factors completely. He can free himself, however,

from their shackle to a great extent and can conform them to his wishes. He can do so "by his power of intellect and knowledge on the one hand and his power of will and faith on the other." Knowledge and science enable man to construct his society and his future any way that he wants. Faith, on the other hand, guides man how to construct his future to be better for himself and for his society. "Faith makes the man, and man makes the world by his power of science and knowledge. Where science and faith 'combine', both man and the world will prosper."³⁸

7. Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience. Only a few writings and lectures of Ayatullah Mutahhari seem to concern themselves with inculcating the values of self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience. One such work is "The Martyr" which is included in this study. In that lecture, Mutahhari tries to inculcate these values in the following ways:

(1) He considers martyrdom the highest position man can aspire for. Martyrs and the mujahids (warriors) who long for martyrdom are the chosen friends of God and will have the highest status in paradise. Martyr is one of the "three classes of people who will be allowed to intercede with Allah on the Day of Judgment." According to Islamic jurisprudence, a martyr is the only person whose dead body "is neither to be washed, nor is it to be shrouded in fresh sheets. ... It shows that the spirit and personality of a martyr are so thoroughly purified that his body, his blood and his garments are also affected by this purification."³⁹

(2) A martyr is like a candle "whose job is to burn out and get extinguished, in order to shed light for the benefit of others." As noted earlier, the blood of a martyr is never wasted. "It does not flow on the ground. Every drop is turned into hundreds and thousands of drops, nay into tons of blood, and is transfused into the body of his society." Thus, the martyr "revives the spirit of valour and fortitude, courage and zeal, especially divine zeal, among the people who have lost it."⁴⁰

(3) The spirit of martyrdom and the zeal for jihad are necessary for the security of Islamic states. "A Muslim community equipped with the spirit of jihad, cannot be vulnerable to the enemy's assaults."⁴¹

(4) If a person dislikes jihad and martyrdom, "Allah will clothe [him] with a garment of humiliation." This is so because "Jihad, or at least a desire to take part in it, is an integral part of the doctrine of Islam. One's fidelity to Islam is judged by it."⁴²

(5) Ayatullah Mutahhari quotes the examples of early Muslims, including Imam Ali and Imam Husain, who had "the spirit of longing for martyrdom." He argues that, "[w]e always have Imam Ali(P)'s [sic] name on our lips and claim to be devoted to him. ... But, true Shia'ism requires us to follow in his footsteps, too." He also argues that "[w]eeping for the martyr [which takes place at commemoration of Imam Husain's martyrdom] means association with his fervour, harmony with his spirit and conformity with his longing. ... [It means] that whenever a situation demanding sacrifice arises, the people should have the feelings of a martyr and willingly follow his heroic example."⁴³

(6) Ayatullah Mutahhari also quotes several passages from the Holy Quran and numerous traditions of the Prophet, Imam Ali, and Imam Husain about the importance of jihad and martyrdom.⁴⁴

8. Simplification. In two of the three works covered in this study, Ayatullah Mutahhari exerts little efforts--if any--to simplify his teachings and ideology by the use of stories, symbols, and slogans. In "The Martyr," however, he refers to several stories and notes some phrases which can be used as slogans: "The Martyrs are the candles of society;" "Jihad is a door to paradise;" "Jihad is the garment of piety;" "If our bodies are to die and decay, is it not better that they are cut to pieces in the way of Allah?"⁴⁵ These three works might represent the general trend in Mutahhari's writings and lectures. He seems to focus his attention primarily on the educated strata. Thus, he does not see much need for simplification. When he does use stories, it seems to be due to the nature of the topic rather than a concern with the level of his audience's education.

9. Claim to Truth and Rationality. Ayatullah Mutahhari is first and foremost a philosopher. Thus, he uses logical reasoning as a basic tool to establish his claim to truth. As the discussions in sections (1), (4), (5), and (6) above show, he seems to try to build a comprehensive, coherent, and consistent theory on the basis of his principle of innate human nature. He also frequently uses logical reasoning to refute the views of those with whom he does not agree.

Ayatullah Mutahhari's philosophical arguments are not separate from his faith, however. His premises are mostly derived from the Holy Quran; for example, his principle of innate human nature or the causality of history and society. Sometimes he also uses the verses of the Holy Quran to support the points that he is making; for example, when he argues that the ultimate victory and the inheritance of earth belong neither to all the weak and oppressed people nor exclusively to them, rather they belong to the righteous servants of God.⁴⁶

Unlike Imam Khomeini and Ayatullah Taleqani, Mutahhari seldom uses traditions of the Prophet and Imams and historical evidence in support of his arguments. More often he refers to the works of Muslim and non-Muslim philosophers and scholars. For example, he presents quotations from the works of Allama Tabatabaie, Dr. Mohammad Iqbal, Montesquieu, William James, Raymond Aron, and Mahatma Gandhi in support of his arguments.⁴⁷

Criticism of rival ideologies: Unlike Ayatullah Taleqani, who criticizes both capitalism and communism, Ayatullah Mutahhari directs his criticism only to Marxism. The reason for this may have been the influence of Marxism among the educated youth to whom he addressed his teachings. In the works covered in this study, Mutahhari criticizes Marxism only once and on only one point. He devotes, however, more than 50 pages to the criticism, which is focused on "historical materialism."⁴⁸ The method he uses is to first discuss the five premises of historical materialism and alternative philosophical principles to those premises. Then he

derives six "logical conclusions" from those premises regarding society and history. Afterwards, he presents a six point criticism based on the premises and conclusions. His points of criticism are briefly the following.⁴⁹

(1) Baselessness: "A philosophical theory of history ought to be based upon observation of contemporary events and historical facts, and should be applicable to other times also. Either it should be formulated on the bases of historical evidence, being in addition applicable to events of the present and the future, or it should have been deduced and inferred from a priori premises based upon a series of scientific, philosophical, and logical principles."

"The theory of historical materialism does not fulfill the conditions of any of the above-mentioned methods. ..."⁵⁰

(2) Revision of views by the founders: One of the premises of historical materialism is the economic foundation of society being the "infrastructure" and other foundations constituting the "superstructure." Logically this means "one-sided dependence of all other structures on the economic base." As a matter of fact, Marx frequently refers to this kind of one-sided relationship.

"But Marx, in many of his writings, has raised another issue on the basis of dialectical logic, which may be regarded as a revision of his view and also a kind of departure from absolute historical materialism. That issue is related to the [principle] of reciprocal causation, [according to which] there is a kind of reciprocal causal relation between all parts of nature and all parts of society."

Moreover, we find Engels writing: "Marx and I are ourselves to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due it. We had to emphasize the main principle vis-a-vis our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into light."

Furthermore, Lenin and Mao contradicted and revised the theory of historical materialism by their actions and their writings.⁵¹

(3) Invalidity of necessary correspondence between base and superstructure: Contemporary historical evidence (e.g., failure of revolutions to take place in England and other industrial countries, socialist revolutions in non-industrial countries, the U.S.A. and Japan having the same economic system in spite of sharp differences in their political regimes, religion, morality, etiquette, etc.) have contradicted the Marxian thesis that there is a correspondence between the superstructure and the base, a correspondence which will be affected by changes at the base and which will remain static should the base remain unchanged.⁵²

(4) Nonconformity of ideological and class bases: Contrary to what the theory of historical materialism claims, there have always been personalities, philosophies, and ideas--and more important than all, religions--which have preceded their times or classes. We can find many ideas that the material conditions of the age in which they emerged have disappeared completely, but still they "shine as stars over the horizons of human history."⁵³

(5) Independence of cultural development: It is true that man and the means of production evolve and develop together. But it does

not mean that the development of culture and science solely depends upon the development of the means of production. First of all, there is no doubt that "man first develops his scientific knowledge and then externalizes his knowledge to invent technological tools." Secondly, the "evolution" and "growth" of man is "literal" and that of the means of production "figurative." "Wherever real development and figurative development take place side by side, it is quite obvious that the real development is to be considered the principal development and the figurative development is secondary.

Moreover, what we have said applies only to technical knowledge and know-how. In other sciences like medicine, psychology, sociology, logic, philosophy, and mathematics, there is not even the possibility of such a unilateral correlation. Progress in those sciences depends to the same extent [or even less] upon the material and economic conditions as the material and economic conditions depend upon the growth of sciences.⁵⁴

(6) Historical materialism contradicts itself: According to Ayatullah Mutahhari,

historical materialism as a theory, as a philosophical point of view or as part of superstructure, either applies to itself or it doesn't. If it does not apply to itself, it contradicts itself. If it is governed by itself, it is valid for a limited period only; it cannot be applied to other periods from which it excludes itself. This objection is also valid in the case of dialectical materialism, which considers the principle of dialectical movement and the principle of unity of opposites applicable to the whole reality including scientific and philosophical laws.⁵⁵

Ayatullah Mutahhari ends his criticism of historical materialism with the remark that, "I cannot conceal my amazement as to how such a baseless and unscientific theory could become famous as a scientific theory. The art of propaganda is indeed capable of working wonders!"⁵⁶

Chapter VII

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF ENGINEER BAZARGAN

According to Hamid Algar, "It is not until the post [World War II] period that we see a beginning of an Islamic development [in Iran] in thought and expression that is separate from the traditional concerns and institutions of the Shi'i ulama."¹ One of the pioneers and leading figures of this new development was Engineer Mehdi Bazargan. Bazargan started his religio-political activities with the establishment of the Students' Islamic Society in Tehran University, "which was by no means a simple students association but concerned itself with the propagation of Islam in the contemporary idiom."² The Students' Islamic Society was founded during World War II and was followed by a number of other Islamic societies--such as the Engineers' Islamic Society, the Teachers' Islamic Society, and the Lawyers' Islamic Society--in all of which Bazargan played a leading role. He joined the Oil Nationalization Movement of Mosaddiq and Ayatullah Kashani in the early 1950s and, together with Ayatullah Taleqani, founded the Liberation Movement of Iran in the early 1960s.

Most of Bazargan's published works are the edited versions of the speeches that he delivered in the gatherings of the Islamic societies in mid to late 1940s and late 1950s and early 1960s. He has written relatively few books. In his lectures and books Bazargan stressed a number of points. "The first was the complete congruence

between Islam and the established findings of modern natural sciences, the applicability of Islam to contemporary social and political problems, and the fact that Islam is a total way of life that addressed itself to all strata of the society."³

The following works of Eng. Bazargan were reviewed for this study:

(1) "The social and Universal Muslim," a collection of two speeches delivered at Hedayat Mosque and at the Students' Islamic Society meeting in January 1960.⁴

(2) "Man and God," a speech delivered at the Engineers' Islamic Society's meeting in January 1961.⁵

(3) "Ali and Islam," a speech delivered in February 1961.⁶

(4) "Youthful Islam," a speech delivered at the Students' Islamic Society's gathering in early 1962.⁷

(5) "The Borderline between Religion and Politics," a speech delivered at the second Congress of Iran's Islamic Societies in August 1962.⁸

1. Political Consciousness. Eng. Bazargan finds his contemporary fellow Iranian Muslims to be individualistic and selfish, while he finds Islamic teachings emphasizing socio-political activeness and selflessness. He also sees the historical evolution of humankind as moving towards the fulfillment of Islamic ideals. Thus, he tries to bring about political consciousness by making the members of his society aware of the genuine teachings of Islam and of mankind's social evolution.

a. Islam a social religion: According to Bazargan,

In the logic of the Quran, and in the Word of God, individual is considered as a being related to a collectivity--a collectivity of the past and the present. Ordinances, duties, activities, and accomplishments are all collective, not individualistic. Moreover, worship in Islam--while focusing on individual--has social dimensions. The Quran also explicitly orders mutual consultation among the Muslims, formation of a community, and social discipline. In Islam individual is not only responsible for his self-improvement and self-development but also for the affairs of his society.⁹

Bazargan criticizes Iranian society--including its religious scholars (before Imam Khomeini's movement)--for failing to "understand Islam and its great social dimension. ... We are locked up in the narrow shell of personal affairs. We think individualistic, live individualistic, and act individualistic."¹⁰ He invites his audience and readers to come out of that shell "and, at the order of the Quran, to think and act broadly, socially, and universally. We should know that [as the Prophet has said], 'The Hand [i.e., support] of God is with the community.'"¹¹

Two of the social duties that Bazargan notes are:

(1) social criticism: enjoining good and right and forbidding evil and wrong, and

(2) struggle against oppression.¹²

He also invites the religious scholars to concern themselves with socio-economic problems of the country and the world and to change their method of work.¹³

b. Common border between religion and politics: Eng. Bazargan observes that religion and politics are two very significant and effective factors in life of a society as well as in the destiny of a nation. Whether a person believes and takes part in them or not,

he will certainly be affected by them. Religion and politics have a common border which is not always respected. In practice, either religion has the upper hand and guides politics, or politics is dominant and shapes people's beliefs. By the growth of government power, "now, unlike the past, the government controls all the affairs of a country." Government's interest and interference in religion is very obvious in the case of Iran. It seems that if religion does not control politics, the latter would overcome religion and will destroy it.¹⁴

According to Bazargan, one of the main factors in Muslim nations' predicament was that the religious and pious people disregarded social and official positions and relinquished them to the mean, ignorant, and charlatan individuals. Bazargan sees an implicit agreement between religious personalities and the government by virtue of which the religious personalities think that if they do not interfere in politics and the affairs of government, the government would not interfere in their affairs. This is far from reality, Bazargan argues. "The more [the religious personalities] stay away from politics and leave it unchecked, the more will the government usurp power and authority and make itself dominant."¹⁵

For Bazargan the relation between religion and politics should be one sided; that is, religion should interfere in politics, but politics should not interfere in religion. The dominance of religion does not mean, however, that religious scholars monopolize the right to appoint all government officials. What it means is that religion

shows the direction in which politics should function. Moreover, every Muslim is duty-bound to be concerned with, and actively participate in, politics. To fulfill this duty, he should monitor the activities of the government closely and be knowledgeable about the socio-political issues of his country and the world.¹⁶

Eng. Bazargan frequently refers to the lives and sayings of Prophet Muhammad and the Imams to demonstrate their concern with, and participation in, socio-political activities. He emphasizes the examples of Ali and Husain and quotes the Prophet as saying, for example, "The person who wakes up in the morning and is not concerned with [getting involved in] the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim."¹⁷

c. God as the ultimate goal of a Muslim: Eng. Bazargan argues that, "The reality and actuality of God's existence is related to the reality and actuality of all values. If there is absolute truth and value, God must also exist. On the other hand, if God/Truth is not absolute, how can we believe in values such as beauty, love, humanism, sacrifice" According to him, the attributes which the prophets have ascribed to God and have set as man's ideal are the highest and most desired values cherished by leaders of mankind throughout history. The prophets have also taught that God has put all the forces of creation at man's disposal to use for his self development. Moreover, God has promised man that he can reach infinity and can elevate himself to the level of God's attributes. The acts of worship prescribed by religions are meant as training and exercise to prepare man to achieve the ultimate goal of "meeting" God.¹⁸

Eng. Bazargan also emphasizes Muslims' belief in the Hereafter and notes its significance.

In the teachings of all true prophets--and more clearly and emphatically in that of the last Prophet [Muhammad]--belief in the Hereafter, and especially preparing oneself for the Hereafter, constitutes an article of faith. What this means is neither withdrawing from the world nor giving oneself up to it. It means doing good deeds and serving the people. What kind of a service? Not to commit oppression, aggression, and treachery; to respect the rights of others--even those of animals; love, kindness, and charity. ... In short, [it means] constructing the world of others.

Bazargan also notes that the outcome of prophets' schools not only include what the philosophers and reformers of mankind have desired, but much more. "People's material life and living conditions will improve without their becoming materialist or selfish."¹⁹

d. Historical evolution of mankind: Eng. Bazargan talks about three kinds of evolution in human history: (1) the trend towards democracy and humanism, (2) the broadening scope of human activities and decisions, and (3) the change in "social gods."

(1) According to Bazargan, mankind lived in a "sub-animal" level for tens of thousands of years. That was the time when man had lost his original free state of nature and had accepted servitude to some members of his own species--something which, according to Bazargan, even animals do not do. After a long time,

slowly he tended towards freedom, liberty, and understanding democracy--as a result of which social cooperation and sudden advancements became possible. With his recognition of human rights and character, he rapidly ascended to the heights of science and perfection. ... At the present, more than ever, he is determined to correct the deviations and weaknesses that he has brought upon himself. With a view to his enormous potentials and great responsibility, he is also determined to assign absolute value and special rights to human personality.²⁰

Bazargan's views on democracy and today's civilization seem ambiguous. In one instance he argues that democracy has become prevalent in the recent centuries and has produced liberty, human dignity, and justice which in turn have caused "human potentials to fully manifest themselves and the lofty palace of civilization to be built." On the next page, however, he notes that under the bourgeoisie, democracy brought about human slavery to capital and industry and consequently led to a reduction in productivity. "Thus, it became necessary to establish a relationship between a worker's product and his personality, spirit, and heart. This was the second step in the direction of recognizing human status and worth. In addition to the right to equality, comfort, democracy and bourgeoisie [sic], man was granted the right to choose and to attain dignity." Then he criticizes American society which "looks at the individual human being as a dollar-producing animal or machine. All factors and all material and spiritual means are employed so that a person delivers the maximum profit to the American society. There is not much concern with the individual's own well-being, education and dignity."²¹

(2) Bazargan asserts that in today's world all human affairs have outgrown the individual, family, tribal, and even the national levels.

[Human relationships] have expanded and developed enormously. Slowly everything has become international. Geographic, historical, economic, and intellectual boundaries have been removed, and now it is the time for the political and military boundaries [to be removed]. ... The economy of no country is independent. ... Military defense at a local or national level is ridiculous. Adopting an ideology or regime is not within the

bounds of one nation's choice any more. ... The civilized and strong countries have been divided into two blocks: the East and the West.²²

This situation, according to Bazargan, leads to a feeling of impotence and fatalism. But this is so only in the authoritarian regimes.

In real democratic countries, the status of the individual is not debased. Rather, in such societies a balance is established between individual and society. Society is like a great mirror where the individual sees a picture of himself together with thousands of other pictures. He is well-acquainted with the society; and when he sees that he can play a role and have the right to freely express himself, he would love and respect the society and will also consider himself respectful and responsible.²³

(3) Bazargan also finds an evolution in what he calls "social gods"--which he defines as any concrete or abstract being that replaces God in man's mind or is associated with Him. He believes the first "social god" was the paternal head of the family in ancient India, Greece and Rome. At the second stage, the father was replaced with tribal chiefs (e.g., among Arabs) and feudal lords and princes (e.g., in medieval Europe). Soon after that, however, the "social god" was transformed from personal and physical beings to non-material and general concepts and social symbols such as central government, patriotism, and nationalism. Later on they evolved further into "spiritual symbols, such as liberalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. ... This has been the evolutionary process of social idols or the deities created by man's mind. The final stage of this process can be nothing but [belief in] the Creator and Sustainer of the worlds."²⁴

2. Criticism of Social Arrangement. Eng. Bazargan does not present a systematic criticism of the socio-economic and political system under the Shah's regime. From time to time, however, he makes passing remarks in criticism of the existing situation. Those remarks can be categorized into three groups:

a. Criticism of the society: Bazargan not only criticizes his contemporary fellow Iranians as individualistic and selfish but also his society as "shaky and stagnant [which is] empty of noble and higher goals and ideals. We lack the [power of] will, initiative, innovation and progress. We do not have any intellectual, artistic and economic products." In such a situation, he finds "luxury, leisure, and extravagance extremely improper. They will lead only to weakness and destruction."²⁵

Bazargan asserts that "Muslims as a whole live in a shameful situation of weakness, poverty, and backwardness. We are far away from what is ideal to us and satisfactory to God. We are alive and engage in reproduction. But we are weakling living beings with limited number of defective offspring." He enumerates a number of factors which he believes have contributed to the predicament of Muslims in general and the Iranian society in particular: (1) tribal and national attachments; (2) worldly ambitions and accumulation of wealth; (3) royal luxury and extravagance; (4) withdrawal from society, apathy, inactiveness; (5) division and disunity; (6) emphasizing the ritualistic and formalistic aspects of worship and neglecting its real meaning and significance; (7) self-righteousness, being proud of one's own religion, and being

sure of one's salvation; (8) exploitation of religion for achieving some socio-political goals; and (9) looking outside for help and seeking foreign loans and advisers, i.e., lack of self-reliance.²⁶

b. Criticism of the regime and the government: Bazargan criticizes monarchy as a "sub-animal" form of government which came into existence after man's life in the free state of nature. He seems to believe that western democracy is not the most perfect form of government. Nonetheless, he talks about it wishfully and states that "genuine democracy is different from the imitative, deceitful, and fraudulent democracy of our rulers."²⁷ He also considers the motto of the Shah's regime--which put the Shah's name together with the Name of God and homeland--as a form of trinity and therefore polytheism.²⁸

Bazargan not only criticizes the Shah's regime, but also those persons who were in the realm of power. He calls them "ignorant, impious, illiterate, and charlatan."²⁹ Regarding the government bureaucracy, he describes it as "wasteful and useless."³⁰

c. Criticism of the living standards: Speaking about his trip to the United States, Bazargan implicitly criticizes the living conditions in Iran. "In America ... you can clearly see that the basic necessities of life and conveniences are easily available. Great efforts have been made so that people do not face the smallest problem and difficulty in their travel and movement, housing, food, work, leisure, medical care, research and other affairs of life. For an Iranian who goes there, its comparison is indeed amazing and astonishing."³¹

3. New Set of Values. Eng. Bazargan refers to and emphasizes social values the most. He emphasizes spiritual values as well, but refers to a relatively smaller number of such values. He refers to more personal values than the two types mentioned above, but he does not emphasize any of them.

a. Social values: charity/serving people, work/action, and love/kindness are the leading social values in the list of values noted by Bazargan (each mentioned at least 12 times). Justice and knowledge/education closely follows the above values. Freedom, struggle, evolution/progress, and social responsibility are next in the list. Bazargan also notes cooperation, humanism, consultation, discipline, and equality (at least twice each).³²

b. Personal values: Among the personal values, Bazargan refers to prosperity, strength, and freedom more often than to others (four to six times each). He refers to dynamism, hope, courage, and dignity/honor at least three times each; to honesty, thoughtfulness, firmness, foresight, and perfection at least twice; and to creativity, beauty, generosity, humbleness, forgiveness, cleanliness, and moderation at least once.³³

c. Spiritual values: Bazargan refers to God-consciousness (obedience to God and His love and pleasure) more often than to any other value (16 times). He also emphasizes piety/asceticism and self-sacrifice/martyrdom. He notes salvation and faith four times each and supplication at least once.³⁴

4. Outline of the Good Society. Eng. Bazargan does not present an outline of the social, economic and political systems of the good society which he desires to replace the Shah's regime. He talks briefly, however, about the role of religious scholars in the ideal society, about the purpose of politics in such a society, and about "genuine democracy."

a. The role of religion and religious scholars: According to Bazargan, religion should set the principles and the goals of the government, but should not interfere into the details of its activities. In relations between religion and politics, Bazargan gives the upper hand to religion. Nonetheless, he believes, "religion and politics [in the ordinary understanding of the terms] should not mix with each other. A borderline should be observed between the two. Each should have its own freedom and independence."³⁵ He also proposes that "the selection of those in charge [in the government] and the way the administration functions are not subject to religion's direct supervision. Neither have the religious scholars any right to interfere in the appointments and procedures [of the government] by the virtue of their religious position."³⁶

b. The purpose of politics: Bazargan believes that "politics should be only for the sake of God." To him, this means that it should be at the service of the people. "In many verses of the the Quran 'for the sake of God' is synonymous--or at least it implies--'for the sake of the people.' The aim of politics is the good and prosperity of the people. ... But it is neither just the

good and prosperity of this world nor those of the Hereafter alone. As a matter of fact, in the Quran, the prosperity of this world is not separated from that of the Hereafter. ... Rather, the goal and real life is the Hereafter, and this world--as the Prophet puts it--is a cultivating field."³⁷

c. Genuine democracy: Although Bazargan does not introduce democracy as his ideal system, he seems to have a special liking for it. He call Ali--his ideal leader--as "the most democratic head of state and ruler in the world."³⁸ He emphasizes the following democratic values and procedures in Ali's leadership: (1) not forcing the people to vote for him, (2) not being harsh to his opponents: they even continued to receive their regular stipend from his government, (3) freedom of expression and freedom of dissent, (4) consultation with the people, and (5) following the decision of the majority.³⁹

Elsewhere Bazargan defines genuine democracy in the following terms:

(1) Equality: all the individuals benefiting equally from the goods and privileges.

(2) Social justice: all the people enjoying equal rights.

(3) Government by the people for the people: liberation of people from servitude and obedience to others.⁴⁰

5. Program of Action. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Eng. Bazargan was very active in establishing Islamic associations and forming political parties. In his speeches and writings, however, he does not present a program of action for bringing about revolutionary change and establishing the desired society.

In the works covered in this study, the only remarks by Bazargan that relate to this subject are the following.

a. Struggle with one's own (lower) self: According to Bazargan, although Islam emphasizes the significance of society, it bases the reform of the society on the reform of the individual. Thus, before any change can take place in society, the individuals should change themselves.⁴¹

b. Organization: Bazargan proposes that the work for social reform should begin with the formation of small groups.⁴² He exhorts the members of the Islamic societies:

You, the Islamic societies, can initiate great reforms and revolutions in the country and in the Muslim world. You could do this easily if you do not limit yourselves to just talking, verbal propaganda, and superficial and temporary meetings. You should continue your mutual relationships and your meetings specially after your graduation--so that you could perform broader services and activities. Enter general and professional Islamic societies. Do not be just nominal members there. Pay your membership fee regularly; and with firm determination work sincerely and actively for reaching the common goal. ...

One of the signs of believers and one of the keys that God has given them to achieve victory is patience, perseverance, steadfastness, and diligence. [As the Quran states:] "And God is with those who are patient and steadfast."⁴³

6. Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence. In his writings and speeches, Eng. Bazargan exerts great efforts to encourage his readers and audience to realize their potentials, to have self-confidence, and to be active and dynamic.

Bazargan notes that man's potentialities are infinitely great, and he has been slowly acquiring the qualities which the believers attribute to God. This is in accordance with Islamic teachings. "The Noble Messenger [Muhammad] reports God's Message: 'My servant! Obey Me so that I make you like Myself (or a manifestation of Myself).'" In this ordinance God has promised man that he can reach infinity and acquire divine attributes--including creativity and the power to carry out what he wills."⁴⁴ Bazargan also argues that

man is such a being that he can do and be whatever he wants. He is the one who makes everything--including himself--and employs everything. [Self-reliance has always produced] geniuses and great movements from among the individuals and nations. Those who have relied upon outside factors--or have expected help from them--have been doomed to fail.⁴⁵

Eng. Bazargan warns his audience and readers about the negative impacts of apathy and feeling impotent. He argues that once an individual believes that he is impotent and cannot make his own decisions, he will lose hope, sense of responsibility, and even his character.⁴⁶ Bazargan also considers extreme asceticism and mysticism--which led to apathy and inaction among Muslims in the past--as a main factor in the predicament of the Muslims.⁴⁷

Bazargan tries to inculcate in his audience and readers activeness and self-confidence by reminding them of the Islamic teachings. He notes, for example, "a Muslim is not a man of belief only. He is also a man of action: positive, fruitful, and effective

action. ... When your heart and mind are fixed on God's religion, the Omnipotent God will suffice to solve all the problems and difficulties."⁴⁸ He also reminds his audience of Imam Ali's example. "Usually we associate piety and holiness with self-restraint which means being extra-cautious. That is followed by withdrawal and resignation which leads to indolence and uselessness. ... Ali was 'the Master of the pious people.' But he was also the most diligent, hard working, and prolific of all. ..."⁴⁹

In his speech on "Youthful Islam", Eng. Bazargan applies a formula from the field of thermodynamics in the case of social life in order to demonstrate that Islam revives and rejuvenates its followers. To put it in a nutshell: On the basis of his formula ($W=U-TS$), Bazargan argues that a person's revival and rejuvenation--which is based on W (the factor of effective and active energy [work], or the actualized portion of a person's ability and potentiality)--takes place only by increasing U (innate energy or the measure of a person's love, wants, and desires) and decreasing S (entropy or the amount of goods and belongings that a person accumulates) as well as decreasing T (the measure of heat or the value and rate of a person's wealth). He notes seven factors prescribed by Islam (and religions in general) that contribute to an increase in U and a decrease in S and T . They are: (1) charity, (2) asceticism (valuing material goods not as an end in themselves but only as a means for spiritual growth), (3) piety and fasting, (4) patience and self-sacrifice, (5) loving the people and serving them, (6) forbiddence of snobishness and arrogance, and (7) prayer and supplication. Therefore, Bazargan concludes,

The result of following the genuine divine religions--including Islam--is that the person's hopes and attention will be focused on God. He will draw benefits from the source of the highest blessings and then will spend what he has acquired in the service of the people. ... The higher the level of a person's searching, activity, acquisition, level of gnosis of his Creator, and charity and kindness to the downtrodden, the higher will be his level of productivity and efficiency, and the closer will he move to infinity.⁵⁰

7. Self-Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience. Out of the five speeches studied in this chapter, Eng. Bazargan refers to the significance of self-sacrifice only in one speech--that is, "The Youthful Islam".

As noted in the previous section, Bazargan considers self-sacrifice and martyrdom as one of the factors that contribute to the revival and rejuvenation of the believers. He quotes verses from the Holy Quran to show that according to Islam sacrifice of wealth and life is not a loss. Rather, it will lead to perpetual life. He wants to prove this point by the formula that he borrows from thermodynamic as well. His argument goes as follows:

Since [the genuine Muslims] do not believe they own anything, their TS is zero. Furthermore, since they believe they themselves belong to someone else (to God), their belonging becomes negative which makes TS negative and further increases U as well as W. Such persons will not become old [because they do not strive for] self-preservation or acquisition of wealth and status. On the contrary, since their W lacks negativity, it will never approach zero and will always remain positive. Thus, they are always alive--even when they sacrifice their life in the Way of Truth.⁵¹

Bazargan criticizes his fellow Shias as misunderstanding the real meaning of commemoration of Imam Husain's martyrdom:

Instead of trying to follow his example, which is accepting self-sacrifice and rising up against oppression and injustice; we think what he [Imam Husain] did will suffice all epochs of Islam [and we do not have to do anything]. With the excuse of Tagya (dissimulation), we prevent ourselves and our families from any movement, any opposition, and any struggle against tyranny and corruption. ... [The way we believe, it seems] as if the [Quranic] verse 'And do not reckon those who are slain in the Way of God as dead, but they are alive' was applicable and true only to the day of Ashura, when the third Imam [Husain] was martyred. [It seems as if] giving away one's wealth and life in the Way of God is death and destruction.⁵²

8. Simplification. Eng. Bazargan does not need to simplify his message much. In general, he uses a simple language with numerous examples from everyday life. Occasionally he also refers to the examples of Imams and the Prophet as models to be followed. Among Imams he emphasizes Ali and Husain. He introduces Imam Ali as a man of practical work, a man of war, an exceptional orator, and a man of politics and government as well as an ascetic, pious, and God-fearing person and a man of prayer and devotion.⁵³ In regard to Imam Husain, he emphasizes his uprising against oppression and injustice and his martyrdom and self-sacrifice.⁵⁴

9. Claim to Truth and Rationality. Eng. Bazargan tries to support his views and arguments by reference to the Holy Quran, to the traditions and Sayings of the Prophet and Imams, to the course of human history, to the writings of Western scholars, to scientific principles and formulas; and by rational reasoning.

a. The Holy Quran: Eng. Bazargan refers to the Holy Quran extensively. In one speech, "Social and Universal Muslim," he notes about 60 verses of the Quran. In most cases, however, he does not

present the Quran as an ultimate source of truth and authority. He quotes verses of the Quran, rather, to demonstrate that its teachings conform to human rationality, social evolution of human history, and "scientific formulas."⁵⁵ Only in one speech, "Borderline between Religion and Politics," does Bazargan try to establish his claim to truth by reference to the Quran.⁵⁶

b. Traditions and sayings of the Prophet and the Imams: Except for the speech "Ali and Islam", the subject matter of which is Imam Ali's life, Bazargan only occasionally refers to the traditions and sayings of the Prophet and the Imams.⁵⁷ As in the case of the Quran, in the speech "Borderline between Religion and Politics", Bazargan tries to use the traditions and sayings in support of his points of view.⁵⁸ In "Ali and Islam" he goes one step further and argues that Ali's acceptance of Islam, his total obedience to the Islamic teachings, his loyalty and devotion to Islam, and his readiness to sacrifice his life in defense of Islam are "the best evidence of genuineness, greatness and truth of Islam."⁵⁹

c. History: Eng. Bazargan refers to history in very general terms. He notes, for example, "history values and respects the people ... who were not selfish and did not work for personal gains; rather, they pursued a goal, an ideal, and a virtue which was beneficial to humanity and raised human value and status."⁶⁰ Or, to cite another example, he exhorts the youth, "... Construct a new Iran and a new pure, strong, and prosperous Islamic society. Everything is possible with the power of God and the bounties and potentialities He has granted to man. There are repeated precedents

in human history--especially in the history of religions."⁶¹ His reference to the Islamic history is also in a similar manner.⁶²

d. Writings of Western scholars: Eng. Bazargan who had studied in the West and spoke to a Western-oriented audience naturally refers to Western scholars in his writings and speeches. In some cases his references are extensive. In "Man and God", for example, he refers to and quotes from an American author (W. J. Reilly), two French scholars (George Ville and Gaston Berger), and a British philosopher (Bertrand Russel).⁶³ In some cases, "Ali and Islam" for example, he does not refer to any Western writer. In other cases, he refers to Western sources only occasionally. In the other three speeches covered in this study, he refers to French orientalist Jules La Beaumc's analysis of the subject matter of the Quran, to British writer Bernard Shaw's views on Islam and Prophet Muhammad, to French scholar Alexis Carrell's theory on the relativity of age, and to French orientalist Prof. Corbon's view on the Occulted Imam.⁶⁴

e. Scientific principles and formulas: Most of Eng. Bazargan's views and arguments in his speech "Youthful Islam" are based on the formulas and principles of thermodynamics. His application of a formula to social life in order to demonstrate that Islam revives and rejuvenates its followers was mentioned above.⁶⁵ Bazargan also presents the principle of increase in entropy and the theory of evolution as signs of God and evidence of His continuous touch with His creation.⁶⁶

In the physical world the 'arrow of time' seems to point toward an inevitable increase in entropy as the atoms and molecules that make up the world tend toward their most probable configuration, and disorder increases. Life, however,--from the first appearance of life itself to the development and evolution of complex human societies--represents a decrease rather than increase in entropy, a movement from disorder to increasing order. The second law of thermodynamics seems to imply that the universe will eventually 'run down,' whereas life is movement in the opposite direction.⁶⁷

These contradicting movements, Bazargan argues, can go on simultaneously only on the basis of Divine Will and Power.⁶⁸

In his other works covered in this study, Bazargan does not refer to scientific principles and formulas to establish his claim to truth. In all other four works, there is only one reference to a scientific formula--and that in a footnote.⁶⁹

f. Rational reasoning: Eng. Bazargan occasionally tries to establish his point by logical reasoning. In "The Borderline between Religion and Politics," for example, he criticizes those Shias who believe legitimate authority belongs only to the Occulted Imam and are waiting for him to return and bring about changes. He argues,

In practice this will mean that falsehood [mongers], oppressors and usurpers can do whatever they want to do; we should not say or do anything--even in self-defense. ... We cannot establish congregational prayer either because only the Occulted Imam is the perfect and just leader of the congregational prayer. ... Neither should the teachers teach any lessons, because only he [the Occulted Imam] is the absolute and legitimate scholar. Judges should not issue any verdicts either!⁷⁰

In his speech on "Man and God," Eng. Bazargan tries to prove God's existence by rational reasoning--a task in which philosophers seem to have failed. He presents two lines of argument. In one case he bases his argument on the question of values. His reasoning, however, is more an exposition of an inconsistency in the position

of those who adhere to certain noble values without believing in God than a proof of God's existence.⁷¹ Bazargan also refers to the efforts of the prophets throughout human history to make man grow and ascend and asks why they took upon themselves such an enormous task and who introduced them to God with all His noble attributes--attributes which sum up the highest ideals of humanity. He argues that any way we want to explain the question will lead us to God. Thus, he concludes, "sun [i.e., human tendency towards God] is itself the evidence of sun's [i.e., God's] existence."⁷² Whether his arguments can convince an atheist of God's existence is an open question.

Chapter VIII

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF DR. SHARIATI

Dr. Ali Shariati is undoubtedly "one of the major figures in the [Islamic] Revolution [in Iran], second only to Ayatullah Khomeini himself."¹ The Iranian youth called him "the Martyred Teacher of the Revolution" during the revolutionary demonstrations of 1978-79, and the Western scholars on Iran consider him "the major ideologue of the Islamic Revolution."² Shariati is also probably the most prolific figure among the leaders of the Revolution--especially considering the relatively short period of time he had to produce his works. The editor of the book Doctor Shariati lists about 200 books, articles, seminars, and series of lectures written and delivered by Shariati. The list, however, is clearly incomplete.³

Shariati's first work was published when he was in his early 20s--i.e., 1955. The most productive period of his life, however, was the five years between 1968 to 1973 when he lectured not only in Husainia-e Irshad,⁴ but in various universities and institutions all over the country. Most of Dr. Shariati's works were originally in the form of lectures which were tape recorded and transcribed by his students, duplicated in thousands of copies, and distributed all over Iran as well as among Iranian students abroad. Shariati has also written a number of books and has translated several books from Arabic and French into Persian (including Frenz Fanon's book The Wretched of the Earth). He has also written numerous articles and

essays most of which were published during his stay in France in Iran-e Azad (Free Iran, the official newspaper of the National Front of Iran Abroad) and in Al-Mujahid (The Holy Warrior, the official organ of the Algerian liberation movement).

Selection of five works from among a couple of hundred of works is obviously extremely difficult and subjective. Unlike some other leaders of the Revolution whose some--or most--works do not relate to the ideology of revolution, all Shariati's works--even his letters to friends and family members--are significant to this study. Moreover, Shariati talks about many different subjects. Although he repeats some themes in various places, each of his works is different from the rest to a larger or smaller degree.

The following works, which are selected for this study, certainly do not cover the whole range of Shariati's views in regard to the ideology of revolution. In order to somewhat remedy the situation, I will refer to Dr. Shariati's other works from time to time. I believe, however, that an independent study is needed to do real justice to Shariati's contribution to the ideology of the Islamic revolution. The selected works are the following:

1. "Shiism, a Complete Party", a lecture delivered in Husainia-e Irshad, Tehran, Fall 1351 A.H. (1972 A.D.).⁵
2. "Religion against Religion", a conference in the early 1970s.⁶
3. "Shahadat" (Martyrdom), a lecture in Tehran in winter 1972-73.⁷

4. "Reflections of a concerned Muslim: On the plight of oppressed people," a lecture in Tehran in Fall 1970.⁸

5. The lecture "Modern Man and His Prisons."⁹

1. Political Consciousness. Bringing about political consciousness to the Iranian people in general and to the Iranian youth in particular seems to be the main focus of Dr. Ali Shariati's efforts. In the works covered in this study, he tries to accomplish this task by introducing a new conception of man and a new conception of the Islamic Ummat (brotherly community), reminding his audience and readers of the characteristics of "monotheistic religion" and their responsibilities as free-thinkers, introducing a new conception of Shahdat (martyrdom), and by identifying himself with the oppressed throughout the human history.

a. The concept of man: For the English word "man"--and its related words used in a generic sense--there are two words in Arabic and Persian: Bashar and Ensan. Ordinarily the words are understood to be interchangeable. Dr. Shariati, however, makes a distinction between the two. From his reading of the Holy Quran, he argues that

by using Bashar, Quran is talking about two-footed creature that emerged at the end of the evolutionary chain. ... Bashar is that particular being that contains physiological, biological, and psychological characteristics which are shared by all men. ... On the other hand, Ensan is that unusual and enigmatic being that has a special definition that does not apply to any other phenomena in nature. ... Bashar is a "being" while Ensan is a "becoming."¹⁰

Thus, according to Shariati, all human beings are Bashar because they have the same biological and psychological make up and the same potentialities. They become Ensan, however, to the extent that they

develop their God-given capabilities and move towards perfection. "Moving towards perfection" means acquiring divine characteristics to Shariati. He refers to the verse of the Quran which states that man is God's vicegerent on earth. This means that "man is a creature who is capable, unlike nature, of utilizing and nourishing God's sublime attributes in himself and continuing to evolve." He also refers "the famous saying of the prophet Muhammad ... [which] tells us that we must assimilate the Lord's attributes."¹¹

Characteristics of Ensan: Shariati notes three divine characteristics towards which man must continuously strive and struggle: (1) self-consciousness, (2) freedom of choice, and (3) creativity. He defines self-consciousness as "perceiving one's quality and nature, perceiving the quality and the nature of the universe, and perceiving one's relationship with the universe." Thus, "we are Ensan to the extent that we are conscious of these three principles."¹²

In regard to freedom of choice, Shariati states, "Man is a chooser; namely, he is the only being who is not only capable of revolting against nature and the order which is ruling over him, but can revolt against his own natural, physical and psychological needs." Shariati refers to the story of Adam in the Islamic theology and argues that Adam was not an Ensan until he was in Heaven and had not sinned. It was only after his revolt against God's order that he became "a new creation in the universe, capable of attaining salvation by obeying God and praying to Him through his choice." He also quotes Descartes, Gide and Camus as to what makes each of them

know that he "is". He finds Camus' statement that "I revolt, therefore I am" as the most meaningful and "the most exalted becoming, peculiar to man."¹³ It is important to remember the circumstances under which these statements in praise of revolt were made--namely, the Shah's oppressive and tyrannic rule. It would be surprising if any of Shariati's students had missed the point.

In regard to creativity, Shariati notes that "man is a creature who creates." Man's creativity, however, is not limited to tool production. "Unlike [the view of] some [thinkers] who define man as an animal who makes tools, it is only man who can make things that go beyond tools." Man is not content with what nature offers him. During his evolutionary process, man reaches a point when "his needs and feelings evolve beyond the totality of nature's powers, creativities, and possibilities. ... [He] realizes that his genus is different than its materialistic nature and that he is different from other animals. He feels that he is attracted towards ideals which do not exist in nature." Technological innovation is one way through which man puts his creativity to work. "He wants to fly but nature did not give him wings; he begins to build a ship, plane, satellite, or spaceship." The second way in which man manifests his creativity is through artistic creation which is "an ultra-natural activity."¹⁴

Man's shackles: According to Dr. Shariati, in the process of becoming Ensan, man must free himself from four shackles or determinants. They are the shackles of nature, history, society, and self. Shariati views the factors hypothesized by naturalism,

biologism, historicism, and sociology as shaping man's character true to some extent. He argues, however, that all these theories disregard a very important fact, that is, "man is capable to choose." By his choice and by developing natural sciences and technology man can overcome the shackle of nature. Likewise, he can overcome sociological determinism and historical determinism by the scientific study of the laws that govern human society and history.¹⁵

Man can also overcome the shackle of self, but not through science. "The last prison, one's self, is the worst of all since it is the one which has rendered man the most helpless prisoner." This is a prison that a person carries within himself. "Here, the prisoner and the prison are the same; that is, the disease and the patient have merged together. This is why getting rid of the malaise is so arduous!"¹⁶ The only way man can overcome this shackle is through love. "What is love?" Shariati asks. "By love I mean an Almighty force (which is beyond my rational and discretionary faculty) in the very depth of my being that can blow me apart and help me to rebel against my self. Since the prison is in me, my inside should be set aflame."¹⁷ For Shariati this "love" manifests itself in self-sacrifice. "Love consists of giving up everything for the sake of a goal and asking nothing in return. ... It is a love which, beyond rationality and logic, invites us to negate and rebel against ourselves in order to work towards a goal or for the sake of others." And he concludes,

"It is at this stage that a free man is born, and this is the most exalting level of becoming Ensan."¹⁸

b. The Concept of Ummat: In the same way that Shariati considers man not as a "being" but a "becoming," he also considers the Islamic community not as a "being" but as a "becoming." The word the Holy Quran uses for the Islamic community is "Ummat." Dr. Shariati goes to the root of the word and notes that it is derived from "umm" which means straight path, departure, journey, migration, and moving ahead. Therefore, he defines "Ummat" as "a society of committed individuals who think likewise, have the same goal, and are comrades and companions to each other--individuals who are moving towards a single, straight, clear, firm, and common purpose."¹⁹

For Shariati the fact that Islam selects the word "Ummat" for its ideal society is very significant. He believes the root of the word relates to its existential philosophy. According to Shariati, the goal of human societies throughout history has generally been welfare and prosperity--i.e., to "be happy." This is the same as the existential philosophy of a hotel. The existential philosophy of an Islamic society, however, is that of a caravan--that is, to move towards a goal, "to become good." In the first case, anything that disturbs the comfort and pleasure of the group is rejected. In the second case, however, any factor that contributes to the collective movement towards the common goal and guarantees the group's safe and speedy arrival is valuable and sacred even if it is unpleasant, uncomfortable, harsh, and (for some members) dangerous. The goal towards which an Islamic community should move is "perfection."²⁰

Ummat making its own destiny: According to Shariati each Ummat is responsible for making its own destiny. He quotes the verse of

the Quran which states, "That [what was described before this verse] was an Umma that has passed away. They shall have the fruit of what they did, and you of what you do. You are not responsible for what they used to do" (2:134). Shariati interprets this verse as telling the Muslims, "You the [Muslim] Ummat who suffer from slavery and misery today cannot blame your problems on earlier generations or on other nations. ... If you consent to the miseries which have been imposed on you [or the ones you have inherited], it is in fact as if you have created them yourselves. Thus, you will be punished for your consent."²¹

The universal responsibility of the Ummat: Dr. Shariati considers the Islamic Ummat responsible not only for its own evolution (movement towards perfection), but for the evolution of humanity as a whole. Again he quotes a verse of the Holy Quran to establish his point: "Thus have We made of you an Umma justly balanced [literally, intermediate] that you might be witnesses [models] over the nations, and the Apostle a witness [model] over yourselves" (2:143). According to this verse, Shariati argues, Muslims have the same responsibility vis-a-vis other nations and peoples as the Prophet had vis-a-vis them. That is, they should serve as an example and model to be emulated. They should also be present (witness) at the center of the arena of struggle between truth and falsehood, between forces of liberty and oppression.

It is only natural that such an Ummat is at the middle. It is neither inclined towards east nor west; neither north nor south. ... It is neither aligned to this block nor to that block. It is neither under the domination of this system nor of its opposite. It is neither sunk into the absolute this-worldliness [materialism] nor into the absolute other-worldliness [spiritualism]. ...Such an Ummat is a manifestation and symbol

of human and social evolution. ... It will not limit itself to a particular form, nor will it practice negative neutrality. It will not withdraw from arenas of human struggle, nor will it separate itself from the body of mankind severing its destiny from the destiny of other wounded masses who are victims of oppression. For such an Ummat victory [over its own oppressors] will not suffice. Thus, it will not engage in "self-improvement," "development," and "implementing long term domestic plans" away from a universal revolution for justice and liberation of all the people. ... Rather, it will be at the middle of the universal revolution and "at the heart" of the oppressed people who are seeking liberation."²²

Shariati emphasizes that unlike other systems, in an Islamic community, the above responsibility is not entrusted to a particular administration or to a particular group of people. Any Muslim who reaches the age of "maturity" becomes "responsible for the salvation of humanity" in the same way that he becomes responsible for establishing regular prayer.²³

To support his arguments, Shariati mentions examples from early Islamic history. He notes that, "The Prophet of Islam never limited himself to the geographic, racial, or national boundaries in his political, military, and social struggles for crushing the anti-justice forces and for the establishment of an Islamic government and an Islamic Ummat." He even wrote letters to the leaders of the great powers of his time inviting them to submit to God's religion and warning them of the consequences of their refusal at a time when the Islamic community was still in its infancy.²⁴ Shariati also notes the response of a Muslim soldier to the commander of the Iranian troops when he was asked why the Muslims had come to Iran. The Muslim soldier rejected the offer of material gifts and replied: "We have come to liberate you from the slavery to each other to servitude to God; to liberate you from the baseness of

the earth to the heights of sublimity; and to liberate you from the oppression of religions to the justice of Islam."²⁵

c. The Characteristics of the monotheistic religion: According to Shariati, human history is the scene of a continuous struggle of "religion against religion." He notes that the feelings of worshipping a power and believing in something sacred are innate in man. The universality of such feelings over time and space and their continuity are evidence of their being instinctive. Because of this, throughout history, all human societies have been religious. All human religions, however, are not the same. Rather, there are two types of religions: the religion of Tawhid (Oneness, Unity, monotheism) and the religion of Shirk (contradictions, polytheism).²⁶

Shariati discusses the characteristics of each religion in detail. In a nutshell, the religion of Shirk originates from man's fear of the forces of nature and is based on ignorance. It divides human societies into different groups and classes--giving privileges to a few against the majority. It justifies the oppressive situation through metaphysical beliefs and invites the people to resignation and inaction.²⁷

Opposite to the above is the religion of Tawhid with the following characteristics:

(1) It originates from man's innate need for consciousness, love, goal and purpose in life, sense of direction in the whole creation, and adoration of Absolute Perfection and Absolute Beauty.²⁸

(2) It is based on man's desires and aspirations for freedom, idealism, equity, equality, establishment of justice and goodness, and destruction of all evils.²⁹

(3) It invites people to focus their attention to One Direction in creation and to believe in only One Effective Force in the universe. It also invites them to worship only One Power and to rely on only One Source in life. This monotheistic invitation has a material and "this-worldly" dimension as well. It means belief in oneness of mankind; oneness of all races, families, and individuals; and oneness of all human rights and values.³⁰

(4) While the religion of Tawhid asks people to submit themselves to God, it invites them to rebel against any other power or authority besides him. Thus, a basic characteristic of the religion of Tawhid is its aggressive and revolutionary attitude. It teaches its followers to have a critical outlook about life and all its material, spiritual, and social dimensions. It gives them a responsibility to change and destroy what they do not like and consider as falsehood, and to replace it with what they consider as Truth.³¹ We can see the clear manifestation of this characteristic of the religion of Tawhid in the lives of the prophets of "Abrahamite religions"--i.e., Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

[Those prophets] always launched an attack on the ruling forces--be it material, or social, or spiritual. They always assaulted all the idols--be it ... material idols, physical idols, human idols, economic idols, or logical idols. They struggled with all manifestations of the religion of Shirk--i.e., the existing religion. They considered it their and their followers responsibility to fundamentally change the existing conditions and to replace them with a just system.³²

d. The responsibility of free-thinkers: Most of Shariati's audience consisted of the educated youth--university students and graduates--who considered themselves as "Roshan Fikr" (intellectual, free-thinker, or--more literally--enlightened thinker). Shariati exerts great efforts to convince them that they cannot become free-thinkers only by using the label or setting in coffee-houses discussing subjects which do not have any bearing to the social realities of their society. He ridicules such "free-thinkers" as "standardized free-thinkers" and "translated free-thinkers". For him "free-thinker" means "a literate or illiterate person, a scholar or a layman ... who has 'social consciousness' and is aware of his 'age' and what it requires--a person who feels direct and serious responsibility in his relations to his society and to its destiny."³³ Thus, social consciousness and social responsibility are the defining characteristics of a free-thinker. Among a free-thinker's social responsibilities, Shariati focuses on two principal responsibilities: (1) to introduce genuine Islam to the people, and (2) to enjoin "Marooof" (right, goodness) and forbid "Munkar" (wrong, evil).

(1) The duty to introduce genuine Islam: Dr. Shariati believes that Islam is the perfect manifestation of the religion of Tawhid and Shiism is the best understanding of Islam. With pain, however, he notes that what is called and practiced as Islam both by the masses and the scholars in the Iranian society of his time is far away from the genuine Islam.

For Shariati Islam is first and foremost a "Mission," a "Message," and a "school of guidance and liberation." Thus, Islam is not some kind of philosophy, science, art, or literature; rather, it is a type of "ideology."

The transformation of Islam from an "ideology" to a collection of "unconscious social traditions and some fixed and dogmatic hereditary and habitual formalities and rituals"--an Islam which is specially for the masses--... has vulgarized and degenerated it. ... Moreover, the transformation of Islam from an "ideology" to a cultural collection consisting of philosophy and specialized sciences and professions--an Islam which is specially for the elite--has given it a philosophical outlook and a scientific role. Such a role ... naturally leads to taking Islam away from the heart of life, from the process of the society's movement, and from the leadership of the age into the corner of philosophical thinking and abstract reasoning and discussion.³⁴

Shariati considers the responsibility of a Muslim free-thinker the same as the responsibility of the earlier prophets; that is, to introduce the religion of Tawhid to the people and to put it into practice.³⁵ This is not an easy task, however. "Today's Shiism has taken such a form that anyone who wants to speak of the genuine, fervorous, and awakening Shiism will be sacrificed by his friends [i.e., those who call themselves 'Shias'] before his enemies get to him."³⁶ Nonetheless, Shariati exhorts his audience to try their best to learn about Islam and to make it known to others.

[We] should travel in its path and be its 'guardian.' ... In spite of all ups and downs, all obstacles and problems ... we should not justify ourselves and should not lose hope. We should not pause even for one moment. ... We should be like Abudhar [a great companion of the Prophet] who told [those who were distorting Islam]: 'If you put your swords [on my throat] and I feel that I would not breathe more than once, I will not be 'quite' even in that last breath.'³⁷

(2) The duty to enjoin "Maroof" and forbid "Munkar": Shariati considers the Islamic duty of enjoining Maroof (right, goodness) and forbidding Munkar (wrong, evil) as the most important responsibility of every Muslim and especially of a Muslim free-thinker. According to Shariati, this responsibility not only includes "what today's progressive and committed free-thinkers ... propose as their social responsibility and commitment towards people," but goes beyond it.³⁸ He notes that "the language which Islam chooses for the 'social responsibility' of its followers is a religious language so that it is alive and in leadership role in all stages of history, in all social systems, and in all forms of struggles."³⁹ The Islamic concepts of Maroof and Munkar are general and comprehensive. Understanding their particular meanings and applying them to different societies and in different ages will differ according to the conditions of each society and the understanding of its people. "The greatest Munkar is that we limit the scope of enjoining Maroof and forbidding Munkar to some 'secondary and personal' issues and confine [their meaning] to some fixed phenomena."⁴⁰

Shariati expounds on the verse of the Quran which states, "You are the best Umma evolved for mankind, enjoining Maroof, forbidding Munkar and believing in God" (3:110). Why does the Quran put social responsibility before believing in God? Shariati asks. His reply is that the Holy Quran does not want to repeat what is obvious. It wants, rather, to say something new, to teach a lesson, to provide guidance, and to preclude future distortions. The verse of the Quran is about Ummat, that is, a committed group.

Social activity and the responsibility to enjoin Maroof and forbid Munkar for the sake of people's liberation is the existential philosophy of an Ummat. By emphasizing this, the Quran wants to give us the wonderful consciousness that an Ummat cannot be actualized without such a responsibility and without active commitment concerning the fate of the people. It wants to tell us that without a primary focus on social responsibility ... and without striving in path of Maroof and struggling against Munkar you can become a divine philosopher, a pure mystic, a perfect gnostic, and an ascetic devotee; but you cannot become a MUSLIM. ...

[It also wants to tell us that] your principal responsibility and the ultimate goal of your creation by God--and the fact that you have evolved as the best Ummat--is not your belief in God; because God does not have any need for your belief. Rather, the purpose of "your evolvement" has been to strive in actualizing Maroof and to struggle for rejecting Munkar in the path of "the people." ...

Thus, if a "group" believes in God but does not take action to fulfill its human responsibilities ... [such a belief] is in vain and of no value.⁴¹

For Shariati the fact that the Quran adds "belief in God" to social responsibility is also significant. From this, he understands that, "Only those people can form 'the best Ummat' in the world and only that Ummat can 'really and with total sincerity' rise up for the people that have liberated themselves from all personal, material, and spiritual attachments ... and 'have faith in God.'"⁴²

Shariati emphasizes that Islam places social responsibility of enjoining Maroof and forbidding Munkar alongside other religious duties at the same rank and at the same time. The reason is that "in Islam, an individual constructs himself with and through the construction of his society. While he tries to invite to beauties (Maroof) and to struggle against ugliness [Munkar] through thinking, experiment, confrontation, and perseverance; he himself is also made. He gains spiritual power, awareness, self-consciousness, and God-consciousness. Thus, everyday he become 'more Muslim' by 'acting

as a Muslim."⁴³ This Islamic position, according to Shariati, is contrary to the views of traditional scholars and modern intellectuals who separate the thinking process from action and believe that the latter should follow the former. Shariati strongly criticizes such a way of thinking and considers it as a justification for one's escape from responsibility.⁴⁴

For Shariati, Islam without social responsibility can probably be considered a religion, but it would certainly not be Islam. He labels as "selfish" even those "who are really pious, have never committed any sin, and have abandoned all the pleasures of this life in order to gain salvation in the Hereafter." He further holds that "the hands of such people are stained with the blood of the oppressed--though they do not realize it--because whenever unjustified blood is shed somewhere on earth, all those who keep quiet about it [share the responsibility]."⁴⁵ He also mentions a statement by Abudhar who said, "I am amazed at the person who does not find any food in his home; how come he does not rebel against the people with his uncovered sword." Shariati notes that Abudhar "does not say against the person who has caused his poverty, nor against the person [or group] who has exploited him. ... He says against all the people. Why all? Because anyone who lives in a society where there is poverty [and he does not do anything about it], he is responsible for my poverty and hunger--even if he is not one of the exploiters."⁴⁶

e. The concept of Shahadat (Martyrdom): Shahadat enjoys a high value in the Islamic culture--especially in the Shi'i tradition. Generally it is understood to mean sacrificing one's life in the Way of God. Shariati, however, by studying the root of the word and looking at the way the Holy Quran uses it concludes that its meaning is much broader. Originally Shahadat means "witness," "serving as a model," and "being present." All these dimensions are applicable to Islamic Shahadat in general and to the Shahadat of Imam Husain and his companions in Karbala--which plays a central role in the Shi'i tradition--in particular. Shariati's arguments can be summarized as the following:⁴⁷

(1) Witness: Imam Husain went to Karbala and accepted martyrdom in order to be a witness in the criminal court of human history in favor of the oppressed people--"in favor of those who have never had any witnesses, in favor of those who have always died silently and defenselessly." Imam Husain took his small child along with him in order to bear witness that "in the system of oppression, tyranny, and crime [which runs throughout history], the cruel executor does not have mercy even on the infants." He took the female members of his family along with him in order to bear witness that in that system the women have the choice "either to accept slavery and become toys in the harems or to stay free [but lose all their beloved ones]." By his own martyrdom, Imam Husain bears witness about "how the heroes have to die in the regimes of tyranny and crime."

(2) Model: Imam Husain is also a model for his Shias. He is a model not only because he is a Shahid (martyr, model); but also because Shia means "follower" and a person who claims to be Husain's Shia must follow his example. Because of the legacy of his last words, his example must also be followed by those who love him. After he had lost all his companions in the battle and was facing the enemy alone, Imam Husain cried, "Is there anyone to help me?" He knew that there was no one to help him at that particular place and time. His question, however, is addressed to the future of human history. "It is addressed to all of us. This question demonstrates Husain's expectation of his lovers. It is an invitation to martyrdom to all those who cherish and extol the martyrs."

The great lesson that Imam Husain wants to teach us by his martyrdom relates to our responsibility towards tyranny and oppression. He teaches us that not being able to match the power of an enemy does not exempt us from Jihad. The martyr chooses his own "red death" as the only weapon for the defense of the great values that are being crushed. He dies in order to demonstrate his love for the truth that is dying. He does not do so with the expectation of immediate victory. Rather, he overcomes his enemy through his death. If he cannot defeat his enemy militarily, he hopes to defeat him by defaming (delegitimizing) him.

(3) Being present: Imam Husain left the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) he was performing incomplete and rushed towards his martyrdom in Karbala. There is another great lesson in this. By his action, Husain wants to tell us that the martyr is present in all the arenas

of struggle between truth and falsehood, between oppression and liberation. He wants to tell us that "if you are not present at the scene of confrontation between truth and falsehood, and if you are not a Shahed (model) for your age, and if you are not a Shahid (witness) for the truth and falsehood of your society; then wherever you are, it is the same. If you are standing for prayer [highly recommended in Islam] or if you are setting drinking alcohol [strongly prohibited in Islam], both would be of the same value."

The Shahadat of Imam Husain also means that he is present in all ages and among all generations. "In the eternal struggle of history, all the earth is the scene of Karbala [where Husain was martyred], all the months are the month of Muharam [the lunar month in which Husain was martyred], and all the days are the day of Ashura [10th of Muharam, the day of Husain's martyrdom]." Thus, each person has to choose between what Husain did--i.e., sacrificing his life--and what his sister Zainab did--i.e., conveying the message of martyrs to other people and to the coming generations. Otherwise, he/she will be one of the companions of Yazid--the tyrant against whom Husain rose up.

It is important to note that according to Shariati Imam Husain's message is not exclusively for the Muslims.

His message is for the humanity. He tell all the people that if you have religion, then your religion--and if you do not have religion, then human freedom--places a responsibility upon your shoulders. It is the responsibility that you as a religious person--or as a free man--be a model for your time and a witness to the truth and falsehood which confront each other at your time. [Remember] that our martyrs are watching; they are conscious; they are always present; and they are models to emulate.⁴⁸

f. Solidarity with the oppressed throughout history: As the above discussions demonstrate, Dr. Shariati aims at bringing about a sense of community among the people--which is a component of political consciousness--in most of his works. His masterpiece in this regard, however, may be his lecture "on the plight of the oppressed people." In this lecture, Shariati identifies himself--and thus invites his audience to identify--with the slaves who died while building the Egyptian Pyramids some 5000 years ago. Shariati tell his audience how his view about the Pyramids changed once he discovered the graves of the slaves who had been crushed under the heavy rocks in the process of building the Pyramids.

I then went to those graves and sat down feeling very close to the people buried in those ditches. It was as if we were of the same race. It is true that each of us came from different geographical areas but these differences were inconsequential when viewed as a basis for dividing mankind. ... I looked back to the Pyramids and realized that despite their magnificence, they were so strange to and distant from me! In other words, I felt so much hatred towards the great monuments of civilization which throughout history were raised upon the bones of my predecessors.⁴⁹

According to Shariati, slavery has continued in one form or another in the past 5000 years. Although its form and method have changed, its effects on the victims have remained the same. Shariati talks about "his" experiences, hopes, and disappointments over the 5000 years in a letter that he addresses to "his brother"--the slave buried near the Pyramids. About the present situation he says, "My friend, I live in a society where I face a system [capitalism] that controls half of the universe, maybe all of it. Mankind is being driven into a stronghold of slavery. Although we are not in physical slavery, we are truly destined with a fate worse than you! Our

thoughts, hearts, and will powers are enslaved. ..."⁵⁰ Thus, historically Shariati identifies himself with all the oppressed people throughout history, and geographically he identifies himself with the victims of capitalism all over the world.

2. Criticism of Social Arrangement. Shariati delivered his lecture "on the plight of the oppressed people" when preparations were under way to celebrate the 2500 years of the monarchy regime and the "Great Civilization" in Iran. In the lecture, Shariati does not say anything about the Shah. However, it is quite clear--except probably to the obtuse SAVAK agents at the time--that his lecture is an indictment of the Shah's regime. The Shah based the legitimacy of his government on the 2500 years of the monarchy system and the "Great Civilization" it had produced. Shariati, on the other hand, condemns all the great civilizations for their crimes against the weak and the oppressed and condemns--in other lectures--all the past systems as part of the "single polytheistic regime ruling the human history."

As noted earlier, Shariati views "civilization as a curse" because it is usually built "at the expense of the flesh and blood" of the oppressed people. He writes to the slave who died while building the Egyptian Pyramids, "My friend, you have left this world, but we are carrying the loads for the great civilization. ... Others [take] the pride and credit for the work we did. No mention has ever been made of our contributions."⁵¹ He goes into Iranian history and condemns what the Shah and his followers seemed to be

proud of. He criticizes the ancient Persian monarchy regime--with which the Shah identified-- as oppressive and exploitative. He talks, for example, about "closed classes" during the Sasanid dynasty. All the power and wealth was monopolized by the two princely and clergy classes, and it was impossible for someone from the lower classes to enter into their ranks.⁵² He criticizes Zoroaster--the ancient Persian Prophet--for "disregarding our [i.e., the oppressed people's] mourning and scars from the lashes inflicted on our bodies by the masters" and joining the king of the time. He criticizes Mobedans--the ancient Persian religious class who were the allies of the kings--for exploitation and pushing "us as slaves into war to protect their power and rule from their enemies." And he criticizes Shahnama--a book which the adherers of the "Great Civilization" ideology considered as their Bible written in poetry about the ancient Persian history --for making "no mention of our class except once in all of [its] 60,000 couplets."⁵³

According to Dr. Shariati, throughout human history--with flashy exceptions--there has been one single ruling regime. It is the regime "which manipulates politics, economics, religion, art, philosophy, ideas, feelings, ethics, and humanity in order to sacrifice man for the sake of its selfish desires. It tries to employ everything [possible] as a base for the governance of oppression, tyranny, and crime."⁵⁴ All the leaders of this ruling regime have been equally blood thirsty. "There is no difference between Genghis Khan who was ruling over the wild tribes, the great emperors who were ruling over the great civilized societies and

those individuals who are at the present reigning over the great civilized civilizations."⁵⁵

Shariati also tries to delegitimize the Shah's regime by criticizing the economic system he had adopted--i.e., capitalism. There are direct and indirect criticism of capitalism in most of Shariati's works. He considers capitalism inhuman and the latest manifestation of the "single ruling regime of human history." It is even worse than the earlier oppressive and exploitative regimes. The past systems were relatively less sophisticated and less effective. Capitalism, however, is "a mixture of economics, culture, politics, sociology, and military power which metamorphoses ... the people from within and from without like a cancerous network."⁵⁶ Thus, according to Shariati, the conditions of those living under capitalism are even worse than the conditions of slaves in ancient Egypt. In his letter to the slave who died while building the Pyramids, he writes,

My friend, knowing that you were a slave, you could identify your master. You could endure the whip lashes on your body. ... We are facing the same destiny as you, but unable to know why it exists. Who is making us slaves of this century? From where are we being invaded? Why are we submissive to misleading thoughts? Why are we engaged in worldly worship? Like animals, we have become victims of exploitation--even more so than your era and race! ... We are more deprived than you! Cruelty and discrimination are more severe than that of your time!"⁵⁷

Criticizing distortions in Islam and Shiism: According to Dr. Shariati, worshipping idols and statues is not the only form of the religion of Shirk (polytheism). Throughout history, once the religion of Tawhid (monotheism) gains victory, the leaders of the religion of Shirk put on the mask of Tawhid and continue their rule

by distorting that religion from within. This has been the fate of Islam as well.⁵⁸ Shariati devotes several lectures to criticizing the way Islam in general and Shiism in particular was understood in Iran at his time. In "Father! Mother! We are to be Blamed," he argues that the youth who are running away from Islam either to the looseness of the western life style or to the leftist ideologies are not blameworthy. Rather, the problem lies with the way their elders and "religious scholars" present Islam to them.⁵⁹ In "Alawid Shiism and Safavid Shiism" he argues that there is not one Shiism but two. The original Shiism which is based on the models of Imam Ali and Imam Husain is totally different in its principles from the "Safavid Shiism" which is a product of the Safavid dynasty--though tendency towards it had started much earlier. According to Shariati, the main difference between the two is that "Alawid Shiism" is a "movement" while "Safavid Shiism" is an "institution." The first one starts with "NO!"⁶⁰ and challenges the existing conditions of oppression, tyranny, aristocracy, and discrimination. But the second one starts with "Yes," justifies the status quo, and teaches quiescence. The latter even distorts the understanding of the major events in the history of Shiism and the facts of the lives of Imams.⁶¹ Shariati considers the "Safavid Shiism"--which he believes to be prevalent in Iran at his time--as "the root of all our problems and the main enemy of 'Alawid Shiism'."⁶² Thus, he argues,

The immediate issue for us is the grievance of a nation's 1300 years of misery. It is the grievance of a nation's intellectual deprivation. It is the grievance of metamorphosis and distortion of a conscious-raising and liberating faith. It is the grievance

of apathy, quiescence, and diversion of a people into oppression, ignorance, and poverty through [misuse of] the most sacred, the most supreme, and the most progressive faith and the eternal divine values as well as through [misrepresentation of] the dearest personalities and heroic figures each of whom will suffice to awaken a nation by providing consciousness, movement, and liberation. ...⁶³

3. New Set of Values. Although Dr. Shariati notes more personal values, he emphasizes social values as much as the personal values. He also underscores a few spiritual values.

a. Social values: It seems that social responsibility is the most important value to Dr. Shariati. In the works studied here, it outnumbers any other value (mentioned at least 44 times) except for "martyrdom"--which also implies social responsibility. Jihad/struggle and justice/equity are also very significant in the list of Shariati's values (each mentioned at least 18 times). Next in the list of social values are freedom (14 times), liberation (10 times), and action/experience (nine times). Shariati mentions equality and unity at least five times each; civilization and charity at least twice each; and consultation at least once.⁶⁴

b. Personal values: Ascent towards perfection is the most important personal value in the list of Dr. Shariati's values (mentioned at least 18 times). Dynamism and consciousness are also very important (at least 12 times each). They are followed by rebelliousness (eight times), perseverance/firmness (seven times), freedom of choice (six times), commitment and creativity (five times each), and wisdom and sincerity (four times each). Shariati also mentions contemplation (three times); hope, morality, idealism, and

prosperity (twice each); and success, objectivity, power, determination, critical outlook, beauty, constructiveness, and ingenuity (at least once each).⁶⁵

c. Spiritual values: Shariati considers self-sacrifice as a manifestation of spiritual love, a movement towards perfection and the ultimate performance of social responsibility. Thus, he puts great emphasis on this value. In his lecture on "Shahadat" (martyrdom), he mentions the term at least 50 times. He also refers to other words implying self-sacrifice frequently in his other works (at least 16 times in the works included in this study). Shariati emphasizes faith and love as well (mentioned 15 and nine times each respectively). He also notes worship/piety and salvation (five times each), thankfulness (twice), and trust in God (at least once).⁶⁶

4. Outline of the Good Society. Dr. Ali Shariati does not present an outline of the good society that he desires to replace the Shah's regime. Glimpses of that society can be seen, however, in his lectures on different topics. In the discussions of the concept of Ummat, for example, he touches upon the goal of the ideal society, its social relations, and the leadership.

a. The goal: The goal of the ideal society is moving towards "perfection." This movement will not be limited to the ideal society itself. Rather, the society will feel responsible to prepare the grounds for the whole humanity to move in that direction. This means that the ideal society will work for liberation of the oppressed people everywhere they are and for providing them with consciousness

and leadership.⁶⁷ The establishment of justice in the ideal society is a prerequisite for the pursuit of its goal.⁶⁸

b. Social relations: Shariati emphasizes cooperation among the members of the ideal society in order to proceed towards achieving their common goal. Moreover, every individual in the society is responsible and a "combatant."⁶⁹ Shariati introduces the Madina society under the leadership of the Prophet as the symbol of the ideal society's social system,⁷⁰ but he does not provide any details in the works covered in this study.

c. Leadership: According to Shariati, "the Ummat (brotherly community) whose existential philosophy is 'continuous collective movement' in a 'straight path towards a common goal' has an absolute need for a guide and leader--i.e., an Imam."⁷¹ In regard to the election of the leader--as the Sunnis believe--or his selection by his predecessor--as the Shias believed in the case of the twelve Imams--Shariati presents a new thesis. He argues that people's consultation and their expression of allegiance and consent to a leader are undisputable Islamic principles. On the other hand, the Islamic society after the death of the Prophet was not ready for the ideal Islamic democracy. Therefore, the society needed "revolutionary leadership" until it had become qualified to elect its own leader. Thus, the process of selection by the Prophet and the Imams was an exception to the rule and a temporary measure which lasted only for 250 years.⁷²

d. Ownership: While discussing the concept of "Al-Nas" (the people, the masses), Dr. Shariati touches upon the question of

ownership in an Islamic society. According to Shariati, the Holy Quran uses the words "God" and "the people" interchangeably in the context of social and economic issues. Thus, when it says "Property belongs to God," it also means that "property belongs to the people"--that is, to all the people, not to some groups, nor to certain individuals. To support his view, Shariati mentions Abudhar's (a great companion of the Prophet) argument with Maaweya (the ruler who was fond of luxurious life and changed the political regime of the Islamic society into monarchy). Referring to his earlier statement, Shariati argues,

This is not my interpretation that I might have come up with under the influence of today's thoughts. It is the interpretation with which Abudhar Ghaffari confronts Maaweya and tells him, "the reason you say 'property belongs to God' is that you want to devour people's property. You say 'property belongs to God' means that it does not belong to the people; therefore, I [Maaweya] as God's representative can do with it as I wish. [This is far from the truth.] 'Property belongs to God' actually means that 'property belongs to the people.' [In Islam] the people and God are in the same row. [As the Prophet says,] 'the people are God's family.' ..."⁷³

5. Program of Action. Shariati discusses in detail the forms of action to bring about revolutionary change. He also identifies the targets of change and the agents of change.

a. Targets of change: Dr. Shariati considers "international imperialism, world Zionism, old and new colonialism, exploitation, despotism, class conflict, cartels and trusts [transnational corporations?], racism, cultural imperialism, and westernization" as "today's greatest evils."⁷⁴ Thus, they are the main targets of change for him.

Shariati also identifies "the religion of Shirk" as a target for change. He observes that, "it is true that religion has been the opium of the masses in order to make them submit--internally and with conviction--to the conditions of humiliation, misery, helplessness, ignorance, and stagnation. ..." ⁷⁵ But this is the function of the religion of Shirk against which the religion of Tawhid has always fought. According to Shariati, "the root of the religion of Shirk is economics. Its root is the ownership of a minority and deprivation of the majority." The factors that sustain the religion of Shirk are ignorance, discrimination, and class stratification. ⁷⁶ The groups responsible for promotion of the religion of Shirk--that is, those who benefit from it--are the wealthy and capitalists, the power elite, and the religious leadership of that religion. ⁷⁷ Thus, these can also be considered as the targets of change.

b. Agents of change: Shariati assigns the greatest role in bringing about revolutionary changes in a society to "free-thinkers." On the basis of a Saying of the Prophet, he argues that today's Muslim scholars have the same responsibility as the earlier Prophets. He interprets "the Muslim scholars" to mean "Muslim free-thinkers." ⁷⁸ About the definition of "free-thinker," it seems that Shariati uses the term in two ways:

(1) In his lecture entitled "The Mission of the Free-Thinkers," Shariati seems to use the term to refer to socially conscious western educated youth. This is probably the reason why he says, "A free-thinker's function is not to lead the society. This is one of

the most serious mistakes that free-thinkers around the world commit. The most worthless elements for leading the people are free-thinkers." In this context, the function of a free-thinker is to "bestow awareness on the masses, that's all."⁷⁹

(2) In his lecture entitled "Shiism: a Complete Party," Shariati's definition of "free-thinker" includes not only the educated people and scholars but also "illiterates" and "laymen." In that lecture he argues, "unlike philosophy, science, and technology which can have a material source, 'free-thinking' ... is basically a special 'consciousness' the bearers of which to earth and for mankind have always been divine prophets."⁸⁰ Thus, according to Shariati, "the committed free-thinker who understands Islam" plays a "leadership role" among his people.⁸¹

It should be emphasized that according to Shariati "the revolutionary leaders are [always] from among the masses and the common people."⁸² Prophet Muhammad was an orphan and a shepherd--and so were the prophets who preceded him.⁸³ He was also an Ummi--illiterate, a layman, one who belongs to the masses. "It has always been those Ummis who have provided the masses with consciousness, have awoken them, and have produced great movements among them."⁸⁴

Although Shariati believes that leadership plays a very important role in a revolutionary movement,⁸⁵ he also notes that "Islam does not consider the fundamental factor in social change to be personality, accident, or overwhelming and immutable laws"--though it recognizes them as capable of affecting the destiny

of a society.⁸⁶ For Islam the fundamental factor of social change is al-Nas (the people, the masses). "Islam is the first school of social thought to recognize the masses as the basis, the fundamental and conscious factor in determining history and society--not the elect as Nietzsche thought, not the aristocracy as Plato claimed, not great personalities as Carlyle and Emerson believed, not those of pure blood as Alexis Carrel imagined, not the priests or intellectuals, but the masses."⁸⁷ The definition of "masses" is important. As a translation of "al-Nas," the term "masses" is not antonym to "elite." It means, rather, "the people as such, without any particular class or social form."⁸⁸

From among different socio-economic classes, Shariati believes the middle class can play the most active role in a revolutionary situation. The upper class is sunk into the quagmire of exploitation, luxury, and pleasure seeking. The lower class is deprived of the means of taking action. In the middle class, however, "there is more opportunity for remaining human than in the nobility, and there is more opportunity for growth and development than in the deprived class which has fallen to the level of intellectual slavery and moral degeneration."⁸⁹ The full success of the revolution and the establishment of the ideal society, however, depends upon intellectual and moral growth of the masses.⁹⁰

c. Forms of action: Dr. Shariati considers "revolutionary self-construction" as a must for bringing about revolutionary changes in the society. He does not see, however,

"self-construction" and "social construction" as two stages one following the other. As he puts it, "in Islam, an individual engages in his self-construction at the heart of social construction."⁹¹

Shariati proposes a three point program for revolutionary self-construction:

(1) Worship (Ebadat): For Shariati "worship" does not mean performing certain rituals and formalities. He goes to the root of the Arabic word Ebadat and argues that "worship is an existential issue which basically means self-construction." Man's existence imposes on him various diverted and selfish tendencies through lust and distorted desires and habits. Those tendencies should be

'filtered, cleansed, and purified' under the direction of human consciousness and will power and through a harsh and strict regimen. [Man] must achieve Ikhlas (sincerity) which is his existential oneness in the path of faith, in the path of noble human values, in the path of totally submitting oneself to God, and in the path of the masses. [Sincerity which results from worship actually means] proving one's existence by negating one's self.⁹²

(2) Work: Shariati notes that Islam strongly emphasizes work and action which includes not only religious activity but also material and productive activity. In addition to its significance for socio-economic production, work is extremely important for self-construction. "Work is the manifestation of the objective realization of man's special will power, desires, and values. Man is born in work and made through work. Work transforms man's subjectivity into objective reality and in the meantime polishes and perfects his existential essence."⁹³

From a revolutionary perspective, work liberates man from the shackles of family and class. A free-thinker from the middle class

can liberate himself from "the evil of bourgeoisie which is accompanied with narrow-mindedness and baseness" only through work. Work will "broaden his social horizons and will bring about deep revolutionary changes in his character. It will polish and purify his human essence despite his living conditions and class framework."⁹⁴

(3) Social struggle: Shariati believes that man is not only a social animal but also a political animal. Actually, being political is man's distinguishing characteristic. This means that man has

a vision and tendency which binds him to the fate of the society in which he lives. This bond is a manifestation of man's will power, consciousness, and choice. It is only man who can sense his social position in the same way that he can sense his natural position. In other words, man is aware of his position in nature and in society and can interfere in it. He can approve it, rebel against it, or take action to change its structure. Therefore, a non-political man is a man who has left half-dormant the highest manifestation of his special capacity.⁹⁵

Social and political struggle is especially important for free-thinkers. A free-thinker cannot become a revolutionary by hiding behind his study desk and among piles of books or by engaging in abstract arguments. The only way he can "improve his thoughts and recover from the disease of verbiage" is through political struggle. "He can test himself and clearly assess his own competence, intelligence, speed of action, courage, degree of self-sacrifice, and even the level of his sincerity, purity, and piety." Moreover, political struggle will put the free-thinker in touch with his people's needs, wishes, desire, ideals, weaknesses, and strengths. It will destroy the "invisible and impenetrable wall" that usually exists between the free-thinker and the masses of the people.⁹⁶

In addition to self-construction, Shariati emphasizes the following forms of action for bringing about revolutionary changes in a society:

(1) Providing education and awareness: According to Shariati, a society does not move on account of the dialectic factor or historical determinism alone. Awareness must be present. Contradictions must enter into subjectivity in order to cause movements. A person must feel and recognize his enemy in order to take action against him. It is the duty of the free-thinker to provide education and awareness to the masses. In order for him to be able to do so, however, he should understand his society and his own ideas. He should know in what "century" his society lives. He should try to learn from those who have covered the same route already. He should know his "people's language," and should have a methodology. Shariati criticizes the Iranian Marxists and other "free-thinkers [who] are living in the 13th century; but their words, thoughts, and ideas are borrowed from the Western European intellectuals of the 19th and 20th centuries. And as such, they cannot find any listeners."⁹⁷

(2) Significance of ideology: According to Shariati, a free-thinker who wants to bring about revolutionary changes must adhere to an ideology. Shariati defines ideology as "a world view and a school of thought ... the goal of which is to guide, to give consciousness, to move, and to liberate the people. An ideology presents a particular way of life, an ideal form of human character, and certain ideals [for the whole] humankind or [for certain] nations."⁹⁸

Shariati considers Islam as a type of ideology. In his comparison of "today's progressive ideology" with Islam, Shariati finds "a common language" between the two. But he believes the Islamic ideology is superior because after a certain point in the comparison, "the human ideology is silent while the Islamic ideology still has more to say."⁹⁹

(3) Significance of party: On the basis of a verse of the Holy Quran (3:104), Shariati argues that "under any conditions, in any system, and in every society, Muslims must--as a collective duty--form 'an especial socially responsible group' from among themselves." It is true that according to Islam each and every Muslim is socially responsible. "This particular group, however, will consist of the Muslims who will not have social responsibility as one duty among many other duties of life. Rather, they will pursue it as the philosophy of their lives." That is, they will totally commit themselves to that task.¹⁰⁰

Shariati considers such an especial group as a "party." Like all other parties, he argues, the Islamic party has (1) an ideology, (2) a goal or mission, (3) slogans and mottoes, (4) a class basis, (5) a class orientation, (6) a political orientation, (7) a method for struggle, (8) some strategies, (9) some tactics, and (10) an organization.¹⁰¹

(4) Method for introducing social change: According to Shariati, "any school [of thought] which is not based upon the cultural foundations of a society looks like a good book in a library which is used only by a small group of students and professors. Even if

thousands of such books are printed, they will have no effect upon the masses."¹⁰² This does not mean, however, that the revolutionaries should conform themselves to the cultural norms of their societies. What it means is that they should not alienate the masses and should not isolate themselves from them. How can one bring about revolutionary changes without alienating the masses? Shariati believes through the method that Prophet Muhammad used: retaining the form of a social custom but transforming its content and meaning. "The Prophet preserves the form, the container of a custom which has deep roots in society [and to] which people have gotten used to from generation to generation. ... But he changes ... the content. [He changes] the spirit, direction and practical application of this custom in a revolutionary, decisive and immediate manner."¹⁰³ As an example of this method, Shariati mentions Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) which was practiced by Arabs for centuries. The Prophet retained the ritual form of Hajj but changed its meaning and significance in a revolutionary manner.¹⁰⁴

(5) Jihad and war of liberation: Dr. Shariati advises that, "In solving social problems we must not think of the shortest way, rather, we must think of the most correct way--... the most logical way that leads us to our objective."¹⁰⁵ For Shariati, "the most logical way" can include Jihad and war of liberation. He criticizes the Muslim apologists who argue that "Islam" means peace and peaceful coexistence and allows fighting only against a foreign invasion. "These people cannot distinguish an aggressive war from a war of liberation." There is certainly a difference between the

imperialistic wars which seek power and revolutionary wars which are waged for liberation of people from oppression and injustice.¹⁰⁶ Since Muslims' social responsibility is not confined to their own nation or territory, they may resort to war not only for liberating themselves but also to liberate other oppressed people.¹⁰⁷

It should be noted, however, that for Shariati Jihad does not mean only fighting. He defines Jihad as "a comprehensive, unremitting, sincere, and faithful striving or struggle to the the last breath--not with the hope of 'victory' but with the power of 'responsibility.' This Jihad could be with sword, with pen, with soul, or with wealth."¹⁰⁸

6. Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence. Shariati believes that thought and action are not two stages one following the other. Rather, there is dialectic relationship between the two. He quotes the verse of the Holy Quran which states, "And those who strive in Our (Cause)--We will certainly guide them to Our Path" (29:69). Shariati observes that this statement runs counter to our ordinary logic--which is Aristotelian formal logic. We think God should first show His Path to mankind; and after the individuals have learned the Path, they can strive in it. But God with His Logic first mentions action and effort and then promises guidance to the Path. What this underscores is the significance of action. "And this is the truth which the great committed free-thinkers have found out today."¹⁰⁹

On the basis of the Quranic verse mentioned above, Shariati argues,

To an individual, a group, a party, or a nation who sacrifices whatever he/it has in the Path and Direction of God ... and moves ahead ... [no matter how weak and stumbling at the beginning], and engages in Jihad ... God will continuously show His more delicate, more precise, much closer, and much clearer Path at the heart of 'action,' events, difficulties, and confrontations. ... With the power of 'steadfastness' and with the miracle of [God's] help, the person can make bridges out of the rocks thrown on his way. He can find [new] life, tranquility, and confidence with the divine power of 'trust.' ... With each step the person takes, his doubts will be removed further, his fear will diminish more, ... his love will grow stronger, his sincerity will become purer, his shackles will become looser, the Presence of God will become clearer, his confidence will become stronger, his faith will increase further, and his hope for victory will become more certain.¹¹⁰

Shariati considers religious determinism as a characteristic of the religion of Shirk. "Determinism means accepting the existing situation as it is and the future as it will happen." He blames Maaweya for the introduction of this to the Muslim world in order to prevent the Muslims from undertaking their responsibilities and from launching criticism against his un-Islamic regime.¹¹¹ The view of the Quran is categorically against determinism. It states very clearly that "a nation which does not change itself mentally and psychologically, a nation which does not make itself qualified for bounties and power, and a nation which does not struggle to earn what is good and to reject what is evil, God will never change its destiny ... as a reward for 'belief in Him.'"¹¹²

Philosophy of History: Shariati believes, "History is without doubt a reality, just like all other realities in the world. It began at a certain point, and must inevitably end at a certain point. It must have an aim and a direction."¹¹³ According to him, in the Islamic philosophy of history, history began with the struggle between Cain and Abel--both the sons of Adam. Abel

symbolically represents "the age of pastoralism, hunting and fishing--the spirit of brotherhood and true faith." Cain, on the other hand, represents "the age of agriculture and the establishment of the system of private ownership, together with religious trickery and transgression against the rights of others." The struggle between Cain and Abel means that "a permanent war began so that the whole history became the stage for a struggle between the party of Cain the killer, and Abel, his victim; or in other words, the ruler and the ruled."¹¹⁴ Since Cain killed Abel, it means that he has had the upper hand in history. Thus, Cain's religion--the religion of Shirk--has always been a reality in human history and has ruled all the societies--except for certain societies for a brief period of time (for example, the society of Madina at the time of Prophet Muhammad). Abel's religion--the religion of Tawhid--has always been the victim. However, "the desire to avenge the blood of Abel has been inherited by succeeding generations of his descendants--the subjected people who have fought for justice, freedom and true faith in a struggle that has continued, in one way or another, in every age."¹¹⁵

According to Shariati, the struggle between the parties of Cain and Abel and their respective religions still continues. He argues that when he talks about religion and relies on it for bringing about social change, he does not mean the dominant religion of Cain but its opposing religion of Abel. He considers it "the responsibility of humanity to replace the justifying, intoxicating, polytheistic religions with the religion of Tawhid as it was

pronounced by the Messengers of Tawhid. Thus, our reliance on religion is not a return to the past. It is a continuation of the path of history."¹¹⁶

Shariati believes God and human history are on the side of the religion of Tawhid and the descendants of Abel.

The end of time will come when Cain dies and the 'system of Abel' is established anew. That inevitable revolution will mean the end of the history of Cain; equality will be realized throughout the world, and human unity and brotherhood will be established through equity and justice. This is the inevitable direction of history. ... The glad tidings of God will be realized: 'We have willed that We should place under obligation those who have been weakened and oppressed on the earth, by making them leaders of men and heirs to the earth' (Quran, 28:5).¹¹⁷

7. Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience. According to Shariati, "each revolution has two faces: the blood and the message." The mission for the blood is carried out by the martyr who sacrifices his life in the path of achieving his goal. "The second mission is the mission of the message. It is the mission of taking the message of martyrdom to the people of the world. It is the mission of being the speaking tongue of the boiling bloods and cold bodies among the moving corpora. ... Those who have the boldness to choose their own death have made a great choice. But the task of those who remain alive is much heavier and more difficult."¹¹⁸ Thus, each revolutionary must be ready for self-sacrifice and must have great revolutionary patience.

Shariati argues that Islam--and belief in God in general--is a more appropriate logical foundation for sacrificing oneself in the path of people's liberation than non-religious ideologies.

A 'worshiper of God' who sees the universe as possessing feelings, consciousness, accountability, and logic --and who considers himself as an eternal 'act' which will not be lost--will understand death in the path of his responsibility and for the life of the masses so naturally and so easily that he will not even feel like a hero in choosing it. With the power that he obtains from [belief in] 'God' and 'Maad' (Hereafter), he will consider confrontation with death less significant than even requiring any [especial] courage.¹¹⁹

Thus, according to Shariati, the religious ideology is "realist" and "logical" in regard to moral values and self-sacrifice. Materialist ideologies, however, are "idealist" in this regard "because in answering the question 'why should I sacrifice myself for the people?' they must rely on [questioner's] 'heroic sentiments'."¹²⁰

Shariati considers martyrdom as "one of the greatest and most rejuvenating assets in the history of Shiism." It is rejuvenating because a martyr injects his blood into the dead body of a society "in which people have lost faith in themselves, ... a society which has surrendered itself [to oppression and tyranny], a society which has forgotten the sense of responsibility, a society which has become dormant and stagnant." Thus, Shariati states, "The Martyr is the heart of history."¹²¹

Shariati also argues that "the martyr is the manifestation and symbol of life and dignity." He has an eternal life not only in the Presence of God but in the hearts of the people as well. In contrast to this, "those who submit to every kink of humiliation in order to stay alive are the mute and evil corpora of history." As an example, Shariati mentions Imam Husain and his companions--who accepted martyrdom in opposition to oppression and corruption--and their enemy--who committed the shameful crime of murdering them.¹²²

Two other ways by which Shariati underscores the significance of self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience were discussed above:

(1) He considers forbearance and steadfastness as part of the existential philosophy of the Ummat.¹²³

(2) He argues that man can come out of the prison of self only through love, the highest manifestation of which is self-sacrifice.¹²⁴

8. Simplification. Even a cursory study of Shariati's works demonstrates that his success and popularity was probably not only due to what he said, but also to how he said it. Shariati is a master in the use of symbolism. He also frequently refers to the stories of prophets and Imams and their opponents. Moreover, his lectures and writings have an especial literary style which includes the use of satire. He is also exceptionally successful in putting his ideas in concise statements which can be used as mottoes and slogans.

a. Symbolism: The reason why Shariati was able to continue lecturing while surrounded by numerous dreadful SAVAK agents was that he never spoke directly against the Shah's repressive and dictatorial regime. Rather, he condemned it through the use of symbols. Two examples from the works covered in this study might suffice.

(1) Dr. Shariati delivered the speech which has been translated as "Reflection of a Concerned Muslim: On the plight of the oppressed people" in 1971. As noted earlier, this was the time when the Shah

was preparing to celebrate the 2500 years of the monarchy system in Iran. The site he had selected for the celebration ceremonies was Takht-e Jamshaid. It was the site of a historical building which was the symbol of Iran's "great civilization"--the Shah's favorite phrase used as the title of one of his books. In his lecture, Shariati condemns "civilization" and views it as a "curse." Addressing "his brother"--the slave who was killed while building the Egyptian Pyramids--he says, "you were sacrificed for the graves while we were sacrificed for the palaces! ... From Palestine to Iran, from Egypt to China and throughout all parts of the earth where there was civilization, we had to carry the loads of stones to construct temples, palaces, and graves."¹²⁵

(2) Shariati delivered his speech on "Martyrdom" in 1973 "just at the time when the Shah's tyrant regime had massacred the Iranian revolutionaries. [It was the time when] the mountains, the deserts, the streets, the mosques, the shops, the factories ... everywhere had been colored with the blood of the martyrs. The greatness of Ali [Shariati's] 'Martyrdom' is not only in its lively content which makes it exiting, but also in its timing."¹²⁶ He gave the speech in commemoration of Imam Husain's martyrdom in Karbala. It is clear, however, that he is also commemorating the Iranian martyrs of the Shah's tyranny. He says, for example, "Now the martyrs have died, and we corpora are alive. The martyrs spoke their words, and we deaf people are their addressees. Those who had the courage to choose death when they could not live [with dignity] have gone, and we shameless people are still here."¹²⁷ He also says, "today it is

difficult for me to speak." The reason is that he has lost his students. As he mentioned in another occasion, "It is surprising! There were such great personalities in my classrooms [and I did not know]. I am ashamed of myself."¹²⁸

b. Stories: Dr. Shariati frequently refers to great historical personalities and their opponents in order to make his audience and readers understand his arguments better. The great personalities are introduced as models to be followed and their enemies are the symbols of evil which should be destroyed.

Among the great personalities, Shariati emphasizes the following:

(1) Prophet Muhammad as the model of commitment, dynamism, and struggle for truth and against falsehood.¹²⁹ The Madina Islamic society under the leadership of the Prophet is the symbol of the ideal society.¹³⁰

(2) Imam Ali as a model of dynamism, leadership, hard word, and commitment to "School of Thought, Unity, and Justice."¹³¹

(3) Imam Husain as a model of self-sacrifice and struggle against oppression, tyranny, and corruption.¹³²

(4) Zainab--Husain's sister--as a model of resistance against repression.¹³³

(5) Abudhar--Prophet's great companion--as a model of struggle against luxury and exploitation and for truth and justice.¹³⁴

(6) Moses as a model of struggle for liberation.¹³⁵

Among the enemies of the great personalities, Shariati refers to the following:

(1) Pharaoh as the symbol of oppressive political authority.¹³⁶

(2) Croesus as the symbol of excessive and illegitimate wealth.¹³⁷

(3) Balaam Ba-Ura--a clergy who justified Pharaoh's oppressive regime--as a symbol of the leadership of the religion of Shirk.¹³⁸

(4) Kaab Al-Ahbar--whom Shariati describes as a Jewish religious scholar who accepted Islam in order to distort its Message and with whom Abudhar had an argument--as a symbol of the clergy of the religion of Shirk which wants to cover itself under the guise of the religion of Tawhid.¹³⁹

c. Satire: Shariati is a great orator, a skillful writer, a poet, and a master in satire. Discussing all his literary skills is certainly beyond the scopes of this study. Suffice it to note that one way he makes his message attractive and effective is through satire. The following example can demonstrate how he uses satire to deliver his message. We should bear in mind, however, that his words lose much of their beauty in translation.

Shariati criticizes those who disregard the social responsibility to struggle against oppression and injustice and believe that they can achieve salvation by shedding some tears in the memory of the martyrs of Karbala, or by repeating some particular prayers, or by giving some charity.

Probably there are such 'individualistic ways,' 'short cuts,' and 'easy solutions' to reach salvation without suffering the headache and pain of commitment and responsibility towards the people. Probably a person can become innocent and pure as he was born by spending some sums of money at the end of his life. Probably he can nullify God's scale of justice by repeating some words and rituals and receive the reward of not one, not ten, but seventy martyrs ... even without leaving his store or bed. But such ways were not discovered [at the beginning of Islam]. Apparently the Imams, the companions of the Prophet, and the great Mujahideen (Holy Warriors) did not know about these ways.

Otherwise they would not have accepted death with the hope of receiving the rewards of only one martyr. In that case Imam Husain would not have taken his children and all his loved ones to the scene of sacrifice. In that case, instead of going to [Karbala to be martyred], he would have gone to seclusion. He would have opened a prayer book with sincerity of heart and would have seen that in the margin of each page there are phrases the repetition of which will hold back the fire of hell and each word of which is a free key to the doors of paradise for any undeserving person who experiences "the mood."

On those days the affairs of the religion were as difficult as the affairs of the worldly life. ... [It is today that everything has become automatic.] Thus, you lie down on the sofa, get into 'the mood,' repeat some phrases--and suddenly, without knowing what happened and why, you are thrown from your sofa to the 'highest level of paradise!' Thus, from among a group of usurious, unscrupulous, parasitic, and carefree colleagues and from the swamps of a dirty life which has come about at the cost of ignorance, escapes, treacheries, lies, participation in oppression and exploitation, silence vis-a-vis tragedies and appeals for justice, and disregarding all responsibilities--without any hard work and suffering--suddenly you find yourself among the family of the Prophet. You find yourself together with Ali, Fatima, and Husain seventy steps ahead of the first row of the most glorious martyrs of the world!

Oh God! What an amazing trick!¹⁴⁰

d. Slogans: Many of the slogans used during the huge demonstrations of 1978-79 came from the lectures and books of Dr. Shariati. Shariati had borrowed some of those maxims from the Holy Quran or the sayings of great Muslim personalities. Some other maxims were his own formulation. The following is a sample of the slogans found in the works included in this study:

(1) "Book, Balance, Iron" (symbols for ideology, justice, and political power--derived from a verse of the Quran [57:25]).¹⁴¹

(2) "Life is nothing but faith [commitment] and struggle" (attributed to Imam Husain).¹⁴²

(3) "Neither East nor West" (a characteristic of the Islamic Ummat).¹⁴³

(4) "Martyr is the heart of history."¹⁴⁴

(5) "Only those who can have a good [meaningful, with dignity] death, can have a good life."¹⁴⁵

(6) "Every scene is the scene of Karbala, every month is the month of Muharam, every day is the day of Ashura" (referring to the place, month, and day of Imam Husain's martyrdom).¹⁴⁶

9. Claim to Truth and Rationality. Dr. Ali Shariati bases many of his arguments on the Holy Quran and on the traditions of the Prophet, his companions, and the Imams. He also refers to history, "scientific survey and research," factual observation, views of "today's committed free-thinkers," and Third World and Western scholars to support his points of view. Moreover, he sometimes mentions his own background and actions as evidence of his qualification and sincerity. He also resorts to logical reasoning to establish his point.

a. The Holy Quran: Most of Shariati's arguments in his lecture on "Shiism: a complete party" are based on the Holy Quran.¹⁴⁷ In the course of his discussions, however, Shariati seems to try to accomplish two tasks: (1) to demonstrate the validity of his ideas to those who believe in the authority of the Quran, and (2) to demonstrate the Holy Quran's validity and relevance to the present social reality to those who are not firm believers. Examples of the first point can be found throughout the above discussions. The following quotation can serve as an example of the second point.

How wonderfully this Quran speaks! And what [wonderful lessons] it teaches! Oh, only if they [the enemies of Islam] had not taken this book away from us! It is a divine book, the words of revelation [coming] from the tongue of a prophet who was an absolute divine personality and in the meantime an Ummi (illiterate, one of the masses). [How amazing that] in its review of social issues and in its analysis of history and human dialectics it uses such a scientific point of view--such an absolute rational perspective--and such a purely logical analysis! It relies so much on objective and practical facts, material factors, and natural causes! It is so much 'realist!'¹⁴⁸

Shariati refers to the Holy Quran in his other lectures and writings as well--though not to the same extent in all of them.¹⁴⁹ In those works also he follows the same lines of discussion as noted above.

b. Traditions and saying of the Prophet, his companions, and the Imams: On the basis of "the method of typology," Dr. Shariati develops a method for a comparative study of different religions. His method "consists of identification of five distinguishing aspects or characteristics of every religion, and then comparing them with the corresponding features in other religions." The five distinguishing characteristics include: (1) the god or gods of each religion, (2) its prophet, (3) its book or scripture, (4) the circumstances of its appearance, and (5) "those choice individuals each religion nurtures and produces--the representative figures it has trained and then presented to society and history."¹⁵⁰

On the basis of the above method, in some of his works Shariati compares the Prophet of Islam to other prophets in order to demonstrate how his life and tradition are the most relevant to the social reality of the Iranian society and today's world in general.¹⁵¹ In some other works, however, he refers to Prophet

Muhammad without comparing him to other prophets. In such occasions he tries not only to demonstrate the superiority of the Prophet's thoughts and deeds, but also to support his own arguments.¹⁵²

More often than the Prophet, however, Shariati refers to the traditions of Imam Ali, Abudhar Ghaffari, and Imam Husain. To him, these three are the most "representative figures" that Islam has trained, nurtured, and presented to history. He chooses Imam Husain because he grew up in the household of the Prophet and sacrificed his life in defense of the Islamic values and principles. He chooses Imam Ali and Abudhar because "no other cultural, environmental, and religious elements took part in making up their great characters except for Islam. Whatever they had, they had gotten from Islam. Abudhar was a bedouin coming from the desert. Ali accepted Islam at the age of eight or ten and grew up in the Prophet's own household."¹⁵³ Shariati refers to the traditions of these Islamic personalities in order to support his points of view and also to demonstrate the greatness of the Islamic teachings.¹⁵⁴

c. History: Shariati is a student of history and presents historical evidence to support his arguments.¹⁵⁵ In many cases, however, his historical statements remain at a very general level. He states, for example, "In the history of all societies and social reforms, we see that the national leaders who were able to easily fight back a foreign enemy ... --and defeat it despite all its power and grandeur--were helpless when they faced those who created problems for the nation and society from within [the system]."¹⁵⁶ Except for his earlier remarks about Imam Ali--in support of which

he makes the above statement--he does not mention any specific examples of this "historic fact."

d. Scientific research: Dr. Shariati seems to have high regard for scientific research. In many occasions he tries to establish his claim to truth by reference to his scientific inquiries. He notes, for example, "After studying all schools of thought, all ideologies, all societies, all revolutions, all movements--after reviewing history, sociology, and the sociology of Islam--and after investigating the factors of cultural degeneration and social and intellectual deviations ... I have come to the final conclusion that 'Shiism is a complete party.'"¹⁵⁷

It should be noted, however, that for Shariati being "scientific" does not mean value neutrality. He spends many pages arguing why he cannot follow the style of other great researchers and scholars who engage in a cool, calm, logical, and scientific study of issues without hurting other people's feelings with their harsh tone and sharp tongue. The main point of his argument is that social commitment and responsibility are more important than "scientific objectivity."¹⁵⁸

e. Factual observation: Shariati occasionally refers to the facts of life as they are generally understood in order to support his arguments. On the basis of the Quran, for example, he argues that "if those who do not believe in God have the capacity of survival and gaining power and mastery in earth, God will grant them what they are qualified for. But if you who believe in God submit yourselves to weakness, humiliation, and degeneration; God will not

grant you what you are not qualified for." In support of this argument, Shariati mentions the "horrible and bitter fact" that Muslims live in misery, hunger, disease, and ignorance; while "the atheists and polytheists" enjoy the material and spiritual bounties that God has created for mankind.¹⁵⁹

f. Views of "committed free-thinkers": On many occasions Shariati finds the Islamic teachings--which are also his own views--in accordance with or superior to what he calls "the views of today's committed free-thinkers." Thus, it seems, Shariati wants to establish his claim to truth against those with leftist tendencies--those who considered themselves as intellectuals and disciples of European social thinkers.¹⁶⁰

g. Criticism of rival ideologies: Shariati strongly criticizes Marxism in general and the Iranian Marxists and leftists in particular.¹⁶¹ He also criticizes other Western ideologies. For example, in one of his works covered in this study, he briefly describes the position of "materialism," "naturalism," "existentialism," "historicism," "sociologism," and "biologism" on a certain issue and then criticizes them for having an inadequate understanding of that issue.¹⁶² Moreover, as noted earlier, Shariati compares Islam to "ideology in its highest, most progressive, and most perfect understanding--not as it is, but in the form that today's conscious, committed, humanist, and progressive free-thinkers design in their minds." Although he finds many similarities between the two, he reasons that Islam is much more complete and realistic.¹⁶³

h. Writings of the Third World and Western scholars: A Western-oriented youth like the Iranian youth among Shariati's audience will be greatly impressed with the names of famous Western scholars and thinkers and the Third World thinkers well-known in the West. This is probably the reason why Dr. Shariati frequently refers to the writings of such scholars and thinkers. In the works covered in this study, we find references to the following names: (1) Rene Descartes, (2) Andre Gide, (3) Albert Camus, (4) Jean Paul Sartre, (5) Heidegger, (6) Karl Jaspers, (7) Jean Isolet, (8) Parteux, (9) Radha Krishnan, (10) Durkheim, (11) Chanler, (12) Montgomery Watt, (13) Hyden, (14) Alexis Carrel, (15) Grishman, (16) Gorovich, and (17) Dostoyevsky.¹⁶⁴

i. Personal life: Shariati refers to some facts from his life as evidence of his qualification to speak about the subjects he lectures upon and as evidence of his sincerity. He notes, for example, his rural background and his close ties with the ordinary people. "The things which the free-thinkers, writers, scholars, and ideologues think about and understand [theoretically], I have 'experienced' at the depths of the conscience of my society. ..."¹⁶⁵ He also notes his religious education and his deep understanding of his culture and society. "I have first hand knowledge of what goes on in our society and in our time. I have been present at the confrontation of today's culture with yesterday's religion. I am aware of the existing traditional religion and its fate after the invasion of cultural imperialism as well as of social transformation and domination of materialistic

perspective and bourgeois spirit."¹⁶⁶ Moreover, he frequently refers to his Western education¹⁶⁷ as well as his love for "the Prophet's household, Fatima's home, Ali's school of thought, and Shi'i martyrs' school of thought."¹⁶⁸

Shariati reminds his audience that by emphasizing the significance of religion in solving Iran's social problems he does not expect--nor does he receive--any material or psychological reward or benefit. He notes that because of doing so he is rejected by the traditional religious class as a distorter of religion and by the modern free-thinkers as a reactionary and betrayer of the younger generation. Shariati disassociates himself from the former. "I do not have any class or social relations with those who make a living in the name of religion--those who have power, influence, and official [position]. I care less whether they are opposed to me or not. I do not have anything they can take away from me. Nor do I expect anything that I could obtain because of their favor."¹⁶⁹ He identifies himself, however, with the free-thinkers and is concerned with their accusation. His response to their accusation is that they are mistaken in their opposition to religion. What they justifiably oppose is the religion of Shirk. But they commit a mistake in not distinguishing that religion from the religion of Tawhid.¹⁷⁰

j. Rational reasoning: Dr. Shariati's lectures and writings have a very strong emotional appeal.¹⁷¹ As the above discussions demonstrate, however, he does not disregard rational reasoning. Shariati presents strong arguments and uses different means to establish his claim to truth. Occasionally he resorts to logical

reasoning as well. Shariati argues, for example, that Islam is basically an "ideology"--not a "science," or a "philosophy." To support his argument, he first mentions the differences between ideology on the one hand and science and philosophy on the other. For a person knowledgeable about Islam, this comparison itself is sufficient to establish Shariati's point. Shariati, however, goes one step further. He compares the "basic idioms" in Islam and in "today's human ideology in its most advanced and most perfect understanding." Thus, he demonstrates how "the two have a common language and [how] their idioms are the same--some in their meaning and some even literally."¹⁷² Shariati also uses logical reasoning to demonstrate that Islam--which is a 'populace' ideology with a divine root--is superior to human ideologies.¹⁷³

Another example of Shariati's logical reasoning can be noted when he criticizes the free-thinkers who condemn religion as a whole without distinguishing between the religion of Tawhid and the religion of Shirk. In addition to different characteristics of the two religions, he mentions the difference between the prophets of the religion of Tawhid and the leaders of the religion of Shirk. The former "were familiar with human suffering and poverty, ... struggled and fought against the religion of Shirk, ... and are the choicest of God and the real choicests of human history." The latter, on the other hand, were wealthy and prosperous and "belonged to the dominant feudal and upper class." Therefore, Shariati argues, "it is wrong and unfair to generalize our judgment about the [second group]--a judgment which is correct and justified--to the [first

group] as well."¹⁷⁴ Shariati also mentions the example of Abudhar who considers all the members of a society responsible for the hunger of a needy person and is amazed if such a person does not launch an armed struggle against them. This is what he has learned from Islam. Thus, he argues,

Is it not unfair, absolute ignorance, ridiculous, and in the meantime tragic to pass the same judgment about a religion which has such a perspective about people and their life as we do about the religion which has approved and justified hunger throughout history?¹⁷⁵

Chapter IX

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF ABUL-HASAN BANI-SADR

Bani-Sadr began his anti-Shah activities as a member of the National Front while he was a Tehran University student in the mid-1950s. In the early 1960s he went to France to pursue higher education. He continued his opposition to the Shah's regime there and became a leading member of the anti-Shah Islamic movement in Europe. He remained in France until his return to Iran with Imam Khomeini in January 1979.

During his stay in France, Bani-Sadr gave speeches and wrote articles for Iranian students' journals. He also wrote several books--most of which were published in mid to the late 1970s. In his writings, Bani-Sadr analyzes the nature of the regime in Iran and its problems and talks about Islamic views on economy, society, and politics. Bani-Sadr's following works were selected for the present study:

(1) "The Cult of Personality," a book written in 1975.¹

(2) "Manifesto of the Islamic Republic," a book consisting of two parts: the first part written in 1971-72 and the second part written in 1978-79.²

(3) "Relationship between Materialism and Idealism," a speech to the members of the Union of Muslim Students' Associations in Europe in October 1977.³

1. Political Consciousness. Bani-Sadr argues that man is not a helpless toy in the hands of fate. He is active and affects his destiny by the way that he deals with his social reality. Thus, he is the maker of his own destiny. "Man has the potentiality either to grow in his various dimensions towards infinity or to become a prisoner of the absolutes [that he creates for himself]. In the latter case, he becomes a 'thing,' and like all other 'things' he will not remain the same; rather, he will rot and make his surrounding rotten."⁴ In order for man to avoid becoming a "thing" and to be able to grow towards infinity, Bani-Sadr argues, he should crush the cult of personality, should establish his relations with others on the basis of relationship with God, and should struggle for freedom and against censorship.

a. The Cult of Personality: According to Bani-Sadr, the "cult of personality" means that a personality claims godhood and receives adoration. This cult, however, is not limited to the countries which are ruled by dictatorships. "In reality, the cult of personality has a more complex identity and its spread is total and complete. ... A combination of material and ideal--or subjective and objective--parts and elements is necessary in order for the personality which represents power to become godlike."⁵ The division of human society into different groups, classes, and nations and the establishment of power relationship among them provides the kind of environment that is necessary for the emergence and growth of the cult of personality. Power relationships lead to unequal relationships and to further concentration and accumulation of power.

Power--be it social, political, economic, or cultural--will grow increasingly larger like an avalanche coming down a mountainside as soon as it starts the process of concentration and accumulation. ... The power will need increasingly more resources and talents because it faces pressure from two sides: one resulting from its own contradictions, and the other resulting from the resistance of the society. Thus, in the process of its concentration and accumulation, power will grow so big that it will seem absolute, unlimited, and uncurbable. From this point on, everyone will be worshiped according to his rank and position in the social ladder. Social status and distinction will become the first and primary value. The most distinguished social position will become the god of gods as a representative of power.⁶

Bani-Sadr talks in detail about the factors that contribute to the cult of personality, about the continuity of the cult in history, about its various manifestations, about its generality among all the people, about the "ideal types" of personality worshipers and self-worshipers, about the symptoms of being affected by the disease of the cult of personality, and about the methods used by its adherers. According to Bani-Sadr, the cult of personality has existed throughout human history and in all human societies. The domination of the cult has not gone unchallenged, however. From time to time, the underdog chooses fighting and survival over getting rotten and dying and uses force against the dominant power. Moreover, the religion of Tawhid (Unity, monotheism) has been struggling against the cult of personality throughout history. The reason why the challenges have not resulted in the destruction of the cult is that so long as the relationship of domination exists, the components of power will evolve anew and will perpetuate the cult of personality in a new form.⁷

Bani-Sadr believes that it is the duty of every committed human being--be it a Muslim or not--to relentlessly struggle against the

cult of personality.⁸ He argues, however, that a person can work for the destruction of the cult of personality only by adherence to the "fundamental values of Islam." He notes five such values which are: (1) Tawhid, (2) Bathat, (3) Imamat, (4) Adalat, and (5) Maad. These are the same as the five tenets of Shiism. Bani-Sadr's understanding of these terms, however, is different from the traditional Shi'i understanding.

(1) Tawhid (Unity, Oneness, monotheism): Traditionally, Tawhid refers to the Oneness of God--though it certainly has social implications. Bani-Sadr emphasizes the social aspect of Tawhid: empathy with another person and achieving a more comprehensive and more complete identity between self and the other through brotherhood, fraternity, and constructing each other. Bani-Sadr notes that Islam recommends this value instead of the alternative value of seeking supremacy over someone else by trying to destroy him.⁹

(2) Bathat (consigning, commission, delegation): Traditionally, Bathat refers to God's sending Messengers for man's guidance. According to Bani-Sadr, however, it means "a perpetual movement in which man develops his talents and potentials together with the collectivity so that they free themselves from the worship and servitude of false authorities. Thus, their forces and creative power will be directed towards infinity."¹⁰

(3) Imamat (leadership): Traditionally, Imamat refers to the leadership of Imam Ali and his eleven descendants. For Bani-Sadr, Imamat means

organizing the Bathat of a collectivity in order to achieve Tawhid. Imamat is that kind of leadership which causes the self-sacrifice of the collectivity (self and others) in the direction of achieving a common identity. In Imamat there is no place for a despotic leader and apathetic/inactive masses. ... In Imamat everyone by himself will be a representative of the power of the collectivity, the will of the collectivity, the knowledge of the collectivity, and the identity of the collectivity.¹¹

(4) Adalat (Justice): Traditionally, Adalat refers to the justice of God and the justice of Imams. For Bani-Sadr, Adalat refers to man's "activity and relativity" in society. "The members of a collectivity are just when they are [equally] active compared to each other and when they consider--and make--themselves relative not in relation to each other but in relation to their common goal which is the achievement of one identity." Thus, Bani-Sadr argues, Islamic justice is dynamic. It means that the members of a society organize their efforts and activities in such a way that they do not result in domination of some over others or in the advancement of some and backwardness of others. Rather, the more talented members of the society elevate the less talented ones so that in their Islamic identity all are in balance with each other.¹²

(5) Maad (the life to come, the future life): Traditionally, Maad refers to life after death. For Bani-Sadr, Maad is the model of a future which Islam values and proposes as a guideline for today's action. "Man's today's efforts should increase the present and future possibilities--this is the real meaning of growth. [By such growth] man will reach an age in which there will be no superiority, no competition in having more than others, and no attempt for earthly elation. ... The individual will work for the collectivity

and the collectivity will work for the individual so that man blossoms in various dimensions of his humanity."¹³

b. Relations with others based on relationship with God:

According to Bani-Sadr, all human relations with the person himself, with his fellow human beings, with nature and universe, and with God can be established on three bases: (1) positive or existent balance, (2) negative or nonexistent balance, and (3) a mixture of the two.¹⁴ A relationship is based on positive balance when individuals or groups look upon others as "variables" of their own needs and wants. Such a relationship is a power relationship. Establishing an equilibrium in such a relationship is extremely difficult. Thus, it will usually result in inequality. Even if equilibrium is established, however, it will be a destructive equality. Each side will continuously try to employ all the talents, resources, and capacities it can amass in order to counteract the forces on the other side. Thus, the point of equality in a relationship based on existent balance is in fact the point of death--i.e., the destruction of human and natural talents and resources.¹⁵

A relationship is based on negative or nonexistent balance when man's relationship with God becomes the primary and principal relationship and his relations with himself, with other people, and with nature are secondary and reflections of the relationship with God. In other words, the relationship with God--not self-interest--becomes the criterion for action and establishment of relations with others. In this case, talents and resources will not

be wasted in confrontation with others. Rather, all the talents and resources of a society will be used in movement towards the same direction, i.e., God. This will mean a dynamic and perpetual movement towards perfection and infinity.¹⁶

Transforming material signs into ideals: In his lecture on the "Relationship between Materialism and Idealism," Bani-Sadr presents another line of argument to support his view that the relationship with God should be the basis of all human relations. Bani-Sadr argues that the mind's basic function is to transform various outside objective phenomena into signs and record them. Then it relates those signs to each other and transforms them either into material phenomena or into ideals. If the signs are transformed into material phenomena--as it is mostly done today--the world's limited resources will not suffice all the demand. That will lead to competition, division, anger, violence, inequality, and domination.¹⁷ When the mind transforms the material signs into ideals, however, "the degree of your greatness will be the measure of your leadership and the degree of your Taqwa (piety/God-consciousness). ... In that case, once the mind produces sufficient material products to meet man's basic needs, its function will be focused on creating new talents for elevating itself and others." Thus, equality in material things will be possible. Moreover, since the non-material values such as piety, sacrifice, knowledge, friendship "and whatever that is a representation of human perfection" are immeasurable, no one will block other people's way for achieving them.¹⁸

Thus, according to Bani-Sadr, there is no contradiction between materialism and idealism, and it is wrong to adhere only to one at the expense of the other. "Each of these by itself will be like opium; that is, it will transform human mind into a destructive apparatus." An alternative to pure materialism and pure idealism is the method that Islam proposes. It is not an amalgamate of the two. Rather, Islam brings about a fundamental change in ideation. "The function of the Islamic scientific ideation is to transform material issues to a limitless idealism by placing man's relationship with God at the basis [of all human relations]."¹⁹

c. Struggle Against Censorship: For Bani-Sadr freedom of thought and action is the most important value. He encourages his readers and audience to fight against any kind of censorship that limits freedom. In some of his works, he talks in detail about different types of censorship. From his discussions, it is clear that for him censorship is not limited to a ban by a government on freedom of expression or political activity. Rather, he regards as censorship any action that directly or indirectly discourages freedom of thought and action or creates the habit of blindly following others.²⁰

According to Bani-Sadr, Islamic Jihad in all its "three forms" are directed against censorship. The "armed Jihad" becomes a duty when there is a censorship and the existing authorities create obstacles for propagation of the Divine Message. The "Superior Jihad" (which is "uttering the truth before a tyrant ruler" according to a Saying of Prophet Muhammad) becomes a duty when a

tyrant ruler demands from the people to transform idealism into materialism and to "worship" him. The "Greater Jihad" (which is "fighting against one's own lower self" according to Prophet's Saying) becomes a duty "when your mind changes into a relentless censoring police which incites you to engage in destructive activities against yourself and others." Thus, Bani-Sadr exhorts his audience, "Struggle against censorship with all your might and means! We do not have any other way to freedom except through such a struggle. [Otherwise,] mankind will continue to remain in slavery."²¹

2. Criticism of Social Arrangement. Bani-Sadr is well aware of the significance of delegitimization as a precondition for toppling down the Shah's regime. In some of his works, he compares the political, economic, social, and cultural goals and activities of the "political power" with those of "religion" and demonstrates how the Shah's regime violates religious principles.²² In his speech to students who had undertaken a hunger strike to protest against the Shah's tyranny, he notes, "the task of our people in their struggle for liberation will become easier only when we are able to destroy the regime's legitimacy. [We should] demonstrate that the regime can base its legitimacy neither on religion, nor on some [noble] purpose, nor on the support of the people. It rules only by force, by oil revenues, and by [the help of] foreign military forces."²³

Living abroad, Bani-Sadr is at liberty to explicitly criticize the Shah's regime. In some of his works, he presents detailed analysis and criticism of Iran's political, military, economic, social, and cultural conditions under the Shah. He also criticizes capitalism and its negative effects on Iran. Moreover, his analysis of the cult of personality is an indictment of the Shah's regime as well as all other ruling regimes in the world.

a. Iran under the Shah: Bani-Sadr considers the Shah's regime as the worst oppressive tyranny "unprecedented in history." He rejects the Shah's claim that repression is necessary for the social and economic growth of the country. On the contrary, Bani-Sadr argues, the extreme repression is caused by "the incalculable growth of plundering of our country's natural resources and by the ruling group's unbearable dictatorship." He also repudiates the claim that the Shah's regime represents the "progressive" groups in the country and opposition to its rule is limited to "backward religious forces" and to the communists. According to Bani-Sadr, "all the people in all walks of life and with different points of view are opposed to this destructive regime which is an agent of American domination." Moreover, Bani-Sadr accuses the Shah's regime of inducing the youth to drugs, alcoholism, sexuality, etc. in order to divert their attention from the conditions of the country. "If only in Tehran, these 60,000 [heroin addicts] had come forward and had asked 'why should Iran's oil be given to foreigners [almost] free of charge and in return tons over tons of commodities which destroy the basis of domestic production be imported?'--How long could the regime stay in power?"²⁴

In his analysis of the socio-politico-economic conditions in Iran during the Shah's rule, Bani-Sadr emphasizes Iran's dependence on the West in general and on the U.S. in particular. He presents his analysis in such a way that it seems valid not only in the case of Iran but for other Third World countries as well. Bani-Sadr argues that the governments and multinational corporations of the world's powers and superpowers pursue the goal of domination and exploitation in the dominated countries. "Those goals cannot be realized without the imposition of a social system in which [some] groups are related to--and find common interests with--the dominant [country]. Thus, the existence of such groups depends upon their organic ties with the ruling groups in the dominant societies."²⁵ This leads to concentration of power into few hands and to deformation of the whole social structure of the dominated society. The government of such a society tries even to occupy the religious institutions and to "officialize" the religion. Under such circumstances, the only way the government can remain in power is through the use of the military. Thus, "in the process of merger into the dominant foreign power, the government and the military increasingly become identical. ... [This leads to] the transformation of law into a means for implementation of general repression and for prevention of any protest by the victimized people of the country."²⁶

In the economic sphere, because of the unequal relationship, the center of productive activity and decision making moves abroad. Production and consumption are based on the economic interests of

the dominant country. The national economic system is shattered into unrelated sectors which are merged into the mother sector of the dominant economy. The relations of the productive sectors are severed from Iran's own culture and natural resources. Thus, the economy is not related to people's basic needs. Neither is it dependent upon the resources, raw materials, and semi-manufactured goods available in the country. The government budget serves as the principal dynamic force--and money and inflation serve as the principal tools--for the transfer of wealth to the dominant countries. The unequal economic relations lead to rapid and gross multiplication of exports compared to imports. They also lead to a growing need for foreign loans and investment--which means plundering of the wealth of the country and shortening the life span of its natural resources. Moreover, the unequal relations lead to the destruction of economic possibilities in different fields--including agriculture--and to increasing reliance on a single commodity. All these result in intensification of social and economic inequalities within the dominated country as well as in further inequality between the dominated and the dominant countries.²⁷

In the social sphere, bureaucracy grows rapidly both within the government--because of reliance on oil revenues and foreign loans--and in the private sector--around the axis of export/import. The alienation of the dependent class leads to social disintegration. Moreover, the country is divided into different regions with no--or minimum--social relations among them. The

traditional tribal system is replaced by the "military tribe" with grave consequences. The youth is merged into bureaucracy and military and their creative talent is exported to the dominant countries. Moreover, the social disintegration causes unprecedented levels of crime and other social diseases.²⁸

In the cultural sphere, because of the relations of domination, out of the three main areas of human activity--i.e., (1) ingenuity and creativity, (2) organization and management, and (3) work and labor--the vast majority of the active human forces have the opportunity to engage only in the third type of activity. That is, they can work as laborers either in factories, fields, or offices. The educational system of the dominated country becomes westernized and trains talents for the West. The dominant countries become centers for accumulation of talents from all over the world as well as centers for export of culture. This export of values results in the moral and personal degeneration of the people of the dominated societies, causes confusion in their identities, and destroys their intellectual independence. In general, the dominant/dependent relationship transforms the man who is the maker of history into a man who is the object of history. To put it differently, it transforms the creative man into a destructive man.²⁹

b. Capitalism: Bani-Sadr considers capitalism responsible for the domination of Iran by the West. He argues that capitalism has brought about such an industrial economy that requires continuous chain production. If there is a halt in production, the system experiences crisis. Thus, it continuously needs more sources of raw

materials and more markets for its products. "Of course, there must be an army to take the energy from [Iran] and the iron from Africa and impose the consumption of their goods by force." In Iran, the Shah's regime serves the role of the capitalists' army.

The use of force, however, is not the only way to increase consumption. Capitalism employs all the means of mass communication such as radio, television, cinema, magazine, book, newspaper, church, and mosque in order to transform each "mental sign" into a measurable "material sign." Thus, it encourages an insatiable urge for consumption and transforms man into a "consuming animal." Capitalism is forced to do so by its very nature. If all the capital were used to satisfy the basic human needs, all those needs could be fulfilled in a certain period of time. After that the value of capital would have decreased and the capitalists would have not been able to pocket the huge profits they are used to.

Bani-Sadr also criticizes capitalism for increasing existing inequalities. The inequalities grow not only because the capitalists have to exploit labor in order to accumulate capital. They also grow because the capital must continuously grow larger in order to be able to survive.³⁰

c. The cult of personality: Bani-Sadr considers his analysis of the cult of personality applicable to today's world and argues that

In our time, more than ever, the personalities which claim godhood have dominated mankind's life by the force of bayonet and/or by the force of propaganda. ... The process of accumulation and concentration at a global scale afflicts those who are under domination with comprehensive and ever-increasing poverty. Thus, in such a general process, those who are dominated as well as the dominant party descend to the verge of deprivation from all dimensions of their humanity.³¹

In his discussion of the social, economic, political/military, and cultural factors that compose the cult of personality, Bani-Sadr does not name any particular contemporary person or country. It is clear, however, that he believes they apply to Iran under the Shah as well as to other countries in the world today.³² His analysis of the factors composing the cult of personality is similar to his analysis of the conditions in Iran which was summarized above. One additional point should be noted, however. In his discussion of the cultural factor, Bani-Sadr criticizes those who transform the religion of Tawhid (Unity, Oneness, monotheism) into the religion of Shirk (contradictions, polytheism):

The imposters [of religious leadership] transform the religion of freedom which leads man to his real nature and shows the way for his return from the darkness of Shirk towards the light of Tawhid--the religion which guides man to break the shackles of weakness, apathy, and worshipping absolutes--the religion which points the direction of growth ... into a religion of acquiescence and conformity with the false authority.³³

3. New Set of Values. The most important values for Bani-Sadr are the ones that can be categorized as "social values." He notes more such values than any other type, and most of the values that he emphasizes fall in this group. He also mentions a number of personal values--emphasizing some of them. He notes, however, only a few spiritual values.

a. Social values: The single most important value in the list of Bani-Sadr's values is freedom and liberty (mentioned at least 40 times). Bani-Sadr especially emphasizes freedom of thought and expression. Tawhid (unity, oneness) is the second most important value in the list

(mentioned at least 35 times). It is followed by Adalat (justice) (20 times), independence (16 times), equality (14 times), and Jihad/struggle (13 times). Bani-Sadr also emphasizes Bathat (social evolution), Imamat (leadership), and work/action (each mentioned at least eight times). The other values that he mentions are elimination of poverty (five times), social responsibility (four times); cooperation (twice); and charity, consultation, solidarity, and security (at least once each).³⁴

b. Personal values: Critical outlook (mentioned at least 15 times) is the leading value for Bani-Sadr among those values that can be categorized as personal. It is followed by creativity (seven times), love/friendship (six times), and ideation (six times). Next in the list are growth towards perfection (five times), sincerity (four times), knowledge (three times), and activeness (three times). Bani-Sadr also notes courage and firmness (at least once each).³⁵

c. Spiritual values: Bani-Sadr uses the term Tawhid in two senses: (1) human social unity (which was noted under social values), and (2) Oneness of God and man's directing himself towards him. Tawhid in the second sense is one of the spiritual values that Bani-Sadr mentions (at least five times). Self-sacrifice, Taqwa (piety/God-consciousness), belief in God, and seeking God's pleasure are other spiritual values noted by Bani-Sadr (at least five, four, two and one times respectively).³⁶

4. Outline of the Good Society. Bani-Sadr calls his ideal society the "society of Tawhid " and presents a rough picture of the social, political, and economic relations in that society. In order to move towards the society of Tawhid after the downfall of the Shah, Bani-Sadr envisions an interim government which he calls "the Islamic Republic." He talks about the goal and function of such a government and presents a platform for its social, political, economic and cultural policies.

a. The society of Tawhid: As noted earlier, Bani-Sadr takes the description of the Hereafter in the Holy Quran as a model for his ideal society. The Holy Quran emphasizes elimination of oppression and establishment of justice in the Hereafter. Bani-Sadr also emphasizes these principles. He goes one step further, however, when he interprets them to mean "elimination of all power relations and elimination of government as the means of regulating power relations."³⁷ Thus, Bani-Sadr seems to advocate an anarchistic society in which "there will be no concentration of economic, political, or intellectual power, no class, and no dominant ideology."³⁸ In such a society, everyone will be an Imam (leader).

There will be no base and vertex in the society. There will be no central leadership to absorb all the forces and powers of the society and employ them in its own interest. ... All [members of the society] will be Imams of each other, responsible for each other, and concerned with each other. [In such a society] there will be no place for competition, multiplication of identity, and creation of distinctions.³⁹

The elimination of force as the basis of social relations will be accompanied with man's becoming "active and relative" not only in comparison to others but also in comparison to himself. This means that there will be no socio-political "absolutes." Each and every

member of the society will be active to develop himself and to actualize his potentials. "Activity and relativity" compared to oneself means that the person will continuously grow and move towards perfection and infinity. As Imam Ali said, according to Bani-Sadr, "Woe to the person whose today is not different from his yesterday." Bani-Sadr considers this "activity and relativity" as the real meaning of "Islamic justice" and argues that it can be established only when "relationship to God" becomes the basis of establishing relations with others.⁴⁰

In regard to economic relations, absolute ownership belongs to God alone. Human ownership is only relative. Both individual and community can own.

[O]wnership by the community as the primary viceregency of God always takes precedence to that of the individual. [Moreover,] the viceregency by the community is retained for all affairs in which community ownership is the condition for the individual's ownership of his/her own labor and its fruits. ... The community can determine the extent of an individual's ownership but is not allowed to prohibit an individual from working or owning the fruits of that work.⁴¹

Bani-Sadr emphasizes that in the "economy of Tawhid," accumulation and concentration of wealth and power will not--and cannot--take place.⁴²

b. The Islamic Republic: In Bani-Sadr's ideal society of Tawhid, all humanity is one unit having one common identity. Bani-Sadr realizes that mankind has a long way to go to realize such an ideal state. Thus, he proposes an outline of the interim "Islamic Republic" which will replace the Shah's regime in Iran. "The Islamic government will not be an absolute government. [Rather,] its goal will be to eliminate the state as a dominant power and absolute

ruler on country's destiny." In order to achieve that goal, the government will try to prepare the grounds for "its replacement with the forces which will represent the next stage of society's transformation towards the society of Tawhid."⁴³ The Islamic government will be responsible to eliminate all factors which cause degeneration. It will also be responsible to elevate human personality by providing awareness and consciousness to the members of the society and by expanding the possibilities of action for mind and body.⁴⁴

In the Islamic Republic, the "dividing line" between citizens and government will be eliminated. Public gatherings such as mosques and Madrasas (traditional religious schools) will be restored as the dynamic and "living centers for evaluation, criticism, and decision making." People will actively participate in their own liberation so that "a new man" is brought up--"a man who has found his true nature and has returned to his real self." This requires that the principle of Ijtehad (independent reasoning on Divine Law) is generalized at the societal level. It also requires that monopolization of ingenuity, invention, and discovery by a small minority is prevented.⁴⁵

In the Islamic Republic, religion will play a leading role. Through Ijtehad, it will answer the ever-changing needs of a society which is moving towards perfection. Religion will also serve as the principal factor for solidarity and unity and as a center for the exchange of views and beliefs. Thus, it is important that it does not become official and/or a tool in the hands of the political power and a means for religious dictatorship.⁴⁶

By the establishment of the Islamic Republic, individual and social liberties will increase. "Law will not be a tool in the hands of the powerful to be used against the weak. Rather, it will rule as an expression of [people's] rights and obligations [in order to] equalize opportunities and resultants."⁴⁷ Moreover, the people will elect the judges. Thus, the judges will be free from the influence of the political power.⁴⁸

In the process of the transfer of power to the masses, the army will become free from foreign domination. That will bring about a total change in its function and organization. Domestically, it will not be used against the people any longer. In foreign relations, it not be used to execute expansionist policies. Thus, it will be reorganized to defend national independence and integrity as well as people's civil rights. All the people will take part in national defense.⁴⁹

There will be fundamental changes in the national economy as well as in foreign economic relations. The main aim of the changes will be self-reliance, economic growth, decentralization, equitable distribution, and establishment of a new pattern of consumption. In regard to economic growth, it will not be an end in itself. "Man will not be [only] a means for [bringing about] economic growth. Rather, the ultimate goal of economic growth will be man's liberation from the domination of nature as well as from social domination."⁵⁰

In foreign relations, the relationship based on "positive balance" will be replaced with relationship based on "negative balance." This means that the Islamic government will neither

dominate others nor will accept any domination.⁵¹ Thus, the Islamic government will destroy all the political, economic, social, and cultural bases of foreign domination in Iran. Moreover, it will take the necessary measures to prevent foreign domination in the future. It will also "end the severance of Iran from the body of the Islamic society" and will establish closer relations with the Muslim countries. Furthermore, the Islamic government, which will be moving towards the society of Tawhid, will "undertake the role of a model for people's liberation" at a worldwide scale.⁵²

By the elimination of foreign domination, the dependent (formerly the upper ruling) class will also be eliminated. The existing social stratification and its criteria--which are mainly personal relations--will be replaced by social status which leads to Tawhid and by Islamic criteria. In fact, "all social structures which are created on the basis of Shirk (contradictions, polytheism) and serve as tools in the hands of the ruling power to repress the people will be destroyed."⁵³

Elimination of foreign domination will affect the cultural life of the society as well. The Islamic government will shut the door on "anti-values" imported from--and imposed by--the West. That will create a cultural atmosphere favorable for the growth of a healthy personality. People will be encouraged to think for themselves and to evaluate everything critically. The criteria for evaluation of issues and things will be their level of significance "in liberating man, in fostering his talents, in increasing his inventive tendency, and in accelerating the transformation of the society towards Tawhid."⁵⁴ The mass media will transfer genuine thoughts,

knowledge and information to the masses. They will neither belong to the government nor to the private sector. Rather, they will be at the hands of public companies. The cultural dualism will be ended. "[Islam], as a social and intellectual system, [will] be placed at the center of the society. [It will serve] as a milestone of thought and action so that man can free himself from all bonds and shackles and advance with an accelerating movement in the infinite horizon of Tawhid [towards God]."⁵⁵

5. Program of Action. Bani-Sadr identifies a few targets and agents of change. He also proposes some forms of action for bringing about revolutionary changes.

a. Targets of change: In accordance with his theory of the cult of personality, Bani-Sadr identifies that cult as the main target of change. In addition to those personalities who claim godhood, two particular groups within the cult are noted as special targets. They are: (1) the group that serves the material power, i.e., the bureaucrats, the militarymen, and the "directors;" and (2) the group that fulfills the non-material needs for growth of power, i.e., "the clergy, the (religious) scholars, and the scientists."⁵⁶ Since in the cult of personality, religion will be distorted from its true nature and will become a tool for justifying the system, it will also be a target for change.⁵⁷ Bani-Sadr's criticism of capitalism and censorship shows that he considers them as targets of change as well.⁵⁸

b. Agents of change: According to Bani-Sadr, two groups will play significant roles in bringing about revolutionary changes:

(1) The youth: Bani-Sadr notes that the dynamic force of the youth not only gives life to a society and provides for continuation of its special identity, "it is also charged with the great task of the growth of society. ... [The younger] generation constructs tomorrow and the future by its work today."⁵⁹ Thus, he exhorts "the committed younger generation"--which he calls "the generation of thought and action"--to "persist in its great struggle" to liberate Iran from the claws of the Shah's regime.⁶⁰

(2) The oppressed: According to Bani-Sadr, the leadership of a revolution is upon the oppressed people. The reason is that they possess such "a force that cannot be contained in any social receptacle. Thus, they should become more conscious of this fact, change, and change the world."⁶¹ Bani-Sadr does not identify any outside source as responsible or instrumental for bringing about consciousness to the oppressed. He argues, rather, that the intensification of tyranny and oppression--which is not only economic but also political, social, and cultural--will make the oppressed as tools in the hands of those in power. When the oppressed are used in the process of competition for power among the ruling groups, however, "they will realize their own power as well as the weaknesses of the ruling groups and the flimsiness of their spider web." Thus, Bani-Sadr believes, "when the time is pregnant with the great resurrection, the contradictions which beset the dominant will grow so much that [finally] the oppressed people will take the initiative and lead the world towards Tawhid."⁶²

c. Forms of action: According to Bani-Sadr, in order to "bring about a new man and to blossom a new humanity"--which is the goal of

an Islamic revolution--Islam emphasizes "fundamental changes in man" as much as it emphasizes "structural changes in society."⁶³ Thus, Bani-Sadr focuses on "cultural resurrection" and "changes in perception" as forms of revolutionary action. He also notes the significance of unity, taking action to delegitimize the regime, migration, and different forms of Jihad.

(1) Cultural resurrection: Bani-Sadr believes that "a political revolution begins with cultural resurrection." This means that the revolutionaries should first overcome their fear and "liberate their wills." They should become conscious of people's significant role in making their own destiny. They should liberate themselves "from the bonds and shackles of the existing system" both in thought and action. They should liberate themselves from "obedience to anti-values." To be able to do so, they need to "wage the greater Jihad"--a struggle within themselves. Part of that struggle is self-criticism and continuous correction of their action.⁶⁴

The revolutionaries should also bring about cultural transformation in the society. Bani-Sadr considers "the ideas which do not have any relationship to reality" as the "greatest opium of our age." He believes that such ideas are "injected in the minds of the youth through different means to intoxicate them and cause them to forget that Iran is being ruined." Thus, it is the task of the revolutionaries to liberate the younger generation from the claws of such ideas.⁶⁵ They should also wage a struggle against censorship which accustoms the mind to obedience and prevents people from joining the revolution.⁶⁶ Moreover, they should encourage "people's active participation in innovative and creative work." No

revolution can be successful without people's general participation in such activities.⁶⁷

(2) Changing perception: Bani-Sadr believes that so long as the power relationships are the dominant form of relations among members of a society, "a revolution will [always] be transformed into anti-revolution."⁶⁸ Thus, the revolutionaries must first change their whole perception and get out of the power relationship. Bani-Sadr warns his audience: "If you want to abolish this power-centeredness [under the Shah], you should not become power-centered yourselves. ... If you become like the regime, even if you overthrow it, nothing will [really] change. Only one form of force will replace another."⁶⁹ Therefore, he asks them to become "negative opponents"--i.e., opponents who are not of the same type as the regime--opponents who struggle for fundamental destruction of the system rather than only for gaining power. Only then, Bani-Sadr argues, will the people have a real alternative to the Shah's regime.⁷⁰

Bani-Sadr also asks his audience to change their perception so that their minds transform the signs they receive into ideals rather than into material phenomena. He argues that the most important issue for mankind today is neither the amount nor the mode of production and consumption. "The issue is more important than these. It is a fundamental change in the way that the mind acts--i.e., transforming each idea into something material. ... We need a mental apparatus in which the mind can transform something material into ideals (something spiritual)."⁷¹

(3) Jihad: In addition to the "greater Jihad," which is the same as "cultural resurrection" for Bani-Sadr, he mentions two other forms of Jihad: (a) the superior Jihad which is speaking up against oppression and tyranny, and (b) armed Jihad which is fighting against those who impede the propagation of truth.⁷²

(4) Unity and cooperation: Bani-Sadr notes that a movement cannot start and continue without the general participation and cooperation of the members of a society. "The greater the degree of merger, unity and oneness of identity in the collectivity; the greater will be the dimensions of the movement and the faster will be its pace." This is why, according to Bani-Sadr, Islam values unity and cooperation.⁷³

(5) Bani-Sadr recognizes the significant role that "hunger strikes and other forms of campaign to free the political prisoners" can play in the delegitimization of a regime.⁷⁴ He does not expound on the subject, however.

(6) Bani-Sadr also notes the significance of "migration to a place where a person can become active and organize the struggle."⁷⁵

6. Commitment to Action and Self-Sacrifice. Bani-Sadr tries to encourage commitment to action and self-confidence by considering man the maker of his own destiny and by presenting a philosophy of history in which the ultimate victory belongs to the oppressed.

a. Man the maker of his own destiny: According to Bani-Sadr, Islam brought about a revolution in man's perception of the future when it considered the future as an outcome of man's work and action

rather than as something happening by chance.⁷⁶ "Man affects the quality of the social system [in which he lives] by his willpower, his action, and his struggle."⁷⁷ Moreover, man has the potentiality "to free himself from the bonds and shackles of the ruling system and to transform himself into a revolutionary force."⁷⁸ Thus, Islam is categorically opposed to determinism and considers "man the builder of destiny."⁷⁹ Islam also considers "any fear from the worldly powers as polytheism."⁸⁰

In regards to the revolutionary situation in Iran in 1978-79, Bani-Sadr observes that "the leadership of Khomeini should make it possible for Iran to regain its morale, its will to live, and its will to struggle."⁸¹ He also exhorts the youth to fight against an "inferiority complex," not to be afraid of hardships and difficulties, not to be afraid of "the overt and covert bayonets," and to show courage in their struggle.⁸²

c. Philosophy of history: Bani-Sadr sees history as the scene of a continuous struggle between the oppressed and the absolute power. He argues that the process of concentration of power will lead to two inevitable consequences. On the one hand, it will intensify the internal contradictions of the ruling groups. On the other hand, it will force the oppressed to make a choice between the intolerable living conditions--which is in fact death--and fighting. It also makes the oppressed aware of its own power. Thus, in the process of concentration and accumulation, "power will finally reach the age of destruction. ... The dominators dig their graves by their own hands."⁸³ Over and over, Bani-Sadr argues further, "the leadership of the oppressed and the pioneering force of the enslaved masses

shatter the pillars of the absolute powers through [their] revolutions." But since the death of the absolute powers does not lead to the abolishment of the relationship of domination, the seeds of absolute power are produced again, grow again, die again, and come to life again in new forms. In this process, however, people move in the path of Tawhid.

Slowly they are liberated from the servitude to different types of gods--including the personality which claims godhood. The more they become free, the brighter will become their horizons of sight and insight with the light of Tawhid, and the better they will be able to distinguish the leadership of Tawhid from the leadership of Shirk. The ultimate victory belongs to the adherents of Tawhid provided that they continue their unremitting resurrection and fight against polytheists until all oppression is eliminated, man is freed from the yoke of oppressors, and he reaches Tawhid.⁸⁴

7. Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience. In the works covered in this study, Bani-Sadr refers to the significance of self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience only on one occasion. While speaking to the students who had entered into a hunger strike to protest the treatment of the political prisoners by the Shah's regime, he notes that only those persons are qualified for "leading the people to freedom that they do not consider work, struggle, prison, loss of beloved ones, torture, and execution as painful. Rather, they accept all of them [happily] for the sake of their goal."⁸⁵ Bani-Sadr also refers to martyrdom of Imam Husain and notes that calling what Husain did as "sacrifice" is a misnomer. A person sacrifices something that he loves and values. Imam Husain, however, "loved nothing but faith. Or, to put it in better words, he loved everything in faith--even life."⁸⁶

8. Simplification. Bani-Sadr extensively uses stories from the Holy Quran to explain his views on the cult of personality. Examples can be found all over his book on the subject. He also uses some personalities in those stories as symbols. Pharoah, for example, is the symbol of the "god of absolute power."⁸⁷ Croesus is the symbol of the "god of capital."⁸⁸ "Haman"--Pharoah's minister--is the symbol of the "shepherd-dog of power."⁸⁹ Moses is the symbol of "the leadership of the pioneering force of the oppressed."⁹⁰ In his other works, however, Bani-Sadr only occasionally refers to stories and symbols.⁹¹ He gives numerous examples, though, to make his points understood.⁹²

9. Claim to Truth and Rationality. In his book on the "cult of personality," Bani-Sadr refers to and quotes several hundred verses from the Holy Quran. Thus, in that book, the Quran constitutes the main source of authority by which Bani-Sadr tries to support his arguments. That book, however, is an exception. In his other works, he rarely--if ever--refers to the Quran.⁹³ He also rarely refers to the traditions of Prophet Muhammad and the Imams.⁹⁴ Another religious source to which he makes few references is the views and writings of Imam Khomeini.⁹⁵ In general, however, Bani-Sadr seems to believe that his general references to "Islam" and "religion" suffice to establish his claim to truth.⁹⁶

Bani-Sadr seems to consider his works on the "cult of personality," on the "characteristics of contemporary Iran," and on the "relationship between materialism and idealism" as

scientific--or at least as works which were written "with the help of scientific methodology."⁹⁷ He does not emphasize, however, the significance of science as a source of authority for his views. Neither does he emphasize the significance of history and/or the views of Western thinkers in that regard.⁹⁸

In addition to his general references to Islam, Bani-Sadr frequently presents "objective evidence" and "examples" to establish his points of view. In his analysis of the conditions in Iran under the Shah, Bani-Sadr frequently refers to statistics and other empirical evidence. He rarely, however, mentions the sources of his information. In "relationship between materialism and idealism," Bani-Sadr tries to support his views by examples and rational reasoning. Although his reasonings are sound, his examples are often redundant and too simplistic.⁹⁹

Sometimes Bani-Sadr does not try--or fails--to establish his claim to truth at all. His description of Bathat, Imamat, Adalat, and Maad is a good example. His understanding of these terms is completely different from the way they are understood by Muslims in general and by the Shia scholars in particular. He does not try, however, to justify his transformation of the meaning and significance of the terms.¹⁰⁰ His anarchist tendency also runs counter to the conventional wisdom among the Muslims. The way he tries to rationalize his position--i.e., taking the Quranic description of the Hereafter as a model of the ideal society--¹⁰¹ will be unacceptable to many Muslims.

Chapter X

CONCLUSION

What was the role of ideology in the Islamic Revolution in Iran?

In what ways did the revolutionary leaders whose works were studied in chapters four to nine contribute to the ideology of revolution?

What was the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran?

How does it compare to the ideology of revolution in the Holy Quran?

How useful is the model of revolutionary ideology developed in this work for study of ideologies of revolution?

In conclusion I will address the above questions.

1. The Role of Ideology. The leadership of Imam Khomeini and assumption of power by the Ulama have forced most students of the Iranian Revolution to assign at least some role to Shiite Islam in bringing about the Revolution. As the review of literature in Chapter One shows, however, there has been no systematic effort to understand the revolutionary ideology provided by Islam nor to assess its role. The present work is a modest effort to understand the ideology of the Revolution. It provides, nonetheless, some clues about the role of ideology in the Revolution as well.

The first contribution of this study in regard to the role of ideology, I believe, is shattering the myth that martyrdom of Imam

Husain was "the central event or myth" on which the revolutionary ideology was based. It is true that commemoration of Imam Husain's martyrdom is one of the most significant religious celebrations among Shia Muslims, and it provided the best opportunity for the revolutionary leaders to deliver their message to the people. It is also true that all the revolutionary leaders included in this study refer to Imam Husain from time to time and some of them devote some entire lectures to his martyrdom. But that event is only one among numerous themes that the revolutionary leaders talk about. None of the leaders focussed all his revolutionary teachings on the subject. The Occulted Imam and his reappearance did not play an important role in the ideology of revolution either. Thus, the ideology was not Messianic. Actually, belief in the Occulted Imam played a somewhat negative role. The Shia masses believed they could not change the conditions until he appeared and the Shia Ulama believed that only he could legitimately lead a government--not them. Thus, Imam Khomeini, Ayatullah Mutahhari, and Dr. Shariati had to exert enormous efforts to change the attitude of the masses and the Ulama.¹

Some students of the Iranian Revolution limit the role of Shia Islam in the Revolution to providing an organizational basis. Obviously the revolutionary leaders used mosques, madrasas and other religious institutions for propagating their messages and for organizing huge demonstrations. The present study, however, shows that their efforts were first and foremost focussed on bringing about a new consciousness and awareness among the people. It is also

important to remember that they did not start their activities at the eve of the 1978-79 revolutionary upheaval. They spent many difficult years and accepted going to jail or to exile in order to bring about the new awareness.

The ideology of revolution played an important role in the disintegration of the Shah's army. The failure of the Iranian armed forces, which was one of the largest and best equipped in the "Third World," to suppress people's uprising and the army's subsequent disintegration have puzzled many students of the Iranian Revolution. It seems that the ideology of revolution contributed to those events in two ways:

(1) It gave the people the courage to stand firm against the use of force by the army. The soldiers shot mercilessly at the demonstrators at the beginning of the revolutionary upheaval. But more shooting brought more people to the streets. In many cases, when the demonstrators at the first row were shot down, those in the back would march forward towards the soldiers with bare chests (as a sign of readiness for martyrdom) instead of running away. Finally a point came when the soldiers could not take it any more and refused to shoot.

The role of other revolutionary leaders should not be underestimated in bringing about such courage. But undoubtedly the Imam Khomeini's teachings played a leading role. A prominent Iranian writer notes with dismay during the revolutionary upheaval:

Mr. Khomeini is more popular in Iran than other [i.e., nationalist and leftist] leaders opposed to the regime. It is at his instruction that people pour into streets and act in such a way to get martyred. But Mr. Khomeini does not have proper

information about the realities of the Iranian society. Neither is he ready [to listen] to the counsel of other oppositional leaders. Because of his misinformation, he proclaims methods which lead to bloodshed without helping the movement to achieve victory. ... Continuation of this method will only result in the defeat of the movement.²

As we know, the passage of time proved the effectiveness of Imam Khomeini's method.

(2) In contrast to the above writer, another Iranian scholar observes after the success of the Revolution,

Our Revolution invented a new method for defeating the ruling regime, that is, conquering the enemy forces from within. That was the only scientific, well-calculated, and successful method. It was a method which led to victory with the least possible casualties. Instead of arming the people in the cities and villages, [which would have resulted in enormous bloodshed,] we conquered the army from within. It neither vanished nor surrendered. It joined the people.³

The method to which the scholar is referring is Imam Khomeini and Ayatullah Taleqani's instructions to people not to fight back against the army; rather, to educate the soldiers and to win their sympathy and support. Those who have seen films of the huge demonstrations would certainly recall scenes in which people offer flowers to the soldiers. During the revolutionary process, an Iranian newspaper reports, "Tehran witnessed people showering the soldiers with flowers and kisses yesterday. While carrying the soldiers on their shoulders, the people shouted, 'At Khomeini's command, the armed forces are our brothers! Oh military brother, let us [get together and] fight the enemy!'"⁴

Moreover, as noted in Chapter four, Imam Khomeini himself exerted efforts to educate the army and to remind the soldiers and officers of their Islamic duties.⁵ The fact that the soldiers refused to fire on the demonstrators at the later stages of the

revolutionary upheaval is well known. Less known is the fact that some soldiers and officers had started shooting at their own colleagues even before the Shah had left Iran. The following incident is only one example:

The event took place in the apparently strong fortress of the [Royal] Guard. It was noontime of the day of Ashura [December 11, 1978]. ... Second Sergeant Ismael Salamatbakhsh and the soldier Nasruddin Umaidi Abid ... bravely designed a plan to execute the Shah's agents. ... When the cafeteria was filled with Guard officers, they launched an attack with machineguns shouting, "Salute to Khomeini." They killed 65 persons. Salamatbakhsh wrote in his will-letter, 'I revenged the blood of the innocent people who were martyred in [the September Eight massacre]. I undertook this action for the sake of Islam and the people.'⁶

2. Contribution of the Leaders to the Ideology of Revolution.

Among the revolutionary leaders included in this study, Imam Khomeini seems to have presented a more comprehensive revolutionary ideology than others. His teachings strongly relate to all the nine components of the ideal type of revolutionary ideology. He exerts great efforts to bring about political consciousness--especially among those who were in positions of power but despised politics, i.e., the ulama. He presents a detailed criticism of the socio-politico-economic conditions under the Shah and tries to delegitimize the Shah's rule as well as the monarchy. He emphasizes the values which were neglected in his society and which are necessary for bringing about revolutionary changes. The top values in a list of his values are: justice and equity, liberation and freedom, Jihad and struggle, self-sacrifice, and courage and fearlessness. He also presented an outline of the good society that he desires. His program of action is very comprehensive and seems valuable for all revolutionary movements. He presents strong

arguments to encourage commitment to action and uses different methods to inculcate the values of self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience. He uses stories and symbols to simplify his message and is very careful to support his arguments by presenting evidence from the Quran and other authoritative sources as well as by logical reasoning.

Ayatullah Taleqani's work is focussed on bringing about political consciousness and presenting an outline of the good society. He also emphasizes values which are necessary for bringing about revolutionary changes, that is, freedom and liberty, equity and justice, Jihad and struggle, unity and brotherhood, and martyrdom. His criticism of the conditions under the Shah and his program of action, however, are very sketchy. He presents some arguments to encourage commitment to action and self-sacrifice. He also uses some stories and symbols to simplify his message. Like Imam Khomeini, he is very careful to establish his claim to truth by reference to authoritative sources and by logical reasoning.

Ayatullah Muntazhari does not present any criticism of the Shah's regime and makes little effort to simplify his message. His focus is first and foremost on bringing about political consciousness, although he presents his arguments in religio-philosophical language. Faith and knowledge occupy the top positions in his list of values. They are followed by self-sacrifice, ascent towards perfection, responsibility, good deeds, freedom, justice, and struggle. His outline of the good society and his program of action are very sketchy. His philosophy of history, which encourages commitment to

action and self-confidence, is well-thought out and comprehensive, however. Moreover, he presents several lines of arguments to encourage martyrdom and self-sacrifice. In general, Mutahhari presents his views within a comprehensive, coherent, and consistent theory based on premises derived from the Holy Quran.

Eng. Bazargan also focuses on bringing about political consciousness and encouraging commitment to action. Unlike Mutahhari, however, he presents his views in simple and direct language. His criticism of the Shah's regime, his notion of the good society, and his program of action are very sketchy. He does not talk about the significance of self-sacrifice either. He emphasizes the values of God-consciousness, charity and serving people, love and kindness, justice, and knowledge and education. He also notes the significance of freedom, struggle, and social responsibility. Since he speaks in simple terms and uses a lot of examples, he does not have to simplify his message. Bazargan extensively refers to the Quran as a source of authority. His use of scientific principles and formulas to support his arguments is unique among the leaders included in this study.

The comprehensiveness of Dr. Shariati's ideology of revolution is comparable to that of Imam Khomeini's. Every sentence of Dr. Shariati seems to be directed towards bringing about political consciousness. His program of action is detailed and in many ways complement Imam Khomeini's program of action. He exerts great efforts to encourage commitment to action, self-confidence, self-sacrifice, and revolutionary patience. His use of symbolism and

satire is masterful and unique among the revolutionary leaders studied here. He mostly emphasizes values that directly relate to revolutionary activities. The five most significant values in his list of values are social responsibility, martyrdom, Jihad and struggle, justice and equity, and ascent towards perfection. In spite of being surrounded by SAVAK agents, Shariati manages to criticize the Shah's regime--understandably, indirectly and without much emphasis. He seems very successful in establishing his claim to truth by reference to authoritative sources and to his own qualifications and sincerity. The only component of the ideology of revolution that Shariati seems to have neglected is an outline of his ideal society, though he touches upon some issues related to it.

Bani-Sadr focuses some of his attention to the areas that Shariati neglects. He presents a very detailed criticism of the social, political, and economic conditions under the Shah and tries to delegitimize his regime. He also presents an outline of his ideal society as well as a detailed policy framework for the interim Islamic government. Bani-Sadr also tries to bring about political consciousness and encourage commitment to action. His program of action, however, is very sketchy. Moreover, he notes the significance of self-sacrifice only on one occasion. Values emphasized by Bani-Sadr include freedom and liberty, unity and oneness, justice, independence, critical outlook, equality, struggle, and ascent towards perfection. Bani-Sadr uses Quranic stories and symbols extensively only in one of his writings. In many of his works, however, he presents numerous everyday life examples

to make his points understood. His efforts to establish his claim to truth also vary in different works. In one case he relies on the Quran. In some other works he tries to support his arguments by objective evidence and examples. In some cases, however, he fails to present convincing evidence or arguments in support of his points of view.

I believe the contribution of the revolutionary leaders to the ideology of revolution goes much beyond their works covered in this study. A major shortcoming of the present work is that it limits itself to studying revolutionary leaders' speeches and books. Thus, it does not look at their activities in general, which are also important for understanding their ideology of revolution. Further studies are needed to explore the full range of the revolutionary leaders' contributions to the Revolution and its ideology. It seems that each revolutionary leader included in this study made some particular contribution to the development of revolutionary ideology in Iran. For example, by his pioneering work, Eng. Bazargan demonstrated that speaking about religious subjects was not a monopoly of religious scholars. Ayatullah Taleqani brought the Holy Quran "from graveyard to the heart of society" and demonstrated that its interpretation was not reserved for the Imams. Both Ayatullah Taleqani and Ayatullah Mutahhari, who studied in Madrasa (traditional religious school) and taught at Tehran University, provided bridges between traditional religious scholarship and the intellectuals with Western-style education. Bani-Sadr, who was the

son of an Ayatullah and went to France for higher education, presented Islam in a contemporary language to the Western educated youth. More important in this regard, however, was Dr. Shariati's contribution. If not for him, it is doubtful that the Iranian youth would have been able to overcome the cultural domination by the West by the time of the revolutionary upheaval and would have been ready for self-sacrifice in a bloody struggle with the Shah's army. Shariati's thoughts were also influential in turning the Iranian youth away from Marxism and other leftist ideologies. He seems to have also influenced religious students and young religious scholars.

Imam Khomeini's contribution to the development of Islamic Revolution in Iran and its ideology seems much more significant than any other Iranian leader. As noted earlier, he made his first political statement in the early 1940s. He was "quiet," however, for about 20 years until he emerged as the most formidable opponent of the Shah in the early 1960s. But was he really politically inactive all those years? I believe he was not. Earlier I quoted him as saying, "Great men, with broad horizons of thought ... continue making plans for the advancement of their cause."⁷ I believe Imam Khomeini is not only a great man but also a great planner. It seems that during the 20 years mentioned above, he had limited the scope of his political activities to training great revolutionary leaders from among his students. In a list of his about 190 students who became prominent scholars we find the following personalities who played important roles in the Islamic Revolution: Ayatullah Muntazeri, Ayatullah Khamenei, Ayatullah Mutahhari, Ayatullah

Behishti, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Meshkini, Mehdavi Kani, Sadiq Khalkhali, Muhammad Mufateh, Raza Saïdy (martyred by the Shah in the late 1960s), and also Imam Musa Sadr (the founder of the Islamic movement in Lebanon).⁸ The early 1960s, when Imam Khomeini launched his movement against the Shah, seems to have provided Imam Khomeini with the right moment he was waiting for. First of all, he had already trained a large number of students who would follow his instructions. Secondly, the Shah's "White Revolution" agitated the religious community, which was in most part apolitical, and made it receptive to Imam Khomeini's teachings. Thirdly, the demise of Ayatullah Broujrdi, who was the sole "source of imitation" for the Shias, provided Imam Khomeini with the opportunity to speak out freely and to become a prominent leader.

Imam Khomeini's relentless opposition to the Shah's regime in the 1960s and 1970s and his critical role in downfall of the monarchy and establishment of the Islamic Republic are widely recognized. They are not studied in depth, however.⁹

3. An Overview of The Ideology of The Islamic Revolution in Iran. At the risk of overlooking some important points, in this section I will present a summary of the ideology of revolution in the works of the six leaders included in this study.

a. Political consciousness: Most of the Iranian revolutionary leaders go beyond the immediate political issues in their efforts to bring about political consciousness. They focus on issues related to man, his nature, his higher tendencies, and his duties and

responsibilities. Man is God's Khalifa (viceregent, representative). God has granted him the trust of responsibility and freedom of choice. Man is neither good nor evil by nature. God created man from clay and breathed in him from His spirit. This means that man has both good and evil tendencies as potentials in him. He has instincts and selfish desires as well as higher intellectual, moral and spiritual tendencies. The latter are man's defining characteristics. Man's ultimate goal is God, i.e., Perfection. This means that he has not only great potentialities but also infinite capability to achieve them. By actualizing his higher potentialities, man will acquire divine characteristics and ascend towards perfection. Otherwise, he will fall to abasement and stagnation. Thus, man is the constructor of himself and his destiny. He can, and should, put his selfish desires and animal instincts under the direction of his intellect and willpower. Otherwise, he will not achieve his humanity. Moreover, the oppressors can use his lower tendencies in order to bring him under their subjugation. Faith is the primary condition for achieving perfection and acquiring divine characteristics. Faith in Islam brings along with it certain duties and responsibilities some of which are:

(1) The duty to enjoin Maroof (good) and forbid Munkar (evil) (noted by all the leaders and expounded by Shariat).

(2) The duty to struggle against oppression, exploitation, and injustice (noted by all the leaders).

(3) The duty to introduce genuine Islam (noted by all the leaders).

(4) The duty to establish the ideal society (Islamic Government ruled by Fuqaha [jurists] according to Imam Khomeini, the society of Qist [equity] according to Ayatullah Taleqani, the Islamic Ummat [society of committed individuals moving towards a common goal] according to Shariati, and the society of Tawhid [all humanity achieving one common identity and moving together towards perfection] according to Bani-Sadr).

(5) The responsibility to come out of the shackles of nature, history, society, and self (noted by Shariati).

(6) The duty to crush the cult of personality (noted by Bani-Sadr).

(7) The responsibility to struggle against censorship (noted by Bani-Sadr).

The revolutionary leaders also emphasize that man is a social and political creature and Islam is a social and political religion. Imam Khomeini, Ayatullah Taleqani, and Eng. Bazargan talk about the political significance of Islamic acts of worship and religious gatherings. They argue against separation of religion and politics as well (though they disagree on the degree of religious scholars involvement in politics). Eng. Bazargan also notes the historical evolution of mankind and argues that it is moving towards the fulfillment of Islamic ideals. Ayatullah Mutahhari expounds the significance of human consciousness (self-consciousness in relations to all human beings). Dr. Shariati emphasizes social responsibility and the significance of community and notes that Islam without social responsibility is not Islam at all. Bani-Sadr considers

Tawhid (empathy and achieving more complete identity with others) as one of the fundamental values in Islam.

b. Criticism of the social arrangement: Imam Khomeini's criticism of the conditions under the Shah includes most of the areas emphasized by other leaders:

(1) Imperialism and foreign domination as well as relations with the Zionist state of Israel.

(2) Unjust economic order and domestic and foreign exploitation.

(3) Misery, hunger and deprivation of the masses.

(4) Oppression and tyranny.

(5) Ruling clique's luxury, wastefulness, incompetence, and bureaucracy.

(6) Prevalence of corruption, immorality, and materialism.

(7) Un-Islamic policies, laws, and system of government.

c. New set of values: All the revolutionary leaders emphasize the values of justice and equity, freedom and liberation, and Jihad and struggle. Ascent towards perfection is a leading value in the list of four leaders. Other values that most of the leaders emphasize are self-sacrifice, faith, unity, love and devotion, and dynamism.¹⁰

d. An outline of the good society: Except for Bani-Sadr who envisions elimination of government in his ideal society of Tawhid, the rest of the leaders do not talk about a governmentless society. There are some aspects of the desired society on which all the leaders agree. Some other aspects are emphasized by some leaders but not discussed by others. There are also some areas of disagreement among the leaders about the desired society.

The leaders agree on the following:

(1) The goal of the government and/or the purpose of the society is to morally and spiritually nourish refined human beings; to provide for all the individuals to develop their talents and potentials, and to move towards perfection.

(2) The society will function on the basis of Islamic principles and laws (Taleqani and Mutahhari expound on Islamic law).

(3) The ideal society is a moral and just society.

(4) Social relations among the members of the society will be based on cooperation and Islamic brotherhood.

(5) The Islamic society will conduct its affairs on the basis of mutual consultation.

(6) The Islamic society will be independent politically, economically, culturally, and ideologically.

(7) The Madina society under the leadership of the Prophet provides a model for the desired Islamic society.

The following aspects of the ideal society are emphasized by some leaders:

(1) Sovereignty belongs to God (Imam Khomeini, Ayatullah Taleqani, Ayatullah Mutahhari).

(2) Absolute ownership belongs only to God. Individual ownership of property is relative and limited (Taleqani, Shariati, Bani-Sadr).

(3) In the ideal society, everyone will have opportunity for useful activities, and each individual will own the fruits of his labor (Taleqani, Bani-Sadr).

(4) Knowledge and justice are the two main qualifications of leadership (Imam Khomeini and Ayatullah Taleqani--each emphasizes some other qualifications as well).

(5) In the Islamic society poverty will be eradicated; security and tranquility will prevail; the government will be at the service of the people--in Imam Khomeini's terms, it will "serve mankind in general" (Imam Khomeini, Taleqani, Bazargan).

(6) In the Islamic society there will be genuine freedom of thought and expression (Taleqani, Mutahhari, Bazargan, Bani-Sadr).

(7) In regard to Islamic economy, Ayatullah Taleqani proposes the following in addition to what was noted above:

(a) Production: Individuals are free to put to work their talents and physical and mental capabilities to fulfill their material needs. Their actions are limited, however, within certain ordinances and within the limits of public interest.

(b) Distribution: Distribution is the natural and innate right of the person whose labor is involved. Moreover, Islam recognizes commerce as a useful and legal occupation. It prohibits, however, exchanges in which no useful act is performed as well as oppressive profiteering.

(c) Consumption: Islam prohibits collection of gold and silver as well as any sort of consumption that does not benefit public life or does not contribute to advancement of faith, knowledge, and intellectual activities.

(d) Government supervision: The Islamic government has authority and responsibility to provide general supervision so that no one transgresses the limits or harms others by his activities.

(8) According to Bani-Sadr, in an Islamic society individual and social liberties will increase. Import of western "anti-values" will stop. Thinking, critical evaluation, inventiveness, and creativity will be encouraged. Islam will serve as a milestone of thought and action. Social structure will be transformed. The army will be reorganized. Fundamental changes in national economy and foreign economic relations will take place aiming at self-reliance, economic growth, decentralization, equitable distribution, and new patterns of consumption. Imamat (leadership) and Ijtehad (independent reasoning on religious matters) will be generalized. The Islamic government will prepare the ground for transformation towards the society of Tawhid in which all the humanity has one common identity and government is abolished.

Besides Bani-Sadr's anarchistic tendency, the only point of disagreement among the Iranian revolutionary leaders in regard to the desired society is the role of religious leaders in that society. Imam Khomeini and Ayatullah Mutahhari argue that the top leadership of the society belongs to qualified Fuqaha (Islamic jurists). Dr. Shariati is silent on this point. Ayatullah Taleqani and Bani-Sadr's positions are ambiguous but seem to tend against Imam Khomeini's position. Taleqani notes that knowledge is a required qualification of the leader, but does not underscore it. He also mentions that the Islamic government is not the government of "Akhunds"--which may mean religious scholars in general or it may mean unqualified clergy. Bani-Sadr notes that in the interim government religion should play a leading role but should not become official or tools for power. Eng. Bazargan, however, is explicitly

against "governance of the jurist" and notes that religious scholars should not interfere in details of government activities.

e. Program of action: The Shah, the ruling clique, the monarchy system, imperialism and foreign domination constitute the targets of change for most of the Iranian revolutionary leaders. Imam Khomeini identifies apolitical religious scholars and Dr. Shariati identifies religion of Shirk (polytheism, contradictions) among the targets of change as well. For Bani-Sadr, the cult of personality constitutes the main target.

All the revolutionary leaders agree on the significance of youth and An-Nas as agents of change. While others understand An-Nas to mean people in general, Bani-Sadr defines it as the oppressed masses. According to Bani-Sadr, the leadership of a revolution also belongs to the oppressed. According to Imam Khomeini, however, religious scholars should provide the leadership. Dr. Shariati assigns the greatest responsibility for bringing revolutionary changes to free-thinkers. He disqualifies, however, the Western-educated free-thinkers from the leadership role and emphasizes that the leader should emerge from among the ordinary people. He also believes that the middle class can play the most active role in a revolution.

In regard to forms of action, all the revolution leaders consider self-development as the starting point and agree that armed struggle can be used only as a last resort. The following list combines and summarizes Imam Khomeini's and Dr. Shariati's proposed forms of action for bringing about revolutionary changes (a few important points by others are also added):

(1) Revolutionary self-construction: freedom from psychological and instinctual shackles

(a) Through worship (filtering, cleansing, and purifying one's lower tendencies; achieving Ikhlas (sincerity, oneness, spiritual development)

(b) Through work (transforming subjectivity into objective reality, polishing and perfecting one's existential essence, liberating oneself from the shackles of family and class)

(c) Through social struggle

(2) Providing education and awareness

(a) Content: - describing the situation and making people aware of the contradictions in which they live

- bringing about three types of consciousness: 1) of man's origin and destiny, 2) of human nobility, and 3) of social rights and responsibilities

- providing guidance to the oppressor

- dispelling doubts about Islam

- arousing people to enthusiastic activities

(b) Means: - religious gatherings, mass media and any other available means

(c) Conditions: - understanding one's society and the "century" in which it lives

- should know people's language and have a methodology

(3) Some methods for introducing revolutionary changes:

(a) Change should be based on the cultural foundations of a society

(b) Retaining the form of a custom but transforming its content and meaning

(4) Significance of ideology: Islam being a divine ideology is addressed to man and his nature

(5) Significance of organization:

(a) creating a special party completely devoted to carrying out the duties of social responsibility

(b) creating new institutions (alternative to those in existence)

(6) Significance of Long Term Planning and Unity

(7) Passive protest: boycott of the government and the regime

(8) Collective protest: sending mail, demonstrations, strikes

(9) Armed struggle: as a last resort, but a natural outcome of the revolutionary process (thus, the revolutionaries must acquire armed power)

f. Commitment to action: The Iranian revolutionary leaders use various methods to inculcate a sense of commitment to action and self-confidence among the people. Imam Khomeini reminds his audience of their religious duties to take action against oppression, exploitation, and corruption and argues that politics is not dirty; rather, efforts to establish the government of divine justice is a form of worship. He also frequently refers to the lives of prophets and other great personalities. He exhorts religious scholars to have

self-confidence and be sure that they are qualified to carry out the functions of the government. Moreover, he uses historical arguments to demonstrate the negative consequences of apathy.

Other leaders try to encourage commitment to action by placing man at the center of all changes and by arguing that man is the maker of himself and his destiny. Some of them present philosophies of history according to which ultimate victory belongs to those who are struggling on the path of truth, justice and human liberty. Ayatullah Mutahhari bases his philosophy of history on the principle of innate human nature and laws of history and society. Shariati and Bani-Sadr base their philosophies of history on continuous historical struggle between the ruler and the ruled (the absolute power and the oppressed masses in Bani-Sadr's terminology) and between religion of Tawhid and religion of Shirk. Eng. Bazargan and Dr. Shariati also present some arguments similar to those presented by Imam Khomeini. Moreover, Eng. Bazargan uses a formula from the field of thermodynamics in the case of social life in order to demonstrate that Islam revives and rejuvenates its followers.

g. Self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience: Most of the Iranian revolutionary leaders emphasize Imam Husain's martyrdom in order to inculcate the value of self-sacrifice. They note that the real meaning of commemorating his martyrdom and the real meaning of being his "Shia" is to follow his example. Imam Khomeini refers to the life of prophets and other Imams as well in order to encourage self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience. He also notes that (1) success depends on steadfastness, and (2) God will reward the

self-sacrifice and perseverance which are for His sake. Ayatullah Muntazhari's and Dr. Shariati's arguments for underscoring the significance of self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience can be summarized as following:

- (1) Each revolution has two faces: blood (which requires self-sacrifice) and the message (which requires perseverance).
- (2) Martyrdom is the highest position man can aspire for.
- (3) Martyrdom is the manifestation of life and dignity.
- (4) Self-sacrifice is the highest manifestation of love which is the means for coming out of the prison of self.
- (5) Fidelity to Islam is judged by readiness for martyrdom.
- (6) Perseverance is part of the existential philosophy of an Umma (Islamic community).
- (7) Martyrdom is the heart of history. The martyr injects blood into the dead body of a society.

Shariati also notes that belief in God provides a more appropriate logical foundation for self-sacrifice than material ideologies.

h. Simplification: Most of the revolutionary leaders use Quranic stories about the lives of prophets and refer to the lives of Imams and other great personalities. The prophets, Imams, and great personalities as well as their opponents are also used as symbols. Dr. Shariati is unique in his use of symbolism in general, his effective use of stories, his literary style and use of satire, and terseness of his speeches.

1. Claim to truth: The Holy Quran provides the basic and the most important source of authority for all the Iranian revolutionary leaders. Most of the leaders support their arguments by reference to traditions of Prophet Muhammad, the Imams, and some of their companions as well. Some leaders also make an effort to demonstrate the conformity of the Quran and the traditions with human rationality, socio-historical evolution, and today's social reality.

All the leaders use logical reasoning to support their points of view. It plays a more significant role, however, in the works of the three ulama, i.e., Imam Khomeini, Taleqani, and Mutahhari. Most leaders refer to history, but mainly in general terms. Most leaders refer to the works of other scholars and thinkers--including non-Muslim ones. Most leaders also criticize rival ideologies--especially Marxism. Science and scientific investigation seem important for the three non-ulama leaders, i.e., Bazargan, Shariati, and Bani-Sadr. Bazargan, however, is unique in using scientific principles and formulas to support his views on religion and social issues.

4. The Holy Quran and The Ideology of The Islamic Revolution in Iran. In chapter three, I studied the ideology of revolution in the Holy Quran from a Sunni point of view. The works of the six Iranian revolutionary leaders show that there is not any major difference between the Shia understanding and the Sunni understanding of the Holy Quran in regard to revolutionary ideology.

As noted earlier, in their efforts to bring about political consciousness, most of the Iranian leaders focus on man's nature, his higher tendencies, and his duties and responsibilities. Their discussions of these issues sometimes advance beyond the traditional commentaries of the Holy Quran by both Shia and Sunni scholars, but they are certainly acceptable to all Muslims. The duties and responsibilities the Iranian revolutionary leaders emphasize are mainly the ones noted in chapter three: to struggle against oppression, to establish justice and equity, to enjoin Maroof (good) and forbid Munkar (evil), and to promote freedom of thought.

In criticism of social arrangements also the Iranian leaders mostly emphasize the areas noted in the Holy Quran; i.e., oppression and tyranny, luxury and waste, corruption and indecency, and exploitation. Their criticism of other aspects of the conditions under the Shah is based on the general teachings of the Quran as well. For example, in regard to imperialism, although the Quran does not use the term, (1) it condemns arrogance, oppression, and exploitation, (2) it commands the Muslims to establish an independent community (2:143, 9:16), and (3) it commands the Muslims to fight against aggression and wrong doing (22:39, 42:39).

The values emphasized by the revolutionary leaders are mostly the ones that have a high position on the list of Quranic values in chapter three. The only exception is ascent towards perfection. Yusuf Ali seems to agree with the Iranian leaders on the significance of this value.¹¹ He does not include it, however, in his index--from which the Quranic list of values in this study was derived.

In their description of the good society, the Iranian leaders emphasize some aspects of what was noted in Chapter Three. Their discussions, however, go much beyond that outline. Ayatullah Taleqani's treatise on Islamic economy is a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject among Shias and Sunnis alike. Bani-Sadr's outline of the ideal society and his policy framework for the interim Islamic government touch upon many new issues--among which his view about abolishment of government in the ideal society runs counter to traditional understanding of the Quran by both Shias and Sunnis. Imam Khomeini's notion of Walayat-e Faqih (governance of the jurist) is also a new position in both Shia and Sunni traditions. Unlike Bani-Sadr, who presents his view on elimination of government without much convincing evidence, Imam Khomeini exerts enormous efforts and uses various methods to establish his claim to truth. His leadership of the Islamic Revolution and the revolutionary government in Iran shows that he has been successful in convincing his countrymen of the validity of his position. But even among Shias in Iran he has faced some opposition--for example, Ayatullah Shariatmadari and Eng. Bazargan. As for the Sunnis, the idea behind the notion of Walayat-e Faqih--i.e., knowledge and piety as main qualifications of the Islamic leader--is in accordance to their understanding of the Holy Quran. There are, however, several problems in having a Faqih as the head of government in Sunni countries. First of all, the notion of imitation (taqlid) of a living Mujtahid (religious doctor) is unique in Shiism, and thus the institutional framework which brought Imam Khomeini to a leadership

role and will provide for his successors in Iran does not exist among Sunni Muslims. Secondly, contrary to the teachings of the Quran, traditionally Sunni ulama have frequently recognized the legitimacy of oppressive and corrupt regimes--although dissent has always been there.¹² At the present most of the religious scholars in the Sunni countries have lost their credibility among the people by their association with corrupt and un-Islamic governments. This is why some Western scholars observe, "in most Sunni countries neither the fundamentalists nor the average pious Muslim wants to be ruled by the ulama, as Khomeini's formula demand[s]."¹³

The Iranian revolutionary leaders seem in general agreement with the program of action and methods for inculcating the values of commitment to action, self-confidence, self-sacrifice, and revolutionary patience presented in Chapter Three. Some of them expound on some of the subjects much more. They incorporate, for example, some other aspects of Quranic teaching--not noted in Chapter Three--in their program of action; or they look at sense of mission and philosophy of history from different angles. They also emphasize Imam Husain's martyrdom.

In order to simplify their messages, the Iranian leaders mostly use Quranic stories and symbols. They emphasize, however, the lives and traditions of Prophet Muhammad and Imams as well. In regard to establishing their claims to truth, it is much easier for the leaders to rely on the authority of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet and Imams than to engage in the type of arguments that the Holy Quran presents in support of its claim to truth.

5. Usefulness of The Model of Revolutionary Ideology. As noted Chapter Two, my search of the literature on revolution for an appropriate model of revolutionary ideology was in vain. Thus, I developed such a model in that Chapter. Study of the Holy Quran and the works of the Iranian revolutionary leaders within the framework of that model demonstrates its usefulness. It seems that the model is not only useful for case studies to understand the ideology of a particular revolution, but it probably would also be valuable for comparative studies of various revolutionary ideologies. For example, a similar study of the ideology of Liberation Theology would show the similarities and differences of that ideology to the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and might prove beneficial to the revolutionaries in the Christian part of the "Third World" to learn from the Iranian experience. The model might also provide clues--and thus generate hypotheses--about the causes of success and failure of different revolutionary ideologies. For example, a comparable study of the Marxist and other leftist ideologies in Iran during dictatorship of the Shah would show whether it was only their failure to establish their claim to truth that led to their rejection by the majority of the people or did they also use a poor method to bring about political consciousness.

Improving the model of revolutionary ideology was not a focus of this study. There is, however, a lot of room for improvement. I can present a few suggestions here:

- a. In chapter three, I clarify the notion of political consciousness as (1) turning people's attention to their unfulfilled

basic needs as well as to higher needs and values, (2) bringing about a sense of community among the people, and (3) providing a framework for the popularization of the higher needs and values and for creation of a sense of community. Firstly I think this clarification is significant and should become part of the model. Secondly, it seems that the revolutionary leaders do not speak much about the third point. Thus, for a study of this, the researcher should look more to their actions rather than to their words.

b. Under "program of action" I study "targets of change" as well as "agents of change" and "forms of action." Although theoretically "criticism of social arrangements"--the second component of a revolutionary ideology--can be distinguished from "targets of change," in practical usage they often overlap. For example, in the case of Iran, the Shah, the monarchy system, and imperialism were objects of criticism as well as targets of change. Thus, I think it is more appropriate to incorporate "targets of change" with "criticism of the social arrangement" than with "program of action."

c. The model has "simplification" as a component of revolutionary ideology and proposes studying the use of stories, symbols, and slogans by revolutionaries to simplify their messages. In the course of study, however, I found this to be problematic. "Simplification" as defined in the study could not explain, for example, the whole range of methods used by Dr. Shariati to effectively convey his views and ideas. Neither could it demonstrate some other revolutionary leaders' shortcoming in communicating their ideas. Thus, I think it is more appropriate to broaden the scope of "simplification" and call it "communication."

Appendix

MODEL (IDEAL TYPE) CONSTRUCTION AND ITS USES

Ideal type concept formation (model) has been considered one of Max Weber's great contributions to the methodology of the social sciences. Although Weber's conception of ideal type is much broader and more complex, Wright Mills's definition of model can serve as a starting point for its understanding and description. According to Mills, a model is "a more or less systematic inventory of the elements to which we pay attention if we are to understand something. It is not true or false; it is useful and adequate to varying degrees."¹ This is the definition that is adopted in this dissertation, and the terms "ideal type" and "model" are used interchangeably.² The above definition refers to what a model is, what it is not, how it is formed, and what are its uses. But these points need more discussion.

First it is important to discuss the definition negatively and put negative limits to the model. Talcott Parsons summarizes Weber's view on what an ideal type is not as the following:

1. It is not a hypothesis, in the sense that it is a proposition about concrete reality which is concretely verifiable, and to be accepted in this sense as true if verified. In contrast to this sense of concreteness, it is abstract.

2. It is not a description of reality if by this is meant a concretely existing thing or process to which it corresponds. In this sense also it is abstract.

3. It is not an average ... in the sense that we say the average man weighs 150 pounds. this average man is not an ideal type.

4. Nor, finally, is it a formulation of the concrete traits common to a class of concrete things, for instance in the sense that having beard is a trait common to men as distinct from women.³

Thus it becomes clear why a model is not true or false. This does not mean, however, that model is a fantasy world without any kind of relations or implication to empirical reality. According to Weber, although a model "is not a 'hypothesis' but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such description."⁴ Therefore, a model is a heuristic device. "It is a devised system of attributes (criteria, traits, elements, aspects, etc.) not experienced directly in this form, but useful as a basis for comparing and understanding the empirical world. It is a construct made of abstracted elements and formed into a unified conceptual pattern wherein there may be an intensification of one or more aspects of concrete experience."⁵ In other words, "This thought-image brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into an internally consistent cosmos of interrelationships existing in thought [of the scientists]. As far as its content is concerned, this construction has the character of a utopia which has been arrived at through an exaggeration in thought of certain elements of reality. Its relationship to the empirical data consists solely in the fact that where [the] relationships of the type referred to by the abstract construct are discovered or suspected to exist in reality, we can make the characteristic features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference to an ideal type."⁶ In short, then, a model is a constructed picture of an "objectively possible" world that provides certain constellations of elements which are only

approximations of empirical reality. It is "a more or less systematic inventory of the elements to which we must pay attention if we are to understand something."

As the above discussion indicates, a model is formed "by one sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sided emphasized view points into a unified analytical construct."⁷ Is a model formed inductively or deductively? The above quotation and also Max Weber's scholarly work demonstrate that both methods are used in the construction of ideal types. A model is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means for ordering and understanding empirical reality. Therefore, it must be inductively abstracted from reality. But as mentioned, a model is not a description of the real world; it is an "utopia." In its construction we approach the empirical phenomena from a particular point of view and build our model by logical reasoning. Weber mentions this point explicitly in connection to ideal type construction of asceticism: "To do this we must prepare and emphasize the internally most 'consistent' forms of practical conduct that can be deduced from fixed and given presuppositions."⁸ It should be noted that Stephen Warner also holds that "The construction and use of ideal type is both a deductive and inductive process." He argues that it is "inductive, in the so far as it is based upon empirical knowledge of various kinds and in so far as an ideal-typical construction may be

empirically improved upon; deductive, in so far as this empirical knowledge is ordered according to logical--or better yet psycho-logical and socio-logical--principles and in so far as the ideal type is used as an explanatory or verstehende device."⁹

Questions arise as to what approaching empirical phenomena from a particular "point of view" means; and why do we need deduction and logical reasoning when we base our model on the observation of the empirical world. To answer these questions we should realize that according to Weber:

The number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set them apart as alone meriting attention. ... An exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomena in its full reality is not only practically impossible--it is simple nonsense.¹⁰ ... The choice of the object of investigation and the extent or depth to which this investigation attempts to penetrate into the infinite causal web, are determined by the evaluative ideas which dominate the investigator and his age. In the method of investigation, the guiding 'point of view' is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here as elsewhere [i.e., in natural sciences]. For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth.¹¹

It is by realizing this point that we can understand why Weber calls the model "ideal type" and considers it as "one-sided" and "utopia." The reason is not that the model has no bearing on reality. It is, rather, that in the construction of the model, a great many causes have been disregarded and only one or a few causes are exaggerated according to a particular point of view. This has not been by choice, rather out of necessity. The task of scientific research is to determine to what extent the model approximates each individual case and to what extent it diverges from reality.

According to Weber, "the goal of ideal-typical concept construction is always to make clearly explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena."¹² Actually, to Weber the whole notion of social science is concerned with "understanding of the characteristics uniqueness of the reality in which we move."¹³ Understanding a social phenomenon means to find out the motives of the human actors who brought it about. This does not mean that Weber is solely interested in individual phenomenon and disregards general regularities or "laws." What it means, however, is his rejection of "the naturalistic prejudice that the goal of social sciences must be the reduction of reality to 'laws!'" To him the goal of social science is "knowledge of reality with respect to its cultural significance and its causal relationships."¹⁵ In this context, "'laws' are of great value as heuristic means--but only as such."¹⁶

As mentioned earlier, ideal type "offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses." Thus, generation of hypotheses can be another function of a model. Arend Lijphart in his article "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method" considers "hypothesis-generating case studies" as one of the six types of case studies. According to him, "hypothesis-generating case studies start out with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases."¹⁷ Instead of the vague notion of possible hypotheses, however, a model as described here can serve a better purpose for formulating hypotheses. Not only the statements

of the model--as far as they are similar to the empirical phenomena--can be modified in the light of empirical reality and proposed as hypotheses, but also the divergence of the empirical reality from the model can be formulated in the form of hypotheses.

A third major use of models is in comparative studies. Howard Becker and John McKinney are two of the proponents of this method of study. According to McKinney:

A scientific function of construct type [i.e., a model] is to order the concrete data so that they may be described in terms that make them comparable, so that the experience had in one case, despite its uniqueness, may be made to reveal with some degree of probability what may be expected in others; hence the type is a heuristic device constructed primarily for comparative and predictive rather than descriptive purposes.¹⁷

And as mentioned in the Second Chapter, David Bouchier uses his model of radical ideologies for a comparative study of leftist and anti-establishment movements in the U.S. and Britain in the 1960s.

Notes to Chapter I

1. General Service Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977, Book II (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 2221.

2. On that day a demonstration in Qum against an article in a newspaper about the death of Imam Khomeini's son ended in clashes with the police and 20 persons were killed; the date is generally considered as the beginning of the revolutionary confrontation in Iran.

3. Resistance, 5 (Nov. 1978): 2.

4. Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

5. Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," Theory and Society, 11 (May 1982): 268.

6. See for example, National Review, 31 (22 June 1979): 810; US News and World Report, 19 March, p. 9; and Honolulu Advertiser, 1 Dec. 1978, p. A-19.

7. Los Angeles Times, 28 May 1982, part II, p. 7.

8. William E. Griffith, "Opinion and Commentary," Christian Science Monitor, 26 Oct. 1982, p. 23 (emphasis added).

9. Joseph Kraft, "Islam's limits force it to be oppositionalist," Los Angeles Times, 7 Dec. 1978, part II, p. 11.

10. Marvin Zions, "Gulf Arabs are Wary," New York Times, 2 August 1982, p. 15.

11. Eric J. Hooglund, "Book Reviews: The Iranian Revolution," The Middle East Journal, 34 (Autumn 1980): 489.

12. For information on the publishers and the dates of publication of all the works noted in this review see the attached bibliography.

13. Hooglund, "Book Reviews," Ibid. p. 487.

14. Shahrugh Akhavi, "Book Reviews," The Middle East Journal, 36 (Summer 1982): 592.

15. Hooglund, "Book Reviews," Ibid. p. 486.

16. Ibid. p. 487.

17. William O. Beeman, "Book Reviews," The Middle East Journal, 36 (Summer 1982): 592.

18. Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, pp. 262-280.

19. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 1.

20. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, "Preface," pp. xi-xii.

21. Thomas M. Ricks, "Book Review," The Middle East Journal, 37 (Spring 1983): 270.

22. MERIP Reports, 87: 21-26.

23. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, p. 427.

24. Loony, Economic Origins of Iranian Revolution, p. 3.

25. Ibid. p. 265.

26. The Middle East Journal, 36 (Summer 1982): 362.

27. Green, Revolution in Iran, "Introduction," pp. xii-xii.

28. Ibid. p. 131.
29. The Middle East Journal, 36 (Winter 1982): 48.
30. Majid Tehranian, "Dependency and Communication Dualism in the Third World: With Special Reference to the Case of Iran," in Deene Neubauer and Folke Lindahl (eds), Occasional Papers in Political Science, Vol. 2, no. 2, p. 151.
31. For a comprehensive list see Nikki R. Keddie, "Selected Western Language Bibliography: Shi'ism and Politics, with Special Reference to Iran," in Nikki Keddie (ed.), Religion and Politics in Iran Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution, pp. 237-43. Some are specially noteworthy: Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of Ulama in Twentieth Century," and N. Keddie, "The Toots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran" both in Nikki Keddie (ed), Scholars Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1500 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
32. Originally the lectures were published under the title The Islamic Revolution in Iran, edited by Dr. Kalim Siddiqui (London: The Open Press and Muslim Institute, 1980).
33. The title "Ayatullah" (Sign of God) and Imam (Leader) are both used for Khomeini. I will use the latter which is currently the common usage in Iran and is slowly adopted by the scholars in the West.
34. Algar, Roots of the Islamic Revolution, p. 39.
35. Theory and Society, 11 (May 1982): 272.
36. Ibid. p. 275.
37. The Middle East Journal, 36 (Winter 1982): 22.
38. Ibid. p. 24.
39. Ibid. p. 24.
40. Keddie (ed.) Religion and Politics in Iran, p. 47.
41. Ibid. pp. 75, 76.
42. Ibid. p. 77.
43. Comparative Study of Society and History, 25 (April 1983): 137.
44. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 100.
45. Ibid. p. 135.
46. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, "Preface," p. viii.
47. Ibid. p. 70.
48. Keddie (ed.), Modern Iran, p. 25.
49. Ibid. p. 35.
50. Keddie and Hooglund (eds.) Iranian Revolution and Islamic Republic, pp. 90-91.
51. Ibid. p. 97.
52. Keddie (ed.) Modern Iran, p. 38.
53. Ibid. p. 57.
54. Ibid. p. 53.
55. The Middle East Journal, 37 (Winter 1983): 33.
56. Ibid. pp. 33-34.
57. Ibid. pp. 41-42.
58. Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 18 (January 1982): 5.

59. Ibid. p. 11.
60. Ibid. p. 18.
61. Keddie (ed.), Religion and Politics in Iran, p. 219.
62. Ibid. p. 221.
63. Ibid. p. 223.
64. Ibid. p. 235.
65. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, "Preface," p. ix.
66. Ibid. pp. 163-64.
67. Keddie and Hooglund (eds.), Iranian Revolution and Islamic Republic, p. 81.
68. Keddie (ed.), Religion and Politics in Iran, p. 182.
69. Kedouri and Haim (eds.), Towards a Modern Iran, p. 167.
70. Ibid. p. 165.
71. It should be noted that there is a general consensus among the authors that the events in 1978-79 which led to the downfall of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic constitute a genuine revolution. There is also little doubt about the "Islamic" character of the Revolution. Some authors, however, consider the Islamic Revolution as just the first step which will lead to a socialist revolution (or to a military government).
72. Skocpol, "Shi'a Islam in Iranian Revolution," Ibid. p. 273.
73. Albert, Tell the American People, p. 4.

Note to Chapter II

1. D.J. Manning, "Introduction," in The Form of Ideology, ed. D.J. Manning (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 2.
2. H.M. Drucker, The Political Uses of Ideology (UK: The MacMillan Press Co., 1974), p. 3.
3. Manning, Ibid., p. 2.
4. Drucker, Ibid., p. 12.
5. Ibid. p. 101.
6. Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology: The Nineteenth Century Philosophers (New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 17.
7. Jorge Larraín, The Concept of Ideology (Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), pp. 48, 50.
8. Drucker, Ibid. p. 104.
9. V.I. Lenin, What is to be done? Quoted in Drucker, Ibid. p. 103.
10. Larraín, Ibid. p. 76.
11. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), p. 49.
12. Ibid. p. 50.
13. Ibid. pp. 238-39.
14. Harry M. Johnson, "Ideology and the Social System," International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 1968 ed.
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Notes to Chapter III

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10. See chapter II, section (3).
11. See, e.g., 2:163, 6:19, 6:22, 23:91, 38:65, 112:1-4. Here and in all references to the Quran in the text, the first figure refers to the number of the chapter in the Quran and the second figure refers to the number of the specific verses.
12. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f.n. 5032, p. 1429.
13. Ibid. f.n. 511, p. 179.
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15. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f.n. 5433, p. 1539.
16. The Quran instructs the believers: "and bow your heads with those who bow (in worship)"* (2:43). The Prophet has said, "Prayer in congregation is superior to single prayer by 27 degrees." Sahih Muslim and Sahih Al-Bukhari (Collections of Hadith), Quoted in Maulana Fazlul Karim, Al-Hadith: An English Translation of Mishkat-ul-Masabih, Book III (Calcutta, India: Scholar Printing Works, 1940), p. 341.
17. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f.n. 2800, p. 857.
18. See e.g., Chapters 7 and 26.
19. According to Yusuf Ali, Zul-Qarnain is the Arabic title of Alexander the Great. See Yusuf Ali, Ibid. Appendix VII, pp. 760-61.
20. According to Maxim Rodinson, "The history of Islam is misrepresented to mystified Muslims and mystical spirits as bathed in perpetual submission. It could actually be much better described as permanent revolution." Marxism and the Muslim World, trans. Jean Malthews (New York, London: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p. 137. As far as this is the case, it certainly relates to the problem of legitimacy.

21. The following are the references noted: -2:115, 152, 177, 186, 238; -3:17, 102, 110, 133, 135; -4:1, 36, 122, 125; -5:9, 38, 108; -6:162; -7:55, 56; -8:2, 3, 45, 46; -9:71, 111, 112, 119; -10:61, 104; -11:114, 123; -13:20, 21, 22; -14:31, 47; -16:97; -17:60, 78, 79; -20:130; -23:2, 9, 57, 60, 118; -24:56; -28:53; -30:17, 18, 38; -31:12, 17, 33; -32:16; -33:35; -34:50; -39:3, 11, 20, 73; -40:14; -41:30; -42:38; -46:15; -50:16, 33, 39, 40; -52:48, 49; -55:46; -56:85; -57:4, 16, 28; -59:19; -61:10; -66:8; -67:14; -70:22, 34; -73:8, 20; -79:40; -94:8.

22. The following are the references noted: -2:212; -3:15, 104, 198; -4:57, 124; -5:38, 122; -7:42, 43; -8:4, 45, 74; -9:21, 72, 89, 111; -13:22, 23, 24, 29; -15:45; -16:97; -18:31; -19:60; -22:23; -23:1, 11; -24:55; -28:54; -29:7; -30:38; -32:17, 19; -35:33; -36:55; -37:43; -38:49; -39:20, 73; -40:9; -41:31; -42:22; -43:70, 72; -44:51; -47:6, 15; -50:31; -52:17; -54:54; -55:46; -56:12, 89; -57:12, 19; -61:11; -66:8; -69:21; -70:35; -76:12; -78:31; -79:41; -87:14; -88:10; -89:30; -90:18; 91:9; 98:8.

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25. The following are the references noted: -3:134; 4:57, 124; -5:96; -7:42, 43; -13:29; -16:97; -18:30; -19:60; -22:23; -23:61; -29:7, 9; -32:17, 19; -35:32; -36:54; -37:39; -42:22, 23; -43:72; -46:15; -47:2, 35; -52:19; 61:14; 98:7.

26. The following are the references noted: -2:45, 153, 177; -3:17, 120, 186, 200; -8:46, 65; -9:16; -10:109; -11:115; -13:22, 24; -16:126, 127; -20:130; -28:54; -31:17; -33:35; -40:55, 77; -46:35; 50:39; 70:5; -73:10; 76:12.

27. The following are the references noted: -2:8, 177, 204; -3:17, 167; -4:60, 61, 88, 140, 145; -5:122; -9:64, 67, 68, 119; -43:78; -49:15; 57:19; 58:14, 18; -59:11; -61:2; -63:1, 2, 4.

28. Yusuf Ali, f. n. 2865, p. 874.

29. The following are the references noted: -2:21, 212; -3:15, 134, 198; -5:9, 96, 108; -7:26; -10:105; -15:45; -25:15; -33:35; -38:49; -43:67; -44:51; -47:15; -49:13; -50:31; -52:17; -54:54; -78:31; -79:40.

30. The following are the references noted: -2:213; 3:103, 105, 195; -4:1; -5:94; -8:46, 63, 75; -9:71; -10:19; -17:53; -30:32; -38:2; -39:6; -41:36; -42:13, 14; -43:65; -45:17; -49:9, 10.

31. The following are the references noted: -2:190, 193, 216, 244, 246; -4:74, 75, 76, 84; -8:39, 65; -9:5, 12, 13, 14, 29, 123; -22:39; -47:4, 20.

32. The following are the references noted: -2:154, 207; -3:157, 158, 169, 195; -4:95; -8:72, 74; -9:20, 23, 24, 41, 81, 88, 111; -22:58; -49:15; -61:11; -85:4, 8.

33. The following are the references noted: -3:18, 21; -4:58, 127, 135; -5:9; -7:29; -8:73; -16:76, 90; -17:35; -42:9; -55:7, 8, 9; -57:25; -59:7; -83:1.

34. The following are the references noted: -2:249; -3:111, 139, 173, 175; -8:2, 64, 65; -10:62, 106; -14:27; 22:40; -24:55; -41:30; -42:36; -47:35; -57:23; -64:13.

35. The following are the references noted: -2:49, 191, 193, 217; -4:75; -7:105; -8:39, 73; -20:47; -22:39; -28:4, 5; -42:39, 422; -44:18, 30.

36. The following are the references noted: -2:83, 177; -4:8, 9, 36; -16:90; -17:23; -24:22; -29:8; -31:14; -42:23; -46:15, 17; -76:8; -90:13, 17.

37. The continuation of verse 29:8 quoted under item (4) of this section reads: "... but if they (either of them) strive (to force) thee to join with Me (in worship) any thing of which thou hast no knowledge, obey them not."

38. The following are the references noted: -3:132; -4:59, 64, 66, 80; -5:95; -8:20, 24, 46; -9:71; -24:51, 52, 54; -47:33; -64:12.

39. Maxim Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, trans. Brain Pearce (New York: Panteon Books, 1973), p. 75.

40. The following are the references noted: -2:164, 219; -3:190, 191; -6:97, 98; -10:5; -24:44; -30:21, 22, 24, 28, 50; -45:5, 13.

41. The following are the references noted: -2:177, 220; -4:2, 6, 10, 58; -5:1; -8:27, 56; -16:91; -17:34; -23:8; -49:12; -70:32, 33.

42. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 1270, p. 444.

43. The following are the references noted: -4:95; -5:38; -8:72, 74; -9:20, 24, 41, 81, 88; -22:78; -25:52; -29:69; -49:15; -61:11.

44. The following are the references noted: -3:135; -7:28; -16:90; -17:32; -23:5; -24:2, 3, 30, 31; -33:35; -42:37; -70:29.

45. The following are the references noted: -4:36; -6:42; -7:161; -10:23; -31:18, 33; -32:15; -33:35; -35:43; -57:16, 23.

46. The following are the references noted: -6:11, -22:46; -27:69; -29:20; -30:9, 42; -40:21, 82; -47:10.

47. The following are the references noted: -2:109; -3:134; -5:48; -7:199; -13:22; -28:54; -42:37, 40; -45:14.

48. The following are the references noted: -2:250; -3:146, 200; -5:9; -8:45; -9:123; -31:17; -41:30; -46:35.

49. The following are the references noted: -4:171; -5:80, 90; -17:26, 27, 29; -25:67; -31:19.

50. The following are the references noted: -2:188; -4:5, 29; -6:141; -7:31; -17:26, 27.

51. -2:190, 217; -9:13, 123; -22:39, 40; -42:39.

52. The following are the references noted: -4:86; -24:19, 27; -33:58; -49:11; -104:1.

53. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 2512, p. 780.

54. The following are the references noted: -7:46; -8:61; -10:10; -16:23; -19:62; -24:55. -34:58.

55. The following are the references noted: -3:104, 110; -9:71, 122; -31:17; -90:17.

56. The following are the references noted: -9:26, 40; -13:28; -48:4, 18, 26.

57. The following are the references noted: -3:118; -4:144; -5:54, 60; -9:16; -60:13.

58. The following are the references noted: -3:200; -5:3; -8:72, 74; -61:4.

59. The following are the references noted: -17:53; -23:3; -28:55; -49:11.

60. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 462, p. 161.

61. See Chapter II section (3) above.

62. According to Mohammad Iqbal, "The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in itself, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change. But eternal principles when they are understood to exclude all possibilities of change which, according to the Quran, is one of the greatest 'signs' of God, tend to immobilize what is essentially mobile in its nature." The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 140.

63. Muhammad Asad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), p. 14.

64. Al-Tumudhi and Abu Daud (Collections of Hadith), Quoted Ibid. p.25.

65. Muhammad Asad, Ibid. p.44.

66. See, e.g., Ibid. p.36.

67. Sayid Abul Ata Maududi, First Principles of the Islamic State, trans. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1960, 4th print, 1974), pp. 44-49.

68. Abu Daud, Quoted in Muhammad Asad, Ibid. p. 81.

69. Sahih Al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, Quoted in Muhammad Asad, p. 76.

70. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (Collection of Hadith), Quoted in Muhammad Asad, Ibid. p. 76.

71. For the meaning of "serving God" see section (1) of this chapter.

72. Sahih Al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, Quoted in Muhammad Asad, Ibid. p. 91.

73. Sahih Al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, Quoted in Muhammad Asad, Ibid. p. 89.

74. Noted, e.g., by Muhammad Qutb, Islam the Misunderstood Religion (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publication Ltd., 1972), p. 85.

75. For the rate of Zakat see, e.g., Al-Ghazzali, The Mystries of Almsgiving, trans. Amin Faris (Beirut, Lebanon: The American University of Beirut, 1966), pp. 5-15.

76. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 510-11, p. 179.

77. Sahih Muslim, Quoted in Muhammad Asad, Ibid. p. 84.

78. Underline added.

79. Dr. Sadiq Al-Mahdi, "The Economic System of Islam," in Longman Group, ed. Islam and Contemporary Society (London and New York: Longman, 1982), p. 108.

80. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 324, p. 111.

81. See items 16 and 21 of section (3) in this chapter.

82. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 1908-9, p. 629.

83. Ibn Marjah (Collection of Hadith), Quoted in Muhammad Asad, Ibid. p. 87.

84. Baihaqi (Collection of Hadith), Quoted in Fazlul Karim, Al-Hadith ... Book I, Ibid. p. 271.

85. See Chapter II, section (3) above.

86. Yusuf Ali translates this verse as the following: "Verily never will God change the condition of a people until they change it themselves (with their own souls)." The Arabic text implies both meanings.

87. Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 4570, p. 1315.

88. Ibid. f. n. 2161, p. 689.

89. Underline added. See also 22:40.

90. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, The Life of Muhammad, trans. Ismail Ragi A. al Faruqi (USA: North American Trust Publications, 1976), pp. 356-358.

91. In Yusuf Ali's translation this verse is numbered 35.

92. Sahih Muslim, Quoted in Muhammad Asad, Ibid. p. 77.

93. See, e.g., 2:21; 3:3; 4:1; 6:130; 7:158; 10:104, 108.

94. Underline added to both verses.

95. Such stories are found in numerous places in the Quran; see, e.g., Chapter 26.

96. For reference see note 49 above.

97. A more detailed and wider interpretation of believers' mission is presented in writer's paper "Man's purpose of life and the function of religion according to Islam," unpublished typescript, Sept. 1983.

98. See, e.g., 2:250-52; 7:127-29; 26:47-52; 29:14, 24; 37:102-107; 40:25-27; 85:4-9.

99. See also 9:111 for the "bargain." For the greater reward in general, see also 2:153, 207; 3:15-17, 157, 195, 200; 4:95; 8:74; 9:20; 11:115; 76:12.

100. For the meaning of worship from an Islamic point of view see Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 1626, p. 547.

101. It is interesting to note that the word "Makka"--the city where Kaabah is located--has entered the English language as "mecca" with a meaning: "The goal of one's aspirations," (Funk and Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary, 1963 ed.). For an interpretation of the verses mentioned in this paragraph see Yusuf Ali, Ibid. f. n. 154, p. 60; f. n. 2807-11, pp. 859-60; f. n. 160, p. 62; and f. n. 221-22, p. 80 respectively.

102. Ibid. f. n. 42, p. 21.

103. Ibid. f. n. 3478, p. 1041.

Notes to Chapter IV

1. Dr. Ali Shariati contrasts this view of the Quran with the Marxist view on social change. He argues that according to classic Marxism--which considers the means and mode of production as the substructure of the society--it is wrong to emphasize the role of "self-development" which is based on ideology or moral values--that is, on the superstructure--in bringing about changes in the society. The Islamic point of view, on the other hand, considers man's consciousness and action as the factor of change and the motor of history. In the mentioned verse of the Quran, two kinds of changes are noted. The factor of the first change is God and that of the second is the people. The first change is deterministic and the second is a matter of choice. But which one is the cause and which one is the effect? Surprisingly, the change brought by the people is considered as the cause and the deterministic change is considered the effect. That is, choice is a cause for changing determinism! What this means is that society has laws of its own (set by God) on the basis of which it undergoes changes. Man cannot do whatever he decides. But those laws come into action only when the people enter the deterministic movement of history as a free factor and as a cause outside the chain of determinism. Thus, the deterministic change that God brings about in a social system depends upon the role of conscious man's free and active will in the process of changing his destiny. (Translated from Jahatgiri Tabaqati Islam (Class Orientation of Islam) Vol. X in the series of Shariati's Collection of Works [Tehran: The Office for Editing the Martyred Teacher Dr. Ali Shariati's Collection of Works, 1359 A.H. (1980 A.D.)] pp. 3-4)

2. Among other sources, Yann Richard provides biographical sketches of Imam Khomeini, Ayatullah Taleqani, Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Ali Shariati, and Abul Hasan Bani Sadr. See Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran, pp. 202-230. For Ayatullah Muntazhari's biographical sketch see Shahid Mortaza Muntazhari, The Human Beings in the Quran, trans. Hossein Dastjerdi, ed. Sommayyeh Hossainmardi (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Islamic Republic of Iran, date n.a.), pp. 7-9.

3. Originally I had planned to determine the significance of different works of each revolutionary leader by conducting survey research among some selected groups in Iran. The circumstances, however, did not allow me to carry out my plan.

4. S.H.R. (Full name n.a.), Barrasi wa Tahlile az Nazate Imam Khomeini (A Survey and Analysis of Imam Khomeini's Movement), (Tehran: Ahrar Publishers, Date n.a.), pp. 57-61.

5. Hamid Algar, "Introduction" in Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 15.

6. See note 5 above. For the following see Ibid. pp. 27-149; 181-188; 212-227; and 233-236.

7. See Chapter III, section 1, p. 4.

8. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 130.

9. Ibid., p. 38.

10. Ibid., p. 219.

11. See Ibid., pp. 47, 54, 118; 76-77; 79, 96, and 111.
12. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 27-28, 142.
13. Ibid., p. 75.
14. Ibid., p. 144.
15. Ibid., 74-75.
16. Ibid., p. 29.
17. I have counted 13 quotations for this duty (Ibid., pp. 48, 50, 66, 71, 92, 109, 113, 115, 118-19, 119, 143, 146, 147) compared to six for number (1) (Ibid., pp. 29, 35, 74-75, 75, 142, 146).
18. Ibid., p. 50.
19. For an explanation of this issue see Mangol Bayat, "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern?" The Middle East Journal, 37:1 (Winter 1983).
20. See Lecture II of the Islamic Government, Islam and Revolution, pp. 40-54. See also Ibid., pp. 37, 61, 62, 76-77, 79, 80, 94, 96, 110, 111, 126, 128, 143, 147.
21. Ibid., p. 54.
22. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
23. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
24. Ibid., p. 62.
25. Ibid., p. 51.
26. In his speeches and declarations, Imam Khomeini turns the attention of the general Muslim public to the same needs and duties as those for ulama discussed above.
27. Islam and Revolution, Ibid., p. 186. In October 1964 the Iranian "Parliament" approved a treaty with the U.S. according to which the Iranian Government conceded the jurisdiction of its courts to prosecute American citizens for the crimes they committed in Iran.
28. Ibid., pp. 236, 260.
29. Ibid., pp. 181-85.
30. Ibid., p. 120.
31. Ibid., pp. 34, 39.
32. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
33. Ibid., pp. 49, 50.
34. Ibid., p. 115.
35. Ibid., p. 225.
36. Ibid., p. 34.
37. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 48, 50, 54, 86, 111, 122, 127.
38. Ibid., pp. 234-35. For the meaning of "taghut" see Ibid., p. 154.
39. Ibid., pp. 34, 54, 58, 86, 120, 257.
40. Ibid., p. 31.
41. See Ibid., pp. 33, 48; 54, 183, 222.
42. Ibid., p. 31.
43. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
44. Ibid., pp. 218, 224.
45. Ibid., pp. 182-83.
46. Ibid., pp. 187-88.
47. Ibid., p. 31.
48. Ibid., pp. 254-55.
49. Ibid., pp. 225-56.
50. Ibid., 256.

51. For justice and equity see Ibid., pp. 28, 48, 50, 66, 77, 80, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 92, 110, 117, 123, 130, 137, 146, 149, 233, 234.

For liberation and freedom see Ibid., pp. 28, 49, 66, 71, 110, 132, 137 (three times), 143, 149 (twice), 213, 258.

For struggle and Jihad see Ibid., pp. 37, 71, 109, 132, 137, 149 (three times), 221, 233 (twice).

For independence see Ibid., pp. 28, 132 (twice), 149, 181, 236.

For unity and brotherhood see Ibid., pp. 47, 49, 54, 130, 149 (twice), 234.

For security see Ibid. pp. 79 (three times), 80, 149.

For social responsibility see Ibid. pp. 29, 109 (twice), 221.

For cooperation see Ibid. pp. 130, 149.

For love and mutual affection see Ibid. pp. 89, 109.

For the rest of the values see respectively Ibid. pp. 37, 89, 125, 236, and 236.

52. For courage and fearlessness see Ibid., pp. 109, 113, 119, 132, 137, 212, 213, 133.

For true happiness and tranquility see Ibid., pp. 36, 44, 109, 113, 119, 132, 149 (twice).

For fortitude and steadfastness see Ibid., pp. 134, 135, 136, 213, 221, 233, 234.

For activeness see Ibid., pp. 109, 113, 119, 210, 219.

For self-confidence see Ibid., pp. 35, 37, 135, 136, 137;

For militancy see Ibid., pp. 28, 35, 137, 219.

For moral virtue see Ibid. pp. 36, 48, 143, 149.

For diligence see Ibid. pp. 135, 136, 137.

For dignity and honor see Ibid. pp. 181, 134, 136.

For piety see Ibid. pp. 48, 146.

For trustworthiness see Ibid. pp. 54, 87.

For self-defence see Ibid. pp. 60, 149.

For hope see Ibid. pp. 135, 136.

For the rest of the values see respectively Ibid. pp. 28, 44, 47, 89, 125, 134, 134, 134.

53. For dedication and self-sacrifice see Ibid., pp. 110, 134, 137, 149, 212, 216, 233 (twice), 236, 254, 258.

For belief in God see Ibid., pp. 48 (twice), 125.

For success and salvation see Ibid. pp. 227, 233, 258.

For asceticism see Ibid., p. 149.

54. Ibid., pp. 55, 56-57. See also Ibid., pp. 30, 33-34, 79.

55. Ibid., p. 56.

56. See Ibid., pp. 76-77, 79, 80, 96, 111, 62, 79, 90.

57. See respectively, Ibid., (1) pp. 59, 60, 61, 62, and many other passages; (2) pp. 59, 60, 78, 89; (3) p. 54; (4) p. 59; (5) p. 59; (6) p. 139; (7) p. 139; and (8) pp. 57, 86.

58. Ibid., pp. 45; 65-66.

59. Ibid., p. 88. See also p. 56.

60. Ibid., pp. 55-56.

61. Ibid., p. 138.

62. Ibid., p. 83.

63. Ibid., pp. 32, 58.

64. Ibid., pp. 33-34.

65. Ibid., p. 60.
66. Ibid., p. 44.
67. See respectively, Ibid., pp. (1) 53; (2) 37, 45, 53, 61, 66, 75, 77, 88, 233; (4) 41, 45; (5) 41, 46, 61, 137; (6) 48; (7) 89, 116; (8) 130; (9) 34, 120; (10) 66, 89.
68. Ibid., p. 79.
69. Ibid., p. 31.
70. Ibid., p. 258.
71. Ibid., p. 149.
72. Ibid., pp. 236, 259.
73. See Chapter III, section above.
74. Islam and Revolution, pp. 214, 221.
75. Ibid., p. 186.
76. Ibid., p. 27.
77. Ibid., p. 28.
78. See Ibid., pp. 31, 49, 58, 182, 218, 256.
79. Ibid., p. 259.
80. Ibid., p. 30.
81. Ibid., pp. 135-36.
82. Ibid., pp. 136, 144-45.
83. Ibid., pp. 114, 116.
84. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 29, 128, 145.
85. See, for example, Ibid., p. 184.
86. Ibid., p. 129.
87. "The Struggle Against the Appetitive Soul, or the Supreme Jihad;" for an introduction to the lecture and an extract of it see Ibid., pp. 349-362.
88. Ibid., pp. 135-36, 137.
89. Ibid., p. 112.
90. Ibid., p. 146.
91. Ibid., pp., 143, 227.
92. Ibid., p. 146.
93. Ibid., pp. 126, 127.
94. See Ibid., pp. 29, 37, 76, 131, 187, 188, 216-17, 235.
95. Ibid., p. 115.
96. Ibid., pp. 128-29, 149.
97. Ibid., pp. 131-32.
98. Ibid., p. 235.
99. Ibid., p. 236.
100. Ibid., p. 118.
101. See Ibid., pp. 212, 216, 233, 234, 235.
102. Ibid., p. 234.
103. Ibid., p. 146.
104. Ibid., p. 130.
105. Ibid., p. 234. See also Ibid., p. 131.
106. Ibid., pp. 132, 133-34.
107. Ibid., pp. 114-15.
108. Ibid., p. 138.
109. Ibid., pp. 38-9, 139. See Ibid., p. 54 for his view on apathy.
110. Ibid., p. 233.
111. Ibid., p. 137. See also pp. 37, 125, 132, 234.

112. Ibid., p. 136.
113. Ibid., p. 137.
114. For a discussion of this subject see section (a) above.
115. Islam and Revolution, pp. 125, 113, 185.
116. Ibid., pp. 211-20.
117. Ibid., p. 187.
118. Ibid., p. 233.
119. Ibid., p. 75. For reference to other Imams and prophets see Ibid., pp. 131, 133, 134, 135, 144, 147, 219-20.
120. Ibid., pp. 137, 144.
121. Ibid., pp. 212, 221.
122. Ibid., p. 254. See also pp. 110, 119.
123. Ibid., p. 134. See also pp. 111, 121, 133.
124. Ibid., p. 254.
125. Ibid., p. 227.
126. See Ibid., pp. 48, 71, 134, 138, 219-20, 226, 227.
127. See sections (f) and (g) above.
128. For reference to Prophet Muhammad see Islam and Revolution, pp. 37, 57, 75, 89; and for reference to Imam Ali see Ibid., pp. 57, 68, 86, 89, 129-30, 135, 225.
129. Ibid., p. 154.
130. See Ibid., pp. 48, 92-93, 98, 147-48.
131. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 41, 42, 43, 51, 59-60, 61, 124, 219-20.
132. Ibid., p. 42.
133. Ibid., p. 226.
134. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 68-73 and 109-124 each of which quotes and expounds only one tradition.
135. Ibid., p. 220.
136. See Ibid., pp. 43, 124 and 219-20.

Notes to Chapter V

1. Hamid Algar, "Introduction" in Society and Economics in Islam by Ayatullah Sayyed Mahmud Taleghani [Taleqani], trans. R. Campbell, ed. Hamid Algar, Contemporary Islamic Thought, Persian Series (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1982), p. 11.
2. Quoted in Ibid. p. 10.
3. The full name of the book is Islam wa Malikiyat dar Muqayesa ba Nezam-hi Gharb (Islam and Ownership in Comparison to Western Systems) (Tehran: Inteshar Co., 4th print, 1344 A.H./1965 A.D.). Chapter six of the book has been translated into English as part of the book referred to in note (1) above, pp. 25-72. There is a complete translation of the book into English as well, but it was not available to me.
4. Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid. pp. 73-108.
5. Tabayun-e Resalat Barai Qeyam ba Qist (Tehran: Ayatullah Taleqani's Cultural Foundation with cooperation of Inteshar Co., 1360 A.H./1981 A.D.).
6. Ibid. p. 45. Throughout this dissertation, unless otherwise specified, the word "man" does not have any sexual connotation. It is a translation of the Persian word "Insan" which equally refers to both man and woman.

7. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. pp. 120, 122-23.
8. Ibid. pp. 222-23.
9. Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid. p. 53.
10. Ibid. p. 79.
11. Ibid. pp. 83-84.
12. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid. p. 84.
13. Ibid. pp. 85, 86, 87, 92.
14. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. pp. 297-98.
15. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid. pp. 83-84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 95.
16. Ayatullah Taleqani participated in at least three international Islamic conferences outside Iran: in Karachi, Pakistan, in 1953; in Cairo, Egypt, in 1959; and in Jerusalem, Jordan, in 1961. See Bahran Afrasiabi and Saeed Dehqan, Taleqani wa Tarikh (Taleqani and History) (Tehran: Neilofar Publishers, 1360/1981), pp. 145-48, 169.
17. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid. pp. 65-69.
18. Ibid. pp. 10-11.
19. Ibid. pp. 55, 73, 74, 75.
20. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. p. 322.
21. Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid. pp. 90-91.
22. See Ibid. pp. 88-90.
23. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid. pp. 38, 41, 54, 67.
24. Ibid. pp. 22, 55.
25. Ibid. pp. 23, 92.
26. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. pp. 203-204.
27. Ibid. pp. 167-68.
28. Ibid. pp. 250-51, 267.
29. Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid. p. 102.
30. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid. pp. 17, 48.
31. Ibid. pp. 19-20.
32. Ibid. p. 48.
33. See for example, Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. pp. 166-67, 197, 258.
34. Ibid. p. 199.
35. For freedom and liberty see Ibid. pp. 122, 199, 204, 218, 229; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid. pp. 11, 12, 19, 29, 30, 43, 45, 46, 77, 84, 85, 88, 89, 92, 93; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 79, 83.
- For equity and justice see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. pp. 137, 140, 141, 206, 207, 216, 217, 258, 259, 261, 302, 304, 307; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 9, 15, 16, 21, 22, 25, 26, 65, 66, 76, 77, 81, 82, 92; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid. pp. 79, 80, 86, 92, 94.
- For Jihad (struggle) see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., p. 224; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 75-99.
- For unity and brotherhood see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 221, 224, 293, 294, 300, 301; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 16, 25, 41, 65, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 90-93.
- For equality see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 294, 295, 297, 299, 301.
- For cooperation see Ibid., pp. 125, 221, 224.
- For charity see Ibid., pp. 120, 121, 224.

For the rest of the values see respectively Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. pp. 141, 241; Ibid. pp. 125, 250; Ibid. pp. 137, 229; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid. pp. 36, 52; Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. p. 121; Ibid. p. 218; Ibid. p. 221; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid. p. 77.

36. For truth and truthfulness see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. pp. 137, 140, 259, 261; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., p. 16; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 79, 99.

For thoughtfulness and pondering see Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 10, 15, 19, 21, 23, 25, 62.

For piety see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 141, 221, 293, 294, 297, 300.

For responsibility see Ibid., pp. 129, 136; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 25, 41, 44, 45.

For self-defence see Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 76, 77, 83, 85.

For consciousness see Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 10, 12, 44, 61.

For foresight see Ibid., pp. 16, 41; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., p. 81.

For wisdom see Ibid., pp. 79, 86; Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., p. 140.

For strength see Ibid., p. 122; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., p. 45.

For perfection see Ibid., p. 45; Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. p. 122.

For kindness see Ibid. pp. 137, 141.

For self-control see Ibid., p. 138; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., p. 75.

For fortitude see Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 16, 54.

For well being and happiness see Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 79, 80.

For action see Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 15, 23.

For dignity and honor see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., p. 229; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., p. 78.

For the rest of the values see respectively, Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., p. 125; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 41, 45, 93; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., p. 81.

37. For faith see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 122, 136, 141, 221; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 9, 12, 16, 45, 76.

For self-sacrifice (martydom) see Ibid., pp. 16, 26, 75; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 99-104.

For evolution (towards perfection) see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 129, 221; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid. pp. 13, 25, 46, 64, 92.

38. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

39. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 129-30.

40. Ibid., pp. 140-41.

41. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 40, 50-51.

42. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid. p. 274. See also Ibid., pp. 204-207.

43. Ibid., p. 218.

44. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., p. 69.

45. Ibid., pp. 22, 46. See also Ibid., pp. 40, 69, and 81.

46. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., p. 125.

47. Ibid., p. 294.

48. Ibid., pp. 126-27, 292-308.
49. See Ibid., pp. 122, 125, 143, 146-47.
50. Ibid., pp. 149-51, 334-36, 255-57.
51. Ibid., pp. 251-55. Translation from Economic and Society in Islam, Ibid., p. 46.
52. Ibid., p. 30. I believe this is an extremely important point which rules out the establishment of two basic institutions through which today's capitalist system operates: (1) the usurious banking system, and (2) the stock market. For the other points made in the paragraph see Ibid., p. 28.
53. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
54. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 185-89.
55. Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., p. 43.
65. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 204-207, 230.
57. Ibid., pp. 207-219, 238-39.
58. For reference see notes (167) and (168) above.
59. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., p. 35. See also Ibid., pp. 13-14, 21, 25, 45, 76, 81.
60. Ibid., p. 52. For reference to other points noted in the paragraph see Ibid., pp. 34, 35, 40.
61. See Ibid., pp. 18-19. See also Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 136-37, 138-39.
62. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 10, 12, 18, 25, 27, 31, 80.
63. Society and Economics in Islam, p. 92. See also Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., p. 72. For reference to people's uprisal, see Ibid., pp. 13, 23.
64. Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., p. 95. For the first condition see Ibid., p. 94.
65. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 72-76.
66. See Ibid., pp. 38, 67-68, 75, 78, 93.
67. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., p. 117.
68. See section (1) above.
69. Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., p. 14.
70. Ibid., p. 24.
71. Ibid., p. 80. See also Ibid., p. 36.
72. Ibid., pp. 54-55, 39.
73. Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 89, 101; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., p. 26.
74. Society and Economics in Islam, p. 102. See also Ibid., pp. 101, 103-104; and Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 41, 60, 78, 89-90, 93, and 95.
75. See, for example, Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 126, 221, 274, 295-99, 301, 303-306. See also Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 97-98.
76. Ibid., pp. 96-98, 101-104; Tabayun-e Resalat, Ibid., pp. 39, 49-50.
77. Ibid., p. 94.
78. Ibid., p. 74; Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., p. 224.
79. The references to the Holy Quran are so numerous that it does not require any documentation. For reference to traditions of the Prophet and Imams see Ibid., pp. 148, 153-57, 187-89, 205-207, 215-18, 272-72; Society and Economics in Islam, Ibid., pp. 84,

92-94, 96. For reference to history see Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 126-27, 161-62, 65-66, 187, 221, 262, 274, 285-313. For reference to philosophers and scholars see Ibid., pp. 133-34, 214.

80. Ibid., pp. 149-51, 225-27, 233-36, 256-57, 266-67, 310-18. For his argument about the shortcomings of man-made laws and about Islamic legislature see Ibid., pp. 117-142.

81. See, for example, Abdullah Yusuf Ali's commentary of the Quran, The Holy Quran, f.n. 541, p. 188. It should be noted that Yusuf Ali also understands the verse to imply that individuals and the community hold the property as a trust.

82. Islam wa Malikiyat, Ibid., pp. 200-203.

83. Ibid., pp. 128, 149, 226, 235, 256-57, 267.

84. Ibid., pp. 128, 235.

85. Ibid., pp. 308-323.

Notes to Chapter VI

1. Dr. Abdul Karim Soroush, ed. Yadnama-e Ustad-e Shahid Murtaza Mutahhari, Vol. I (Tehran: Publication and Educational Organization of the Islamic Revolution, 1360 A.H./1981 A.D.), pp. 535-552.

2. The Martyr, trans. n.a. (Houston, Texas: Free Islamic Literature, 1981).

3. Both number (2) and (3) have been published as part of a seven volume series under the title Muqadamah-e bar Jahanbini Islami (An Introduction to the World View of Islam), (Qum, Iran: Sadra Publishers, date n.a.). Insan dar Quran forms the fourth volume of the book (pp. 245-306); and Jama'a wa Tarikh forms the fifth volume of the book (pp. 307-482). Insan dar Quran has been translated into English under the title Human Beings in the Quran, Ibid.

4. Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 363, 376.

5. Human Beings in the Quran, Ibid., p. 88.

6. Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., p. 262.

7. Ibid., pp. 263-65.

8. Ibid., p. 253.

9. For quotations in the paragraph see respectively Ibid., pp. 331, 460-63, and 448.

10. Ibid., p. 284.

11. We may recall that bringing about a sense of community is a component of political consciousness as defined in this study (see Chapter III, section (1)). As for the other component of political consciousness, which is "to provide a framework for popularization of the higher needs and values and for the creation of a sense of community," nothing could be found in the works analyzed. Mutahhari might have discussed it elsewhere, or he may have disregarded it because he did not see any need for it.

12. See Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 288-92, 299-302.

13. Ibid., pp. 292-93.

14. Ibid., p. 296.

15. Ibid., pp. 319-25. For the first quotation in the paragraph see Ibid., p. 340.

16. Ibid., pp. 314, 317.

17. The Martyr, Ibid., pp. 3, 15-16.

18. Haftanama-e Ummat (A weekly paper published in Persian in Tehran by the "Militant Muslims' Movement"), No. 57, May 21, 1980; quoted in Sayed Hussain Shafiei Darabi, Yadnamah-e Ustad Mutahhari (In Commemoration of Professor Mutahhari) (Qum, Iran: Mehr Printing House, 1360/1981), p. 318-19.

19. See Ibid., pp. 164, 193, and 219.

20. Ibid., p. 211.

21. Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 276-77.

22. For faith see Ibid., pp. 253, 254, 270, 272, 370, 374, 441, 443, 462; and The Martyr, Ibid., pp. 8, 9, 12.

For self-sacrifice see Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., p. 441; The Martyr, Ibid., pp. 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 15, 16, 21, 24.

For evolution towards perfection see Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 252, 282, 284, 338, 342, 344, 365, 443, 439.

For devotion and Worship see Ibid., pp. 251, 258, 259, 260, 270, 272, 441.

For love see Ibid., pp. 293, 441, 448.

For the rest of the values see Jahanbini Islami, Ibid. pp. 248, 252; Ibid. pp. 249, 252; Ibid. pp. 441, 448; Ibid. p. 257.

23. For knowledge see The Martyr, Ibid., p. 4; and Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 248, 253, 256, 267, 275, 293, 370, 374, 439.

For responsibility see Ibid., pp. 249, 252, 263, 331, 448, 449, 460, 461, 463.

For consciousness and awareness see Ibid., pp. 275, 284, 285, 286, 287, 443.

For reflection and intellect see Ibid., pp. 255, 262, 272, 274, 435.

For freedom of choice and willpower see Ibid., pp. 262, 269, 272, 277, 363.

For strength see Ibid., pp. 252, 276; and The Martyr, Ibid., pp. 10, 11.

For dignity and honor see Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 252, 263, 374, 462.

For truth see Ibid., pp. 303, 443, 455; and The Martyr, Ibid., p. 26.

For moral virtue see Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 250, 256, 439.

For piety see Ibid., p. 253; and The Martyr, Ibid., pp. 9, 10.

For the rest of the values see Ibid. p. 16, Jahanbini Islami, Ibid. p. 441; Jahanbini Islami, Ibid. pp. 284, 293; Ibid. p. 293; Ibid. p. 441; The Martyr, Ibid. p. 8; Ibid. p. 16.

24. For good deeds see Jahanbini Islami, Ibid. pp. 253, 343, 441, 442, 448; The Martyr, Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 26.

For freedom: Ibid., p. 8; and Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 249, 252, 262, 277, 293, 363.

For justice: Ibid., pp. 293, 303, 441, 442, 443, 448; and The Martyr, Ibid., p. 8.

For Jihad: Ibid., pp. 8, 9, 10; and Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 253, 448, 460, 463.

For the rest of the values see respectively see Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 249, 252; Ibid. p. 293; Ibid. p. 441; Ibid. p. 448; The Martyr, Ibid. p. 4.

25. For the points noted below see Majmoa-e Yadash-t-ha, Sokhanrani-ha wa Musahiba-hi Ustad-e Shahid Murtaza Mutahhari Piramun-e Inqilab-e Islami (A Collection of Martyred Teacher Murtaza Mutahhari's notes, speeches, and interviews regarding the Islamic Revolution) (Tehran: Sepehr Printing House, date n.s.): (a) pp. 80-81; (b) pp. 91-92; (c) pp. 85-86; (d) p. 59; (e) pp. 60-62; (f) pp. 62-62, 103-104; and (g) p. 65.

26. See Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 433-39, 449, 467-68.

27. Ibid., pp. 457, 461-62.

28. Ibid., p. 462.

29. Ibid., pp. 263-65.

30. Ibid., pp. 436, 460.

31. Ibid., p. 460.

32. Ibid., p. 277.

33. Ibid., pp. 319-21, 340.

34. Ibid., p. 327.

35. Ibid., pp. 469-70.

36. Ibid., pp. 479-80.

37. See Ibid., pp. 342 and 44-42.

38. Ibid., pp. 270-72. For the earlier quotation see Ibid. p. 330.

39. See The Martyr, Ibid., pp. 3-4, 5-6, 9-10, 16-17.

40. See Ibid., pp. 5, 15-16.

41. Ibid., p. 10.

42. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

43. See Ibid., pp. 11-14, 22-23.

44. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 4, 8, 10, 11, 14-17, 21, and 26.

45. Ibid., pp. 5, 8, 9, 14. For stories, see, for example, Ibid., pp. 7-8, 11-14, 15, 22-23, 28.

46. See section (1) and (6) above.

47. See Jahanbini Islami, Ibid., pp. 342-44, 260, 365, 259, 354, and 286.

48. Ibid. pp. 366-421.

49. For the points noted below see Ibid. pp. 407-21. The translation is by Mahliqa Qara'i, "Sociology of the Quran, Part II: A critique of Historical Materialism," Al-Tawhid (A quarterly journal published in English in Tehran), Vo. I, No. 4 (July 1984): 77-135.

50. Ibid., p. 121.

51. Ibid., pp. 122-28.

52. Ibid., pp. 128-29.

53. Ibid., pp. 129-30.

54. Ibid., pp. 130-31.

55. Ibid., p. 132.

56. Ibid.

Notes to Chapter VII

1. Hamid Algar, The Roots of the Islamic Revolution (Ontario, Canada: The Open Press, 1983), p. 72.
2. Ibid. p. 72.
3. Ibid. pp. 72-73.
4. Musalma-e Ijtemaie wa Jahani (Social and Universal Muslim) edited by Abdul Ali Bazargan (Houston: Book Distribution Center, 1356 A.H.. [1977 A.D.]).
5. Chahar Maqala (Four Essays) (Tehran: Intishar Company, Date n.a.), pp. 99-154.
6. Del wa Damagh (The Heart and the Mind) (Tehran: Intishar Company, 1344 A.H. [1965 A.D.]), pp. 37-50.
7. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 155-212.
8. Marz Meyan-e Deen wa Seyasat (The Borderline between Religion and Politics) (Publisher and Date n.a.).
9. Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 27-33.
10. Ibid. p. 48.
11. Ibid. p. 63.
12. Ibid. p. 67 and Deen wa Seyasat, Ibid. pp. 38-39.
13. Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 52-53, 66.
14. Deen wa Seyasat, Ibid. pp. 4, 12-14, 41.
15. Ibid. pp. 5-9.
16. Ibid. pp. 45-53.
17. Ibid. pp. 22-24, 31-34, 53 [See p. 33 for the quoted Hadith]; Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 35-70; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 36, 76; and Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 205-6.
18. Ibid. pp. 125, 130, 139, 142.
19. Ibid. pp. 132, 134.
20. Chahar Maqala, Ibid.
21. For the quotes see respectively Ibid. pp. 110, 112-13, 115.
22. Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 38-40. I think Bazargan's remarks here, especially his assertion that "adopting an ideology and a regime is not within the bounds of one nation's choice," provides a clue for his dismissal as the provisional Prime Minister of the revolutionary government.
23. Ibid. p. 42.
24. Ibid. p. 12.
25. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 185-86.
26. Ibid. pp. 198-208.
27. Ibid. p. 109.
28. Deen wa Seyasat, Ibid. p. 46.
29. Ibid. p. 8.
30. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. p. 212.
31. Ibid. p. 114. It should be noted that after these remarks Bazargan criticizes the American society for its treatment of individual as "a dollar-producing machine."
32. For charity see Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 6, 59; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 125, 132, 164, 181, 183, 189, 205, 208, 211, 212; and Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 43.

For work/action see Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 30, 45, 61, 63; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 132, 154, 158, 183, 205, 211; and Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 40, 49 (twice).

For love/kindness see Ibid. pp. 43, 49; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 125, 132, 139, 142 (twice) 164, 189, 211, 212.

For justice see Ibid. pp. 108, 109, 125, 137, 139, 142; Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 42, 49; and Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 46.

For knowledge/education see Ibid. p. 46 (twice); Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 48, 49; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 125, 126, 137, 139.

For freedom see Ibid. pp. 108, 109, 110; Del wa Damagh, Ibid.; and Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 65, 66.

For struggle see Ibid. p. 6; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 154, 202, 206, 208.

For evolution/progress see Ibid. pp. 110, 137; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 10, 37, 46.

For social responsibility see Ibid. pp. 6, 61, 63, 64.

For cooperation see Ibid. pp. 211, 212; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 66.

For humanism see Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 109, 112, 139.

For equality see Ibid. pp. 108, 109, 142.

For consultation see Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 3; Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 45.

For discipline see Ibid. p. 45; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 31.

33. For prosperity see Ibid. pp. 6, 58; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 125, 149, 154, 209.

For strength see Ibid. pp. 125, 153, 209; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 58

For forebearance see Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 45, 49; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 208, 212.

For dynamism see Ibid. pp. 158, 187, 202.

For hope see Ibid. pp. 158, 211; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 64.

For courage see Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 42; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 139, 142.

For dignity see Ibid. pp. 149, 153, 209.

For honesty see Ibid. p. 205; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 45.

For thoughtfulness see Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 153, 208.

For health see Ibid. p. 149; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 58.

For firmness see Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 45; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. p. 212.

For foresight see Ibid. pp. 125, 149.

For perfection see Ibid. pp. 125, 149.

For the remaining values see respectively Ibid. pp. 122, 139, 142, 191; Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 48; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 45; Deen wa Seyasat, Ibid. p. 20.

34. For God-consciousness see Ibid. pp. 46, 48; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 6, 7, 31, 57, 61, 63, 68, 69; Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 48; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 127, 139, 142, 208, 210.

For piety/asceticism see Ibid. pp. 137, 183, 187, 205; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 59; Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 40, 49 (twice).

For martyrdom see Ibid. p. 48, Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 139, 188, 202, 206 (twice), 208.

For salvation see Ibid. pp. 154, 211; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 6, 57.

For faith see Ibid. pp. 61, 63; Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 49; Chahar Maqala, Ibid. p. 205.

For sacrifice see Ibid. p. 192.

35. Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 47, 51.

36. Ibid. p. 48.

37. Ibid. pp. 48-49.

38. Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 44.

39. Ibid. p. 44.

40. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 108-109.

41. Musalaman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 32, 34-35.

42. Ibid. p. 66.

43. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. p. 212.

44. Ibid. pp. 120-130 (the quot is on p. 130).

45. Ibid. p. 138.

46. Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 64.

47. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. p. 200.

48. Ibid. pp. 210-11.

49. Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 40-41.

50. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 186-96.

51. Ibid. pp. 188-89. A flaw in Bazargan's argument is easily discernible. A slave might believe he belongs to someone else (his master). Would this give him perpetual life?

52. Ibid. pp. 205-206.

53. Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 40-50.

54. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 205-206.

55. See, e.g., Ibid. pp. 122, 124, 127, 131, 162-64, 182-191, 204-208; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 21-34, 57-63.

56. Deen wa Seyasat, Ibid. pp. 35-39, 46-48.

57. For reference see sections (7) and (8) above, as well as Ibid. pp. 32-35; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. pp. 34, 36.

58. Deen wa Seyasat, Ibid. pp. 22-24, 32-35.

59. Del wa Damagh, Ibid. p. 46.

60. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. p. 125.

61. Ibid. p. 209. Underline added.

62. Del wa Damagh, Ibid. pp. 31-32.

63. See Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 105-109, 115-17, 118-19, 123-24, 134-37.

64. See respectively, Deen wa Seyasat, Ibid. pp. 28-30; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 47; and Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 158-59 and 206-207.

65. See section (6) above.

66. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 164-69.

67. Academic American Encyclopedia (Princeton, N.J.: Arete Publishing Company Inc., 1981) Vol. 4, p. 209. This quotation seems to properly summarize Bazargan's rather lengthy discussion.

68. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. p. 169.

69. Musalman-e Ijtemaie, Ibid. p. 58.

70. Deen wa Seyasat, Ibid. pp. 24-25.

71. For his argument see Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 139-42. For a brief summary of the argument see section (1c) above.

72. Chahar Maqala, Ibid. pp. 147-49.

Notes to Chapter VIII

1. The Root of the Islamic Revolution, Ibid., p. 71.
2. See, e.g., Ibid. p. 71.
3. Ali Jahanzada, ed. Doctor Shariati (in Persian) (Iran: Hamgam Publishers, 1358 A.H. [1979 A.D.]) pp. 216-221. One can easily add at least ten more works to the list.
4. A religio-academic institution in Tehran which provided a forum for Shariati and other Iranian scholars to present their teachings to the Iranian youth.
5. "Shia yak Hezb-e Tamaam" (Shiism a Complete Party), in Shia (in Persian), Collection of Works, Vol. 7 (Tehran: Husainia-e Irshad, date n.a.), pp. 7-107. It should be noted that the lecture was delivered in two nights. This study includes only the first part of the lecture.
6. Madhhab Alaih-e Madhhab (Religion against Religion) (in Persian) (Published by the Muslim Students Association in America and Canada, date and place n.a.) Date and place of the conference are not mentioned either.
7. Excerpted in Kayhan-e Hawai-e (Kayhan Airmail) Nov. 6, 1985, p. 10.
8. Reprinted in Race and Class XXI, 1 (1979): 33-40 (translator not mentioned).
9. Man and Islam trans. Dr. Fatollah Marjani (Houston, Texas: Free Islamic Lit., Inc. 1981), pp. 46-62. The date and place of the lecture are not noted in the book.
10. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
11. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
12. Ibid., pp. 48-50.
13. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
14. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
15. Ibid., pp. 55-58.
16. Ibid., p. 58.
17. Ibid., pp. 58-60.
18. Ibid., p. 62.
19. Shia, Ibid., p. 42.
20. Ibid., pp. 42-49.
21. Ibid., p. 49.
22. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
23. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
24. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
25. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
26. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 10, 26-27.
27. Ibid., pp. 16-22.
28. Ibid., pp. 23-25.
29. Ibid., p. 45.
30. Ibid., pp. 9-11.
31. Ibid., p. 14.

32. Ibid., p. 23.
33. Shia, Ibid., pp. 16, 26.
34. Ibid., pp. 98-99.
35. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 44, 47.
36. Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
37. Shia, Ibid., pp. 33-34. Abudhar was a great companion of the Prophet.
38. Ibid., pp. 105-6.
39. Ibid., p. 74.
40. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
41. Ibid., pp. 78-82.
42. Ibid., p. 87.
43. Ibid., pp. 23-30.
44. Ibid., p. 28.
45. Ibid., p. 66.
46. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 50-51.
47. All the discussions and quotations in this section are from Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
48. Ibid., p. 10.
49. Race and Class, Ibid., p. 34.
50. Ibid., p. 39.
51. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
52. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 36-38.
53. See Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 36, 37, 39.
54. Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
55. Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 48. Underline added.
56. Khudsazi Inqilabi (Revolutionary Self-construction), Collection of Works, Vol. 2 (Tehran: Husainia-e Irshad, 1356 A.H. [1977 A.D.]), p. 153.
57. Race and Class, Ibid., p. 40.
58. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 12-13.
59. Padar, Madar, Ma Mutahamaim (Father, Mother, We are to be Blamed) (Tehran: Husainia-e Irshad, 1350 A.H. [1971 A.D.]) Reprinted by the Muslim Students Association in U.S. and Canada, 1976.
60. A reference to Islam's basic proclamation of faith: "(There is) no god but God."
61. See Tashyu-e Alawi wa Tashayu-e Safawi (Alawid Shiism and Safavid Shiism) Collection of Works, Vol. 9, (Tehran: Tashayu Publishers, 1359 A.H. (1980 A.D.)).
62. Ibid., p. 15.
63. Ibid., p. 9.
64. For social responsibility see Shia, Ibid., pp. 21, 23, 27, 28, 30, 39, 42, 49 (twice), 54, 56, 57, 64, 66, 68, 74, 76, 78, 81, 82, 87, 88, 89, 93, 95, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 14, 25, 33, 44, 47; Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 40, 60, 62; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10 (four times).
- For Jihad/struggle see Ibid., p. 10; Shia, Ibid., pp. 21 (twice), 27, 29, 30 (twice), 32, 33, 56 (twice), 57, 87, 95, 99; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 39; Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 48.
- For justice/equity see Ibid., pp. 49, 55, 57 (twice), 60, 83, 95, 99 (twice), 102, 106; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 23, 25, 45, 48; Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 38, 39, 40.

For freedom see Shia, Ibid., pp. 9, 10 (twice), 11, 23, 60, 64, 83, 88; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 43, 45, 48; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.

For liberation see Ibid., pp. 38, 40; Shia, Ibid., pp. 55, 69, 78, 87, 99 (twice), 104, 105.

For action/experience see Shia, Ibid., pp. 19, 22 (twice), 29, 30 (twice), 78, 87; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 39.

For equality see Ibid., pp. 9, 45; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 36, 43, 45.

For unity see Ibid., p. 10; Shia, Ibid., pp. 42, 57, 83; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 40.

For civilization see Shia, Ibid., p. 83; Madhhab, Ibid., p. 48.

For charity see Shia, Ibid., pp. 95, 106.

For consultation see Ibid., p. 97.

65. For ascension towards perfection see Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 40, 42, 46, 47, 54, 55, 60, 69, 86, 93; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 23, 43, 48; Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 48 (twice), 52.

For dynamism see Ibid., p. 48; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10; Shia, Ibid., pp. 21, 23, 32, 33, 40, 42, 57, 69, 87, 99, 102.

For consciousness see Ibid., pp. 30, 57, 69, 93, 99, 104; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 8, 9; Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 49, 50, 51, 52.

For rebelliousness see Ibid., pp. 49, 50 (three times), 52; Shia, Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 29.

For perseverance/firmness see Ibid., pp. 18, 22, 23, 29, 32, 33; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 39.

For freedom of choice see Shia, Ibid., p. 27; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 49, 51, 52; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10 (twice).

For commitment see Shia, Ibid., pp. 40, 55, 99, 102, 105.

For creativity see Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 8, 9; Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 49, 51, 52.

For wisdom see Shia, Ibid., p. 49, Race and Class, Ibid., p. 39 (twice); Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 49.

For sincerity see Shia, Ibid., pp. 21, 87, 88; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 39.

For contemplation see Shia, Ibid., pp. 29, 30, 83.

For hope see Ibid., pp. 23, 32.

For morality see Ibid., pp. 10, 17.

For idealism see Ibid., p. 99; Madhhab, Ibid., p. 45.

For prosperity see Ibid., p. 87, Race and Class, Ibid., p. 38.

For the remaining values see respectively Shia, Ibid., pp. 23, 38, 83; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 8, 14, 23; Man and Islam, Ibid., 51 and 51.

66. For martyrdom see Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.

For self-sacrifice see Shia, Ibid., pp. 10, 13, 14, 17, 21, 29, 73, 81, 82, 88 (twice), 106; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 40; Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 60, 61.

For faith see Ibid., p. 61; Shia, Ibid., pp. 17, 21, 22 (twice), 30, 57, 81, 82, 87, 88, 89, 100; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 39.

For love see Ibid., p. 39 (twice); Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 60, 61; Shia, Ibid., pp. 32, 97, 107; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 23, 45.

For worship/piety see Ibid., p. 23; Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 50; Shia, Ibid., pp. 27, 30, 96, 97.

For salvation see Ibid., pp. 57, 86, 93, 97; Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 50.

For thankfulness see Shia, Ibid., pp. 23, 32.

For trust in God see Ibid., p. 33.

67. Ibid., pp. 20, 55-57.

68. Madhhab, Ibid., p. 25.

69. Shia, Ibid., pp. 42, 56.

70. Madhhab, Ibid., p. 34.

71. Shia, Ibid., p. 46.

72. Ummat wa Imamah (The brotherly community and leadership) (Tehran: Qalam Publishers, 1358 A.H. [1980]) pp. 182-83.

73. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 31-32.

74. Shia, Ibid., p. 76.

75. Madhhab, Ibid., p. 19.

76. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

77. Ibid., p. 15. See also Ibid., pp. 24, 32, 46, 47.

78. Ibid., p. 44.

79. Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 110.

80. Shia, Ibid., pp. 16-17.

81. Ibid., p. 103.

82. Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 110.

83. Race and Class, Ibid., p. 37.

84. Shia, Ibid., p. 17.

85. He writes, for example, "It is 'Imamah' or leadership which is the factor [that provides] life and movement [to the society]. His existence and continuity makes the existence and continuity of the Ummat possible. He becomes the motor for the movement of the ideologic society and the factor which provides it with direction." Shia, Ibid., p. 47.

86. On the Sociology of Islam, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1977), pp. 48, 50.

87. Ibid. p. 49.

88. Ibid. p. 49.

89. Khudsazi Inqilabi, Ibid., pp. 158-59.

90. Madhhab, Ibid., p. 34. see also Ibid., pp. 44-45.

91. Shia, Ibid., p. 29.

92. Khudsazi Inqilabi, Ibid., p. 151. The word "Ikhlas" is underlined in the Persian text.

93. Ibid., p. 157-58.

94. Ibid., pp. 159-60.

95. Ibid., p. 173.

96. Ibid., pp. 176-77.

97. "The Mission of the Free-Thinkers," in Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 102-119. Quot from p. 103.

98. Shia, Ibid., p. 93.

99. Ibid., pp. 95-97.

100. Ibid., pp. 64, 105.

101. See Ibid., pp. 124-48.

102. Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 106.

103. Fatima is Fatima trans. Laleh Bakhtiar (Tehran: Shariati Foundation, 1980), p. 65.

104. For a discussion of this subject see Soroosh Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1983), pp. 121-25.

105. Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 109.
106. Shia, Ibid., pp. 63-64.
107. Ibid., pp. 57-60.
108. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
109. Ibid., pp. 19-21.
110. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
111. Madhhab., Ibid., p. 16.
112. Shia, Ibid., p. 86. Shariati's statement is based on the Quranic verse 13:11.
113. On the Sociology of Islam, Ibid., p. 97.
114. Ibid., p. 98.
115. Ibid., p. 108; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 33-35.
116. Ibid., p. 25.
117. Sociology of Islam, Ibid., p. 10.
118. Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
119. Shia, Ibid., p. 88.
120. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
121. Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
122. Ibid., p. 10. See also Shia, Ibid., pp. 10-14.
123. Ibid., p. 43. For a discussion of the subject see section (1b) above.
124. Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 58-62. For a discussion of the subject see section (1a) above.
125. Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 35-36.
126. Doctor Shariati, Ibid., p. 44. The symbolic significance of Shariati's speech on "Great Civilizations" is also noted in this book.
127. Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
128. Doctor Shariati, Ibid., p. 44.
129. Shia, Ibid., pp. 54-58; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 11-12; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 38.
130. Madhhab, Ibid., p. 34.
131. Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 38-40; Shia, Ibid., pp. 13-14.
132. Ibid., pp. 10, 13, 14, 72-73, 92; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
133. Ibid., p. 10.
134. Shia, Ibid., pp. 11-13, 29, 33, 93-100; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 50-51.
135. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 15.
136. Ibid., p. 15.
137. Ibid., p. 15.
138. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 15, 46.
139. Shia, Ibid., pp. 12-13, 33.
140. Ibid., pp. 67-68. See also Ibid., pp. 8-9, 23-24, 52-53, 65-66, 69-72, 75, 79-80, 84-85; Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 47-48.
141. Shia, Ibid., p. 102.
142. Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
143. Shia, Ibid., p. 106.
144. Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
145. Ibid., p. 10.

146. Ibid., p. 10.
147. For references see Shia, Ibid., pp. 16, 19-21, 30-31, 34, 41, 48, 50, 56, 58, 61, 77, 86-89, 96, 102.
148. Ibid., p. 86.
149. For references to the Quran in other works included in this study see Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 18-31, 45; Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 46-48; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
150. On the Sociology of Islam, Ibid., pp. 63-64.
151. See for example, The Visage of Muhammad trans. A.A. Sachedina (Houston: Free Islamic Literature, Inc., 1979); see also Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 36-37.
152. See for example, Shia, Ibid., pp. 34, 61, 93, 101; Madhhab, Ibid., p. 44; Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 52, Race and Class, Ibid., p. 37.
153. Shia, Ibid., p. 38.
154. Ibid., pp. 9-14, 31, 38-39, 66-67, 69, 72-73, 93, 103; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 31-32, 50-51; Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 36-38; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10.
155. See for example, Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 1-5, 9-13, 16-21, 26-28, 35-38, 41-50; Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 34-40; Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 48.
156. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 42-43.
157. Shia, Ibid., pp. 15-16. For other references to scientific research see Ibid., p. 39; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 1, 4-5, 18, 19, 22, 36-38, 49; Race and Class, Ibid., p. 33.
158. Shia, Ibid., pp. 8-15.
159. Ibid., pp. 83-84. For other references to factual observations see Madhhab, Ibid., p. 49; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10; Man and Islam, Ibid., p. 60.
160. See, for example, Shia, Ibid., pp. 16, 19-21, 30-31, 73, 76, 97-98, 105-6; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 16, 49.
161. See, for example, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique, trans. R. Campbell (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980), pp. 40-41, 49-96; Madhhab, Ibid., p. 49; Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 103-7.
162. See Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 52-55.
163. See Shia, Ibid., pp. 95-98. See also, Ibid., pp. 17-18.
164. See respectively, Man and Islam, Ibid., pp. 49-50, 49-50, 50 (also 52, 53), 51-52, 57, 59, 60, 62; Shia, Ibid., pp. 10, 31 (also 79), 90; Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 43, 49, 50, and 50.
165. Ma Mutahamaim, Ibid., p. 9.
166. Ibid., p. 9.
167. Ibid., p. 9.
168. Shia, Ibid., p. 14. See also Ibid., p. 33; Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10; Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 38-40.
169. Ma Mutahamaim, Ibid., p. 12. See also Shia, Ibid., pp. 18, 32-33, 37-38.
170. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 4-5, 25.
171. His lecture on "Martyrdom" can probably be considered as a masterpiece in this regard, see Kayhan, Ibid., p. 10. See also Race and Class, Ibid., pp. 33-40.
172. Shia, Ibid., pp. 92-97.

173. Ibid., pp. 88, 97-98.
174. Madhhab, Ibid., pp. 48-49.
175. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

Notes to Chapter IX

1. Kaysh-e Shakhseyat (The Cult of Personality) (Place of Publication and the Publisher n.a., 1976) Preface: pp. One to Six; Text: pp. 1-48, 231-314.
2. Bayanya-e Jamhuri Islami (Manifesto of the Islamic Republic) (Tehran: Imam Publishers, 1979). It should be noted that in the preface of the book, Bani-Sadr claims that the book was written in 1971-72. A careful study of the book, however, shows that the second part of it was written--or at least substantially revised--in the light of the revolutionary developments in Iran in 1978-79.)
3. Rabita bayn-e Madyat wa Manawyat (Relationship between Materialism and Idealism) (Place of Publication and the Publisher n.a., 1978).
4. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. (Preface) pp. One and two.
5. Ibid. p. 1.
6. Ibid. p. 2. (Underlined in the original)
7. See Ibid. pp. 7, 51, 87.
8. Ibid. (Preface) p. Three.
9. Ibid. p. 270.
10. Ibid. p. 273.
11. Ibid. pp. 276-77.
12. Ibid. pp. 280-81, 282.
13. Ibid. p. 286.
14. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 53; see also Bani-Sadr, Mawazena-ha (The Balances) (Tehran: Imam Publishers, 1356 A.H. [1977 A.D.]) pp. 1-2.
15. Ibid. pp. 42-43; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 48.
16. Mawazena-ha, Ibid. pp. 3-4, 7, 26.
17. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 6, 9, 11.
18. Ibid. pp. 31, 34, 36.
19. Ibid. pp. 33, 36.
20. Tameem-e Imamat wa Mubareza baa Sansor (Generalization of Imamat and Struggle against Censorship) (Place of Publication and the Publisher n.a., 1978), pp. 96-138. See also Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 22-23, 42.
21. Ibid. pp. 42-43.
22. See, e.g., Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) pp. One to five.
23. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 5.
24. Ibid. pp. 3-5, 21-22, 26-27.
25. Ibid. pp. 1-4.
26. Ibid. pp. 5-12. Quots from pp. 10 and 11.
27. Ibid. pp. 18-29.
28. Ibid. pp. 45-66.
29. Ibid. pp. 67-77.
30. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 15-20.
31. Keysh-e Shakhseyat. Ibid. pp. 1, 6.
32. Ibid. pp. 7-48.

33. Ibid. p. 29.

34. For freedom/liberty see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. (Preface) pp. three, four, six; Ibid. pp. 29, 30, 31, 32, 282, 283, 299, 300, 301; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 26, 41, 43, 50; Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) pp. Zay, Sad, Zuy; Ibid. pp. 90, 91, 94, 96, 98, 106, 113, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 132, 134, 135, 138, 141, 143.

For Tawhid see Ibid. (Preface) pp. Dhat and Zuy; Ibid. pp. 90, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 106, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 129, 130, 133, 138, 144; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 29; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 270, 271, 276, 277, 282, 286, 290, 296.

For justice see Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Tuy; Ibid. pp. 122, 123, 126, 132, 135, 138, 141; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 279 (three times), 280, 281 (three times), 282, 283 (four times), 290, 292.

For independence see Ibid. (Preface) p. Zuy; Ibid. pp. 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 113, 114, 117, 122, 123, 128, 129, 130.

For equality see Ibid. pp. 282, 287; Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Ha; Ibid. pp. 99, 138; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 35, 47, 48, 49.

For Jihad/struggle see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. (Preface) pp. Dhat (twice), Tuy, Zuy; Ibid. pp. 123, 135, 137, 142; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 39, 40, 42, 43.

For leadership see Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Dhat; Ibid. pp. 126, 128, 131, 135, 141; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 276, 290.

For social evolution see Ibid. pp. 272, 273, 274; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 50, Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) pp. Zuy, Dhat' Ibid. pp. 92, 120, 121.

For work/action see Ibid. (Preface) p. Zuy; Ibid. pp. 126, 131, 134, 135, 138, 141; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 283.

For elimination of poverty see Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. pp. 98, 108, 119; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 287; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 55.

For social responsibility see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 276, 283; Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Dhat; Ibid. p. 125.

For cooperation see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 274, 276.

For charity see Ibid. p. 276.

For consultation see Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Ba.

For solidarity and security see Ibid. p. 121

35. For critical outlook see Ibid. pp. 110, 126, 128, 142; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 283, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298.

For creativity see Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. pp. 113, 118, 122, 126 (twice), 130, 136.

For love/friendship see Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 31, 36; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 276, 282, 283, 296.

For ideation see Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Zuy; Ibid. pp. 131, 134, 135, 138, 141.

For growth towards perfection see Ibid. pp. 119, 120 (twice), 131; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 31.

For sincerity see Ibid. pp. 31, 36; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 282; Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. p. 118.

For knowledge see Ibid. p. 131; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 31; Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 29.

For activeness see Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. pp. 118, 122, 128.

For courage see Ibid. p. 143.

For firmness see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 31.

36. For Tawhid see Ibid. (Preface) p. One; Ibid. pp. 29, 30, 283; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 50.

For self-sacrifice see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 290; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 36, 38, 39, 41.

For piety/God-consciousness see Ibid. pp. 31, 37, 38; Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Ha.

For belief in God see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 29, 286.

For seeking God's pleasure see Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 5.

37. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 288.

38. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of Ayatullah's: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1984), p. 94.

39. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 276-77.

40. See Ibid. pp. 279-82; Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Tuy; Mawazena-ha, Ibid. p. 3.

41. "Islamic Economics: Ownership and Tauhid," Excerpted from Bani-Sadr's Iqtisad-e Tawhidi (The Economy of Tawhid) trans. and eds. A. Dabirian and David Albert in David Albert ed. Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution (Philadelphia: Movement for a New Society, 1980), p. 194.

42. Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. pp. 98, 115.

43. Ibid. pp. 194-97.

44. Ibid. p. 119.

45. Ibid. pp. 94, 116, 126.

46. Ibid. p. 94.

47. Ibid. pp. 95-96.

48. Ibid. (Preface) p. Jeem.

49. Ibid. (Preface) p. Bai; Ibid. pp. 94, 113-14.

50. Ibid. pp. 99-112. Quot from p. 106. (Underline in the original) It should be noted that Bani-Sadr presents detailed guidelines for bringing about fundamental changes in the national economy.

51. Ibid. (Preface) p. Alif.

52. Ibid. pp. 93, 115-16, 118.

53. Ibid. pp. 96, 115-16.

54. Ibid. p. 128.

55. Ibid. pp. 97, 137-38.

56. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 25.

57. Ibid. p. 27.

58. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 15-20, 22-26, 42-43. For Bani-Sadr's views on capitalism and censorship see sections (2b) and (1d) above respectively.

59. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 4.

60. Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Zuy.

61. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 20.

62. Ibid. pp. 18-19.
63. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 140.
64. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 23-33, 291-92.
65. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 51-52.
66. Ibid. pp. 22-23.
67. Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. p. 136.
68. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 20.
69. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 26.
70. Ibid. p. 28.
71. Ibid. pp. 29-30.
72. Ibid. p. 42. See also section (1d) above.
73. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 274. See also Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Zuy and Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 29.
74. Ibid. p. 5.
75. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 289.
76. Ibid. p. 288.
77. Ibid. p. 309.
78. Ibid. p. 31.
79. Ibid. (Preface) p. One; Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Ray.
80. Ibid. (Preface) p. Zay.
81. Ibid. p. 123.
82. Ibid. p. 143.
83. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 7, 10-11, 18-19, 25-26.
84. Ibid. pp. 32-33.
85. Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 41-42.
86. Ibid. pp. 38-39.
87. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 3, 8-25.
88. Ibid. p. 10.
89. Ibid. pp. 10, 21.
90. Ibid. pp. 19, 22.
91. See, e.g., Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 38-41.
92. See, e.g., Ibid. pp. 7-8, 11-12, 15-16, 17-18, 19, 20-23.
93. In each of the the other two works covered in this study there is only one reference to the Holy Quran. See Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. p. 136; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 35.
94. For the few occasional references see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 292, 302-303; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 38-40; Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Tuy; Ibid. p. 45.
95. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 295-96, 303. It is interesting to note that Bani-Sadr refers to Imam Khomeini as Mr. Khomeini-without using the title "Ayatullah" as it was popular at that time.
96. See, e.g., Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) pp. Alif to Zuy; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 31-37, 50.
97. Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. (Preface) p. Five; see also Jamhuri Islami, Ibid. (Preface) p. Tuy; Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. p. 49.
98. For his reference to history see Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. p. 31. For his reference to Western thinkers see Ibid. p. 35.
99. For examples of his rational reasoning see section (1b) above. For some of the examples that he uses see Madyat wa Manawyat, Ibid. pp. 14, 15-16, 25, 27-28.

100. See Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 271-89. For a brief review of the changes that he introduces see section (1a) above.

101. See Keysh-e Shakhseyat, Ibid. pp. 285-88.

Notes to Chapter X

1. Mutahhari's and Shariati's works on this subject were not included in the present study.

2. Dr. Ali Asghar Sayed Jawadi's interview with Nouvel Observator French Journal on Nov. 27, 1978. Persian text of the interview in the Library of The Council of Experts, Tehran, Iran.

3. Jalaluddin Farsi's speech on March 1, 1979; reported in Soroush (magazine published in Tehran) No. 1, March 24, 1979.

4. Kayhan (newspaper published in Tehran) Dec. 25, 1357 A.H. (January 15, 1979).

5. See Chapter IV section (1d) above.

6. Mujahid (Organ of People's Mujahideen, published in Tehran) Azar 12, 1358 A.H. (Dec. 3, 1979 A.D.).

7. See Chapter IV section (5c) above for reference.

8. Nahzat-e Imam Khomeini, ibid. pp. 43-50. It should be noted, however, that Imam Khomeini did not teach about revolution explicitly. According to the author of the above book, until Imam Khomeini started his movement in the 1960s, he had kept all his plans and real thoughts secret even from his close associates (p. 96).

9. I hope what I said above does not give the impression that Imam Khomeini was so power-hungry that he planned for reaching power all his life. Far from that. Reading about his life style and studying some of his writings on Gnosticism as well as his political writings, I have come to the conclusion that he is a saint who is deeply concerned with the plight of humanity in general and of Muslims in particular. For a mass media whose hero is Ronald Reagan, it is not surprising to depict Imam Khomeini as a villain. It would have been ironic if it were otherwise.

10. A compiled list of the ten leading values of each of the six leaders include the following values as well: social responsibility, charity/good deeds, knowledge, independence, true happiness/prosperity (each emphasized by two leaders); courage/fearlessness, steadfastness, truth, thought/pondering, piety, strength, consciousness, critical outlook, equality, leadership (each emphasized by one leader).

11. See The Holy Quran: Translation and Commentary, Ibid. p. 1429 (f.n. 5032).

12. As examples from early Islamic history, we can mention Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Ahmad Anbal (founders of two out the four schools of law followed by the Sunnis). They refused to cooperate with the corrupt governments of their times and suffered punishment (see Shariati's letter to his father in Ba Mukhatab-hi Ashna [a collection of his letters and other miscellaneous works] Vol I of Shariati's Collection of Works [Tehran: Husainia-e Irshad, 1356 A.H. (1979 A.D.)]). A recent example is the Muslim Brotherhood and other revolutionary groups in Egypt (see Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "The

Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyed Qutb" in The Middle East Journal, Vol. 37:1 [Winter 1983], pp. 27-29).

13. Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie, eds. Shi'ism and Social Protest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 21.

Notes to Appendix

1. See footnote 96, ch. II above.

2. I realize that the term "model" has been used in several other meanings [see for example, May Brodbeck, "Model, Meaning, and Theories," in Reading in the Philosophy of Social Sciences, ed. May Brodbeck (New York: The MacMillan Co. 1968), pp. 579-600]. But it is also true that many scholars have called the "ideal type" a model [see for example, John Lewis, Max Weber and Value Free Sociology (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), ch. 5; or Thomas Burger, Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation (N. /carolina: Duke University Press, 1976), ch. 4].

3. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York and London: McGraw-Hall Book Co., 1937), pp. 603-604.

4. Weber, "Objectivity," Ibid. p. 90.

5. McKinney, Ibid. p. 6.

6. Weber, "Objectivity," Ibid. p. 90. The translation of the first part is Thomas Burger's, Ibid. p. 125.

7. Ibid. p. 90.

8. Max Weber, "Religions of the World and Their Directions," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 11th rpt., 1966), p. 324.

9. R. Stephen Warner, "The Role of Religious Ideas and the Use of Model in Max Weber's Comparative Studies in Non-Capitalist Societies," Journal of Economic History, 30 (1970): 95.

10. Weber, "Objectivity," Ibid. p. 78.

11. Ibid. p. 84.

12. Ibid. p. 101.

13. Ibid. p. 72.

14. Ibid. p. 101.

15. Ibid. p. 75.

16. Ibid. p. 76.

17. Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," The American Political Science Review, 65 (Sept. 1971):692.

18. McKinney, Ibid. p. 6.

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